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Foreword
In the 2003 annual conference of the European Society of Criminology (ESC) in
Helsinki (27–30 August), quite a large number of papers (21) were presented
that focused on issues related to organised crime, including trafficking in human
beings and corruption. This collection presents all of these papers to the benefit
of those who attended and, in particular, those who did not. During the confer-
ence, many colleagues expressed the feeling that such material should be made
more widely available than was possible at the conference alone.
One particular feature of interest is the high proportion of colleagues from
Eastern European countries in this context—twelve out of twenty-one—which
is a lot considering that the vast majority of presenters came from other regions
than these. This feature is a special bonus, we hope, for many who are unfamiliar
with criminological work in that region. It may be too hasty a conclusion to be-
lieve that organised crime issues must be particularly acute and topical in those
parts of Europe as the volume of contributions might indicate. The outcome
could, however, just as well be a reflection of a peculiar lack of interest and tradi-
tion concerning this topic in Western Europe, amazing as this may seem. My ob-
servation has been, at any rate, that the European criminological tradition(s) have
been oddly disinterested in this matter. This is not to say that a lot of good work
had not been done; our concern is just that there might be more of it. The present
situation is understandable as organised crime is not among the easiest research
topics, in particular if empirical studies are called for. Not so long ago, many Eu-
ropean colleagues were expressing serious doubts as to whether such a thing ex-
ists at all in reality, it being the kind of social construct as it no doubt also is.
One practical problem became quickly clear when the editing of this volume
commenced: the language. Europe speaks and writes mostly languages other
than English. For this reason, a project like this one easily becomes relatively ex-
pensive and labour-intensive. The language barrier being a major cause of dis-
semination difficulties, a volume like the present one attempts to overcome some
of this European dilemma. Although a British standard of English has been as-
pired to, this report serves also of an example of how English language is in use
way beyond the borders of the Commonwealth, and ways of expression are con-
stantly borrowed from other languages.
This collection is hoped to inspire more serious work in this area. On behalf of
HEUNI, I also wish continued success to the ESC in advancing researcher con-
tacts and improved scientific work on issues related to organised crime. For this
purpose, we have also included the contact information to the authors (as pro-
vided to the ESC conference) as an appendix to this volume.
Kauko Aromaa
Director
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Banking, Fraud and Stock Manipulation:
Russian Opportunities and Dilemmas
Alan A. Block
The Pennsylvania State University, United States
Introduction
There are two primary and related issues when it comes to the money that flowed
out of the former Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. How much was more or less
traditional capital flight in which rapacious and sometimes frightened business
people moved their money to safe havens; how much was the result of organized
criminal activities; and how much was clandestinely contributed by politicians
and state officers. It certainly is not possible to effectively calculate the real fig-
ures of capital flight, although there have been, from time to time, educated
guesses, and more importantly, real cases which light a small corner or two of the
sums involved in capital flight. The real bottom line, therefore, is not how much
was moved nor by whom, but how lucky it was for all those involved that so many
Western banks were so anxious to co-operate. And indeed none more so than The
Bank of New York.
The Bank of New York: Berlin and Edwards Plead Guilty
On February 16, 2000, forty-one year old Lucy (Ludmilla) Edwards, a Bank of
New York (BONY) vice-president working in the newly minted Eastern Euro-
pean Division, and her husband, Peter Berlin, forty-five years old with a degree
in physics from the Moscow Physical Technical Institute, pled guilty for partici-
pating in a conspiracy to evade income taxes, establishing a branch of a foreign
bank in the United States without the approval of the Federal Reserve, operating
an illegal money-transmitting business, laundering money and engaging in a
wire fraud service scheme to defraud the Russian government of customs duties
and tax revenues.1 There was much more. Edwards and Berlin admitted to mak-
ing corrupt payments to two Bank of New York employees as well as laundering
these payments through offshore accounts. In addition, the pair stashed their il-
licit earnings in offshore locations, principally the Isle of Man.2 Edwards con-
1
1 See, TRANSCRIPT OF THE ALLOCUTION HEARING PURSUANT TO THE GUILTY PLEA OF LUCY
EDWARDS UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT. SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, 99 Cr. 914 (SWK); PETER BERLIN, LUCY EDWARDS, BENEX INTERNATIONAL CO., BECS
INTERNATIONAL CO., INC. and LOWLAND, INC., Defendants, February 16, 2000 10:00 a.m., Before: HON.
SHIRLEY WOHL KRAM, District Judge.
2 Alan Cowell and Edmund L. Andrews, “The Isle of Man as an Enclave of Intrigue”, New York Times, September 24,
1999. On the internet check www.globalpolicy.org/nations/isleoman.htm
fessed that she assisted Russian customers of the Bank in obtaining visas to enter
the United States for business trips. In order to accomplish this, she prepared
false documents for Russian bankers which were sent to various U.S. embassies.
In her testimony, she significantly added that this was “consistent with the prac-
tice of the Eastern European Division of the Bank of New York”. Her intent, it ap-
pears, was to raise the issue of collusion with some of the highest officers of the
bank.
The judge in the case, the Honorable Shirley Wohl Kram, summarized when
and how the Berlin-Edward’s criminal activities were carried out. They began in
late 1995 when Edwards was approached by Russians who had control of the
Depositarno-Kliringovy Bank (DKB) in Moscow whom she knew from her
work in BONY’s Eastern European Division. They wanted BONY’s zippy wire
transfer software, Micro/Ca$h-Register, in order to move money through a new
BONY account. Edwards and Berlin, therefore, crafted a criminal agreement
with DKB which enabled them to personally receive and keep wire transfer com-
missions. This enabled the Russians to transfer money in and out of the BONY
account with no real-time intervention, oversight, or control by the Bank. Berlin
established the DKB account at BONY early in 1996.3 At approximately the
same time, Edwards was assigned to the London office of the Bank of New York,
and the couple moved to England.
To move the scheme forward, in early 1996 Berlin opened a corporate account
at BONY in the name of Benex International Co., Inc., a New Jersey firm of
which he had been the president since 1993. In the first few years Benex arranged
to ship stereo equipment and some other electronic items to Russia. Unsatisfied,
he decided to hustle money instead.4 Edwards, as one would expect, also had an
unrevealed interest in Benex. In the next phase, Edwards installed Mi-
cro/Ca$h-Register software on a computer located in an office in Forest Hills,
Queens, run by individuals from DKB, and Aleksey Volkov who was the putative
head of an analogous money-laundering firm named Torfinex. Indeed, the mail-
ing address for Benex’s activities, 118-21 Queens Boulevard, Forest Hills,
Queens County, New York, was in the name of Torfinex. Volkov had actually ap-
plied for a Torfinex license “to engage in business as a Transmitter of Money”
which was received on November 17, 1997, by the New York State Banking De-
partment.5 The application was somewhat tardy as Torfinex had been ordered by
the New York State Banking Department to cease and desist from transmitting
money one month earlier.
In the summer of 1996, the DKB high riders had Berlin open a second account
at BONY, called BECS International L.L.C. Berlin became BECS’s president.
This maneuver doubled the Russians’ ability to wire transfer huge amounts of
money to their pals around the world. Then, in the autumn of 1998, the DKB-ers
wanted another BONY account because they had taken control of a Russian bank
2
3 Berlin and Edwards also set up Benex and BECS’ accounts in Barclays Bank PLC in London in 1996. See, Paul
Beckett and Michael Allen, with assistance from Ann Davis, “Two Firms in Money-Laundering Probe Held Accounts
at Barclays Bank of U.K.” The Wall Street Journal, October 8, 1999, p. A4.
4 Timothy L. O’Brien and Lowell Bergman, “The Money Movers: A Special Report; Tracking How Pair Went From
Rags to Riches”, New York Times, October 19, 1999.
5 State of New York Banking Department, Weekly Bulletin, December 5, 1997, Section 1, code number (TM-LFS).
with a Florida sounding name—Commercial Bank Flamingo. Berlin, ever com-
pliant, dubbed the new account Lowland, became its president, and established a
Lowland–Flamingo office in New Jersey.
Berlin was, he said in his testimony, somewhat perplexed that DKB continued
to use Benex, BECS and Lowland after it had obtained its own BONY corre-
spondent account in April 1997.6 Perhaps DKB preferred the anonymity of
Benex and certainly Berlin did not hesitate in aiding the venture. In June 1998,
DKB told both Berlin and Edwards that BECS should be deep-sixed because the
FBI was sniffing around. The FBI’s activity was centered on a BECS’ account
transaction involving an incoming transfer of $300,000, which represented the
payment of ransom money on behalf of a kidnapped Russian businessman,
Edouard Olevinskiy.
Around that same time, DKB wanted Berlin to turn over the Benex corporate
seal, which he did, knowing they would use it to create a trail of false documents.
DKB also established a bank in Nauru which lies 1,200 miles east of New
Guinea, just south of the Equator. Nauru is one of those “new opportunity” Pa-
cific Island nations which includes Vanuatu, the Cook Islands, and Samoa.7 The
Nauru bank was dubbed Sinex and it was used to carry out transfers to the Benex
and BECS accounts. Sinex was founded in the early 1990’s by several Russians.
Its president was Andrey Mizerov, and one of its directors, not surprisingly, was
Aleksey Volkov, Peter Berlin’s compadre.
In an attempt to hide Sinex’s Nauru home, DKB listed Australia as its domi-
cile in the BONY transfer records. In addition, DKB promoted Sinex through the
Commercial Bank of San Francisco, another haven for Russian organized crime
which will be discussed shortly.8 Along with Sinex Bank came Sinex Corp. and
Sinex Securities. Supposedly, Sinex’s correspondent account in the Commercial
Bank of San Francisco only lasted a few months.
One Ukrainian suspected of participation in the Edwards–Berlin scheme is
the organized crime baron, Semion Mogilevich. Thus, it may have been
Mogilevich’s underlings that Lucy Edwards had in mind when she commented
in her confession that she was “aware that personnel from DKB were on occasion
. . . afraid to leave the bank because they said customers with machine guns were
waiting for them”.9
Although the FBI’s watchful presence was known to the conspirators, it did
not stop them from carrying out their plans with only one or two very minor ex-
ceptions. Thus in April 1999, Flamingo went into operation, transferring money
into the Lowland account and then using Micro/Ca$h-Register software in Rus-
sia to wire transfer money out. Little did the conspirators know that the Flamingo
3
6 DKB’s BONY correspondent account numbered 890003119259 and its customer ID 5001830017 were opened on
April 20, 1997.
7 Anthony van Fossen, “Sovereignty, Security and the Development of Offshore Financial Centres in the Pacific Is-
lands”, in Michael Bowe, Lino Briguglio, and James W. Dean, eds., Banking and Finance in Islands and Small States,
(London: Pinter), 1998.
8 Knut Royce, “San Francisco Bank Linked to Laundering Probe at Bank of New York”, The Center for Public Integrity,
November 9, 1999.
9 Jack Hitt, “The Billion-Dollar Shack”, New York Times Magazine, December 10, 2000. Hitt noted: “According to the
deputy chairman of Russia’s central bank, Viktor Melnikov, in 1998 Russian criminals laundered about $70 billion
through . . . Nauru, draining off precious hard currency and crippling the former superpower.”
deal would not last through the summer. It was, in fact, the last “hurrah” before
their roof tumbled down.
Combined, the three conduit companies deposited more than $7 billion at
BONY in a 42-month period and transmitted almost all the funds shortly after re-
ceipt to offshore locations. Benex, BECS and Lowland sent nearly 160,000 wire
transfers an average of more than 170 transfers each business day. Edwards and
Berlin made approximately $1.8 million from their commissions, paid from
BONY accounts, and sent directly to the following offshore companies—
Globestar Corporation, Highborough Services and Sandbrook Ltd.
Other Benex Operations
Outside of their BONY activities, Edwards and Berlin also worked their magic at
a Fleet Financial bank in upstate New York.10 There they opened Benex accounts
through which they transferred more Russian money. Some of the transfers were
in the considerable range of $200 million. Fleet Financial and BankBoston were
in the midst of a merger process at the time, and BankBoston helpfully wired
money to Benex accounts at Fleet.11 I would assume, therefore, that BankBoston
had its own series of Russian accounts only some of which were destined for
Benex.
Another potentially significant line into the Benex-BONY saga, that was left
out of Edwards’ and Berlin’s confessions, was developed by Russian reporter
Oleg Lurie who followed the affairs of Sergei Victorovich Pugachev, the founder
and chairman of the board of the International Industrial Bank, Russia. Pugachev
was also a member of the administration of the Russian Union of Industrialists
and Entrepreneurs, who first worked for Promstroibank and then, in 1992, joined
Meshprombank. Lurie states that these days Pugachev “has actively been culti-
vating his image in two basic directions: Orthodox religiosity and friendly close-
ness to Vladimir Putin”. Pugachev’s most important Meshprombank officer was
vice-president Eleonora Razdorskaya. She was, Lurie notes, the link between
Pugachev and organizers of Russian money that “cascaded into the Bank of New
York”. In addition, Razdorskaya had her own joint venture with Peter Berlin’s
Benex company, and was a co-manager in an unidentified offshore company be-
longing to Berlin. This firm dealt exclusively with laundering money through
4
10 Once a sleepy Rhode Island lender, back in the days before massive consolidation when a bank could stand on its own,
there were two separate banks, Fleet Financial Group and BankBoston. In October 1999, that all changed when the two
banks decided to merge operations and form the FleetBoston Financial Corp. The combined institution boasts assets of
roughly $185 billion and ranks as the nation’s eighth-largest bank holding company. It became the largest bank in New
England and one of the 10 largest banks in the U.S. The company’s aggressive stance emerged during the 1980s, a de-
cade that saw Fleet acquire 46 smaller banks. During the 1990s, however, Fleet went after bigger targets. It purchased
the Bank of New England in 1991, bought Boston-based Shawmut National in 1995, and acquired NatWest in 1996.
As of early 1999, the bank was the ninth-largest in the U.S., with about $100 billion in assets, having acquired Advanta
Corp’s credit card business for $500 million, and about half the credit card accounts of the Crestar Financial Corpora-
tion for $48 million in 1998. Also in a busy 1998, Fleet acquired the nation’s third-largest discount brokerage, Quick &
Reilly, and the U.S. unit of Japan’s fourth-largest bank, Sanwa Business Credit. The bank has also rapidly built its mu-
tual fund business by waiving its sales charge on its Galaxy mutual funds for retirement accounts (thus making them
“no-load” funds). In 1998, the assets in Fleet’s Galaxy accounts shot up more than 100 percent.
11 See, Inner City Press’ Federal Reserve Reporter, September 27–December 31, 1999, Archive # 4.
BONY accounts. An FBI agent, seconded to Russia and involved in the overall
investigation of money-laundering through BONY, said that “Mezhprombank of
Russia and its head Pugachev are probably directly concerned with the money
laundering. We are aware of a whole series of dubious transfers of big amounts of
money and quite possibly we may have some questions we would like Pugachev
to reply to. The questions will not only be related to BONY, but also with connec-
tions to the Russian mafia.”12 And there the issues lingered and soon passed
away.13
Reporters seem to have had a better grasp of the situation, from time to time,
than did the FBI. James Bone and David Lister, for example, raised important
questions about the International Monetary Fund’s loans to Russia in 1998, some
of which appear “to have passed through three commercial banks in the U.S. and
Europe before ending up in an offshore account in the Channel Islands controlled
by a Russian bank”.14 Czech detectives also discovered a “network of question-
able financial transactions between BONY and the Prague affiliates of Komercni
Banka and Invedticni Postovni Banka”, and they were certain these transactions
were a part of the money-laundering operation of IMF funds. Komercni Bank
had a long-running correspondent account with BONY which was originally
sealed on October 31, 1990.15
And finally, there was Peter Berlin’s Benex Worldwide Ltd., which first nes-
tled on St. Barnabas Road, London. Supposedly its business was “Commodity
Contracts Brokers, Dealers”. It was incorporated on May 18, 1998, and reported
no employees, no sales, no profits, and no net worth. On August 24, 1999, just af-
ter the New York Times broke the Bank of New York money laundering story,
Benex Worldwide Limited moved from St Barnabas Road to 62 Montagu Man-
sions, London. A careful reading of Benex Worldwide in the British registry
showed the only category in which it reported an actual figure was “Issued Capi-
tal (Sterling)”. The figure entered was 2 pounds. Benex Worldwide did state it
had share capital but again no entry was made in the registry. Nothing else stands
out in the registry except the category Latest 10 Transactions, which actually re-
corded five. They were the following: June 9, 1998—change among the directors
of the company; February 15, 2000—new incorporation; March 21, 2000—first
dissolution; and July 11, 2000—final dissolution.16 Whoever the new directors
were and whatever was meant by a new incorporation remain a mystery.
Clearly, Edwards and Berlin had come a very long way in a relatively short
time. However, they harbored a kind of “grifter” mentality that slid, from time to
time, from big-time crime to small and shoddy crime. Edwards, for example, had
two encounters with New Jersey law enforcement while employed by BONY, for
5
12 Oleg Lurie, “Putin Likes Skiing: So What Does Pugachev Have To Do With It?” Novaya Gazeta, November 28, 2001.
The article can be found on David Johnson’s Russia List Home, davidjohnson@erols.com, #8 November 26–28, 2001.
13 Pugachev also “figured in a string of scandals” as he attempted to take control of the state diamond company, Alrosa,
which Pavel Borodin now heads. “Russia: Profile-Part 2: Sergei Pugachev: The ‘Orthodox-Chekist’ Banker”, Finan-
cial Times Information, April 24, 2002.
14 James Bone and David Lister, “London, New York, and the Channel Islands Implicated in Money Laundering: New
York bank linked to IMF’s missing millions”, The Times, August 24, 1999.
15 Komercni Banka Prague’s correspondent account in BONY was CAS 8900053488, and its ID number was
9027710015.
16 See Dialog Web Records, file: ///C/mail/attachment/Benex Intl corp data.htm.
what some call shoplifting and others, theft. She pled guilty to both and paid
fines. On the other hand, when Berlin, was arrested for shoplifting he quickly
hired a lawyer and the local A & P, in Fairview, New Jersey, magnanimously
dropped the charges.17
Boris Avramovich Goldstein—Friend of Friends
The Commercial Bank of San Francisco is a small privately-held bank formed in
the mid-1970s. Its primary function was to handle small-business loans. But
when Boris Avramovich Goldstein, from Latvia, and his Bulgarian partner, Peter
Nenkov came on the scene in 1994, the bank underwent somewhat of a renais-
sance. A computer whiz in Latvia, Goldstein had first become rich in the soft-
ware business and then turned to banking. He was a founder of Dalderis Bank in
Latvia which merged into another Latvian bank called Sakaru. The business
manager at Sakaru Bank was Edmund Johanson, who had retired as the last
chairman of the Latvian KGB in 1991, when Latvia achieved independence from
the Soviet Union.18 Sakaru had an intriguing band of shareholders which in-
cluded at least one gangster, various money-launderers and financial criminals at
the center of the infamous Mabatex-Mercata scandal.
The Kremlin and Flight Capital
Mabatex’s President was Behgjet Pacolli from Kosovo, in residence in Lugano,
Switzerland. Viktor Stolpovskikh, a Russian living in the canton of Ticino, Swit-
zerland, was in charge of the Mabetex Company in Moscow from 1992 through
1994.19 Mabatex and its sister company Mercata became the centerpiece of a se-
ries of long investigations into what was called the Palace project. The issues in-
vestigated linked President Boris Yeltsin and members of his staff and family to
quite massive corruption. One very small example: Pacolli transferred $1 million
to a Budapest bank account in late 1995 for Yeltsin’s benefit. A Pacolli associate
stated it was to help Yeltsin’s political campaign, while Pacolli held it was used to
buy advertising which was handled by Trinlo Investment, supposedly with ad-
dresses in both the British Virgin Islands and The Bahamas. No one, as far as I
know, has been able to find them or Trinlo’s officers. Other key players in the
scandal included Pavel Borodin, one of the most powerful persons in the
Kremlin. Borodin worked directly under Yeltsin, heading the Office of Presiden-
tial Affairs and was in charge of all the State’s property—planes, palaces, hospi-
tals and hotels. Andre Silyetsky, Borodin’s son-in-law, was the Kremlin’s prop-
erty manager. The Swiss investigation of this case (there were others, particu-
larly in Russia, which did not work nearly so well) established the following.
6
17 Timothy L. O’Brien and Lowell Bergman, Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 “Text of Swiss Magistrate’s Investigative Request on ‘Mabetex’ Case Sent to RF Prosecutor-General”, Document ID:
CEP20000912000280, Entry Date: 9/12/2000, Version Number: 01, Region: Central Eurasia, West Europe, Sub-Re-
gion: Russia, West Europe, Country: Russia, Switzerland, Topic: Crime, Domestic Political, International Political
Leader.
In 1995, Stolpovskikh together with Siletskiy, bought out the dormant Swiss
joint-stock company Mercata Trading & Engineering SA. Then they cobbled to-
gether a finely tuned series of mostly offshore accounts. The movement of
money began when Stolpovskikh purchased Lightstar Low Voltage Systems
Ltd., registered on the Isle of Man. Lightstar opened a bank account in the Mid-
land Bank branch on the Isle of Man. Next, Mercata and Lightstar concluded a
contract for services agreement on May 29, 1996. The agreement’s preamble
stated the following: “In view of the fact that the Lightstar company, because of
its connections and its work in Russia [which were nonexistent], will allow
Mercata to conclude and finance two contracts with the Business Administration
of the Russian Federation President”,20 etc. The initial contract was for renovat-
ing the Kremlin Palace in Moscow, the second for renovating the Comptroller’s
Office in Moscow. The agreement held that Mercata would receive promissory
notes for $492 million guaranteed by Vneshtorgbank. The first part of the pay-
ment came to $150 million and Lightstar received $21 million to distribute. In
the second tranche, Lightstar distributed more than $41 million.
With whatever commission Lightstar itself received, the rest was passed to at
least ten offshore companies and the United Overseas Bank, Nassau, The Baha-
mas. They were Zofos Enterprises Ltd., and Somos Investment in Cyprus;
Winsford Investment Ltd., and the Amati Trading Corporation in The Bahamas;
the Thornton Foundation, and Skaurus AG., in Liechtenstein; the ABS Trading
Establishment and Bersher Enterprises in the British Virgin Islands; and finally
the Amadeus and Carmina Foundations in Panama. There was of course the stan-
dard “layering” through these offshore accounts. For example, of the
$9,208,691.45 transferred to the Bersher company, $5,172,052 was subse-
quently transferred to Account No 2214 in Bank Hoffman in Guernsey which
was the Thornton Foundation account in Liechtenstein. Overall, more than
$62.52 million was paid out to these money-laundering institutions in
1997–1998.
All the commission fees that Mercata paid to the Lightstar company were
done at the instructions of Stolpovskikh. They were transferred to the Isle of
Man’s Midland Bank into the Lightstar account No. 12018701360. Instructions
on the distribution of the fees in Midland Bank were provided by attorney Greg-
ory Connor, the Lightstar company’s Geneva-based administrator. The putative
owners of the offshore accounts were the following: Stolpovskikh, Viktor
Bondarenko and his wife Ravida Mingaleyeva, Olga Beltsova, Pavel Borodin
and his daughter Yekaterina Siletskaya, Milena Novotorzhina, Vitality
Mashitskiy, and Andrey Nerodenkov. The banks that were used to move the
money into the offshore accounts were the Swiss Bank Corporation, Geneva;
Banco Del Gottardo, Lugano; Bank Adamas, Lugano; UBS, Zürich; and Bank
Kamondo, Geneva.
Much of the media attention on the Mabatex-Mercata dynamos centered on
Yeltsin’s two daughters, Tatyana Dyachenko and and Yelena Okulova, who ap-
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pear to have had their extremely large credit-card bills paid by Mabatex-
Mercata. Tatyana is married to Leonid Dyachenko, “an oil trader who main-
tained Bank of New York accounts in the Cayman Islands containing more than
$2 million”.21 Two of his known companies are East-Coast Petroleum and Belka
Energy New York. Tatyana is also famous for having become Yeltsin’s tough
right-hand strategist.
Not covered nearly as well, however, was the cunning partnership between
Mabatex and a Serbian firm Genex. While the economy of Serbia and
Montenegro was consolidating into the hands of perhaps 30 to 40 families, busi-
ness and politics became indissolubly linked. Genex was the country’s primary
import-export firm. In 1990 its capital was valued at more than $1 billion. Mean-
while, thanks to a network of relations and friendships in Moscow, Slobodan
Milosevic’s brother managed to obtain gas supplies from Gazprom on credit, at a
cost of $300 million a year. It was this relationship that brought Genex into con-
tact with Mabetex. Pacolli recently ended up in the Kremlin-Gate inquiry, “the
scandal of ‘golden contracts’ in Russia, kickbacks totalling millions of dol-
lars”.22 It was the Geneva daily Le Temps that first discovered Genex was a part-
ner in the restoration of the Kremlin.
Goldstein claimed he was only a passive investor in Sakaru and knew none of
his partners. In 1996, Sakaru Bank collapsed largely because the First Russian
Bank in Moscow had failed. Sakaru had a correspondent account there and was
thus unable to meet certain capital requirements. Goldstein was also a fairly im-
portant shareholder in First Russian although he described himself as a passive
investor “unfamiliar with its day-to-day operations”. The bank failed, quite sim-
ply, U.S. Intelligence said, because of embezzlement. For a fellow who sat on
both Sakaru’s and First Russian’s Boards, Goldstein seemed to know very little
about either. I suppose someone somewhere might believe Goldstein’s claim that
he never knew many of his associates were criminals, indeed hardly knew much
about them at all. But aside from everything mentioned so far, both the FBI and
CIA were certain his partner Nenkov was an associate of criminals in Bulgaria.
Goldstein’s endlessly reiterated lack of knowledge about his partners was simply
nonsense.23
Spotty Russian Banks
At the center stage of Berlin and Edwards’ laundering activities would appear to
be DKB and Flamingo, but appearances can be deceiving. The principal owners
of the Moscow Business World Bank, known as MDM, and Sobinbank were the
primary owners of DKB and “helped raise new capital in 1996 for the other con-
duit bank, Commercial Bank Flamingo”.24 Both MDM and Sobinbank had cor-
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respondent accounts with BONY. MDM’s was recorded on the last day of May
1994, and Sobinbank’s in August 1996.25
Neither MDM nor Sobinbank was pleased to be in the middle of this mess and
Gleb A. Kostin, the young deputy chairman of MDM, stated the real problem
was not criminality but the “vast cultural differences between Russia and Amer-
ica, and that American investigators know nothing about the Russian banking
process”.26 To some extent Kostin was correct. For example, MDM did not pay
its workers in a conventional manner nor did it contribute money to the govern-
ment for its workers’ pension benefits. Instead it came up with an ingenious sal-
ary substitution scheme. It worked like this: “a company would take a loan from
the bank and redeposit the cash from the loan in the bank. It then made interest
payments on the loan. MDM paid a higher interest rate on the deposit than the
company paid on the loan, and the difference was paid to the company’s employ-
ees instead of salaries.” The companies, never identified, “received compensa-
tion for providing this service through other moves”.27
MDM and Sobinbank insisted that they did nothing wrong. They argued,
rather unconvincingly, that all their actions were premised by what their uniden-
tified clients wanted them to do. And, they insisted that the web of interconnec-
tions in Russian banking confused U.S. prosecutors about their role.
Sobinbank was what the Russian’s call a “pocket bank”. Its origins came from
state enterprises which turned their financial departments into co-operative
banks which soon became known as “pocket banks”.28 To put it as mildly as pos-
sible, they were tightly attached to individual enterprises. Sobinbank’s 1998 an-
nual report reflects its pocket bank ambience. Eighty percent of its loans that year
went to just five borrowers. Its major investors were a space company, a
Gazprom affiliate, a large oil producer, and the developer of a Moscow under-
ground shopping mall, strongly desired by Moscow’s Mayor, Yury Luzhkov. In
addition, Sobinbank moved approximately 40 percent of its assets outside Rus-
sia. Its foreign exchange transactions were limited to one unnamed but related
company. It seems that what these institutions primarily had in common with
foreign banks, was the use of the word bank. So when Mikhail Kasyanov, Rus-
sia’s first deputy prime minister, said the majority of Russian banking institu-
tions “have never been banks in the real sense”,29 he knew precisely what he was
talking about.
Of course, there were real reasons for Russian “pocket banks” and others to
search for unconventional methods of operation. For example, raising capital
was a very complicated procedure especially from 1996 on when the Russian
Central Bank limited who could invest in a bank and how much could be in-
vested. Therefore, investors searched for a “beard”—a group of companies or
banks, or both, who were willing to purchase all or part of the equity in the bank
for them. After the sale was approved by the central bank, the “beard” would sell
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the stock to companies chosen by the real investors. This is the role that MDM
Bank said it played in raising capital for both DKB and Flamingo Bank.
Gleb Kostin claimed that in 1996, at the direction of yet another unnamed cli-
ent, MDM Bank bought stock in Flamingo Bank and held it from September 3rd
of that year to December 10th. Additionally, MDM owned stock in DKB from
June 13th to December 10th. After that, Kostin said, the stock was sold to other
companies, also at the client’s direction. Kostin would neither name the compa-
nies nor the client.30 Sobinbank’s chairman, Aleksandr Zanadvorov, echoed
MDM’s claim.
To the contrary, however, a Russian banker involved in the Bank of New York
investigation insisted that Sobinbank was the primary participant in raising capi-
tal for DKB and Flamingo Bank, and that both DKB and Flamingo were actually
bought for one or both of the DKB bankers, Ivan Bronov and Kiril Gusev.
Bronov and Gusev were strongly believed to be co-conspirators with Edwards
and Berlin. Bronov also worked at some time in the past with Zanadvorov of
Sobinbank.31 As if this were not complicated enough, it was discovered in the
late 1990s that Sobinbank was a subsidiary of the almost defunct SBS-Agro bank
which, it turned out, had held 20 percent of Flamingo’s shares.32 It was all so
chummy although Sobinbank did have to “renounce” $11.75 million which it
held in its Bank of New York account upon the order of Manhattan federal dis-
trict judge William K. Casey.33
And finally, when all else is confusing, one can turn with solace to the
straight-forward machinations of the International Cassaf Bank situated in Mos-
cow, headed by Latvian Alexey Ushakov who was accused of money-laundering
to the tune of approximately $500 million in 1997–1998. Though Cassaf was in
Moscow, its heart and soul was in the South Pacific. Here was another Nauru epi-
sode, which began in 1994 when Cassaf registered in Nauru, with a slight twist.
Cassaf ran at least part of its scheme utilizing its correspondent accounts with
MDM, Rossiyskiy Kredit, Atlant-Bank, and others. The almost-very-clever
Ushakov, who sat in a Moscow lockup as his trial moved forward, took down
about $600,000 a month before being caught. But given the vagaries of Russian
justice, none of the perpetrators had much to worry about. In March 2000 the
case was turned over to the court. The trial began in the summer of 2001 and
ended in January 2002. Over the course of almost nine months, 260 witnesses
testified. After some jockeying, and a great deal of foolishness, the prosecutor
called for a three-year sentence. The court solemnly announced the sentence and
then “amnestied everybody at once”. Nonetheless, numerous major foreign
banks, including the Bank of New York, served as middlemen in transferring the
money abroad. For instance, in the period from October 1997 through March
1998 around $50 million was transferred from Russia via the Bank of New York.
Cassaf’s income from this operation alone was $1.2 million. In all, according to a
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seemingly serious Russian investigation marred by the zany and/or corrupt
Judge Z. Zadorozhnikova, Cassaf had at least 1,500 clients, and the bank laun-
dered somewhere around $500 million. The defendants, on the other hand, had to
pony up 17,000 rubles, the equivalent of several parking tickets in Manhattan, as
their financial penalty.34
The Life and Times of YBM Magnex
Culled from the work of eleven reporters from the Wall Street Journal, the Phila-
delphia Inquirer, U.S. News and World Report, and the World Economy Weekly
in Budapest, it was determined there were clear ties between Benex and YBM
Magnex International Inc., a Newtown, Pennsylvania, maker of industrial mag-
nets. In fact, Benex has been described as a distributor of YBM Magnex mag-
nets. Semion Mogilevich, one of the most feared organized criminals, was the
founding shareholder of the company, although in 1994, a Russian emigre scien-
tist, Jacob G. Bogatin, was credited with starting the firm. Under his direction,
YBM specialized in manufacturing magnets and bicycles. In less than four years,
YBM rose “from an obscure penny stock to a multinational worth nearly $1 bil-
lion”. From 1994 to March 1998, YBM’s “net sales quadrupled, net income
jumped ninefold, earnings rose by a factor of five, and the future looked just as
promising”. Indeed, YBM boasted of “plans to become the world’s leading pro-
ducer of high-energy permanent magnets”.35 At any given time, some parts of
this YBM yarn might actually have been true, although one must always keep in
mind that the intention of those who created YBM was always base, an expand-
ing criminal enterprise in which bicycles played no part.
YBM’s saga is also another example of the complicated mechanisms which
organized criminals use, though surely un-organized criminals specializing in
fraud follow many of the same patterns. In this case, Canadian stock markets
were central. The responsible YBM officers included Bogatin, Harry W. Antes,
Igor Fisherman, Daniel E. Gatti, Frank Greenwald, Kenneth E. Davies, James J.
Held, R. Owen Mitchell, Michael D. Schmidt, and Lawrence D. Wilder. Two
firms that often specialized in pumping near worthless stocks, Griffiths
McBurney & Partners, and First Marathon Securities Limited were also hip deep
in this case.36
To get the ball rolling YBM Magnex International Inc. was incorporated on
March 16, 1994, in Alberta, Canada. It then used a shell company, Pratecs Tech-
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nologies Inc., as its listed name and in August of that year began trading on the
Alberta Stock Exchange as a Junior Capital venture or “blind pool”.
Generically speaking, a blind pool typically stands for a sham corporation
which has been created to “merge with other closely-held public companies in
order to bypass . . . securities regulation, gain immediate access to the secondary
market and serve as a vehicle for market manipulation”.37 Canadian commenta-
tor Diane Francis described “blind pools” as “venture capital outfits” that raise
money without needing to tell the investors there was a “specific plan” in mind
for use of their money.38
In the old days a penny-stock-criminal firm made its money through an initial
public offering of some phony and/or overvalued security. Over the course of
time, stock swindlers refined the idea and began conning investors to give them
money for investments in unspecified companies. They were asking for what
came to be known as a “blank check”. A “blank check” when combined with a
“blind pool” created the synergy needed to make investors’money evaporate af-
ter the felons made theirs. The secondary market became the arena for making
really big criminal money. It works like this: a public offering is made for the
stock of a sham company, which is merging with another usually unspecified
firm already registered with a securities exchange. Investors are not informed
that the bulk of the shares are owned by the swindler’s firm. This practice is
known as “scalping”.39 The price is then driven up, made all the easier when the
crooked firm is the sole market maker.
“Blank checks” and “blind pools” rely on the most important technical inno-
vation the criminal stock firm has—the telephone, which by the 1980s had
evolved to include 800 numbers, call waiting, call screening, the availability of
specialized phone lists, and hooked into fax machines and computers. The stock
swindlers’basic tool has become better and better. Their methods reveal the kin-
ship between the penny-stock racket and the classic swindler’s “boiler room” op-
eration resulting in high pressure telephone promotion of a phony commodity by
people who usually haven’t the foggiest idea what it is they are promoting.40
Pratecs publicly announced it would “acquire Canadian distribution rights for
YBM Magnex Inc. products and, further, to acquire all the shares of YBM
Magnex”. As stock analyst Adrian Du Plessis noted, both of these represented
non-arms length transactions as the president of Pratecs, Robert Ventresca, and a
director, Jacob Bogatin, were also principals and/or shareholders of the private
entity, YBM Magnex. The rest of this initial scheme included the Canadian dis-
tribution rights for “magnetic materials produced by YBM Magnex” which
would be bought with four million shares of Pratecs costing 20 cents a share. Of
course Pratecs had to wait until it issued its first tranche of shares, which num-
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bered 110,000,000, to the always enthusiastic market vendors in league with the
company.
Early in 1996, the managers of YBM/Pratecs brought on Robert Owen Mitch-
ell, the Vice President of First Marathon Brokerage, Canada’s largest independ-
ently-owned brokerage house, and the former Ontario Premier David Peterson
whose law firm—Cassels Brock and Blackwell—assisted YBM. There were
others who were helpful and past masters at pumping worthless stock. These in-
cluded money managers such as Connor Clark and Lunn, and Kaan Oran who
was formerly with First Marathon and very enthusiastic about YBM.
In the summer of 1995, Pratecs’trading ground to a halt. This was the result of
Britain’s Operation Sword which targeted several British solicitors for aiding
and abetting Mogilevich’s money-laundering and other similar matters. The
Pratecs’ response said the British firms were “in no way related to YBM or its
Channel Island subsidiary, Arigon”. By the first week in October, 1995, how-
ever, Pratecs changed its name to YBM. About four months later, “YBM became
a reporting issuer in Ontario.” That meant YBM shares would soon be listed on
the Toronto Stock Exchange. YBM hit the big time on March 7, 1996.
YBM was, if nothing else, hopelessly dishonest, although that did not seem to
bother those key Canadian brokerages that helped to ratchet up its share price
from 20 cents to almost $20 Canadian. Meanwhile, there had been some internal
changes. Given the publicity about Arigon, the crooks in charge decided to make
a move. They formed a new offshore company named United Trade Limited in
the Cayman Islands, and dumped all of Arigon into it. They also slid 99.9 percent
of the shares of Magnex RT based in Hungary into the new venture. One other
part of this fraudulent clean-up was the allegedly complete separation from
YBM’s other known subsidiary, Arbat International, Inc. Interestingly, YBM’s
Chief Operating Officer, Igor Fisherman, was the President of the rather soiled
Arigon, but he quickly nestled into the same position with UTL.
Although YBM had a mercurial ride, it was destined to slip slide away into a
series of hints and allegations and on into numerous civil cases followed by one
or two ventures into the criminal side. The slide began in August 1996 when
YBM learned there was a “pending investigation” of the company by the U.S.
Attorney’s office in Philadelphia. On August 29, YBM held an emergency meet-
ing and formed a Special (Independent) Committee to investigate the allegations
and innuendos. They retained the Fairfax Group, a U.S. based private detective
firm, which is now known as “Decision Strategies”. The senior Fairfax investiga-
tors working the case included a former Special Prosecutor, a forensic accoun-
tant, and a retired U.S. Ambassador and former senior official with the U.S. State
Department.
For a company riven through with world renowned mobsters, this was a seem-
ingly odd choice. The initial Fairfax report to YBM took place in Toronto on
March 21, 1997, and in Philadelphia the following day. It was an oral report. In
sum Fairfax confirmed YBM’s original shareholders were organized criminals,
that Arbat in Russia, Arigon in the U.K., and Magnex in Hungary, were owned or
controlled by the Mogilevich syndicate. Fairfax also went over other ar-
eas—“companies with which YBM was doing business, some of these compa-
nies were shells, others were shells within shells, others did not exist”—which
13
added to the grim picture. Moreover, Fairfax had found that Igor Fisherman,
YBM’s Chief Operating Officer, maintained a long-standing friendship with
Mogilevich. Indeed, it seems Mogilevich “had access to bank accounts at a key
Eastern European YBM subsidiary run by Fisherman”.41 Despite what would
appear to be very bad news, YBM’s gallant Special Independent Committee was
soon pleased to inform YBM staff that Fairfax looked hard but “could not find
any evidence to substantiate the rumours” swirling around YBM.42 This, I must
add, despite the Special Committee’s own notes, actually two versions, which
confirmed what Fairfax had actually said.
YBM’s slide accelerated in the spring of 1997 when it filed a preliminary pro-
spectus that was to a large extent, misleading. Actually, it was completely mis-
leading Another supposedly independent committee of the Board of Directors
was then set up to “review the Company’s operations to ensure that they are con-
sistent with the standards applicable to Canadian public companies”.43 The next
problem emerged when YBM’s auditor, Deloitte & Touche LLP (U.S.), said it
was stopping its audit of YBM’s 1997 financial statements and would not con-
tinue until the firm truly underwent and completed a serious forensic investiga-
tion. YBM had not notified D & T about the Fairfax conclusions. YBM held to-
gether for another year. In fact, on April 27, 1998, it sent out a glowing news re-
lease reporting its net income had increased 94.6% compared to the preceding
year, and that sales of shares were up 38.2%. The stock pumpers were giddy.
However, this was YBM’s last gasp.
On May 13, 1998, the Ontario Securities Commission finished off YBM’s
ability to sell shares. A few months later, YBM’s general counsel, Cassels Brock
and Blackwell, represented by YBM board member Lawrence D. Wilder, left the
scene. On December 8, 1998, a Receiver was appointed to handle the YBM
windup, and First Marathon Securities Limited changed its name to National
Bank Financial.44 There were several prosecutions of YBM principals.
14
41 Sandra Rubin, “YBM Linked to Russian Underworld: Headquarters Raided”, October 27, 1998, at
http://www.nationalpost.com/features/annivgallery/Oct 27 1998.pdf.
42 Ibid.
43 See, “Statement of Allegations of Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission”, II. Overview of Staff’s Allegations, p. 7.
44 There were a series of court cases that bloomed from the YBM fiasco. I am listing three.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Court File No. 01-CV-209418, Between Plaintiff YBM Magnex International, Inc.
Through its Independent Litigation Supervisor, Paul Farrar, and Defendants Jacob Bogatin, Igor Fishermam, Harry
Antes, Kenneth Davies, Frank Greenwald, R. Owen Mitchell, David Peterson, Michael Schmidt, Cassels, Brock &
Blackwell, Parente, Randolph, Orlando, Carey & Associates, Deloitte & Touche LLP, National Bank Financial Corp.,
formerly First Marathon Securities Limited, Griffiths McBurney & Partners, Scotia-McLeod Inc., Canaccord Capital
Corporation and HSBC James Capel Inc., Formerly Gordon Capital Corporation, Defendants, and Third Parties
Connor Clark & Lunn Investment Management Ltd., Fogler Rubinoff LLP, Decision Strategies LLC and Pepper Ham-
ilton LLP.Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Commercial List, Court File No. 99-CL-3424, Between Plaintiff YBM
Magnex International Inc., by its Receiver and Manager Ernst and Young YBM Inc., and Defendants Jacob Bogatin,
Igor Fisherman, Michael Schmidt, Kenneth Davies, Frank Greenwald, Guy Scala, Daniel Gatti, James Held, Robert
Ventresca and Harry Antes.
Summary
First and foremost, the Berlin-Edwards finagle proved without a shadow of a
doubt that “due diligence”, “know thy customer”, and all the other phrases in the
post-modern banking world did not really apply to The Bank of New York. Its
Eastern Europe Division had a minimum of 378 correspondent accounts and
each transfer through The Bank of New York made money. In fact, the process-
ing fees from wire transfer revenues went from $530 million in 1994 to more
than $1 billion three years later. Indeed, so profitable was the Electronic Funds
Transfer Division that BONY’s senior management called it “the golden child”.
Added to this windfall were the extraordinary number of BONY correspondent
banks that were very busy transferring money into other banks and/or busi-
nesses. A large percentage of these institutions were either absorbed by the felt
necessity of engaging in tumultuous capital flight or were little more than crimi-
nal organizations.
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Research into Organised Crime
in the Czech Republic—solved topics,
methodology, basic results
Martin Cejp,
Institute of Criminology and Social Prevention,
Czech Republic
Organised crime appeared in the Czech Republic in a developed form after the
year 1990. Though some elements had previously existed in the black and grey
economy, and occasional pilfering of the cultural heritage occurred as well, these
activities were not developed in any significant form. In totalitarian regime, con-
ditions for organised criminals to attain maximum profits with a minimum risk
were far from ideal. Numerous repressive measures, including the almost imper-
viously closed borders, presented too much of an obstacle. An insolvent popula-
tion, which could hardly pay for the brokering of illegal goods or services, held
no promise of any significant source of income. The risks were too great when
compared with the potential profits.
Politicians, the appropriate organs of the state administration and the general
public reacted to the threat of organised crime that emerged after 1990. It was
paradoxical that the citizens reacted before the politicians. Criminological re-
search also focused on the issue of organised crime right in the early 90s. In the
Institute for Criminology and Social Prevention, we first summarised informa-
tion from specialised literature at the end of 1992, focusing especially on foreign
experiences with the possible utilisation of research methods. We attempted to
come up with a working definition and to create a probable model of the activi-
ties of organised crime which could be taken into consideration. The preliminary
information was summarised in a theoretical methodological study. (Cejp 1993)
In 1993 we began with systematic research. We observed both the general
characteristics of the structure of groups and of their activities, as well as specific
issues. The basic characteristics of the groups and activities were investigated
regularly each year. (Cejp 1996) In the framework of specific themes we focused
on the detailed research of those activities which were most widespread or typi-
cal of the Czech Republic. We inquired into the involvement of organised crime
in manufacturing, smuggling and distribution of drugs (Gawlik 1994), in the or-
ganisation and operation of prostitution (Trávníčková 1995), in illegal migration
(Scheinost 1995), in thefts of artistic monuments (Gawlik 1995), in violent
crime (Marešová 1996) and extortion (Cejp 1995).
We gradually attempted to resolve specific themes as well. Since it had been
demonstrated that in the Czech Republic, the Czechs participate in almost half of
the cases of organised crime, and that 25% of the groups operating are purely
Czech, we decided to look in greater detail at organised criminal activities of the
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citizens of the Czech Republic (Scheinost 1999). Foreigners were also sepa-
rately addressed (Scheinost 1996). Later we systematically studied the involve-
ment of organised crime in financial areas (Baloun 1999), inquired into eco-
nomic crime, especially money laundering (Kadeřábková 1999), and into the is-
sue of the deliberate evasion of taxes (Marešová 1999). Furthermore, we at-
tempted to analyse the flow of funds both inside and outside the world of organ-
ised crime. Over the last ten years we have assessed the effect of specific legal
measures that were established and applied for the purpose of fighting organised
crime. (Karabec 1999) At the end of the 1990s, we analysed the issue of organ-
ised crime in a wider social context. We looked for criminological factors in the
life of the society that enable organised crime to realise its activities and acquire
accomplices or clients for illegal goods and services. (Cejp 1999) In the frame-
work of attempting a prognosis of selected types of criminality, we specified
problematic as well as developmental facts that could prove effective when fight-
ing crime in the coming years. (Cejp et al. 2001) In addition to particular reports,
we presented research results in comprehensive publications, in which a particu-
lar stage was always summarised. (Scheinost et al. 1994, Scheinost et al. 1997,
Cejp et al. 1999)
International co-operation is a significant part of the research of organised
crime. We have gathered information on the basic characteristics of organised
crime and on the possibility of its research from foreign sources (i.e. Fijnaut
1999). We have released several translated proceedings that present documents
from the UN, CE, EU, as well as translations of foreign legal norms. Systematic
international co-operation began in 1996, when we compiled data for the Coun-
cil of Europe questionnaire “Groups for criminal law and criminological issues
of organised crime”. After that the survey was conducted annually, and we di-
rectly participated in the work of the groups. Once we also compiled data on or-
ganised crime for the European Union, and participated in the preparation of the
Pre-entry Pact on the issue of organised crime, ratified in Brussels in May, 1998.
We also participated in the preparation of the UN Convention on fighting organ-
ised crime, and on the UNICRI pre-research realised in 1997. The Institute for
Criminology and Social Prevention co-operated with the Florida University dur-
ing the organisation of a joint seminar (1995), and in 1999 we organised the
“Cross-border crime in Europe” international conference in co-operation with
the University in Tilburg.
Methodology
When researching organised crime, we cannot for the most part use research
methods and techniques which have a direct link with the criminal environment.
Due to the fact that before 1998, there were no cases in which a defendant was
prosecuted, charged and convicted of participation in a criminal conspiracy, the
analysis of investigation and court files is very limited. In 1998 the first few
dozen cases appeared, but the information obtained from such a small sample
cannot be generalised, but used only as an example. For the same reasons, we
cannot fully utilise police and court statistics. Hitherto we have been largely de-
pendant on indirectly obtained information.
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We utilise various methods for gathering information from experts: For the re-
peated acquisition of basic data on the structure of groups and their activities, we
turn to police officers specialised in detecting or investigating organised crime.
Anonymous inquiries are realised with questionnaires sent to approximately 30
experts. Attempts to broaden the field to include specialists from state represen-
tatives and judges have not proven effective so far. In matters related to specific
themes, we give preference to individual interviews. For prognoses we have used
the “round-table” method in particular issues, and “focus-groups” for solution
proposals. When assessing the effects of developmental and limiting societal
factors, the SWOT method is used. In addition, we utilise information from spe-
cialised publications and sources as well as comparative analyses of legal means.
Statistics are used at least for orientation, and when possible, concrete cases from
file materials are analysed. Results from public opinion polls, and more techni-
cally oriented newspaper articles can also be utilised to limited extent.
For research purposes we use the following working criminological defini-
tion: Organised crime comprises of repeated (systematic) acts of purposefully
co-ordinated criminal activities (and activities supporting these acts), where ac-
tors are criminal groups or organisations (largely with a multiple-level vertical
organisational structure) whose main goal is to attain the maximum illegal profit
while minimising the risk (ensured via contacts in decisive social structures).
Accidental criminal groups or organisations, the majority of white-collar crime
or terrorism are thus excluded from the scope of organised crime.
Basic Information about Groups
We can deduce the main changes occurring between 1993–2002 in the basic in-
dicators from the qualified assessment of the experts. A wide range of data is sta-
ble as far as criminal groups are concerned. The age variable is on the whole un-
changed: most rank and file members are 20–25-year-olds, bosses
30–35-year-olds. The participation of women (about 15%) is also demonstrated,
especially in organised prostitution and drug trafficking. Women also participate
to a lesser extent in illegal migration and corruption. They sporadically appear as
negotiators of extortionist groups. The ratio of permanent members and outside
help (50:50) is also stable. External collaborators are quite often used to provide
all sorts of supporting services or information, and to realise contacts or special
operations. In more demanding operations they act as advisors. The proportion
of international and local elements in criminal groups is also altogether stabile.
Foreign participants are represented a bit more frequently than Czech citizens.
Some 20–30% of the groups are purely local. (See Table 1)
As far as the level of organisation is concerned, a definite increasing tendency
can be detected. Highly organised groups usually have a three-level organisa-
tion: The highest leadership is on top, managing several independently operating
groups known as the middle link. At the lowest level there are the rank and file,
and outside help. In the 1990s, about one third of the groups in the Czech Repub-
lic were organised in this way. Since the year 2000 we have noted an increase:
four out of ten groups are highly organised.
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Even though we have not detected changes in the ratio of foreign and Czech
citizens in groups of organised crime, certain variation has occurred in the level
in which individual countries are represented. In the 1990s, organised crime in
the Czech Republic involved mostly Ukrainians, Russians, Chinese and Yugo-
slavians, and often also Vietnamese, Albanians and Bulgarians. At the end of the
1990s, the number of Chinese citizens began to decrease—apparently not
sharply, but rather gradually. The decrease in the number of Yugoslavians appar-
ently resulted from the disintegration of the former federative Yugoslavia into a
number of smaller states, whose citizens are still represented in organised crime.
The share of Bulgarians is also decreasing, and Poles have almost disappeared.
In 2002, Ukrainians and Russians were most conspicuously represented.
They were followed at some distance by the Vietnamese, Chinese and Alba-
nians. Arabs, followed by Bulgarians, Byelorussians and Yugoslavians are fur-
ther down the list. Israelis, Croatians, Romanians, Germans and Afghans appear
rarely, and there are isolated cases involving people from Poland, Austria, Italy,
Turkey and Dagestan.
Basic Data about Activities
When we first started to examine organised crime in 1993, we chose 35 activities
which could be taken into consideration. It was a theoretical, model concep-
tion—at the time we did not know the real situation. We started with the criminal
law and considered which criminal acts could be practised by organised crime.
We also took “supporting activities” into account, such as compromising or sup-
pressing evidence, and organising offenders’getaway. We were also inspired by
foreign experiences, though these were not as extensive as they are at the current
time, and could not be applied mechanically.
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1993 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
N=12 N=17 N=18 N=31 N=20 N=27 N=27 N=31 N21
International - 30 20 25 27 31 28 24 28
(Total: international) (53) (61) (47) (53) (55) (60) (55) (53) (54)
Mixed: predominantly
international
- 31 27 28 28 29 27 29 26
Mixed: predominantly
domestic
- 21 20 24 20 20 21 20 23
(Total: domestic) (47) (39) (53) (47) (45) (40) (45) (47) (46)
Domestic 18 33 23 25 20 24 27 23
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 1. Estimate of the ratio of international and domestic groups of organised crime in the
Czech Republic
The 35 activities were then presented to experts, who were asked to judge
whether each individual activity was in a developed or embryonic stage in the
Czech Republic, or non-existent in the present time. We later submitted the list
for examination every year, updated with the results from the preceding survey.
Activities which in previous year had been deemed non-existent were discarded.
Experts were also allowed to suggest new activities. In this way, the counterfeit-
ing of CDs and videocassettes, the transfer of shares without owner’s knowl-
edge, eliciting money with the promise of its great appreciation, trading in radio-
active materials, and the illegal import and export of hazardous waste, for exam-
ple, were added to the list. We discarded usury and activities peculiar to transi-
tion periods: fraud connected with the process of privatisation or establishing
private enterprises.
The order of the most widespread activities is defined according to the num-
ber of experts who estimate the given activity as widespread. We mainly concen-
trate on those activities which have been marked as widespread by more than half
of the experts. This does not mean that the other activities would not be present at
all. We can assess the order of the embryonic activities as well. Some activities
have been listed as embryonic for ten years now without becoming widespread
(i.e. computer crime).
As far as the most widespread activities are concerned, the following are in-
cluded in the most recent data from 2002: the theft of motor vehicles; organising
prostitution and trading in women; the production, smuggling and distribution of
drugs; organising illegal migration, receiving stolen goods; tax, loan, insurance
and exchange fraud. The order of the other activities is presented in Table 2.
Owing to the fact that the extent of the activities has been monitored annually
since 1993, we are able to determine trends and observe changes. Throughout
this 10-year time span, organised prostitution and the theft of automobiles have
been among the most widespread activities of organised crime in the Czech Re-
public. Since the middle of the 1990s, a majority of experts have predicted a de-
crease in the theft of automobiles. So far there is no evidence of such reduction,
but other changes have occurred: more expensive automobiles are stolen, and in-
stead of Bulgarians and Poles, more Czechs are involved in organised theft.
Since 1995 the production, smuggling and distribution of drugs has persistently
belonged to the group of the most widespread activities. Thus the most common
activity of organised crime world-wide has gradually taken its place also in the
Czech Republic. In 1993, only half of the experts considered organised drug traf-
ficking to be widespread. In 1994, however, it was already ranked among 5 most
common activities, and from that year onwards it has remained among the most
widespread. This development corresponds to the real situation. In the early
1990s, the Czech Republic was more of a transit country for drug dealers. Since
1995 the local market has proven to be profitable. Another significant change in
the group of the most widespread activities is the substantial increase in illegal
migration. Since 1999 it has regularly ranked among the most widespread ones.
Organised illegal migration has thus become a significant problem.
Until the mid-1990s, the theft of art objects belonged to the most widespread
activities. This activity, deriving from the period before the year 1989, and dis-
tinctive to Spain and Italy as well as to the Czech Republic, gradually began to
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lose its importance in the second half of the 90s, probably owing to the many pre-
cautions the state had taken: the Ministry of Culture improved its records and the
Ministry of the Interior its protection. International police co-operation enabled
many illegally exported artefacts to be successfully intercepted and returned.
The cultural monuments administered by the church are still, however, in danger
due to poor record-keeping.
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N=21
1.–2. Theft of motor vehicles 20
Organised prostitution and trading in women 20
3.–5. Production, smuggling and distribution of drugs 19
Organised illegal migration 19
Receiving stolen goods 19
6. Tax, credit, insurance and exchange fraud 18
7.–10. Counterfeiting CDs and illegal copies of videocassettes 16
Extortion and collecting a fee for “protection” 16
Founding fraudulent and fictitious companies 16
Customs fraud 16
11.–13. Theft of art objects and their export 15
Hired debt collection 15
Theft by breaking into apartments, cottages, shops and warehouses 15
14.–15. Theft from transport trucks and lorries 14
Bank fraud 14
16.–17. Money laundering 13
Eliciting money with the promise of its great appreciation 13
18. Murder 11
19. Bribery and corruption 10
20.–21. Counterfeiting documents, cheques, money, coins 9
Bank robbery 9
22. International trade in weapons and explosives 8
23.–25. Other violence 7
Gambling 7
Computer crime 7
Table 2. Estimate of the occurrence of the most widespread forms of organised crime in the
Czech Republic in 2002
In addition to the most widespread activities of organised crime, there also ex-
ists a whole group of heavily widespread activities, mentioned by 65–85% of the
experts. These activities are characterised by fairly strong fluctuations. Tax fraud
has belonged to this group since the second half of the 90’s, the receiving of sto-
len goods since 2000, and the counterfeiting of CDs and illegally copied
videocassettes since 1999. Customs frauds are also relatively common—though
with fluctuations. In 2002, there was a strong increase in the founding of ficti-
tious companies. Extortion and collecting a fee for “protection” also have defi-
nite fluctuations, but are usually ranked in top ten. The illegal collection of debts
is somewhat more rare, but has had two peak years: in 1994 and 1999 it was
among the five most widespread activities of organised crime.
The other activities are relatively widespread. This is especially true for bank
fraud; money laundering; forging documents, money and coins; theft after
breaking and entering; bank robbery and corruption. The occurrence of violent
criminality and murders is average. Organised crime avoids violence if at all pos-
sible. If it does occur, it seems to be confined to criminal underworld, since so far
there are no other cases recorded. Trading in weapons, explosives and radioac-
tive materials is not very common, either.
Since 1999 we have regularly followed the activities in which foreign groups
are involved. It seems that Ukrainian groups focus on extortion, violent crime,
robbery, theft, organised prostitution, smuggling weapons and, after 2001, on the
theft of automobiles, and more recently also on drugs. Russian groups have simi-
lar tendencies. They are involved in extortion, violent crime, organised prostitu-
tion, robbery, smuggling weapons and radioactive materials, automobile theft,
and, since 2001, in drugs. If compared to Ukrainians, Russians are much more
frequently engaged in economic crime, money laundering, bank fraud, corrup-
tion, and in founding fictitious companies.
Vietnamese groups focus on the forgery and smuggling of goods, often in-
volving infringement of trademarks and copyrights, as well as customs and tax
fraud. The Vietnamese are active in illegal migration, the distribution of drugs,
and in organised prostitution. Chinese groups are foremost engaged in illegal mi-
gration, but also in smuggling, organised prostitution, drugs, money laundering,
and tax and other types of fraud. Albanian groups focus on drugs, illegal trade in
weapons, organised prostitution and automobile theft. Arab groups are mostly
involved in drugs, illegal migration, money laundering and prostitution. Bulgari-
ans are active in organised prostitution, but relatively seldom in drugs, and to di-
minishing extent in automobile theft.
Members of other nationalities turn up only sporadically in the Czech Repub-
lic, and thus their activities are also less numerous. Byelorussians and Afghans
are specialised in extortion, Yugoslavs, Croatians and Turks in drugs. Slovaks
have committed criminal acts connected with illegal migration.
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Topical themes
In addition to collecting data on the structure of the groups and on their activities,
most of our annual surveys cover topical themes to which the experts are asked to
respond. We have defined organised crime in greater detail, and characterised its
features. We have looked for criteria with which organised crime can be differen-
tiated from regular criminality carried out in an organised form. From time to
time we have paid somewhat greater attention to the predictions of future devel-
opments. The growth of organised crime is still probable, though at lesser rate
since the strongest groups have already made contact and divided the spheres of
influence. Drug-related activities will outweigh the others.
In 1999 we focused on the social causes and consequences of organised crime
by specifying 150 relevant factors. In 2000 the issue of corruption was probed.
We inquired into the extent in which organised crime attempts to use corruption
when dealing with individual elements of society. In the same year we also fo-
cused more on ascertaining the ethnicity-based co-operation within criminal
groups. In 2001 we attempted to pinpoint elements of society into which organ-
ised crime is trying to penetrate, and groups against which it uses force. On the
basis of the events that transpired on September 11th, 2001 we examined
whether any co-operation between organised crime and terrorism existed in
Czech conditions, and whether such co-operation could occur in the coming
years. In 2002 we, together with the experts, sought the main problems which,
when removed, would lead to successful measures against organised crime. This
year we also want to assess possible developmental factors.
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1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
% N=12 N=17 N=19 N=18 N=31
100 cars(12) cars(17) drugs (19)
Art(12) prostitution(19) drugs (30)
cars (30)
prostitution(30)
cars(18) drugs(17)
art(16) cars(17)
prostitution(16)
prostitution(15) art(16)
90 debts(15)
drugs (15)
prostitution(10)
burglary(14) tax(25)
Receiving(14)
corruption(15)
80 enterpr.fr.(15) tax(14)
custom(9) art (15) m.launder.(24)
burglary(9) corruption(23)
Migration(13) migration(14) bank.fr.(23)
racket.(13) migration(13) art(23)
debst(13) custom(13) receiving (23)
fict. firms(13) burgl.into cars(22)
custom(13) privatization fr.(22)
corruption(11) racket.(13) receiver(12) debst(22)
70 penetration(8) enterpr.fr.(11) bank.fr.(12) fict.firms(21)
migration(8) m.launder.(12) enterpr.fr.(12) enterpr.fraud(21)
privat.fr.(12) privat.fr.(12) custom fraud. (21)
enterpr.f.(12) debst(12) migration(20)
racket.(12) racket.(20)
m.launder.(10)
corruption(7) arms(10) burglary(11) fict.firms(11) murders(19)
receiver(7) murders(10) murders(11) counterfeiting(11)
60 gambling(7) burglary(18)
m.launder(10)
murders(10)
burglary(10)
tax(10) arms(10) arms(16)
arms(10)
50 m.laudering(6) corruption(9)
racket.(6)
drugs(6) custom.f.(8)
Part I
Comparison of estimates of the occurrences of the most widespread forms of organised crime in
the Czech Republic in 1993–2002
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1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
% N=20 N=27 N=27 N=31 N=21
100 drugs(20) drugs(27) drugs(27) drugs(31)
cars(20) cars(27) migration(31)
prostitution(20) cars(30)
prostitution(26) prostitution(30) cars(20)
migration(26) prostitution(20)
migration(19) cars(25)
migration(25)
prostitution(24)
art(18) corruption(24) drugs(19)
90 migration(19)
receiving(23) receiving(19)
m.laundering(23)
video/CD(23) tax(18)
murder(23)
debst(22) trucks(22) video/CD(25)
art(22)
80 burglary(22)
custom(21)
video/CD(16)
debst(21) racket.(16)
corruption(15) tax(21) fict.firms(16)
art(20) custom(16)
m.launder.(20)
art(15)
racket.(14) racket.(19) bank robbery(19) receiving(22) debst(15)
70 debst(14) video/CD(19) counterf.(19) corruption(21) burglary(15)
bank.fr.(19) m.laundering(21)
trucks(18) racket.(18) trucks(14)
m.launder.(13) art(20) banking frauds(14)
video/CD(13) corruption(17) custom(17) trucks(20)
burglary(17) fict.firms(17) debst(20)
murder(17) burglary(19) m.laundering(13)
arms(12) racket.(19) eliciting m.(13)
60 fict.firms(12) eliciting m.(16)
ntbl bank fr.(11) privat.fr.(15)
tax(11) countref.(15) arms(15) murder(17)
trucks(11) Receiving(15) violence(16)
privatiz.fr.(11) tax(16)
counterfeit.(11) arms(14) murder(11)
50 custom(10) eliciting(14)
receiving(10) fict.firms(15)
murder(10) custom(15) corruption(10)
arms(15)
counterfeiting(14)
banking frauds(14) counterfeiting(9)
gambling(12) eliciting(14) bank robbery(9)
Part II
Comparison of estimates of the occurrences of the most widespread forms of organised crime in
the Czech Republic in 1993–2002
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Thefts and Illicit Trade of Works of Art. An Overview
Theft and illicit trade of stolen works of art surely are not new phenomena: we
can think for instance about the precautions and means adopted in Ancient Egypt
in order to prevent the pillage of pharaonic tombs. But in spite of the social, reli-
gious and legal blame encircling their traffics, the thieves always succeeded in
finding purchasers disposed to buy objects with the royal seal, clearly coming
from royal tombs.
Since the antiquity, the problem of the thefts of works of art has always been
seen to involve two closely connected groups of people: the thieves (commis-
sioners of the thefts) and the receivers of the stolen goods (merchants, collectors
or simply incautious purchasers).
This phenomenon has recently reached such proportions and caused so much
concern that Interpol, anxious of the amount of international crime connected to
the art market, considers this activity one of the main categories of transnational
crime (The Sunday Times, 8 January 1995).
The rapidity of not only international but also intercontinental movements,
the development of new kinds of contacts and communications, a constantly in-
creasing private demand for archaeological goods, the lack of scruples in people
connected with the illegal trade of the objects, and the increasing involvement of
international organised crime have over the past few years given the market of
works and objects of art a new and extremely worrisome dimension and charac-
ter. The objects are often defended and protected in an inadequate way. Once sto-
len, they can easily be concealed and transported, and are thus extremely difficult
to recover.
In Italy, the situation appears to be particularly difficult, because there is great
amount of small works of art, hardly controlled and controllable. The problem is
aggravated by undeniable budget limits: only greater museums and galleries can
manage the costs of adequate and up-to-date alarm systems, while private galler-
ies, foundations, small civic or ecclesiastical museums are in many cases de-
fenceless in front of professionals thieves.
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1 Criminologist; Adjunct Professor at the University for Foreigners, Perugia (Italy); Judge at the Penal Court of Florence
(Italy).
The frequent lack of means for prevention and preventive co-ordination is un-
derlined in the crucial moments following the theft, when the victim, confused,
can waste valuable time before denouncing and describing to the police the ob-
jects that have been stolen, thereby preventing any serious investigation co-ordi-
nation and allowing the thieves enough time to remove the assets. The follow-up
phase is always static, and based above all on improvisation, good will and
chance, facilitating those who consider trafficking of works of art as a profitable
profession.
At world-wide level, we can see, on one hand, a true haemorrhage of objects
from archaeological sites (often still unexplored) in Latin America, Africa and
Asia, and, on the other hand, an annual increase in thefts from galleries, muse-
ums, churches and houses in industrialised countries. In 1994, the Interpol Gen-
eral Secretariat launched a “call for action” in order to prevent and fight such
types of crime.
It is worth noting that in the trade of stolen works of art, the risks the criminals
take are often low: in many countries, there is no specific national legislation on
the matter (or the legislation is difficult to apply), crossing national frontiers is
easy, and individual works of art are rarely photographed or documented—espe-
cially if they are of low economic value—which complicates the identification
and recovery of the object. In addition, dealers’rapidity, lack of scruple, flexibil-
ity, and degree of organisation add to the problem, above all in the less industrial-
ised countries.
Another problem is the enormous expansion of the art market over the last two
decades; it has become a field for economic investments where several interested
parties try to gain high profits in minimum time. This increase in demand has un-
avoidably facilitated the illegal trade in works of art, owing also to the lack of
control on the part of private purchasers, but also of institutional purchasers such
as museums and galleries. For example, it seems that in London, art vendors (in-
cluding major auction galleries like Christie’s or Sotheby’s) exercise the practi-
cal “no questions asked” policy: when they acquire works of art to put on the
market through their normal sales channels, they usually do not verify the real or-
igin of the objects, and whether the supplier has obtained them legally or not.
They thus act as “go-betweens” with no guarantees or references.
There are many reasons for the enormous increase in the demand for artistic
assets: an increasing number of wealthy people need secure investment objects,
interest in art in general is greater, and private financing has assumed a bigger
role in the world of art collecting, especially in Japan and the United States2.
We can point out three indirect consequences of the thefts of works of art, di-
minishing the effectiveness of the price system in the international legal art mar-
ket:
• often the theft involves damaging the works in order to facilitate the removal
(for example, it may be necessary to cut the cloth along the edges of the frame
in order to steal a painting) or the transport (for instance, by dividing large
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2 These are regarded as countries that import stolen works of art. Others, such as Italy, from where a greater part of the
stolen works originate, are called exporting countries, and countries, like Switzerland, which usually act as temporary
storage places, transit countries.
sculptures in smaller parts by taking them apart or breaking). This surely can
happen when the works are taken from private homes, museums, churches or
palaces, but is more frequent and worrisome when occurring at archaeologi-
cal sites, where the stone sculptures (such as ornaments and statues) are al-
ways broken into smaller pieces in order to maximise the profit by selling
them separately;
• the increasing risk of thefts forces to take more precautions in order to protect
the works of art. This causes nuisance to museum visitors and exhibitors in
two ways: due to inflexible timetables and restricted access, it becomes more
and more difficult to actually see the works, and the necessary technical sys-
tems and security guards incur expenses and eventually result in higher ticket
prices;
• thefts have raised the price of works of art, which in turn has stimulated the
production of counterfeits, causing uncertainty in art markets.
Thieves prefer objects that are saleable in richer countries: pictures, prints,
terra-cottas, china, jewels, sculptures, religious objects (reliquaries, ciboria and
so on). According to Interpol database, in 1998 approximately 50% of the stolen
objects were either paintings, sculptures or statues.
Thieves favour works which meet the following criteria:
a) not well-protected or guarded;
b) situated in a church or similar religious building3, especially if it is small,
isolated and abandoned or quite abandoned;
c) painting, print or sculpture made by a European or other well-known artist;
d) easy to transport, hide and sell;
e) piece is well known and valued.
Two additional criteria could be added: piece meets buyer’s requirements, as in
case of commissioned thefts (frequent with rare, famous works or objects of un-
exceptional value), and familiarity with the alarm system. The latter hypothesis
mostly concerns thefts carried out in museums, foundations or private homes by
own employees or others with access: the thief takes pieces of minor value, often
stored in a warehouse and not yet inventoried or protected.
People Involved
Most people involved in the illicit trade of works of art operate in two parallel art
markets:
1. criminal groups offer stolen works to legitimate buyers (museums, galleries,
merchants, auction galleries, private citizens);
2. independent galleries and small museums are “resupplied” by criminal
groups.
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3 Always deserted at night.
The black art market is also fed by independent professional thieves who often
co-operate with organised crime acting as a mediator between the buyer and the
thief. We again have to underline the increasingly relevant and active role of or-
ganised crime in this field, its means, and economic, human, organisational and,
nowadays, also technological resources.
Organised crime operates in several ways in the art market:
a) it can manage the entire operation, selling objects it has obtained through its
own activities;
b) it can act as an intermediary between the buyer and the professional thief;
c) it can use works of art that are easily transported, concealed and marketed as
payment for drugs;
d) it can use stolen works to blackmail institutions (as happened in Modena, It-
aly in 1992, when Felice Maniero’s organised crime group stole Velasquez’
and Correggio’s paintings, and tried to use them for an “exchange of fa-
vours” with the police enforcement agencies, fortunately not succeeding);
e) it can use the objects for money laundering.
Archaeological objects and works of art are ideal for money laundering, because
they are fungible and easy to sell. Today, the art market is one of the most popular
means of money laundering, employing several financial channels; it has been
claimed that drug traffickers control the world of art to such an extent that if they
suddenly stopped covering their illicit doings by buying works of art, the global
art market would collapse. It is obvious that all criminal systems developed by
the dealers include some degree of control over art vendors, auction galleries and
so on; otherwise it could not exist.
The rare and valuable pieces are removed from the place of theft at a very early
stage, or hidden in a safe place until “things settle down”, sometimes longer.
Only professional thieves or ones connected to criminal organisations use inter-
national distribution channels for stolen goods. The most famous objects are
transported from one country to the next skilfully hidden (if small in size), and
the less famous ones by counterfeiting the certificates and documents.
If a purchaser is not found, the thieves sometimes convince an insurance com-
pany—same one that has insured the piece—to buy the stolen object back at the
price that usually amounts to 10% of its value. However, most stolen objects end
up in private collections.
Underwater Cultural Heritage
One of the most interesting (and, unfortunately, also one of the most dangerous)
features of modern criminal organisations is their enormous ability to adapt to
the environmental, political and social conditions in which they operate, as well
as to the requirements and possibilities of the legal or illegal market (it is worth
remembering that organised crime organisations profit from both the legal and il-
legal markets, obviously adapting and modifying their actions case by case).
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From the economic point of view, criminal organisations are behaving more
and more like multinational companies, differentiating their fields of activity and
the range of services being offered to various customers. Thus they are able to
obtain high profits also in a case of “crisis” in a specific “economic” field.
As already mentioned, organised crime is very interested in the market of
works of art, a market that holds few risks and enormous profits. Organised
crime organisations launder money by feeding the illegal market with stolen
works of art or objects recovered from archaeological sites (plundered in a clan-
destine, non-authorised way), directing them to private collectors (as in commis-
sioned thefts) or through auction galleries to legal market.
For a long time now police enforcement agencies have focused on traditional
trafficking in works of art, usually stolen from museums, churches, palaces, pub-
lic buildings and so on. Only recently they have become aware of the activities of
organised crime in this field. It has become evident that criminal organisations
are especially interested in several archaeological sites, particularly underwater
ones that are rich in artistic and cultural relics, and often unexplored. Oceans,
seas, rivers and lakes embed an enormous amount of objects from all periods of
human history, from the beginning (prehistoric stilt houses, for example, by now
usually submerged) towards the present times (ships sunk during WW II, etc).
The difficulty in recovering such objects and the lack of necessary resources has
prevented the states, but fortunately, also criminal elements from exploiting
these riches. However, the situation has now changed: the states are still unable
to organise large-scale recovery expeditions—mostly due to issues concerning
territorial waters, jurisdictions and national prerogatives—but criminal organi-
sations (the only ones to have enough men, means and, above all, money to un-
dertake such activity), sometimes disguised as recovery companies only a bit
more “unscrupulous” than the others, proceed to recover underwater objects
with great velocity.
This is why far greater attention must be given to this part of our cultural patri-
mony, and why current international laws must quickly be adapted to the new sit-
uation.
Before proceeding with our analysis, it should be explained what we mean by
“underwater cultural heritage”. Surely the most applicable definition is the one
supplied by UNESCO in “Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cul-
tural Heritage” (Paris, 2 November 2001). According to it, underwater cultural
heritage is comprised of
“All traces of human existence having a cultural, historical or archaeological
character which have been partially or totally under water, periodically or
continuously, for at least 100 years (…)”4
When examining this definition, one can see that the underwater cultural heri-
tage does not only include works of art or valuable objects (like the treasures in
Spanish ships that sank during their voyage from Americas to Europe) but all
cultural, historical or archaeological relics of human civilisation that have been
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4 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (UNESCO, Paris, 2 November 2001), art. 1, par. 1 a.
submerged5, totally or in part, periodically (tides, etc.) or continuously for at
least 100 years. This limit of 100 years is a compromise, set during the prepara-
tion of the Convention, and was chosen to distinguish cultural heritage from the
more recent objects and wrecks, which are regulated by the normal international
statutes. The time limit was necessary to avoid criticism and disagreement from
many countries, most of them concerned with aeroplanes and ships that sank
during the World War II. By excluding the most recent wrecks from the protec-
tion and “international competence” established by the Convention, fulmination
was perhaps avoided, but problems were not. In some cases, such as R.M.S. Ti-
tanic, the time limit has led to total destruction of the wreckage before the effec-
tive and actual international protection takes effect.
Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage
There are various instruments provided by the international legal system for the
protection of the underwater cultural heritage:
• General international normative instruments (Conventions)
• Specific international normative instruments (ILA and UNESCO
Conventions)
• Bilateral agreements
• Statements
• Diplomatic agreements
We will next examine in detail the most important normative acts concerning this
matter. They are as follows:
1. General international normative instruments (Conventions)
– United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 10 De-
cember 1982)
– Recommendation 848 (1978) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe on the underwater cultural heritage
– Recommendation 1486 (2000) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe on the maritime and fluvial cultural heritage
– International Convention on Salvage (London, 28 April 1989)
2. Specific international normative instruments (ILA and UNESCO Conven-
tions)
– International Law Association - Draft Convention on the Protection of
Underwater Cultural Heritage (Buenos Aires, 20 August 1994)
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5 In marine and oceanic waters but also in inland waters like lakes, rivers and so on. One would think that inland waters
would be less problematic as they usually concern only one state, and territorial limits do not need to be taken into ac-
count. However, sometimes the state in question is not equipped with normative instruments and laws necessary to
protect the submerged objects. We also need to remember that usually these waters are not very deep, and the recovery
of relics is therefore easier, which opens a window of opportunity also for the less well-equipped perpetrators. Inland
waters are often rich in testimonies: take for instance the numerous ritual offerings ancient peoples threw into lakes.
– Charte Internationale sur la Protection et la Gestion du Patrimoine
Culturel Subaquatique (Sofia, le 9 Octobre 1996)
– Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage
(UNESCO, Paris, 2 November 2001)
3. Bilateral agreements
– Exchange of Notes between South Africa and the United Kingdom Con-
cerning the Regulation of the Term of Settlement of the Salvaging of the
Wreck of HMS Birkenhead (Pretoria, 22 September 1989)6
– Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the French Republic Concerning the Wreck of the CSS
Alabama (Paris, 3 October 1989)7
4. Statements
– Statement by the President of the United States on U.S. Policy for the Pro-
tection of Sunken Warships (19 January 2001)
– Siracusa Declaration on the Submarine Cultural Heritage of the Mediter-
ranean Sea of 10 March 2001 (adopted during the international confer-
ence “Means for the Protection and Tourist Promotion of the Marine Cul-
tural Heritage in the Mediterranean”)
5. Diplomatic agreements
– In many occasions unofficial and informal, particular, and decided case
by case.
Not one of these instruments is by itself sufficient to protect the underwater cul-
tural heritage, especially since most conventions (of more general nature, such as
the one on the Right of the Sea) have not been ratified by all countries, and pro-
vide no means to enforce their execution. In the case of the more specific conven-
tions, such as the UNESCO Convention on the underwater cultural heritage, the
situation is even worse. Bilateral agreements are usually more effective, but they
naturally involve only a limited number of countries and usually relate to a sin-
gle, specific case. As far as the so-called “declarations” (or “statements”) are
concerned, they only apply to the country/countries enforcing them (like in the
case of the United States8), and thus have very limited effect on the international
community.
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6 On 26 February 1852, the English warship HMS Birkenhead, with 638 passengers, supplies and a great amount of
money on board, all destined to the English army engaged in the Kaffir War in South Africa, sank off Cape Danger
(Cape Town); there were only 193 survivors. On 22 September, 1989, Great Britain and South Africa signed an agree-
ment for the common “management” of the wreckage: South Africa declared Birkenhead a “National Monument”, so
anyone taking objects from the ship, or parts of the wreckage itself, would be punished with an economic penalty and
two years of imprisonment. Recoveries can only be made by qualified persons (the so-called “salvors”), with a special
permission issued by the South African Council for the Cultural Heritage; all recovery activities are to respect the un-
derwater grave site, and everything that is recovered must be divided equally between the two states.
7 On 19 June, 1864, U.S. corvette Kearsarge hit and sank confederate ship CSS Alabama just outside the French town of
Cherbourg. According to a federal declaration, all the goods of the Confederation were to be considered part of the U.S.
patrimony after the Civil War. In 1984, the wreckage of CSS Alabama was found in the French territorial waters; to re-
solve the problems of authority regarding the wreckage, a bilateral agreement was signed between USA and France,
stating a common “management” of the sunken ship and creation of a “protection zone” around the wreckage.
8 Statement by the President of the United States on U.S. Policy for the Protection of Sunken Warships (19 January
2001).
This overview aims to demonstrate that the international normative legisla-
tion is not sufficient to protect the underwater cultural heritage owing to a num-
ber of reasons:
• incoherent territorial jurisdictions;
• ineffectiveness of international protection efforts;
• special legislation regarding the sunken military ships and the so-called
“State ships”9
International protection of the underwater cultural heritage is extremely limited
by state borders and territorial waters, and usually there is low interest regarding
the underwater cultural heritage because the states are more focused on the ma-
rine resources that are potentially more remunerative (such as fishing resources
or oil). As regards to sunken ships, the problem is reversed: instead of low inter-
est, there is too much interest, because usually both the flag state and the coastal
state guard their interests.
All military vehicles are protected by a particular immunity; but the problem
is whether such immunity covers also the wrecks. The 2001 USA Declaration10
speaks about “immunity that never ends”. Considering the rapidity of innova-
tions in war industry, especially in recent times, it is difficult to understand the
strategic importance of military ships that have sunk more than a hundred years
ago. In addition, the norms that concern these wrecks are actually formed by
praxis (neither uniform nor coherent) and bilateral specific agreements11, even
though the 2001 UNESCO Convention states that if a military vehicle is older
than one hundred years, the coastal and the flag state should co-operate12.
Unfortunately, the situation of undefined norms and international conflicts re-
garding the protection of underwater cultural heritage is causing a loss (even
without the participation of criminal organisations!) of numerous wreckages and
extremely precious objects since every one of them is unique and characterised
by history and particular vicissitudes. This is undoubtedly the case with RMS Ti-
tanic, for example, demonstrating one of the greatest failures of international
protection of the underwater cultural heritage.
On 14 April 1912, during her maiden voyage from London to New York, the
Royal Mail Steamer Titanic, owned by the English White Star Line Company,
sank off the United States’ coast after a collision with an iceberg. Of the 2227
passengers and crewmen on board, only 705 survived. Owing to the great loss of
lives, the famous technical innovations (which, however, did not prevent the
shipwreck), and the luxurious furniture and cabins, Titanic became a legend,
even if a sad one, fascinating people all over the world. On 1 September 1985, a
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9 Ships engaged in official government tasks at the time of the sinking, like postal ships.
10 Statement by the President of the United States on U.S. Policy for the Protection of Sunken Warships (19 January
2001).
11 As between USA and France regarding the ship CSS Alabama, or in the case of the HMS Birkenhead, where Great Brit-
ain and South Africa were the contracting parties.
12 The coastal state “... should inform the flag State...”, Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage
(UNESCO, Paris, 2 November 2001), art. 7.
scientific expedition led by Robert Ballard, found Titanic very deep in the ocean,
and in July 1986, the wreckage was explored and photographed for the first time.
Ballard proposed that Titanic should be considered an international monument,
and protected against plundering.
Unfortunately, no such protection has been executed. As a result, the wreck-
age has been emptied and irremediably damaged by numerous “expeditions”. In
2012, when Titanic finally becomes part of the underwater cultural heritage13
and gets some protection, there will be nothing left.
The “Siracusa Declaration”
In this general overview regarding this particular kind of cultural heritage, the
activities of organised crime are given a new dimension. We have already seen
that criminal organisations have money, men and others resources, but often also
better technical and scientific possibilities, facilitated not only by money, but
also by the lack of scruples and the prevailing legal and territorial
indetermination. Criminal organisations are indifferent to territorial waters,
competences, rights of the coastal and the flag states, and they surely do not re-
cognise legal, ethical, moral or other types of boundaries. They have only one
goal: to obtain maximum profit with minimum risk and economic investment14.
Consequences are clear: recoveries are directed to only those objects that are
economically favourable, and no attention is paid to the possible damaging of the
site. The aim is to recover objects as quickly as possible, not to observe the sites,
to analyse them, to study the cultural testimonies. Fundamental historical and ar-
chaeological items are lost in the process. Cultural heritage is plundered and de-
stroyed, and thus human history abates every day.
If possible, the situation is even worse in the Mediterranean Sea: it is a closed
sea, and has been used since prehistoric times by numerous European, African
and Asian populations. It is full of wrecks, sunken ships, traces of lost villages
and villas, and so on. We have just begun to understand the extent of the threats
facing these wonderful things, especially so since the Mediterranean Sea is so
shallow that wrecks and objects can be easily recovered.
Many Mediterranean states have approved specific legislation regarding the
researches and underwater recoveries (sometimes they use current internal legis-
lation and extend it to submarine heritage15), and we can see attempts to extend
the competence of the Mediterranean coastal states to parts of the international
waters, at least as far as the cultural heritage is concerned (although some coun-
tries, particularly USA, the United Kingdom and the Low Countries, do not
agree with this kind of development16).
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13 According to the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (UNESCO, Paris, 2 November
2001).
14 Unfortunately, often the criminal organisations are not very different from the “legal”ones operating just on the bor-
derline of laws. These types of organisations are interested in locating wreckages and in “treasure hunting”, as in the
case of RMS Titanic.
15 As Morocco did, extending the prerogatives of the exclusive fishing area to archaeological objects.
16 These states are concerned about the right of passage for their ships in the Mediterranean international waters, should
the control of the coastal states become stronger.
Italy has no specific legislation regarding the underwater cultural heritage,
nor a specifically protected archaeological area around its coast. This is a shame
since a large quantity of Roman wrecks is situated just off the Italian coast and
isles. Great expectations are thus laid on the Siracusa Declaration on the Subma-
rine Cultural Heritage of the Mediterranean Sea (March 10, 2001), signed by
many Mediterranean states in the city of Siracusa, Sicily (Italy).
Indeed, we can say that the future of the protection of the underwater cultural
heritage in the Mediterranean area is laid out by the Siracusa Declaration. Even
though the Declaration is not an international normative act, all Mediterranean
countries are trying to focus on its goals, and work towards transforming it into a
formal international Convention.
The Declaration is divided in two main parts:
I) Preservation of the integrity of the submarine sites.
Concerning the preservation of the sites, it is recommended that the subma-
rine heritage is primarily preserved in situ17, with the intention of opening
the sites to the public if possible (for instance, by using little submarines or
boats with see-through bottoms). The objects are removed only if it is not
possible to conserve them on site. The Declaration aims to non-destructive
research methods and to the protection of the environment (with specific
preliminary studies). Researches are not to damage human remains or reli-
gious sites, buildings or objects, and all steps of the research and eventual re-
covery of the objects need to be described in scientific documents and publi-
cations.
II) Strengthening the involvement of concerned states.
In the second part of the Declaration, the Mediterranean nations state that
“without prejudice to the rights of the coastal State”18, all countries having a
verifiable link with the objects should be informed of, and possibly also in-
volved in an activity concerning the underwater cultural heritage. Further-
more, “without prejudice to the rights of the coastal State”, consultations on
how to ensure the appropriate investigation, effective protection and, if in
situ preservation is not possible, final destination of the objects belonging to
the Mediterranean submarine cultural heritage should be held among all the
countries having a verifiable link with the objects.
As we can see, the goals of the Declaration are ambitious, especially in regard to
the preservation of the objects “in situ”: that is probably the main cause why the
Declaration is still only a statement. We can consider the Declaration as a kind of a
programme, a project for the future. It is partly comprised of general statements
and hypothesis that are more wishes than effective intentions. The realisation of
the Declaration might prove problematic, most of all due to the opposition of many
non-Mediterranean nations and the difficulty to find sufficient funds to realise pre-
liminary studies, adequate researches and innovative submarine “museums”.
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17 Where it is: under the water.
18 This is the main condition for the cooperation of all the Mediterranean coastal states.
However, we cannot forget that while we are trying to find the ideal way to re-
cover and preserve the submarine cultural heritage, international organised
crime continues to plunder the sites, not caring at all about the rights of the flag or
the coastal states, and without any consideration for what is not economically
profitable. Unless we understand that time is not a variable to be ignored, we are
destined to lose a great part of our history. Heritage is turning into a mere eco-
nomic commodity.
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Map of Corruption in Lithuania:
The Residents’ View
Aleksandras Dobryninas and Laima Zilinskiene,
Vilnius University, Lithuania
Corruption is most frequently defined as “the misuse of entrusted power for pri-
vate benefit”.1 According to this definition, the main source of corruption is the
conflict of public and private interests. Political power or public authority is in-
tended for managing public affairs. Public authority representatives are not dele-
gated to realise interests of their own or their fellow men, but in the first place to
take care of public affairs. This is the mission of public power. If the government
does its duties improperly and respects only private interests, thus impairing
public interests, one says that such a government is corrupt, as are its respective
activities. Uncontrolled “privatisation” of public functions performed by politi-
cal authority impedes democratic and economic reforms, deepens social differ-
entiation and demoralises society.
Organisation of anticorruption activity is a critical issue not only in Lithuania
and the former “communist” Central and East European countries. The United
Nations Convention Against Corruption adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly in 2003 reads that “corruption is no longer a local matter but a transna-
tional phenomenon that affects all societies and economies, making interna-
tional co-operation to protect and control it essential”.2
It takes more to curb corruption than merely adopt anticorruption legislation,
organise appropriate divisions in law enforcement authorities or make public
declarations of good intentions. Anticorruption activity is a sophisticated, com-
plex activity including not only different political, economic and cultural
spheres of life, but also envisaging specific control and prevention mechanisms
to fight corruption. One of the most effective mechanisms is corruption diagnos-
tics, which helps to identify the most sensitive spheres of life in respect of cor-
ruption, and thus contributes to the development of the most effective anti-
corruption programmes.
In recent years, quite a number of corruption diagnostic researches have been
developed around the world. One of the best-known diagnostics is the Corrup-
tion Perceptions Index that is made public annually by the international
anticorruption organisation Transparency International. The Corruption Per-
ceptions Index is a complex indicator constructed on the basis of surveys of busi-
ness sector representatives and other expert studies, enabling the grouping of
states by corruption proliferation rate. According to the said Index, Lithuania
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1 Transparency International Source Book 2000. Berlin: Transparency International. 2000, p. 1
2 United Nations Convention against Corruption. United Nations. 2003.
still does not belong to countries with a low level of perceived corruption, and is
rated among the “mediocre” states.3
Another well-known corruption diagnostic tool is presented in “Anticor-
ruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate”, a research con-
ducted by the World Bank in 2000.4 This study analyses two forms of corruption:
state capture and administrative corruption. The former influences “rules of the
game” of everyday life, and strives to modify them according to one or another
interest group. Administrative corruption, on the other hand, makes no attempt to
change these “rules of the game”, but tries to affect those who are responsible for
implementing them. According to this research, the state capture index in Lithu-
ania is on the same average level as in such Central and East European countries
as the Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia and Hungary. However, by the adminis-
trative corruption index, Lithuania “outdistances” the said countries, and its po-
sition is closer to that of Kazakhstan, Russia or Albania. Considering that the ad-
ministrative corruption is most often associated with the bribery of public offi-
cials, the results of the World Bank investigation should be seen as a warning, in-
dicating that the rate of bribery is high in Lithuania, which may in turn hamper
the restructuring of society in line with western democratic standards.
The above-mentioned and similar researches have a huge impact when de-
nominating common corruption proliferation factors, both globally and within
specific regions or states. This is simultaneously an advantage and disadvantage,
because such investigations usually fail to represent specific institutional prob-
lems of each country. Based on these investigations, one may say that the admin-
istrative corruption rate is rather high in Lithuania, but one cannot answer the
questions where and how this administrative corruption manifests itself in soci-
ety.
In 2001–2002 the Transparency Intentional Lithuanian Branch—Transpar-
ency International – Lithuanian chapter—initiated the first national survey in
Lithuania: “Map of Corruption in Lithuania”. The survey attempted to monitor
the institutional and geographical spread of corruption in Lithuania. The meth-
odology of the project presupposed the use of representative sociological sur-
veys for the evaluation and analysis of:
• attitudes of the general public and entrepreneurs towards corruption, its level
and role in society;
• personal experience of the general public and entrepreneurs regarding corrup-
tion (bribes);
• sources of information about corruption for the general public and entrepre-
neurs;
• anti-corruption means proposed by the general public and entrepreneurs.
The Embassies of Finland, Great Britain and the United States of America as
well as the World Bank Lithuanian Branch contributed to the project.
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3 In 2003 Lithuania’s index was 4.7 out of 10; it ranked 41 among 133 states.
4 Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate. Washington: World Bank. 2000.
Two groups—Lithuanian residents and representatives of the Lithuanian
business sector—were involved in the study. This article presents the results of
the sociological surveys of Lithuanian residents.
The Joint British–Lithuanian Public Opinion and Market Research Company
“Baltijos tyrimai” carried out sociological questionnaire surveys of the Lithua-
nian general public. The surveys were carried out in July 2001 with 2,028 re-
spondents and in November 2002, when 1,012 residents were interviewed. The
statistical error did not exceed 3.1 percent.
Attitude of Lithuanian residents towards the phenomenon of
corruption in Lithuania
The respondents were asked: “Which of the following statements corresponds
best with your opinion?” The result is presented in Chart 1.
As Chart 1 shows, an absolute majority of residents consider corruption a big
obstacle or an impediment to public life. The number of those who considered
corruption a big obstacle increased by almost 6 percentage points from 2001 to
2002.
The opinions of the respondents about the corruption growth in Lithuania
over the last five years are shown in Chart 2.
More than half of the respondents stated that the corruption rate in Lithuania
had increased during the last years. If compared to 2001, the number of those
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Chart 1. Attitude of Lithuanian residents towards the phenomenon of corruption in
2001-02.
who thought that the corruption rate had grown very much increased in 2002 by 4
percentage points, as did the number of those who said that corruption rate had
remained stable (also 4 percentage points).
The respondents were also asked to assess the corruptness of 88 public au-
thorities. Chart 3 represents these assessments (the higher to the top, the more
frequent was the assessment “very corrupt”) and the personal experience of the
respondents in respect of public authorities (the farther to the right, the greater
the number of respondents who had experienced corruption).
When judging by the “institutional experience” and “institutional assess-
ment” criteria, the following three public authorities were considered as being
most problematic: the Customs, the Traffic Police and the Tax Inspectorate. The
negative assessment of these public authorities was at times based on the respon-
dent’s personal experience. However, in the cases of the Privatisation Agency,
the State Medicines Control Agency and the Financial Crime Investigation Ser-
vice, the negative assessment was hardly ever linked with personal experience. It
is noteworthy that respondents frequently expressed their opinion about the level
of corruption without referring to their personal experience.
Chart 4 shows the sources from which Lithuanian residents obtain informa-
tion about corruption.
Both in 2001 and 2002, the main sources of information about corruption
were the mass media, personal experience and experience of friends/acquain-
tances. While in 2001 the difference between the said sources was insignificant,
in 2002 television had become an indisputable leader in that field: 33 percent of
respondents indicated this to be the main source of information. Experience of
friends and acquaintances ranked second (24 percent), and national press and
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Chart 4. Sources of information for residents to obtain information about corruption in 2001–
2002.
personal experience third and fourth respectively (both approximately 16 per-
cent).
The residents assessed the phenomenon of corruption negatively and esti-
mated that the corruption rate had considerably increased over the last five years.
The respondents were frequently inclined to assess the corruptness of the public
authorities not by referring to their personal experience, but rather to the mass
media, especially television.
The popular assessment of the level of corruption is significant information,
although it does not necessarily reflect reality since, as was noticed, mass media
affected this assessment. As media researches disclose, the mass media may ei-
ther underestimate or overestimate the presented social problem5. Therefore, the
following questions arise: what kind of corruption-related experience do Lithua-
nian residents really have? How often and in what ways have they become vic-
tims/initiators of corruption?
Corruption-related experience of Lithuanian residents
The respondents were asked whether they had given a bribe over the last five
years. Chart 5 presents the results of the 2001 and 2002 surveys.
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5 A. Dobryninas. Virtual reality of crime. Vilnius: Eugrimas. 2001, p. 66–74.
Both in 2001 and 2002, about 38 percent of the respondents admitted that they
had given a bribe during the past five years. The number of residents who had not
given bribes increased from 54 percent in 2001 to 62 percent in 2002. This can be
explained by the fact that the number of respondents who had no opinion was re-
duced by 8 percent over the same period.
Naturally, bribes are not distributed evenly—neither geographically nor insti-
tutionally. Certain public authorities and regions can be distinguished for their
high bribery rate, others for a smaller one. Which public officials in which re-
gions had the respondents bribed? Table 1 represents the results.
The results reveal that residents most often paid off public officials of the mu-
nicipal level (20.7 percent), markedly more often than those of the county (9.2
percent) or national level (8.4 percent). Of the ten counties in Lithuania, the
worst situation was in Klaipeda, where more than 28 percent of the respondents
had “paid off” public authority officials of the municipal level. The best situation
was registered in the Panevezys County, where the corresponding figure was
about 13 percent.
When analysing the bribery distribution, it is important to establish which
public authorities are most corrupt. Chart 6 discloses five most frequently indi-
cated governmental institutions among the analysed 88 Lithuanian public au-
thorities and institutions.
As one can see from the presented results, residents most often bribed the fol-
lowing institutions: local hospitals, policlinics, national level hospitals, the Traf-
fic Police and the Customs.
The so-called bribery indices, i.e. those of extortion, giving, effectiveness and
initiative, help to clarify the situation in the said institutions. The first index reg-
isters how often one “made somebody understand” that a bribe should be given,
the second one how often a bribe was given, the third whether a bribe helped the
situation, and the fourth on whose initiative bribery took place—the briber or the
receiver of the bribe.
The results presented in Table 2 reveal that the highest bribery indices were
established in national level hospitals and the Traffic Police: respectively in 55
and 53 cases one “made somebody understand” that a bribe should be given. And
indeed, also the bribery index is the highest in the said institutions: respectively
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Level of
institution
Alytus
County
Kaunas
County
Klaipéda
County
Marijampolé
County
Panevé¾ys
County
Šiauliai
County
Tauragé
County
Telšiai
County
Utena
County
Vilnius
County
Aver-
age
National 8.1 10.6 3.8 15.0 8.1 2.3 8.2 3.8 10.5 10.8 8.4
County 14.6 9.6 10.9 8.2 3.6 7.5 25.9 6.8 6.7 8.6 9.2
Municipal 16.8 21.6 28.4 18.5 13.9 18.4 27.9 16.1 27.3 19.6 20.7
No answer 17.3 9.6 6.4 2.0 6.3 12.9 1.2 7.7 7.7 4.1 7.5
Total 5.3 20.6 11.7 4.8 9.2 11.0 3.3 4.4 5.7 23.9 100
Table 1. Which public officials did you bribe? (2002)
in 58 and 50 cases bribes were given. The index of effectiveness is the highest
with the Traffic Police: bribery helped in 90 out of 100 cases. Only in national
level hospitals were the respondents active to take the initiative; in all other insti-
tutions, the initiative was more often taken by the representative of the institution
than by the client.
The high index of effectiveness supports the respondents’ notion that bribes
help to resolve “challenging problems”. People are prepared to pay considerable
amounts for such illegal “decisions”. There even exists an unwritten price-list for
illegal payments in Lithuania. Chart 7 represents the average “maximum and
minimum bribe” in the aforementioned most corrupt institutions.
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Index of
extortion
Index of
giving
Index of
effectiveness
Index of
initiative
Local hospitals 0.44 0.40 0.75 -0.04
Policlinics 0.23 0.22 0.82 -0.01
National level hospitals 0.55 0.58 0.78 0.03
Traffic police 0.53 0.50 0.90 -0.03
Customs 0.44 0.36 0.86 -0.08
Table 2. Bribery indices (2002)
General public
5.1
11.6
12.2
12.7
13.2
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0
The Lithuanian
Customs
The Traffic
Police
National
Hospitals
Policlinics
Local
Hospitals
Chart 6. Most frequently indicated governmental institutions in 2002 (based on ex-
perience of last five years)
Among the five most corrupt institutions, Lithuanian residents paid the most
in Customs Houses—the average maximum was as much as 617 LTL6, while the
average minimum was 144 LTL. The smallest bribes were paid in policlinics: the
average maximum was 101 LTL, the average minimum 33 LTL.
Sociological surveys have shown that about one-third of all corruption cases
consist of bribery. In Lithuania, the residents’ attitude towards bribery causes
anxiety. An absolute majority of the respondents (75 percent) believed that brib-
ery helps to resolve “problems” in Lithuania, 60 percent were ready to give a
bribe “when necessary” and only 21 percent maintained that they would not give
a bribe. This reveals a peculiar and prevalent “bribery” mentality in Lithuanian
society.
Unfortunately, one has to say that there exists quite a substantial potential
“bribery market” in Lithuania. Neither the possible imposition of a punitive
sanction (bribing and taking a bribe are both considered a crime), nor the com-
mon attitude of residents that corruption does not promote public life have been
able to diminish it.
Lithuanian residents’ assessment of anticorruption potential
How do residents, who on one hand condemn corruption as an obstacle for life
and society’s development but who, on the other hand, are prepared to settle their
affairs by bribery, plan to fight corruption? Chart 8 gives a partial answer to this
question:
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General Public
346
101
417
224
617
35 33
103
69
144
Local
Hospitals
Policlinics National
Hospitals
The Traffic
Police
The Lithuanian
Customs
Average maximum Average minimum
Chart 7. Bribery “price-list” (2002)
6 1 € = 3.45 LTL
As many as 43 percent of residents gave priority to law enforcement or puni-
tive measures. A slightly lower percentage preferred preventive measures, i.e.
they wanted to concentrate on the causes rather than the outcome. However,
when the respondents were asked whether a National anti-corruption strategy
would help to reduce the corruption rate in Lithuania, only 15 percent responded
that it would, 45 percent said that it would not and 40 percent gave no answer.
The anti-corruption potential can be assessed from another perspective, too.
This is provided by the interesting group of those who responded that they had
never given a bribe. Chart 9 illustrates their motivations.
One should pay attention to the fact that only 13 percent had not given a bribe
due to moral conviction or because it is prohibited. One can hardly expect that
their share will increase in the near future: attitudes may eventually change pro-
vided that there is effective anti-corruption education available. Therefore, if one
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What is the most effective anticorruption measure?
Prevention
41%
Law
enforcement
43%
N/O
16%
Chart 8. Effectiveness of anti-corruption measures (2002)
General Public
There was no
such situation
42%
N/A
11%
Did not believe
that it would
help
7%
Lack of
experience
6%
Did not have
money
21%
Contradict to
moral values
10%
It would be
Illegal
3%
Chart 9. Why did you not give a bribe? (2002)
wants to prevent corruption, a mere appeal to one’s morality and legal principles
is not enough. At present, such arguments seem to fall on deaf ears in Lithuania.
On the other hand, 42 percent of the respondents answered that they had never
given a bribe because they had not felt the need to do so. This result can be as-
sessed both pessimistically and optimistically: One could say that the absence of
bribery depends upon contingency. However, one could also suggest that people
live in such an environment where services can be obtained without some extra
illegal payment. This would confirm the opinion of anti-corruption experts who
say that there lies a huge anti-corruption potential primarily in public administra-
tion and new management, where the lack of corruption is ensured by the trans-
parency and openness of governance.7
In the process of assessing the provided results, one must emphasise that the
“Map of Corruption in Lithuania”, like any other diagnostic measurement, is
only able to assess those phenomena that can be disclosed by applying research
methodology. In this case, we can only hope that the corruption monitoring
methodology used to assess the residents’ attitudes towards anticorruption and
their corruption-related experience, not only enable us to clearly delineate the in-
stitutional and geographical corruption map and provide deeper analysis of the
corruption rate in Lithuania, but that it also provides public authorities and
non-governmental organisations with more precise, more practical and more ef-
fective tools with which they can resolve corruption problems in Lithuanian so-
ciety.
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7 Transparency International Source Book 2000. Berlin: Transparency International. 2000, p. 105.
Organized Crime and Corruption in
Ukraine as a System Phenomenon
Viktor Dryomin,
Criminology and Penitentiary Law Department at the Odessa
National Academy of Law, and Information and Research
Center on Organized Crime, Ukraine
The history of mankind is not just a story of progressive development and spiri-
tual improvement. It is also a story of terrible violent crimes with millions of vic-
tims all over the world. From the beginning of humanity people have been trying
to explain the origin and meaning of human life. The history of mankind is a
never-ending struggle with nature in order to survive. At the same time humanity
has been unable to stop people from killing other people. Many centuries have
passed, but people have achieved very little: they have simply invented different
types of punishment for different crimes. People have thought of different and
complicated ways to commit crimes, while others have elaborated a whole puni-
tive system for serious and minor offences. Today the world is full of prisons.
Some of them are modern and comfortable, others simply degrading and bar-
baric. People use violence as a remedy against violence and murder against mur-
der, which has become an accepted norm and is recognised by the law. Such
legalised violence is the prerogative of a state as the main political and social in-
stitute. Violence, stipulated by the law, is gradually becoming an essential part of
modern civilisation and a crime itself. Modern states have succeeded in develop-
ing cruel repressive methods, which do not, however, stop people from breaking
the law. Thousands of executed and millions of convicted criminals, kept in pris-
ons, prove that even severe and inhuman punishments cannot change human na-
ture, nor affect the unexplainable and unreasonable desire to kill and hurt other
human beings.
The last decade of the 20th century witnessed an unprecedented social experi-
ment, which had a tremendous impact on the fates of nations and individuals. By
this we mean the collapse of the communist bloc, the disintegration of the Soviet
Union and the emergence of new independent states. All these developments
radically changed the world geopolitical situation.
Many politicians assume that the main outcomes of the current reforms in the
former Soviet Union republics will be the establishment of free market economy
and truly democratic civil society. However, we should expect equally signifi-
cant criminological consequences from the collapse of the USSR. They are man-
ifested in the penetration of crime and organised crime into economy, politics
and culture, embracing all layers of society. Total criminalisation threatens to
transform the post-communist society into a criminal society.
Professionals have been given a unique chance to observe and even partici-
pate in the global social and criminological experiment, which can significantly
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influence the long-lasting debate about the role of social and biological factors in
the determination of criminal behaviour. Obviously the genetic nature of human
beings has not changed very much during the recent decade while the social con-
ditions of their lives have taken a radical turn. This leads to the conclusion that
deterioration of social welfare and other similar factors are the main causes for
an extremely high level of crime. However, it would be unfair to say that the re-
forms alone lead to total criminalisation because also a completely different con-
clusion can be made: the crime level is constantly increasing in spite of the
changing conditions of human life (both for the worse and for the better). Thus
probably the main and even the only source of crime is human nature, which has
remained more or less the same for many centuries. The law of self-preservation
makes human beings react and adjust to the changing environment.
Criminal and anti-social behaviour is one form of such reaction and means of
self-preservation, manifested by high level of crime and vivid tendency to grow.
Official statistics show that criminal activity has become one of the most wide-
spread types of activity and can be called a criminal practice.
A criminal practice is a widespread type of social practice and specific experi-
ence manifested in behaviour forbidden by criminal law. Criminal practice has
adopted features of a concrete “focused” activity, competing with other social
practices, such as labour, recreation or sports. The contents of this activity is
crime. Criminal practice has become an independent phenomenon performing
specific functions in society. It is proved by the fact that the words criminality,
criminal society, criminal activity, criminal environment, criminal leader, crimi-
nal way of life, etc are commonly used in conversational, written and profes-
sional language. Criminal jargon is also widely used in everyday speech.
Millions of people are involved in criminal activity all over the world. Due to
its enormous financial, human and ideological resources, criminal practice
greatly influences all legitimate activities and expands the reproduction of
crime. Organised crime is the most vivid example of criminal practice since it
has all the features of professional activity. As any social practice, criminal prac-
tice has a subject, object and content form. Understanding criminal practice as a
type of social experience to a great extent clarifies the issue of crime reproduc-
tion.
In spite of the fact that the available criminological data on crime expansion in
modern world need theoretical analysis, the issue of crime reproduction has not
been largely discussed by Ukrainian criminologists. In Russia, this area has been
studied for many years by Professor A. Dolgova and her school within the frame-
work of comprehensive analysis of crime [1]. Dolgova regards crime as a system
with internal and external links, certain patterns and capacity for self-determina-
tion. Such an approach has a well-grounded theoretical basis. But how did the
system become established and what are the sources for its existence? The con-
clusion about self-determination and the effects on society explains the opera-
tional mechanism of the criminal system. These conclusions are confirmed by
criminal practice.
The Table below contains statistics on crime in Ukraine for the period
1973–2000. The general trends of crime rates are the following:
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From the Table it is evident that the years when Ukrainian independence was
built were marked by the highest level of crime.
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Year
Registered
crimes
%
compared
to the
previous
year
%
compared
to 1973
Detected
offenders
%
compared
to the
previous
year
%
compared
to 1973
Convicted
offenders
%
compared
to 1973
Custodial
sentences
%
of
custodial
sentences
1973 128 340 94.6 100 136 752 96.2 100 103 969 100 - -
1974 144 325 112.5 112.5 142 517 104.2 104.2 110 373 106.2 - -
1975 145 117 100.5 113.1 152 761 107.2 111.7 110 419 106.2 - -
1976 148 514 102.3 115.8 153 411 100.4 112.2 113 294 109.0 - -
1977 141 604 95.3 110.3 138 455 90.3 101.2 104 100 100.1 - -
1978 155 088 109.5 120.8 145 240 104.9 106.2 113 338 109.0 - -
1979 178 019 114.8 138.7 153 623 105.8 112.3 123 566 118.8 - -
1980 196 902 110.6 153.4 175 244 114.1 128.1 138 223 132.9 - -
1981 209 136 106.2 163.0 189 252 107.8 138.4 151 495 145.7 - -
1982 212 990 101.8 166.9 196 551 103.9 143.7 162 777 156.6 - -
1983 236 580 111.1 184.3 209 083 106.4 152.9 167 901 161.5 - -
1984 229 712 97.1 179.0 203 034 97.1 148.5 169 509 163.0 - -
1985 249 553 108.7 194.5 226 072 111.3 165.3 173 877 167.2 - -
1986 248 663 99.6 193.8 230 236 101.8 168.4 167 572 161.2 - -
1987 237 821 95.6 185.3 204 482 88.8 149.5 124 905 120.1 38 845 31.1
1988 242 974 102.2 189.3 172 703 84.5 126.3 90 987 87.5 29 372 32.3
1989 322 340 132.7 251.2 173 997 100.7 127.2 90 121 86.7 31 197 34.6
1990 369 809 114.7 288.2 186 683 107.3 136.5 104 199 100.2 35 947 34.5
1991 405 516 109.7 316.0 187 468 100.4 137.1 108 555 104.4 35 045 32.3
1992 480 478 118.5 374.4 207 326 110.6 151.6 115 260 110.9 38 740 33.7
1993 539 299 112.2 420.2 242 363 116.9 177.2 152 878 147.0 54 019 35.3
1994 571 891 106.0 445.6 269 061 111.0 196.8 174 959 168.3 63 572 36.3
1995 641 860 112.2 500.1 340 421 126.5 248.9 212 915 204.8 74 689 35.1
1996 617 262 96.2 481.0 339 530 99.7 248.3 242 124 232.9 85 824 35.4
1997 589 208 95.5 459.1 337 908 99.5 247.1 234 613 225.7 83 396 35.1
1998 575 982 97.8 448.8 330 067 97.7 241.4 232 598 223.7 86 437 37.2
1999 545 416 94.7 425.0 309 808 93.9 226.5 222 239 213.8 83 339 37.5
2000 553 594 101.5 431.4 309 057 99.8 226.0 230 903 222.1 82 869 35.9
Total 9 317 993 - - 6 063 105 - - 4 247 669 - - -
Table 1. Crime rate and conviction rate in Ukraine (1973–2000)
From 1986 (the beginning of democratic reforms in the USSR) to 1997 (the
following year was the starting point for the slump in crime rates) the number of
crimes per 100,000 population were the following: 488 crimes in 1986; 484 in
1987; 473 in 1988; 623 in 1989; 718 in 1990; 921 in 1992; 1,033 in 1993; 1,096
in 1994; 1,241 in 1995; 1,202 in 1996; 1,159 in 1997.
For the purpose of criminological analysis we subdivide the outlined period
into three phases, distinguished by the economic and political situation, pecu-
liarities of legal regulation and dynamics of crime rate.
The first period (1973–1981), known as the stagnation period or Brezhnev’s
epoch, was marked by the authoritarian system of government. The second pe-
riod (1982–1990) is known as perestroyka, used in different languages without
translation. This period began under Yu. Andropov and continued under the gov-
ernment of M. Gorbachev. The third period (1991–2000) was marked by the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new independent states. Each pe-
riod is characterised by specific peculiarities reflected, among other things, in
the crime statistics.
In 1973–1981, the total number of registered crimes was 1,447,045; in
1982–1990 2,350,442 crimes; and in 1991–2000 their number was 5,520,506.
Compared to 1973, the growth in the crime rate was 184% in 1983; 500% in
1995, and 431% in the year 2000.
The rate of crime detection corresponds to the above figures. Statistics for the
detected offenders are the following:
When the high level of latency is taken into account, we can assume that in re-
ality the crime rate is perhaps four or five times higher than the official statistics.
Judicial practice within the same period reveals a different tendency. In 1973,
the number of convicted offenders was 103,969; in 1983 and 1995 it was 167,901
and 212,915 respectively (162% and 205% compared to 1973). When compared
to 1973, the number of registered crimes and people charged with offence in-
creased in 1995 500% and 249% respectively. However, the number of offenders
convicted by the Court increased only by 205%. Naturally, one needs to bear in
mind repeated crime, which affects the figure of convicted offenders.
However, it is quite evident that the dynamic growth in registered crime does
not correspond to the dynamic growth in convictions. Some years are character-
ised by the growth in crime and dramatic fall in convictions (the most vivid ex-
amples being 1987–1989). These data should be analysed separately. The ana-
lysed period is generally marked by the large growth of crime.
The social status of the offenders does not reflect the social stratification of
the population in general. For example, in 1996 the social status of convicted of-
fenders was the following:
• industrial workers: 22%
• agricultural workers approx. 7%
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Year 1973 1983 1995 2000
Detected offenders 196 551 209 083 340 421 309 057
Growth rate compared to 1973 - 153 % 249 % 226 %
• employees approx. 7%
• students approx. 5%
• other categories (pensioners, disabled people, housewives) 10,8%
• unemployed approx. 42% (57% in 1997)
About half of all offenders were unemployed when they committed the offence.
These facts prove the direct link between economic crisis and the rate of crime.
The classification of crimes reflects the whole spectre of motivation for offen-
sive behaviour. The public is most concerned about the steady growth in serious
violent crimes, such as intentional murder and serious bodily harm. In
1993–1997, the share of intentional murders increased from 16 to 21%, and seri-
ous bodily harm from 27 to 37%. The following table illustrates the dynamics of
intentional murder within this period.
In 1993, juvenile offenders committed 159 intentional murders, in 1997 this
figure increased to 232 intentional murders.
Both intentional murder and serious bodily harm are often committed under
such circumstances where many people are exposed to danger, and where explo-
sions, arson, and firearms are involved. The criminals try to intimidate the public
by using terrorist methods. In 1991, 70 crimes were committed using terrorist
methods, while in 1995 such methods were applied in more than 180 cases. A
similar situation applies to mercenary killings: 1993 – 87 registered crimes;
1994 – 198; 1995 – 210; 1996 – 157 [2].
During 9 months of 2002, the gangs and criminal organisations throughout
Ukraine committed 5,298 crimes, of which 4,340 belonged to the category of
common criminal offences.
The Table below lists the main types of offences committed by these criminal
groups, and their share in the total amount of common criminal offences [3].
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Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Number of crimes 4 008 4 571 4 783 4 896 4 529
Type of offence Detected offences Share of all offences
Common criminal offence 4 340 100 %
Theft 1 707 39 %
Major theft 500 0.01% (29% of total theft)
Brigandage 588 14 %
Illegal dealing in drugs, psychotropic
substances and precursors
450 10 %
Illegal dealing in weapons 215 5 %
Robbery 187 4 %
Extortion 108 2.50 %
Intentional murder (including attempts) 80 2 %
Gangsterism 66 2 %
Human trafficking 26 0.60 %
Taking of hostages 2 0.05 %
The figures prove that common criminal offences like thefts, robberies and il-
legal drug dealing constitute the biggest share of all offences (63%).
The Ministry of the Interior reports that 1987–1997 were marked by an inten-
sive growth in armed robberies: in ten years their number multiplied by a factor
of nine.
In spite of the undeniable growth in violent crimes, there is evidence that the
most pressing problem in Ukraine is the growth in economic crime. Between
1987 and 1997 their number doubled to 62,400 crimes, although this type of
crime as well as tax evasion, corruption, financial fraud, etc is marked by a high
level of latency.
The above-mentioned types of offence are mostly committed in connection
with banking and crediting, foreign economic activity, privatisation and energy
supply. According to the official statistics of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in
1997, 3,600 offences were detected in the sphere of energy supply. They in-
volved 1,855 offences in oil industry, 278 offences dealing with natural gas, and
805 offences related to electricity supply. In addition, the law enforcement bod-
ies detected 1,102 crimes in enterprises manufacturing and selling alcoholic bev-
erages [4]. Offences in this sphere have acquired the form of organised crime. In
1997, the Fraud department detected 1,079 criminal gangs with a total of 4,393
members. They committed 7,434 crimes, including 361 violations in banking
and crediting, and 184 violations in the sphere of foreign economic activity.
There is evidence that the members of these gangs were involved in 112 murders
and 530 armed robberies. According to V. Skribets, organised crime is becoming
more influential due to the accumulated financial resources and connections in
the government bodies. Organised criminal groups try to establish control over
commercial banks, foreign economic activity, exportation of goods and raw ma-
terials, and privatisation of state property [5].
The transition period with its economic reforms brought about new types of
economic crimes and mechanisms, new methods of planning illegal transactions
and taking advantage of corruption. Criminal conduct is particularly common in
the sphere of finance because it is very difficult to exercise legal control over fi-
nancial transactions.
This is demonstrated by the dynamic growth in financial crimes. Over the last
years, their number has tripled to 9,000 crimes of which 4,100 occur in the sphere
of banking. For comparison, corresponding figures from preceding years:
In 2000, 6,200 banking violations were investigated and charges were
brought against 1,500 persons. The growing number of offences in this sphere
results in bigger damages to the country’s economy amounting to 75% of losses
in the sphere of finance.
There is no doubt that shadow economy is a crucial factor contributing to the
growth of organised crime. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Statistics and
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Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Number of financial crimes 362 533 5 400 7 800 8 200
some expert assessments, shadow economy amounts to 40 percent of the gross
domestic product. In one way or another, the entire population of Ukraine is in-
volved in the shadow economy. The forms of this involvement vary from getting
payment in cash in so-called “envelopes” to tax evasion, corruption, etc. Accord-
ing to some estimates, capital kept abroad amounts to $15–20 billion [6]. Thus,
organised crime is closely related to the shadow economy, which emerges and
flourishes due to the loopholes in legislation, and to the merger of criminal world
and different branches of government with the purpose of gaining power and
profit [7].
The shadow economy in modern Ukraine has been shaped over the past two
decades on the basis of two main components: corrupt representatives of state
power and matured criminal “businessmen”. The share of criminalised business
clans is constantly increasing [8].
Corruption plays a very special role in the reproduction of crime. In Ukraine,
the level of corruption is so high that foreign experts place it among the most cor-
rupt states in the world. Corruption of the law enforcement bodies and of the ju-
diciary system presents the biggest threat to society. In 1997, the Institute of Eco-
nomic Development at the World Bank investigated corruption among Ukrai-
nian judges. According to this research, more than 20 percent of the citizens
whose cases had been tried in the Courts of first instance (District Courts) had
bribed judges either by cash or commodities. More than 30 percent of the respon-
dents complained about unjustified delays and 15 percent about inappropriate
behaviour of the judges [9].
According to a research conducted in Odessa in 2003, 80% of the 400 respon-
dents believed that corruption flourishes among the judges and the staff of the
law enforcement bodies, such as militia, the prosecutor’s office, taxation agency
and the National Security service. 68% knew cases of corruption in the local
courts, 63% in administrative courts, and 56% in the Court of Appeal. 47% of the
respondents were certain that the judges of the Supreme Court are also corrupt.
The interrelationship between organised crime and corruption has become a
cliché. Corruption of the law enforcement officers is one of the means with
which they are forced to co-operate with the criminal world. To a great extent,
corruption is caused by low salaries, which do not ensure a decent lifestyle for
the law enforcers.
Assessment of the current situation of corruption leads to the conclusion that
corruption is an integral part of Ukrainian society and an independent system of
social relations. At the same time it is closely linked with other spheres of social
relations. There is an intricate system of corrupt relationships on different levels
of government and law enforcement, making corruption a constituent element of
the whole system.
Due to huge investments of funds, corruption is capable of reproduction. Peo-
ple view corruption as an independent source of income that is much higher than
the official salary. Corruption has become one of the strongest elements of the
shadow economy, inseparable from legitimate economy. There are justified
opinions that at the moment, the state is not interested in eliminating corruption
because it could lead to social, economic and political crisis.
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One of the crucial issues is to identify the causes of such rapid growth of or-
ganised crime and corruption in Ukraine. In the author’s opinion it is the result of
several factors.
The rapid growth of organised crime in Ukraine was largely affected by the
destabilisation of state power as a result of the collapse of the USSR. Political,
economic and legal reforms led to social instability, and the criminally-minded
part of the population took advantage of this situation. The unjustified redistribu-
tion of national income, abusive privatisation, deceit of the population due to fi-
nancial fraud and other similar activities led to the unprecedented growth in the
criminal potential used for the expansion of criminal activity and its influence in
society.
The participants of the Round table, dedicated to the prevention of economic
crime, came to the conclusion that the causes of economic crime and its growth
include ineffective management, shortcomings in the new laws and narrowing of
governmental control over economic activities [10].
It is widely known that the USSR was an authoritarian state based on Commu-
nist ideology. From the official standpoint, there was no criminality in the Soviet
state. In order to conceal the actual situation, the communist party did not publish
official crime statistics. Yet during the years of Soviet power at least 80–90 mil-
lion people served sentences in prison or exile. They acquired certain criminal
experience, which they passed on to the next generation. In the Soviet Union,
there were basically two categories of crime: common criminal offences, such as
murder, theft, armed robbery, etc) and political crimes, such espionage, treason,
etc. Naturally the first category was the prevailing one. Low living standards led
to the emergence of specific criminal groups with their own jargon and criminal
traditions. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian nouveau riches pri-
vatised properties and accumulated huge fortunes with fraudulent transactions
on the security market. Very soon the public discovered that the capital and prop-
erties had been captured by the former communist party and Comsomol bosses
who had been in power when the Soviet Union collapsed. They had held auctions
and carried out the privatisation according to an old familiar custom: power out-
weighs the law.
Organised crime emerged in Ukraine and in other post-Soviet states due to the
merger of political and economic opportunities of the former party and
Comsomol apparatchiks with recidivist criminals, known today as the Godfa-
thers. This relationship which might at first seem strange, is actually quite natu-
ral and logical, and based on a common style of management where violence,
suppression, deceit and fear are the key factors.
As their fortunes accumulated, the new capitalists realised the need to protect
and increase their property acquired through crime. They tried to penetrate into
the private sector and government in order to acquire political influence and af-
fect decision-making on the highest level. At the same time they were keen on
expanding illegal business that would enable them to gain maximum profit in
minimum time. As it was a dangerous occupation, they had to think about their
personal security. To meet these objectives they started forming criminal organi-
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sations, similar to the gangs of some Western countries. Thus, as strange as it
might seem, the communist ideology was easily replaced by a criminal one, and
the former party leaders eagerly entered into co-operation with the criminal
world.
Presently large criminal organisations and small gangs possess whole arse-
nals of firearms and explosive substances. With weapons the criminals are able
to demonstrate to the public their real strength and power [11]. In 1997, the law
enforcement bodies confiscated 892 pistols, 205 automatic guns, 1,090 units of
custom-made pistols, 613 carabines, 960 sports guns, 430.3 kg of explosive sub-
stances, 835 grenades, and 298.5 thousand cartridges. Statistics on intentional
murder with the use of firearms demonstrate the following dynamics:
Analysts of the Ministry of the Interior have noted that modern criminal or-
ganisations utilise a mixed type of economic and violent crime, combining meth-
ods of criminal business with violent methods of terror against business rivals,
legitimate businessmen and officials [12].
Criminal terror as a feature of organised crime is essential for the reproduction
and self-determination of crime.
Criminal leaders often act as arbitrators who solve both disputes of the crimi-
nal world and ordinary business disputes. Thus they have become an important
part of economic and political life, and decision-making instruments on the level
of national and local governments. By using terrorist methods the criminals
force government officials and businessmen to undertake actions for their bene-
fit. The impunity of criminal leaders and gang members creates an impression of
the unlimited power of the Mafia. It inspires respect among some parts of the
population, particularly the young, and under certain circumstances they may be
willing to join up.
We believe that the path the organised crime in Ukraine has chosen is particu-
larly dangerous for society. The merger of the former communist party apparat-
chiks and the new criminal leaders makes it easier for organised crime to pene-
trate into all spheres of public life. The interrelation of legal and criminal busi-
ness creates a basis and source of reproduction for organised crime. Criminal tra-
ditions and sub-culture have a strong influence also on the cultural sphere.
The mass media and modern show business facilitate the matter by propagat-
ing violence, terror and force. All these factors change the traditional moral val-
ues and attitudes.
Hundreds of domestic and imported movies show that violence is the main
tool for managing peoples’ behaviour. Films portray criminal leaders and ordi-
nary gangsters as attractive characters worthy of the spectator’s sympathy (a
vivid example being the “Brigade” TV serial). The Internet and numerous vio-
lent computer games make matters worse. Young people get used to violence and
start to believe that it is an acceptable method to solve problems.
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Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Number of intentional murders
with the use of firearms 194 296 254 300 300
The mass media lavishes the public with information about terrorist acts, “res-
onance” crimes, murders, mercenary killings, robberies, etc. Attitude studies
show that criminal news are among the most popular topics in newspapers and on
TV.
Using the method of content analysis the author of the present paper studied
about 500 publications on legal topics in several central and local newspapers.
The author discovered that about 80 percent of these publications deal with
crime. A vast majority of articles (58 percent) describe in detail serious violent
crimes, such as terrorist acts, gangster attacks, extremely violent murders, rapes,
torture, racket, etc. The press and TV indulge in the description of crime and the
victims’ sufferings. Numerous publications about serial killers are often based
on interviews with the criminals, their friends and relatives. Each resonant crime
is reproduced in numerous editions and cycles of TV programmes, etc. The pub-
lic gets an impression that such crimes are very common and widespread. The
image of criminals, created by the media, is often far from reality. Some crimi-
nals are misjudged by the audience due to the “nimbus effect”. The people attrib-
ute qualities to criminals which they do not possess in real life.
Hence we are actually dealing with two types of crime: the actual crime exist-
ing in reality, and the informational crime reproduced by the mass media
(“infocrime”). Our perceptions and ideas about crime are shaped by both reality
and media depiction. It is evident that these two phenomena are not identical in
form or content: in real life profitable non-violent crimes and fraud predominate
(more than 60 percent), but in infocrime, the share of serious violent crimes is ap-
proximately 70 percent.
Both the reality and the mass media have added to a specific social and psy-
chological atmosphere in society, characterised by such attitudes and ideas that
contribute to the neutralisation and justification of criminal behaviour.
The comprehensive approach to crime as a type of social practice will shift the
focus from “combating” crime to bringing positive changes to this behaviour. It
is hardly possible to “combat” the entire population. Moreover, the enemies in
this fight have similar moral values and psychology, and often change place with
each other. However, the notion of social and anti-social behaviour gives us hope
that the level of crime and the number of people involved in criminal activity can
be reduced. In this respect the only alternative is to increase financial motivation.
It is vitally important to create conditions under which criminal activity will not
be profitable. This can be achieved by introducing corporate criminal liability
and other measures.
Presently, Ukraine does not have a comprehensive public policy for combat-
ing organised crime on different levels. To elaborate such a policy it would be
necessary to work out a state policy concept against crime in general, and mea-
sures against organised crime should be an integral part of such comprehensive
strategies. The policy should be based on the realisation that organised crime is a
complex social phenomenon, capable of self-determination and reproduction.
The primary goal of such a policy should be public security as an essential ele-
ment of national security. However, it is quite obvious that such objectives are
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not achievable without political will to reform the judicial system, the law-en-
forcement bodies and the system of government.
On the other hand, the government should undertake the responsibility to pro-
vide employment for those who change their anti-social attitudes and stop of-
fending. In this respect the past experience of the Soviet Union and international
practices can be useful. It involves governmental funding for new enterprises and
new jobs (Japan, Sweden, etc.). The growth in crime during the transition period
in Ukraine shows that the state should maintain some control over national econ-
omy. There is no doubt that eventually Ukraine, a new independent state will be-
come stronger. To resist crime, the government will elaborate and implement
sound state policy, based on moral values and ideology and adequate financial
support.
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Contemporary Russian Corruption
Yakov Gilinskiy,
Sociological Institute, St. Petersburg, Russia
All social reality is precarious.
All societies are constructions
in the face of chaos.
P. Berger, T. Luckmann
Do ut facias1.
What is corruption?
There are too many definitions of corruption (Friedrich, 1972; Heidenheimer,
Johnston, Le Vine, 1989; Meny, 1996; Nye, 1967; Palmier, 1985; Rose-
Ackerman, 1978; Wewer, 1994; and others). Perhaps the shortest (and the most
precise) of them is: “the abuse of public power for private profit” (/Joseph
Senturia/ see: Wewer, 1994: 481). The UN offers an analogous definition (Reso-
lution 34/169 of the UN General Assembly, 12.17.1979).
There are too many forms (manifestations) of corruption: bribery, favourit-
ism, nepotism, protectionism, lobbying, illegal distribution and redistribution of
public resources and funds, theft of treasury, illegal privatisation, illegal financ-
ing of political structures, extortion, allowance of favourable credit (contracts),
buying votes, the famous Russian “blat” (different services for relatives, friends,
acquaintances /Ledeneva, 1998/), etc.
There are three main sociological models of corruption: “nomenclative” (in-
fringement of official norms for the sake of private relations), “market” (business
activities for maximisation of income) and “public interest” (corrupt practices as
threat to public interest).
Heidenheimer distinguishes “routine” (presents, bribery) and “aggravating”
corruption (extortion and organised crime relations); and “white” (when public
opinion does not regard corrupt action as reprehensible), “grey” (when there is
no public consensus) and “black” (general disapproval of corrupt action) corrup-
tion (Heidenheimer, Johnston, Le Vine, 1989).
Corruption is a complicated social phenomenon. It is intertwined with the re-
lations of economic exchange (brokers). It is a type (manifestation) of venality
just as marriage swindling or prostitution (the venality of spirit or body…), and it
exists in societies of commodity and pecuniary circulation.
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1 I give that you make (Latin)
Corruption is a social construction (Berger, Luckmann, 1967). Society deter-
mines (“constructs”) what, where, when, and under which conditions is consid-
ered as “corruption”, “crime”, “prostitution” and so forth. How is corruption
constructed? This process includes numerous bribes of different State employ-
ees; the consciousness of these facts as social phenomenon, as corruption, as so-
cial problem; the criminalisation of some forms of corruption (for example, brib-
ery, extortion, theft of treasury, etc.), and so on.
Corruption is a social institution (Kuznetchov, 2000; Timofeev, 2000). It is a
part, an element of the system of management and government; it consists of
some elements, ways, methods, means of the process of managing and govern-
ing. It is a pity, but it is a fact. Corruption is a social institution because:
• Corruption carries out certain social functions: simplifying administrative re-
lations; accelerating administrative decisions; consolidating and restructur-
ing relations between social classes, strata; adding to economic development
by decreasing government regulation; optimising economy when there is a
deficit of resources; etc. (Leff, 1964; Scott, 1972; and others).
• The process of corruption involves actions of certain persons: bribe-takers,
bribers, mediators. They are in “patron–client” relationship with each other.
They play certain social roles.
• There are certain rules (norms), and participants know them.
• Certain slang and symbols exist.
• There are certain fixed prices (“tariffs”). In Russia, some of these prices have
been made public by the press. The newspaper “Signal” (1996, N1) published
tariffs for the illegal services of GAI—State Transport Inspection; the news-
paper “Vash Tain’y Sovetnik” (“Your Secret Counselor”) tariffs for “free” ed-
ucation in different universities of St. Petersburg (including faculties of law
and Police Academy…). Perhaps the most interesting data were published in
the book “Corruption and Combat Corruption” (2000: 62-63): there are fixed
prices for bribery when obstructing an investigation (bringing an action) in
criminal cases - $1,000-10,000; for substitution of arrest for obligation to give
a written statement agreeing not to leave a place—$20,000–25,000; for re-
ducing punishment—$5,000–15,000; for “ignorance” in customs infringe-
ment—$10,000–20,000 or 20–25% of customs duty. Moreover there are data
on tariffs for bribing high State officials: the head of Duma’s (Russian parlia-
ment) committee—$30,000, assistant of the deputy—$4,000–5,000, a pre-
sentation of law project—$250,000 (Sungurov, 2000: 41). These prices are
undoubtedly subject to inflation adjustment, and will, therefore, rise.
Brief summary of Russian corruption
It is a pity, but corruption is a Russian tradition (see: Kabanov, 1995;
Kirpitchnikov, 1997). “Legal” corruption began already in the IX–X centuries,
when an institute called “kormlenie” (“nourishment”, “feeding”) was formed.
The Russian head of State (prince, tsar) sent his representative to a province
without salary, but for “kormlenie”: the people of the province were to provide
for the representative, who had a lot of power. Local people started to bring
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“presents” for favourable decisions. The institute was officially abolished in
1556, but the habit of bribing survived (and still does…).
Later “kormlenie” was transformed to “lichoimstvo” (bribe with infringe-
ment of law) and “mzdoimstvo” (bribe without infringement of law), which in
turn were (in ca. XV century) replaced by “vzjatotchnitchestvo” (taking a bribe,
corruption). The first law to stipulate a punishment for judges who took bribes
was “Sudebnik” (Law for Court, “sud” = court) of 1497. In the 16th century,
“Vymogatel’stvo” (extortion) was acknowledged as a form of corruption. Cor-
ruption turned into an epidemic in Russia in the XVIII century. The Tsar (em-
peror) Peter I (“Peter the Great”, 1672–1725) was very concerned of mass cor-
ruption, and attempted to restrict it even by the death penalty (Edicts 23 August
1713, 24 December 1714, 5 February 1724), but in vain. Even his best friend,
Prince Men’shikov, was corrupt! All future legislation (1845, 1866, 1916) in-
cluded statutes on the different forms of corruption. But “Corruption is immor-
tal!”… Or as P. Berlin wrote about Russia: “Taking bribes is indissolubly inter-
laced with the whole system and political life” (Berlin, 1910: 48).
The Soviet State fought corruption, too (also by death penalty since 1922), but
nothing worked. It is known that corruption existed even during Stalin’s totalitar-
ian regime, although in complete secrecy. In the 1960s and 1970s, the leaders of
the Communist Party and the Soviet State (the so-called “nomenclature”) and
Soviet bureaucrats were absolutely corrupt.
How widespread is Russian corruption?
There is corruption in all countries. It is a world-wide problem. But the dimen-
sions of corruption vary. In Russia, corruption is common in all organs of power
and establishments. The Corruption Perception Index 2002 (published by Trans-
parency International) for Russia is 2.7; it is on the 74th place among 102 coun-
tries (least corruption: Finland, Index—9.7, most corruption: Bangladesh, In-
dex—1.2).
The damage caused by corruption is estimated at $20–25 milliard per year.
Every year $15–25 milliard of Russian capital is exported abroad. Between
1988–1999, the corresponding figure was $300–350 milliard in all (Corruption
and Combat Corruption: Role of Civil Society, 2000: 18–21; 72–73).
Every day Russian and foreign mass media reveal more facts about Russian
corruption and corrupt activities. Every day Russian newspapers and journals
publish names of people who have taken bribes, and describe the amounts of
money or types of services exchanged, but the authorities do not react. In July
2003 (N49), “New newspaper” published the price of education in St. Peters-
burg’s universities: from $2500 to $4000. In December 2002 (N93), it cited a
booklet of Duma’s deputy Professor G. Kostin, where prices for buying off the
highest State officials were stipulated: head of department of the Supreme Court
of Justice—$400,000; deputy of head of Moscow’s Arbitration Tribunal—$1.3
million; deputy of Ministry of Power Engineering—$10 million. The newspaper
hoped to get some reaction from state officials (excuse, refutation, inquiry) but
got nothing! Most of the highest officials enjoy inviolability de jure (deputies,
judges, etc) or de facto.
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Konstantinov’s “Corrupt Petersburg” contains a great number of facts about
corruption (Konstantinov, 1997). The USA Congress report “Russia’s Road to
Corruption” (September, 2000) is interesting, too.
There are extensive corruption networks including ministries, police, FSB
(former KGB) (Satarov, 2002; Sungurov, 2000: 72–82). Corruption in contem-
porary Russia is an element of the political system, a mechanism of the political
regime. There are two levels of corruption: “lower” (“face-to-face”) and
“higher” (corruption networks). The study of Fond INDEM (head Dr. G.
Satarov, former assistant of ex-president Boris Yeltsin) shows that there are ex-
tensive corruption networks in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Ser-
vice of Security, and the State Committee of Customs Service. The Military
Government is also very corrupt. Each corruption network contains three struc-
tures: commercial or financial, state officials and “group of defence”—police,
FSB, prosecutors office (Satarov, 2000: 8).
On the “lower” level, an average bribe (for policeman, doctor, teacher and so
on) ranges from $20–$120 to $1000–$5000 (Arguments and facts, 2002:4) per
occasion. The dimensions of bribes on corruption networks are greater. There is
also an other system for calculating the bribe, “otkat” (“recoil”, “delivery”, “re-
turn”): the official gets 3–10% (Satarov, 2000: 8) or 40–60% of the sum of an
agreement (New Newspaper, 2003: 12).
Corruption paralyses all positive, creative activities. It is virtually impossible
to develop production, market economy or social reforms when everything de-
pends on corrupt officials. Corruption of police, the prosecutor’s office and
judges is particularly dangerous. “Corruption of judges is one of the most power-
ful corruption markets in Russia… Corruption of judges penetrates the different
corruption networks at different levels of power” (Satarov, 2003). Arbitration
courts are particularly corrupt.
The Center of Deviantology (Sociology of Deviance and Social Control) of
the St. Petersburg Sociological Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences (head
Prof. Y. Gilinskiy) studies organised crime and corruption in Russia, especially
in St. Petersburg. Our respondents (informants) have commented as follows on
the contemporary situation: “The average businessman is extremely involved in
crime… One has to bribe for everything… one cannot deal with taxation inspec-
tion without a bribe… A bribe is an inevitability in the sphere of business…Tax
inspection is highly corrupt”. One has to bribe when registering a business, when
renting premises from state bodies, when acquiring licenses for their utilisation,
when obtaining low-interest bank credits, when reporting to tax inspectors,
when completing customs formalities, etc. The “tariff” for fire inspection is
higher than for sanitary inspection, but lower than what is paid to the custom
house… However, business people are not the only ones who suffer from corrup-
tion. Everybody must offer bribes, in educational institutions, in medical institu-
tions, in different administrations, in the police, and so on.
There are various forms of taking bribes. One of our respondents (interviewer
Dr. Y. Kostjukovsky) mentioned an interesting method: “I can invite somebody
to the casino and he will win. He can win as much as I want. This situation is pure
and perfect—no bribes, no corruption. The person is lucky, no problems”.
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Official data on bribes and corruption are presented in Table 1. But corruption,
including taking bribes, is a very latent phenomenon. Official, registered data
portray the results of police action rather than the reality: Firstly, these figures are
only “a drop in the ocean”. Secondly, the number of registered crimes (bribes) is
two times higher than the number of revealed persons, and the number of re-
vealed persons two times higher than the number of convicted persons (Table 2).
Thirdly, these revealed and convicted persons are “small fish”, including work-
ers, students, the unemployed (Table 3). Furthermore, the rates of “corrupt
crimes” (bribes, embezzlement, appropriation) in 1999 were the following:
Moscow 11.8, St. Petersburg 11.2, Komi Republic 78.7, Kurgansky region 75.6,
Kostromskaja region 70.9 (Luneev, 2000). This is a sheer impossibility: corrup-
tion in Moscow and St. Petersburg is far greater than in other Russian regions.
Corruption is a “normal” way of solving different problems in contemporary
Russia. Results from various questionnaire studies provide interesting informa-
tion. For example, although 56% of our respondents (St. Petersburg, 1993) re-
garded corruption as a negative phenomenon, 45% of them were ready to take or
give bribes (Afanasjev, Gilinskiy, 1995: 94). 37% of respondents (Russian repre-
sentative interrogation, 1999) had witnessed (participated in) corrupt activities
(of business people 65%); 50% had given “presents” to medical institutions (of
business people 62%) (Kljamkin, Timofeev, 2000: 11,14). In a survey examining
the regional elites of Russia’s Northwest, 94.4% of the respondents confirmed
that “corruption and taking bribes are widespread in Russia” (Duka, 2001: 162).
It is known that there is “white”, “grey” and “black” corruption (Heiden-
heimer, Johnston, Le Vine, 1989). Russian corruption is becoming more and
more “white”, because the tolerance of corruption is growing. It is a shame that
young Russians have learnt in childhood, at school and university (including the
faculty of law) that in Russia, anything can be bought and sold.
Old Russian tradition (and ethics!) of corruption is reflected in local proverbs
and sayings: “Let’s put a candle in front of God, let’s put a sack (with a present in
it—Y.G.) in front of a judge”, “Hands exist in order to take”, “What you do for
me, I do for you”, and so on (see: Kuznetchov, 2000: 67). Russian ethics tolerate
bribery. It is a custom, habit—a way to “thank” for “a service”.
What are the causes of contemporary corruption in Russia? There are count-
less factors (“causes”), but I believe the following to be the primary ones:
• Old Russian traditions;
• The corrupt “nomenclature” of the former Soviet system has maintained its
position and power, and brought its corrupt habits to the “new” system;
• The privatisation by the “nomenclature” created an economic basis for cor-
ruption;
• Powerful Russian organised crime uses bribery as its main means of defence;
• Since the highest strata of power are corrupt, it is clear that lower and ordinary
officials will take bribes, too (or as a Russian proverb puts it: “a fish starts to
rot from its head”).
I think corruption is the most serious problem in Russia, because all other prob-
lems remain unsolved when anything can be bought and sold.
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Is it possible to fight corruption in Russia?
I think it is impossible (as it is impossible in any country). Corruption is an eter-
nal social problem. It is impossible “to gain victory over corruption” in Russia,
or the world.
In today’s Russia, legal reaction to corruption poses a very complicated prob-
lem. On one hand, the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (CC RF) stipu-
lates stern punishments: for taking a bribe a maximum of 12 years of imprison-
ment (Art. 290, CC RF), for giving or offering a bribe up to 8 years of imprison-
ment (Art. 291, CC RF), for abuse of power up to 8 years of imprisonment (Art.
285 CC RF) and so forth. On the other hand, a “Law of Corruption” has not yet
been passed (although it has been prepared for a number of years), and in prac-
tice, convictions of high officials are rare.
There are no real organisational mechanisms for counteracting corruption,
but too many institutions which “combat corruption”: the prosecutor’s office,
FSB (former KGB), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), different commis-
sions and committees.
In reality, any attempts to reduce the scale of corruption must be made step by
step. It is a long and hard process involving social, political, economic and juridi-
cal means (not only juridical!). I believe that the primary means are:
• A drastic reduction of the plenary powers of bureaucrats.
• A drastic reduction of the right of bureaucrats to “regulate” economics, edu-
cation, science, medicine and so on.
• Decreasing the number of bureaucrats (in 1990s, there were 15 million bu-
reaucrats in Russia; in 1991, the “State machinery” employed 715,900 offi-
cials and in 1993, already 926,600; in 1996, the personnel of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs—MVD—comprised 1.5 million people, or 1,200 per
100,000 population, which is more than in any other country /Corruption and
Combat Corruption, 2000: 29; Newman, 1999: 124/).
• Increasing the independence of businesses and citizens.
• Increasing the independence and prestige of courts (judges).
• Developing civil society.
• Increasing the salary of officials.
• Forming corresponding social consciousness (by Mass Media, by actual at-
tempts to fight corruption, etc).
• Forming political will to decrease corruption; etc.
Unfortunately, I think this is impossible in contemporary Russia. Police and
prosecutor’s office are very corrupt (Corruption and combat corruption, 2000:
86–112), as are all strata of power. “We can talk about a new model of govern-
ment, where the corruption of the government staff is a way of maintaining
power. Corruption… is a part of commanding policy” (Brovkin, 2000: 70). Who
will fight corruption? That is the question!
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Year Registered cases Rate (per 100,000 population of
16-year-olds or older)
1986 6 562 5.9
1987 4 155 3.8
1988 2 462 2.2
1989 2 195 2.0
1990 2 691 2.4
1991 2 534 2.3
1992 3 331 2.9
1993 4 497 3.9
1994 4 921 4.3
1995 4 889 4.3
1996 5 453 4.8
1997 5 608 4.9
1998 5 804 5.0
1999 6 871 5.9
2000 7 047 6.0
2001 7 909 6.8
2002 7 311 5.1
Source: Crime and Delinquency in the USSR (1991: 83,84); Crime and Delinquency (1995: 116, 121);
Crime and Delinquency (2002: 117, 122);
Table 1. Bribery in Russia (1986–2002)
Year Registered cases Revealed persons Convictions
1987 4 155 2 836 2 008
1988 2 462 1 994 812
1989 2 195 1 306 451
1990 2 691 1 510 649
1991 2 534 1 266 612
1992 3 331 1 537 686
1993 4 497 2 279 843
1994 4 921 2 727 1 114
1995 4 889 2 342 1 071
1996 5 453 2 692 1 243
1997 5 608 2 320 1 381
1998 5 804 2 803 1 314
1999 6 823 2 921 1 515
2000 7 047 3 481 1 529
2001 7 909 3 696 2 084
Source: Crime and Delinquency (1992: 97, 146); Crime and Delinquency (1995: 117, 154);
Crime and Delinquency (2002: 118, 171)
Table 2. Some data on bribery in Russia (1987–2001)
6
7
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Gender:
– male 58.7 48.7 59.7 69.0 66.3 70.1 75.2 77.3 77.5 77.4 73.7 75.4 70.1 74.2 73.4
– female 41.3 51.3 40.3 31.0 33.7 29.9 24.8 22.7 22.5 22.6 26.3 24.6 29.9 25.8 26.6
Age:
– 16–17 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 * * * * * * *
– 18–29 17.8 19.3 20.5 25.4 19.6 28.6 27.2 30.7 29.8 28.8 27.1 26.4 8.9 26.9 26.2
– 30 or older 81.9 80.3 79.4 74.6 80.2 71.2 72.2 69.2 70.2 71.2 72.9 73.4 91.0 73.1 72.9
Social status:
– workers
33.2 38.4 37.7 37.9 34.0 33.8 16.4 18.5 19.3 21.3 13.7 15.0 13.2 14.1 16.8
– employees 58.3 50.8 51.2 50.0 53.9 51.3 43.9 46.4 50.9 48.8 46.3 48.6 50.7 46.8 43.2
– farmers 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.2 0.6 1.1 1.5 1.4 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6
– students 0.7 1.4 0.6 2.9 0.7 0.2 2.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 1.7 0.8 1.3 2.7 4.0
– without work
or study place
(unemployed)
1.7 2.0 3.1 3.0 3.9 6.5 6.8 3.6 12.6 13.1 14.2 12.9 9.8 13.9 15.1
* No data
Source: Crime and Delinquency (1992: 97); Crime and Delinquency (1995: 117); Crime and Delinquency (2002: 118).
Table 3. Bribery: Data on revealed persons in Russia, % (1987–2001)
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Human Trafficking: Concept, Classification,
and Questions of Legislative Regulation
Georgi Glonti,
Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, Georgia
Human Trafficking has become a global business bringing huge profits to organ-
ised criminal syndicates. Studies show that the overall annual profit in this sector
is 5–7 billion dollars, in some years 9.5 billion dollars. An increasing number of
criminal communities are moving from drug trafficking to human trafficking
and trade, which is characterised by high profits, small expenditures and mini-
mal risk of punishment. It is also worth noting that the exploitation of people is
often long-term, and unlike drug trafficking, it does not require preparation, pro-
cessing and realisation of the initial goods.
The reasons for the growth of trafficking are the following:
• On one hand, the liberal legislation of many advanced countries does not en-
force a strict policy against slave labour, especially in sex and porno busi-
nesses. They fear that stricter policies would harm the economy and the
growth of tourism, and hence decrease tax revenues.
• On the other hand, economic reasons and poor living conditions result in mass
emigration. Some countries cannot ensure appropriate conditions for their cit-
izens or control demographic processes.
The said circumstances guarantee the satisfaction of the modern slave market,
reflected in a balance of demand and supply of illegal human resources.
The situation in Georgia
After the breakdown of the USSR, negative political, economic and demo-
graphic processes have led to a complete social disorganisation, economic col-
lapse, ethnic conflicts and civil wars, and have radically changed the public life
in the Republic.
Numerous researches have shown that the annual “Human Trafficking” cases
for sexual exploitation in the countries of the Central Caucasus involve more
than 10,000–15,000 people. As for the quantity of cases concerning other forms
of exploitation of human beings (trafficking in migrants for sweatshops, domes-
tic or agricultural labour, and other forms of involuntary servitude), there are no
accurate statistical data available.1
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The fall of the “iron curtain” and removal of barriers between the East and the
West freed the people of the USSR from totalitarianism, but the social changes
occurring in the countries of the former Soviet Union gave rise to a whole new set
of difficulties: interethnic conflicts, unemployment and other economic prob-
lems, increased illegal migration, terrorism, organised crime and corruption.
Criminal groups took advantage of the situation and became more involved in
drug dealing and prostitution. Human trafficking, a new crime in the former So-
viet Union, also grew into a highly attractive and lucrative business. In the Soviet
era, borders were tightly controlled and movement limited. Therefore, human
trafficking, or transporting people across borders for financial gain, did not occur
before 1991. When the Soviet Union collapsed, law enforcement agencies and
border control troops were unprepared for the massive migration flows and the
rise in criminality that quickly took root. New criminal structures created ex-
panding transnational networks for prostitution and exporting young people
abroad for various forms of labour exploitation.
The author’s research has shown that in Georgia, negative tendencies in the
migratory processes emerged at the beginning of the 1990s. This marked the be-
ginning of organised commercial export of people with the purpose of exploita-
tion, i.e. so-called “human trafficking” or “white slavery”. Trafficking has be-
come a very lucrative business in Georgia, involving both professional criminals
and high-level state officials.
As the analysis of the data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs has shown,
Georgian criminal clans, headed by the so-called “Thieves-in-Law”2, are ac-
tively expanding their transnational connections, participating in the organisa-
tion of the trafficking throughout the former Soviet Union, especially in Russia
and Ukraine.3 They are striving for gaining more influence in other countries as
well, the richest western states in particular. Recently, a whole network of crimi-
nal organisations has established a foothold in USA and some other countries.
The said organisation is involved in trafficking from Georgia, and consists of
some recent Georgian immigrants as well as professional criminals. Organisa-
tions interact with criminal groups of the former USSR, creating a so-called
transnational network of trafficking that recruits, transports and exploits people
for the purpose of obtaining material profit. According to a non-governmental
agency, in recent years, more than 160 cases of sexual exploitation of Georgian
women have been reported in Western Europe, Israel and USA.4 According to
expert data, more than 5,000 Georgian women have been forced into prostitution
through the trafficking network, and even more people have been subjected to
exploitation as cheap manpower or victims of deception.5
71
2 More information – J. Finckenauer, E. Waring - Russian Mafia in America. Immigration, Culture and Crime Boston
1998, pp 107–110; J. Serio and V. Radzinkin “Thieves Professing the Code: The Traditional Role of Vory v Zakone in
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3 G. Glonti – Problems Associated with Organised Crime in Georgia, Researches project. Tbilisi, 2000
4 V. Sulashvili – Materials of International Conference April 2001
5 I. Tchovrebashbili – Researches Proposal 2000, The Institute of legal reform of Georgia
We can name the main reasons for trafficking in Georgia:
Political destabilisation and massive migration of population
from Georgia
Migration processes have occurred in waves in several stages:
1. In the beginning of the 1990s, emigration of the Russian population began.
Since then more than 200,000 citizens have left for permanent residence in
Russia. Within a few years, Georgia lost a significant part of its technical and
qualified labour force traditionally belonging to the Russian Diaspora.
2. In 1992–1993, ethnic conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia led to internal
migratory processes. As a result, more than 300,000 people were forced to
leave their homes and become refugees in various regions of Georgia.
3. From 1995 to the present, economic crisis, unemployment, and the resulting
migration have affected not only national minorities, but also ethnic Geor-
gians.
According to the census data from 1987 to 2003, the population of Georgia has
reduced from 5.6 million to 4.3 million.6 The number of inhabitants has thus de-
creased by 1.3 million or nearly 25%, but if parameters of natural population
growth are taken into account, the reduction is close to 30%. Researchers un-
equivocally regard this as a demographic disaster. It is worth noting that demo-
graphic losses have to a great extent concerned the young, able-bodied popula-
tion which can emigrate and adjust to other countries.
Poverty
UN data on Georgia shows that between 1990 and 1995, the standard of living
decreased to almost one-seventh: from 2,250 dollars per capita per year to 370
dollars.7 As a result, in 2002, about 80% of the population lived below the pov-
erty line, making less than the living wage of approximately 50 dollars a month.
Prostitution
In Georgia, especially in Tbilisi and the cities near the Turkish border, prostitu-
tion has quickly developed into a form of organised criminal business. The num-
ber of brothels has increased, and there is also a significant number of street pros-
titutes. These facts are indirectly confirmed by data on the growth of venereal
diseases: from 1990 to 1997, the number of venereal diseases nearly quintupled.
According to Interpol data, in 1997, 98 Georgian citizens were detained for
prostitution by the Turkish police, and 4 by the Greek police. According to the
Institute of legal reforms, up to 5,000 Georgians are engaged in this activity in
the specified countries.
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7 UN Report Committee of the elimination of discrimination against women, Georgia, 55. 10/030/1998.
Children’s homelessness
Neglected and homeless children have turned out to be the primary victims of the
situation. Many have become street children, spending most of their time on the
streets and earning money by begging and stealing. A private voluntary organisa-
tion, Child and Environment, noted a dramatic rise in homeless children follow-
ing the collapse of the Soviet Union. It estimates that there are now more than
2,500 street children in Tbilisi due to the inability of orphanages and other social
service institutions to provide with adequate care. Many homeless children sur-
vive by turning to criminal activity, narcotics, and prostitution.8 In 1997, internal
affairs agencies registered 50 underage girls found guilty of prostitution.9
Imperfection of legal mechanisms in protecting victims of trafficking.
Georgian legislation needs complex anti-trafficking laws which should include:
1. The organisational basis for fighting trafficking (list of organisations re-
sponsible for combating trafficking; rights and responsibilities)
2. The legal basis
– amendments and changes to Criminal, criminal-procedural, civil and ad-
ministrative Codes and the legislation on the control of immigration, nec-
essary for preventing and fighting human trafficking.
– Special instructions for Georgian Consular services abroad on rendering
assistance to the victims of “human trafficking”
– harmonisation of Georgian legislation with international standards
3. Measures of rehabilitation. The organisation of special centres providing as-
sistance to victims
4. Preventive measures: plans how to work with the potential victims of human
trafficking, how to decrease professional prostitution, vagrancy and drug ad-
diction in the country
5. Measures for international co-operation with receiving (recipient) countries
6. Sources of financing anti-trafficking law and prevention programmes
The high level of illegal migration and trafficking has drawn sharp criticism
against Georgian government from many international organisations and local
NGOs. However, up to the middle of 2003, authorities did not pay due attention
to these phenomena and failed to carry out the necessary legal reforms.
It is particularly regrettable that the Parliament of Georgia has not yet ratified
the United Nations Convention against transnational organised crime, signed by
the Minister of Justice of Georgia in Palermo, Italy, on 15 December 2000.
The situation has triggered negative consequences: In the report on human
trafficking prepared for the U.S. Congress in June 2003, Georgia was categor-
ised as a “Tier 3” country under the provisions of the U.S. government’s Traf-
ficking Victims Protection Act of 2000”, i.e. as a country that fails to meet the
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9 UN CEDAW/C/GEO/1 March 1998 http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw21/georgia.htm
minimum standards of combating human trafficking.10 In the previous report of
2002, Georgia was among “Tier 2” countries. The bases for categorising are not
very clear, because in many countries, especially those of the former Soviet Un-
ion, the conditions of trafficking are the same or even worse.
The U.S. Congress has threatened to take severe measures against the coun-
tries that do not fight trafficking, and to deny governmental credits and grants.
This would cause serious problems for Georgia, because about 1/4 of its budget
comes from the U.S. (over the past 10 years, US financial support has amounted
to more than 1 billion). US sanctions would undoubtedly result in a collapse of
Georgian economy and in political destabilisation. The threat has, however, pro-
vided an effective stimulus for Georgian authorities to improve the situation with
trafficking. It forced the Parliament of Georgia to show activity and hastily ratify
several anti-trafficking laws, including additions and amendments to criminal
and criminal-procedural codes.
After the said changes, the U.S. Congress decided to reverse its decision, and
on 11 June 2003, Georgia was returned to “Tier 2”.11
Unfortunately, it seems that changes to anti-trafficking laws that are made un-
der the pressure of the international community are not enough to promote fun-
damental improvements in the situation.
Criminal Characteristics of Trafficking in Georgia
Research has shown that it is possible to name three basic stages of trafficking
from Georgia:
1. Recruitment of the victim;
2. Transit of the victim (crossing international borders);
3. Exploitation (illegal use of the physical abilities of a person with the purpose
of gaining profit).
The first two stages of trafficking are carried out in Georgian territory, while ex-
ploitation usually occurs in some third country, beyond the jurisdiction of Geor-
gia.
1. Recruitment
It is a fact that a majority of Georgians aspire to go abroad. They do so on their
own initiative and voluntarily, driven by the difficult economic situation in the
country. However, the realisation of the plan is often difficult, because western
consulates impose restrictive visa policies to reduce the number of illegal labour
migrants. People then turn to agents, middlemen or agencies who are specialised
in getting visas, and who promise to solve the problem. Such individuals and
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agencies actively advertise their services in mass media, but also resort to more
veiled forms of labour recruitment.
The criminal activity starts with the registration of travel documents.
According to IOM International, a majority of the victims of trafficking
(84.5%) request help from travel agents and visa brokers to depart from the coun-
try, and pay directly for the intermediary services. 13% of the victims refrain
from saying how they obtained visas, and only 2.5% receive visas without
go-betweens.12
On the grounds of the kinds of services offered we can distinguish different
types of agencies:
1. agencies providing legal tourist visas, insurances and other required travel
documents.
2. agencies providing legal visas and organising illegal jobs abroad.
3. agencies providing false documents or organising illegal entry to a country.
4. agencies specialised in trafficking young women and providing travel docu-
ments, transportation, and employment abroad.
5. agencies specialised in frauds, promising to provide travel documents and
highly paid work abroad, but not fulfilling their obligations.
As research has shown, there are no firms in Georgia which would have the right
and possibility to organise legal employment for citizens abroad, which would
meet all the necessary requirements, and would have a universal (uniform, stan-
dard, approved by state) form of contract with the client.
A majority of the illegitimate firms have a “roof”, meaning that they are con-
trolled by organised crime. The organisations, especially those that provide cli-
ents with legal documents, have close contacts with officials, sometimes with the
highest echelons of power. For example, there is evidence that governmental del-
egations have been used to smuggle people abroad.
A more widespread method of smuggling people is to give them so-called ar-
tistic or sports visas, and to include them in a well-known arts group, ensemble or
sports team that frequently travels abroad. In some cases, officials have connived
to form fictitious groups for the sole purpose of obtaining legal visas. Such
frauds are usually executed by highly organised groups of criminals, controlled
by “thieves in the law” or other criminal authorities. The cost of such services
varies from $1,500 to $10,000 depending on the country of destination.
Some agencies are specialised in smuggling people to specific countries, such
as Greece. The standard price—$1,500. The Bulgarian/Greek border, the
so-called “green corridor”, is usually crossed with the assistance of local smug-
glers.13
Some agencies and individuals are specialised in manufacturing false pass-
ports and other documents. Normally the following procedure is used: criminals
acquire a passport of a person who has a valid visa for a western country, and re-
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place the photo in the passport with that of another person. Such falsification is
easily feasible since the photographs in Georgian passports issued for travelling
abroad are not affixed by seal or other means of protection. As a result of this neg-
ligence, hundreds or even thousands of people have migrated illegally. It is also
quite common that passport service officers help people who have been refused a
visa to acquire a new passport with a different surname.
In my opinion, there is no clear-cut distinction between human trafficking and
other forms of illegal migration from Georgia. Frequently the same firms are en-
gaged in the organisation of trafficking and illegal migration, using the same
methods of recruitment and transportation, and the same intermediaries for get-
ting visas.
However, the victims of trafficking are somewhat different from other illegal
migrants:
1. Victims of trafficking are more often women.
2. Victims of trafficking are usually younger than other migrants.
3. Victims of trafficking are more often unmarried, divorced or live alone.
4. Victims of trafficking more often have no prior experience of staying abroad.
5. Victims of trafficking more willingly entrust themselves to dishonest mid-
dlemen.
6. Victims of trafficking more often come from rural areas.
7. Victims of trafficking more often have a lower level of education, and are
less familiar with their rights.
Practice has shown that middlemen tend to give preference to the organisation of
trafficking in women over illegal migration, because it is more profitable.
There are different ways of recruiting girls with the purpose of involving them
in sex business:
1. Recruiters contact professional prostitutes working in brothels, and suggest
they continue their business abroad.
2. Recruiters invite girls to work as models, waitresses, dancers or maids, and
then voluntarily or violently engage them in prostitution.
3. Recruiters blackmail girls who owe to commercial organisations or private
persons, and force them to be engaged in prostitution to pay their debts.
4. Recruiters addict girls to drugs, take them abroad and then force them to be
engaged in prostitution in exchange for drugs.
The commission per girl is $2,000–5,000 depending on her age and physical ap-
pearance.
2. Transit
A majority of illegal migrants go to the country of destination in the company of
other migrants. In 61% of the cases, the group is accompanied by its “enlister” or
an assistant to the agent.
Transit is carried out in different ways, depending on the legality of the mi-
grants’ transportation. Studies show that approximately 72% of the migrants
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cross the border legally and by using an optimum means of transport in terms of
cost and time. In other cases, the migrants are treated as “contraband”.
Firms that are specialised in smuggling people organise the manufacturing of
false documents, develop complex routes of transit, and have close ties with in-
ternational organised crime.
For example, in 2001, a criminal group recruited five Georgians (women) to
work in the USA, took them first to Russia, where they were given Russian inter-
national passports, then moved them to the port of Kaliningrad, and onward to
the USA by ship. Not one of the five women would have received American visa
through official channels, and one of them had already been deported from the
country.14
In recent years the amount of illicit human smuggling organised by travel
agencies has increased in Georgia. This owes to the fact that many consulates
have tightened their visa requirements, but also to the increasing number of
Georgians who have become personae non grata in different countries for differ-
ent offences.
One of the most popular illicit routes runs from Georgia via Turkey and Bul-
garia to Greece. Usually Georgian migrant groups use Bulgarian smugglers to
get across the Bulgarian-Greek border, also known as the “green corridor”. In
2001 a tragic incident occurred when four Georgians were found frozen to death
at the mountains after attempting to cross the border in winter.
The international ties of traffickers are impressive, and over the last five years
new routes of trafficking have been established, including:
• Georgia–Turkey–Bulgaria–Macedonia–Greece
• Georgia–Latvia–Poland–Germany
• Georgia–Czech Republic–Germany
• Georgia–Russia–Mexico–the USA15
Sometimes air routes from Europe to Central American countries are used. The
flights transit through the USA (Miami), where migrants disembark the plane
and stay illegally in the country.
In 2001, a group of Georgian citizens travelled via Armenia and Amsterdam
to Panama, and from there to Mexico. When they tried to enter the USA, they
were, however, apprehended by customs authorities and returned to Mexico with
no means.
In practice, many illegal migrants manage to reach the desired country safely
through the ramified network of transnational organised crime to which Geor-
gian criminal organisations also belong. Trade in people has become such a lu-
crative business that criminal organisations take pains to perfect the chain from
recruitment and transportation to safe exploitation of potential slaves in host
countries.
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3. Exploitation
A majority of migrants who become victims of trafficking are employed abroad
through intermediary travel companies and agencies which operate legally in
Georgia.
Usually migrants are accompanied by traffickers all the way to their final des-
tination, i.e. place of work. Transit routes to the USA and Greece are especially
closely monitored since traffickers tend to have close connections to Georgian
Diasporas and emigrants.
As a rule, conditions which migrants meet in the country of destination do not
correspond to the promises given by the travel agency in Georgia.
Research has shown that trafficking from Georgia is carried out for the pur-
pose of:
1. acquiring slave labour
2. sexual exploitation (prostitution and porno business)
3. adoption (trade in minors)
4. trafficking in organs (obtaining transplants).
5. using women as substitute mothers 16
As the Figure 1 above indicates, most Georgian victims of exploitation
(approx. 90% of all cases) are engaged in slave or forced labour. The second larg-
est group (8–10%) is formed by victims of sexual exploitation including porno
business. Although a majority of them are engaged in regular prostitution, some
are periodically exposed to sexual exploitation in their primary work of serving,
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Figure 1. Types of exploitation to which Georgian victims of trafficking have been
subjected.
16 Glonti G. – Trafficking in Georgia Tbilisi, 2003 newspaper “Criminal Chronic”
cleaning, waiting tables, etc. Over the last few years there have been some re-
ported cases of child trafficking, and one case of using a woman as a substitute
mother.
It is worth noting that not all Georgians who go abroad to earn a living fall into
the hands of criminals and are exposed to slave-like exploitation. Many of our
fellow citizens find well-paid (especially by Georgian standards) work in the Eu-
ropean Community or North America as maids, nurses, cooks, construction
workers, unskilled workers, seasonal workers, etc. They are even able to help
their families and relatives in Georgia. However, if the job, any kind of job, has
been obtained illegally, our compatriots abroad are regarded as offenders, and
cannot usually expect to be protected by labour and basic human rights. They can
be left to do dirty and harmful work for employers who disregard safety precau-
tions and responsibility in case of an occupational accident or even death. Practi-
cally none of the Georgian workers have a medical insurance policy or means to
get by in case of a trauma or illness.
Any illegal work abroad is, therefore, coupled with major, and frequently un-
justified, risks.
In spite of the fact that sexual exploitation constitutes only 1/10 of all traffick-
ing cases, as a phenomenon, it is regarded as the most scandalous and unaccept-
able by the international community.
As the pie chart (Figure 2) shows, about 69% of sexual exploitation falls into
the category of regular professional prostitution, while 22% of the victims are
exposed to periodic sexual exploitation. Strip dancing is significantly more rare
(7%), probably owing to the fact that dancers must have special skills and certain
type of physical appearance. Only 2% of the victims are engaged in porno busi-
79
Sexual exploitation of Georgian victims of trafficking
regular prostitution
periodic sexual
strip dancing
exploitation
porno business
Figure 2. Types of sexual exploitation.
ness. Porno business is particularly difficult to measure and prevent also in Geor-
gia since it spreads through the Internet, as well as the film and photo industry.
Studies show that about 60% of the young women working illegally abroad in
sectors not connected with prostitution, have been subjected to sexual violence
or serious harassment by their employers.
As far as trafficking in organs is concerned, scandalous stories connected to
this phenomenon are frequently published in the press. On the other hand, repre-
sentatives of law enforcement bodies claim that no such cases have been re-
corded in Georgia. However, V. Tsurkanu, Minister of Internal Affairs of the Re-
public of Moldova, has stated that certain organised Georgian groups participate
in the international trade of human organs. In his opinion, there is an established
international network through which healthy young Moldavian men (as a rule
unemployed or earning minimum wage) between the ages of twenty-five and
thirty, sell their organs either voluntarily or by force. The said network allegedly
operates in the following way: Donors are recruited (mostly from the poor
Southern Moldova) and transported to Istanbul by minibuses. There they are
monitored for a week, and if their health is in order, they are taken to Georgia. In
Tbilisi, they are usually accommodated in a hotel called “Ajara”. After addi-
tional medical inspection they are operated in a nearby hospital. From Tbilisi, the
donors return home to Moldova USD 3,000 richer, while their kidneys go to Tur-
key. The organs, kidneys in particular, are later sold in Germany for USD 30,000.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia has conducted an official investiga-
tion into this matter, but found no proof of the existence of such a network.17
Although we do not know whether this information is true or not, we do know
that there are well-equipped clinics in Tbilisi where the removal and preserva-
tion of human organs would be technically possible.
A majority of the crimes connected with trafficking in Georgia, especially
those of a sexual nature, are marked by high latency, i.e. victims seldom report
them to law enforcement bodies. It is hardly surprising that victims refuse to de-
scribe how they worked abroad as prostitutes and had sexual contacts with a
number of men every day. In Georgia, latency in all sexual crimes is common,
more than 95%. This means that of every 100 crimes of sexual violence, only five
are reported.
It is also worth mentioning that even if the victim of trafficking decides to
come forward, lack of appropriate experience and legislative tools prevents the
police and the Public Prosecutor’s Office from providing qualified help.
In conclusion, I would like to express my opinion: the problem of human traf-
ficking cannot be solved with a single campaign in a single country. Combating
this negative phenomenon should become a part of international policy, con-
structed on a complex programme including organisational, legislative, adminis-
trative, financial, scientific, propagandistic and other measures.
80
17 Analytical materials Ministry of internal affairs of Georgia 1998–1999
Social Co-ordinates of the Use of and
Experimentation with Drugs among
Young People in the European Part of
Russia—the Example of Tatarstan
Yuri Komlev,
Kazan Law Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Russia
The use of illegal drugs by some Russian youths has become a relatively wide-
spread and statistically stable phenomenon. The social co-ordinates of the use of
and experimentation with narcotic substances among young people in the Euro-
pean part of Russia can be assessed by the results of a research carried out in
Tatarstan under the supervision of the author of the present article. Tatarstan and
the other regions of the Volga-Basin (Ulyanovsk, Samara areas) are situated on a
drug trafficking route from Central Asia to the central part of Russia and to West-
ern Europe. The use of and experimentation with narcotic substances among
young people was studied with a formalised interview method at homes and in
the streets in November 2002. The sample of 1,100 units of analysis adequately
represents the youth community between the ages 14 to 29. The sample is char-
acterised by the following values: sex—52.2 per cent men and 47.8 per cent
women; age—41.3 per cent in age group 14–19-year-olds; 23.6 per cent in age
group 20–23-year-olds; 35 per cent 24–29-year-olds; ethnicity—50 per cent
Tatars, 45.6 per cent Russian, and 4.7 per cent representatives of other ethnic
groups. The methods of respondent selection and research technique have been
described in detail in earlier literature (Komlev 2003, 28–33). The present article
is devoted to the description and comparison of levels, degree of activity, and
other social parameters of the use of and experimentation with narcotic sub-
stances among young people in Tatarstan, also typical of other areas of Russia.
According to the study, the level of drug experiences among young people (all
forms of experiences) in the region is 25.6 per cent. This number characterises
the external diameter of a ‘drug funnel’. More detailed study reveals that 19.3 per
cent of respondents have used drugs once or several times. 1.6 per cent have been
actively using drugs earlier, but have stopped. At present, 4.7 per cent of the
youth are using drugs actively and on a regular basis, including hard drugs. This
population of active drug addicts represents the internal diameter of the youth
‘drug funnel’, and can form a reliable empirical basis for an estimation of the
quantity of drug addicts among young people between 14 and 29 years of age.
The regional centre, Kazan, shows a general level of youth drug use of 25.8
per cent. 19.0 per cent of young Kazanians have experimented with drugs once or
several times. 1.6 per cent have been using drugs actively earlier, but stopped. At
present, 5.2 per cent of the youth are active drug addicts. The situation in other
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cities is more complicated. As the received data show, the general rate of drug use
there is 28.1 per cent. 21.5 per cent of urban youth have experimented with drugs
once or several times. 1.7 per cent of young men have used drugs actively earlier,
but stopped. At the moment, 4.8 per cent of respondents are actively using drugs,
including hard drugs.
The level of drug use in rural areas is considerably lower at 19.8 per cent.
There, 14.9 per cent of respondents have experimented with drugs at least once.
1.2 per cent of rural youths have been actively using drugs earlier, but stopped. At
the moment, 3.7 per cent of respondents are using drugs actively, including hard
drugs.
A comparison of the Tatarstan data with the results of Keselman’s research of
Samara area reveals many similarities. For example, the vox pop survey shows
that in Samara, the general level of drug use among urban youths is 30 per cent
(same as in Tatarstan).
What is surprising is the uneven distribution of youth drug use in the urban en-
vironment. The research data show that the general drug use level in
Naberezhnye Chelny, the second largest city of Tatarstan, is 27.3 per cent, and
thus higher than in Kazan. The highest level of general drug use in Tatarstan is
registered in Bugulma, where 58.7 percent of all youths have used drugs in one
way or the other. Most have experimented with cannabinoids once or several
times instead of using drugs systematically. The situation in this small city in the
southeast of Tatarstan results from its proximity to the borders of three large re-
gions (Bashkiria, Samara area, and Orenburg area), where one of the drug traffic
routes runs. According to research data, this city is also distinguished by a rela-
tively high crime rate and corruption of law enforcement bodies. As a result,
there is not enough formal and informal social control to prevent the expansion
of drug use.
The research data show that of those who have tried drugs at least once, 76.1
per cent are young people. The Samara area data show that 97.1 per cent of drug
users used cannabinoids (Keselman 1998, 45).
The situation among the young is characterised by a spread of ‘light’ drugs,
which are more available due to their low price. Young people as a rule do not
consider ‘grass’ to be a drug, and do not define themselves as drug addicts. The
notion that marijuana is not dangerous, and that one can easily stop using it at
will is widespread among the youth. Law enforcement agencies counteract
mainly the expansion of heroin and other ‘hard’ drugs, and underestimate the
danger of cannabinoid proliferation.
All other drugs are much less known by the youth. 14 per cent of respondents
with drug use experience have tested various opiates, 5.8 per cent heroin, 3.7 per
cent ‘poppy straw’ (an opiate derivative), and 2.9 per cent opium. In the Samara
area, the rate of opium and opiates users among all drug users is considerably
higher at 21.8 per cent (Keselman 1998, 45). Only 1.4 per cent of Tatarstan
youths have tested cocaine and coca derivatives. 9.8 per cent of respondents with
drug use experience have used phenylalkylamines (amphetamine, metamphe-
tamine, methadone, ephedrine, ‘ecstasy’, and other central nervous system sti-
mulators). The most popular of these substances is amphetamine. Its use is re-
ported by 4.7 per cent of respondents with drug use experience. In addition, some
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have experienced the euphoria effect by inhaling acetone fumes, ‘Moment’glue
(universal glue made of acetone) or different aerosols. This is reported by 4.7 per
cent of respondents. Barbiturates and hallucinogens are not widespread in the re-
gion.
Drug use among the young is clearly gender-, socio-professional status- and
age-dependent: The general drug use level among young males below the age of
30 is 37 per cent, but considerably lower among young females—13.1 per cent.
The Samara data show somewhat higher levels of drug use among the latter
(males—34 per cent, females—16.6 per cent). A similar pattern has also been
observed by other Russian researchers (Gilinsky and Afanasiev 1993, 78).
According to the 2002 census data, the Tatarstan youth community is bi-eth-
nic, with approximately an equal number of Tatars and Russians. Tatars domi-
nate in rural areas and small towns. The youth community also includes other
ethnic groups: chuvash, mari, udmurt, as well as representatives of other ethnic
regions of Russia. The present research was conducted by dividing the young
into three groups: Russians, Tatars, and other. It was found that curves of drug
use activity distribution are identical, but the levels of drug use differ. The gen-
eral drug use level among Tatars is 23.9 per cent (3.9 per cent active drug users).
Russian youth show a somewhat higher drug use level—25.7 per cent (5.3 per
cent active users). The research indicates that the situation in large cities where
there are no noticeable ethnic-cultural differences between Tatars and Russians
(same language, similar values, identical forms of recreation, same interests) is
characterised by equal drug use levels, e.g. in Kazan they are practically the
same. What is surprising is the dynamics of drug use among the other ethnic
groups. Calculations show that these youth are more involved in drug use, the
general level being 39.3 per cent. This phenomenon needs more profound re-
search.
Our attention was drawn to the relatively high proportion of young males
among drug users (27.3 per cent), and also to the frequency of their drug use (7.3
per cent active users). Another important observation is that males in both rural
and urban areas have approximately identical drug use levels regardless of their
ethnic background. The situation in Tatarstan indicates a masculinisation of
youth drug use that is typical also of the other regions in central Russia.
Drug use is not generally typical for females from rural areas. This may be
caused by the ethnic-confessional specific features of young Tatar females
which in rural areas prevail over females of other ethnic origins. Provincial Tatar
females are more oriented towards the norms of traditionally male-oriented be-
haviour.
At age 20–21, the involvement in drug use slightly increases to the rate of 30
per cent. This figure is the highest in the Samara region—38 per cent (Keselman
1998, 50). This group also uses more drugs than the others, since 10 per cent of
its drug users use drugs actively. In the age group of 22–23-year-olds, the general
level of drug use reaches its maximum—33.3 per cent. This group shows a lesser
number of active drug users (3.8 per cent) and an increasing number of those who
refer to drug use at an earlier period of life (4.5 per cent). In sum, the general drug
use level increases rapidly between the ages 14 to 23.
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Analysis of gender and age features can lead us to the conclusion that young
men between 14 and 16 years of age, irrespectively of their family status and
other characteristics, belong to the group with the highest risk of contact with
narcotic substances. According to the received data, the level of the use of and
experimentation with narcotic substances among 16–17-year-olds is twice that
of 14–15-year-olds, and continues to increase.
The survey shows that the socially disadvantaged, often unemployed, demon-
strate rather a high level of drug use. Most of them are people whose social and
professional position is weak, and who are perceived as outsiders by the general
public. 35.5 per cent of the jobless youth are addicted to drugs. 10.5 per cent of
them are active drug users.
The involvement in drug use is high also among the students of vocational
schools (35.5 per cent) and the working-class youth engaged in manual labour
(34.1 per cent). However, these two groups differ in the rate of active drug users
(4 per cent and 7.2 per cent respectively). The situation among college students is
not much better: 31.1 per cent of them are involved in drug use, 8.1 per cent ac-
tively. The general drug use level in this category in Kazan is extremely high,
reaching 44.5 per cent. The working and studying youth rank high in the level of
criminalisation, too. Young people are responsible for most registered offences
which also adds to the increase in the number of drug distributors and users.
The use of and experimentation with narcotic substances is also rather wide-
spread in universities. 29 per cent of university students are involved in drug use,
and 8.3 per cent are active users. Young qualified professionals and ‘white collar’
workers also show high levels of involvement in drug use (26.8 and 21 per cent
respectively).
The survey data show that school students have a relatively low drug use level
(9.7 per cent) because they are only in the beginning of their drug addiction route.
The survey data show that the use of and experimentation with narcotic sub-
stances is widespread in many social groups of Russian society. It would be quite
logical to think that the higher the level of education (and culture), the lower the
level of drug use. In practice the correlation between these two factors is not so
simple, and depends on the indirect influence of many other socio-cultural and
socio-structural indices. According to the Samara area survey data, ‘educational
type influence on the level of use of and experimentation with narcotic sub-
stances can be characterized as weak and contradictory’ (Keselman 1998, 56).
The Tatarstan survey shows that there is some correlation between education and
the use of and experimentation with narcotic substances, but that it is very spe-
cific, and can be observed only at the level of definite socio-territorial communi-
ties. The level of the use of and experimentation with narcotic substances is the
highest among the youth with only secondary education (30.7 per cent, with 7.9
per cent active drug users). They are over 17 years old and have graduated from a
secondary school. The youth graduated from or attending a university show a
drug use level of 26.7 per cent (with 3.7 per cent active drug users).
The first possible conclusion is that people with no higher education are more
involved in drug use than those who have graduated from or are presently study-
ing in a university. However, analysis of the Kazan city data makes it possible to
draw an opposite conclusion.
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Young Kazanians with higher education show a drug use level of 34.9 per cent
(with 7 per cent active users). For those whose educational level is lower, the
same figure is 29.3 per cent (8.6 per cent active users). This phenomenon can per-
haps be understood by examining some social and socio-cultural factors that are
more dominant in the regional centre than in peripheral territories. In provincial
communities, the social and demographic structure and mentality are somewhat
different than in urban environments. Empirically defined differences can be ex-
plained by the influence of the following factors, including (1) relatively high
proportion of Kazanians under the age of 30 with higher education; (2) preva-
lence of ‘major’drug use among well-to-do youth; (3) higher anonymity of drug
use and better availability; (4) growing prevalence of double standards among
the youth. Provincial and rural uneducated youths are to a lesser extent drug-ad-
dicted than their educated peers. This dependency provides a more general pic-
ture of drug use in the region.
One of the research objectives was to test the hypothesis about the correlation
between the general drug use level of the youth, and the average per capita family
income. It was discovered that these two factors are indeed interrelated, but not
as straightforwardly as it was assumed. Drugs are expensive in Russia, and avail-
able only for those whose economic status is high enough, or who can get money
illegally.
The received data show that the proportion of young people involved in drug
use grows with the increase in average per capita income and economic status of
families. Among those respondents whose average per capita family income is
less than 1,500 rubles (about $50 in 2000), the general drug use level is 23.7 per
cent (with 3.8 per cent active drug users). If the average per capita income ex-
ceeds 4,500 rubles ($150), the drug use level is 33–37 per cent (11 per cent active
drug users).
The higher economic status to some extent adds to drug usage. Although this
relation is very complex and mediated by other social factors, the milieu of
well-to-do young people shows many examples of the so-called ‘major’drug us-
age.
The use of and experimentation with narcotic substances among young peo-
ple has rather complicated social co-ordinates. This is evident not only among
those young people whose social position is less favourable, but also in case of
economically advantaged families. However, the prevalence of drug-addiction is
higher among the socially disadvantaged youth than those from well-to-do fami-
lies.
Under the conditions of market economy, all employers need qualified pro-
fessionals, and sustainable future is guaranteed only to those who can be suc-
cessful in professional competition. The transition towards market economy has
changed the youth’s values, and stimulated their economic aspirations. Realisa-
tion of ambiguous plans and orientation towards economically successful life
strategies is not unproblematic for the majority of young people. This is mainly
caused by the fact that economic transformation processes have deprived many
youths of the available channels of vertical social mobility needed for the devel-
opment of socially favoured careers. Most professional activities are not profit-
able or attractive enough for the youth. Social experience of the disadvantaged
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parents has stopped being a guiding line for them. Their own choice of profes-
sion is very often unsuccessful. As a result they are faced with diminishing life
prospects, disappointment in life, lack of faith in their own vigour. Often such a
situation leads young people to the use of and experimentation with narcotic sub-
stances and illegal activities.
Failure of socialisation, broken families and the consequent lack of social
control are the main reasons for the increase in the use of and experimentation
with narcotic substances among young people. It is not surprising that the lowest
drug use level is registered in extended families (19.8 per cent). In single-parent
families (father or mother with children) the general drug use level does not ex-
ceed 30 per cent. The figure climbs to 35.7 per cent if children are brought up by
grandparents. If the youngster lives outside any kind of family structure, the drug
use level reaches its maximum—38.2 per cent. The disintegration of family
structure leads to decreasing parental influence and diminished ability to prevent
youth’s or teenagers’ drug use.
In conclusion, the social research of the use of and experimentation with nar-
cotic substances among young people in Tatarstan allowed the description of the
main social co-ordinates of the phenomenon typical of the central Russia. Its re-
sults prove that actual drug usage is approximately 11 times more common than
what official statistics indicate. The use of and experimentation with narcotic
substances spreads rather quickly but irregularly in the youth milieu affecting
those parts of society where socialisation and social control have weakened, em-
ployment is replaced by unemployment and crime, and where social conscious-
ness is experiencing a prolonged normative anomie and deprivation of values.
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Organized Crime and Smuggling Through
Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Alexander Kukhianidze,
American University’s Transnational Crime and
Corruption Center (TraCCC), Georgia Office
General Description of the Situation
Georgia is located in the Caucasus on the eastern coast of the Black Sea. The
length of its total land border is 1,461 km, and the coastline—310 km. Its border
countries are: Russia in the North (723 km), Azerbaijan in the East (322 km), Ar-
menia in the south-east (164 km), and Turkey in the south-west (252 km).1 Due
to armed civil conflicts at the beginning of the 1990s, two of its secessionist re-
gions—Abkhazia and South Ossetia—are outside the jurisdiction of the Govern-
ment of Georgia, and parts of Georgian border are thus uncontrolled and trans-
parent. Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia border on Russia. The Abkhaz part of
the Georgian-Russian border is 197 km long, and its sea border 200 km. The
South Ossetian part of the Georgian border with Russia is only 66 km long (see
Map of Georgia below).2
Map of Georgia.
Smuggling Routes Through Abkhazia and South Ossetia
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1 Georgia. The World Factbook, August 1, 2003; http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gg.html
2 Interview with representatives of State Border Guards of Georgia, October 2003.
By 2003, contraband trade had become a severe problem in Georgia. Its cata-
strophic growth started in 1998, and in five years time it began to threaten the
very national security of the country. It stimulated corruption, creation of power-
ful criminal clans, and association of the criminal world with political groupings,
representatives of central, regional and local authorities, and law enforcement
structures of the country. It also led to the involvement of the poor part of the pop-
ulation in criminal activities.
The problem of contraband trade through Abkhazia and South Ossetia is
worsened by the fact that it is closely connected to the problem of separatism, un-
resolved armed conflicts, violence in these regions, and transparency of borders.
As it is known, there were armed conflicts in South Ossetia in 1991–1992, and
in Abkhazia in 1992–1993. They led to heavy casualties (one thousand and ten
thousand lives respectively) on both sides. With Russia’s military support, sepa-
ratists of both regions won their wars, and declared de facto independence, while
remaining de jure part of Georgia. In Abkhazia, more than two hundred thousand
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) (mostly of Georgian ethnicity)
have been expelled from their homes, and those who have stayed are living in
beggary and nakedness.3 Most refugees and IDPs living outside Abkhazia have it
even worse.
Self-proclaimed republics increased the concentration of weapons among the
population, especially in the criminal world.
Sanctions Against Secessionist Government of Abkhazia
Three years after the end of the war in Abkhazia, a decision taken by the Council
of the Heads of States of the Commonwealth of Independent States on M    easures
for Settlement of the Conflict in Abkhaz  i a,G   eorgia (19 January, 1996), de-
clared, that:
“6. Confirming, that Abkhazia is an integral part of Georgia, the mem-
ber-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States, without consent of the
government of Georgia:
a) will not exercise trade-economic, financial, transport or other operations
with the authorities of the Abkhaz side;
7. Member-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States will not permit
the functioning of representations of the authorities of neither the Abkhaz side
in their territories, nor the persons in a capacity of official representative of
those authorities.”4
According to this statement, all import-export operations, which are not agreed
upon or approved by the Georgian government, are illegal and contraband trade.
This seriously hinders the ability of the secessionist government to develop offi-
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3 UN: Abkhazia Within Georgia Still The Basis of Talks, Says Envoy. By Robert McMahon;
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/12/11122002222246.asp; Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, Inc.
4 Regional Conflicts in Georgia—the Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia, the Autonomous Republic of
Abkhazia (1989–2002). The Collection of Political-Legal Acts. Tbilisi 2003, p.170.
cial foreign economic relations. As a result, instead of respectable international
companies, shadow businesses with possible money laundering schemes have
established links with the territory of Abkhazia. In addition, Russian state and
private companies are often directly involved in business operations in
Abkhazia. This is in violation of the Russian government’s own obligations
based on the 19 January agreement. On November 7, 1997 Mr. Chernomyrdin,
the Russian Prime Minister, signed a Decree issued by the Government of the
Russian Federation on Importing of Citrus Fruits and Some O   ther Agricul-
tural Products to the R   ussian Federation, and on June 24, 1998 the State
Duma issued a Decree of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on
N   ormaliz  ation of B   order and Customs R   egimes along the Abkhaortion
of the B   o  rder of the R   ussian Federation. This marked a new strategy on the
part of the government of Russia, aiming at the economic integration of
Abkhazia into the Russian Federation. It consisted in the development of eco-
nomic relations with the secessionist regime, the introduction of a non-visa sys-
tem for the secessionist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, granting Rus-
sian citizenship to population in the secessionist parts of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, and opening a railway connection between Sochi and Sukhumi. All this
was done without consulting the Government of Georgia, which caused the ag-
gravation of Georgian-Russian relations, and gave an incentive to the secession-
ist government of Abkhazia to proclaim independence in 1999 after a referen-
dum on independence in which the Abkhazian exiles (mostly ethnically Geor-
gian) did not participate. Further negotiations with the government of Georgia on
the political status of Abkhazia were effectively blocked.
The Impact of Sanctions
Some Western experts argue that any sanction imposed on the secessionist gov-
ernment of Abkhazia contribute to the development of smuggling. Such sanc-
tions only help the local authorities in Abkhazia to make money, and hurt the
population. On the one hand, due to these sanctions, various political-criminal
groups are able to make illegal trade and profit, and on the other hand, such sanc-
tions help the regime in Abkhazia increase its power and legitimacy as a result of
the “Georgian blockade.”5
Sanctions have created an extremely favourable setting for smuggling
through Abkhazia, especially when there are almost no relations and agreements
between the secessionist Abkhaz government and the Government of Georgia,
or the Abkhaz government in exile. Poverty and personal relations between eth-
nic Abkhazians and Georgians, who wish to establish economic relations and
improve their lives, have led many of them to pursue the only means of co-opera-
tion left by their governments—participation in the smuggling network. It is the
only way of survival. This has created a broad social base for the smuggling net-
work, which stretches far beyond the border of the demilitarisation zone in Gali
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5 Interview with Western representative of an international organization working in Abkhazia and based in Tbilisi.
and Zugdidi districts from Gagra to Tbilisi. People who live in Gagra and
Sukhumi often visit the biggest market in Tbilisi–Lilo—another trans-shipment
point of smuggled goods which mostly come from Azerbaijan, and take them to
Abkhazia for sale. In turn, ethnic Georgians visit Abkhazia for commercial pur-
poses.
Uncontrolled territories as crime zones
The current situation demonstrates that the conflicts in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia are not simply in deadlock. They have gradually transformed into crime
zones that nobody is able to fully control—not the Government of Georgia, the
Abkhaz and South Ossetian governments, or the international community.
On the one hand, Georgian authorities declare that they cannot establish Bor-
der Guard and Customs Service checkpoints on the Inguri River and the Roki
tunnel because secessionists would immediately interpret it as an attempt to es-
tablish a new border. The border remains open for smuggling into Georgia and
for the movement of criminal groups from one side of the conflict zone to an-
other.
On the other hand, de facto governments in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali are not
able to control their territories and prevent activities of the different (Abkhaz and
Georgian) crime groups. Frequent assassinations and kidnappings have become
usual practice in these regions.
As in many other conflict situations, the criminal world always fills the vac-
uum in official and legal relations. Crime groups are flexible and quickly-built
criminal networks that are often international, and which bring in representatives
from both sides of the conflict. The examination of the situation in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia confirms this general trend, and any observer can easily see how
successfully the Georgian, Abkhaz, and Ossetian crime groups and law enforce-
ment bodies co-operate in smuggling through secessionist territories.
In Abkhazia, crime groups operate in Gali and Kodori Gorge, and in Zugdidi
district of Samegrelo, while in South Ossetia—mostly in Tskhinvali and Gori
districts. They collaborate with each other regardless of their ethnic origins and
political orientation. They have different, sometimes paradoxical partnerships
with other crime groups, law enforcement bodies and governmental structures
(or individual government officials) in other parts of Abkhazia and Georgia. If
one link of this “smuggling chain” is broken, the whole chain falls apart. Goods,
which flow from Russia, Turkey or any other country through the territory of
Abkhazia to Georgia, or in the opposite direction, are protected through a system
of bribes, mutual sharing and “roofs” of influential government officials outside
and inside Abkhazia.6 The main actors (law enforcement bodies, crime groups,
and Russian peacekeepers) in the Gali, Zugdidi, Tskhinvali, and Gori districts,
along with the co-operative groups or individuals, compose a smuggling net-
work which successfully operates and expands its influence, involving more and
more poor people in contraband trade.
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6 A “roof” is a personal patron or clan—usually identified with a state organization—which protects criminal activity.
There are many questions, which arise in such circumstances. How dangerous
is the criminal situation and smuggling for the population living on both sides of
the Inguri river, and for the international community? What kind of impact does
it have on the economic, political and military situation? What forms of contra-
band trade and mechanisms exist, and which are the dominant contraband
goods? Which political actors benefit from the situation, and—most impor-
tantly—are there any possible solutions to the problem?
Routes and Types of smuggling: potential and real threats
During the Soviet period, Georgia was adjacent to NATO (Turkey), and armed
troops with sophisticated weapons—including strategic and tactical nuclear
weapons—were maintained on the entire Georgian territory. After the Soviet
collapse and the withdrawal of nuclear weapons and a major part of these troops,
there have been 197 discoveries of radioactive materials abandoned by Russian
troops on Georgian territory. They include both weak and strong sources of radi-
ation.7 Experts have concluded that the international community is exposed to
real danger if such radioactive materials are smuggled abroad, making it possible
to use “dirty bombs” in potential terrorist attacks against the West and Russia.
Uncontrolled territories are the best places for smuggling such materials.8
The smuggling of nuclear materials through the territory of Abkhazia is a real
possibility, but smuggling in weapons and drugs is already a reality. The scale of
illegal trade in weapons dropped dramatically after the end of military action in
1993, but demand from criminal groups inside and outside the region has contin-
ued to stimulate supply.
In 1997, the criminal police department in Moscow discovered an extensive
crime network which for two years had supplied illegal weapons (pistols, ma-
chine guns, grenades, and grenade-guns) from Abkhazia to organised crime
groups in Moscow.9
In the summer of 2002, a Russian criminal leader, Artur Liudkov (nick-
name—Iasha Astrakhanskyi) and Mchelidze, a major in the Georgian Ministry
of State Security, were arrested by Georgian law enforcement representatives for
transporting anti-tank rocket launchers (“Fagot”), hollow-charge shells and
other weapons. They claimed that they had been bought in South Ossetia from
Russian peacekeepers. There were strong suspicions that these weapons were in-
tended to be transported from South Ossetia to Chechen separatists in the Pankisi
Gorge. David Shengelia, leader of a Georgian partisan group, the “Forest
Brothers,” declared that he had asked for these weapons to defend the Georgian
population in the Gali district of Abkhazia. Despite a significant controversy, the
investigation was unsuccessful. Arthur Liudkov insisted that he was just an “ac-
cidental traveller” in the Land Cruiser carrying the weapons, and was released
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7 George Kolbin, Environmental Aspects of Former Soviet Military Sites in Georgia. NATO CCMS Workshop on
Reuse and Cleaning of Former Military Sites, Bishkek, May 27–29 2002.
8 Ken Stier. Missing Radioactive Generators in Georgia Raise “Dirty Bomb” Concerns. 6/28/02,
http://www.eurasianet.org
9 Alexander Strogin. Banditam privezli iz Abkhazii tselyi arsenal. Kommersant-daily, Moscow, September 30, 1997.
after three month’s detention. The Land Cruiser belonged to a well-known pro-
fessional criminal called Shakro Kalashov. In April 2003, Liudkov was killed in
Moscow under suspicious circumstances10.
Until a political resolution to the conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is
reached, local crime groups and their political allies will have an ongoing excuse
for illicit trade in weapons under the pretext of either “struggle against separat-
ists” or “struggle against terrorist groups.” Assassinations, kidnappings, taking
hostages, and abuse of human rights will also continue.
Another form of smuggling through Abkhazia and South Ossetia is the illicit
trade in drugs. Smuggling in either direction, i.e. to or from Georgia, manifests
itself in a variety of ways. Much depends on who is smuggling, where it takes
place, on the type of drug, and how much is being transported. Some narcotics
are grown for domestic consumption. Any country in decline, with a very high
unemployment rate and deep poverty among young people, usually faces explo-
sion in drug consumption. Some smuggling routes cross the North Caucasus
through mountain passes or across the Psou or Inguri rivers. Marijuana and hash-
ish are produced locally, while such drugs as cocaine and heroin are imported
from Turkey for transit either to Russia, or by Turkish boats to Spain and other
European countries. New drug routes are concentrated around major drug traf-
ficking centres such as Sukhumi, a major seaport, and Gudauta, a former Russian
military base.11 Russian army and navy, which use the airdrome and port in
Gudauta, are useful conduits for drugs. Russian air force can easily transport
drugs from Central Asia to the Gudauta airdrome. After that, the drug route con-
tinues to Europe. Neither the Abkhaz nor Georgian customs officers or law en-
forcement bodies are allowed to check Russian military cargoes.12 Other parts of
Georgia are also used for trafficking in drugs, especially South Ossetia and the
Pankisi Gorge. The latter has decreased in influence due to the introduction of
the Train and Equip programme and anti-terrorist operations there. It has be-
come too risky for drug smugglers to use the Pankisi Gorge.
Abkhazia has become one of the routes for trafficking local and Russian
women to Turkey. Usually they are transported by Turkish boats in groups of
5–6.13 There are also recorded cases of people being smuggled in the opposite di-
rection, i.e. from Turkey to Abkhazia. For example, the Georgian Coast Guard
once stopped a boat carrying 4 persons who had escaped from a coal mine in
Tkvarcheli district of Abkhazia. Turkish smugglers had promised them
well-paid jobs in Russian coal mines, but had transported them to Abkhazia in-
stead, where they had been forced to work in poor conditions with no pay. After a
month they had escaped. The Kutaisi City Court investigated the case.14
All of the above-mentioned types of smuggling are illegal anywhere in the
world, including Abkhazia. Unfortunately, the political resistance in the region
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10 Gangstera rasstreliali za svias s lesnymi bratiami? Newspaper Moskovskyi Komsomolets, April 22, 2003.
11 Georgian sources claim there is still a Russian military presence there.
12 Interview with officers of the Department of Intelligence of Georgia.
13 Ibid.
14 Based on materials from the Department of the Border Guard of Georgia.
creates uncontrolled zones that jeopardise the security of the international com-
munity, and leaves few chances for a successful struggle against them.
There are also other types of smuggling through Abkhazia and South Ossetia
which are economically damaging for Georgia.
Smuggled goods are mainly imported from Russia, while most exported
goods go to Turkey. There are also other countries, from or to which smuggling
takes place—notably Ukraine, Rumania, Bulgaria, Italy, and Spain. Most active
are the private boats and ships under the Turkish flag—approximately 40 vessels
in all—which handle up to 80 percent of all maritime smuggling, and up to 60
percent of all smuggling through Abkhazia. Every day 3–4 ships participate in
smuggling to and from Sukhumi and Ochamchire, while smaller boats operate to
and from Pitsunda and other towns. Most boats carry timber directed above all to
the Spanish shadow market. State-of-the-art equipment situated in Abkhazia
manufacture parquets that are then exported by Turkish boats to Spain. Expen-
sive timber, such as box-tree, is used, which was not allowed in the Soviet period.
Timber smuggling is one of the main sources of income for the Abkhaz seces-
sionist government and local clans.15 According to Abkhazian sources, in 2002
the production value of the Abkhazian timber industry was $1,723 million, of
which logs constituted 82 percent.16
Another smuggled commodity is fuel. Its extent depends on world prices, but
there is not enough reliable information and no reliable statistics to give exact es-
timates. For example, according to Georgian sources, the total population of
Abkhazia is currently approximately 170,000, while secessionist sources claim
that the correct figure is 320,000. This makes it difficult to calculate the average
level of fuel consumption in Abkhazia. However, it is generally believed that
there is a very small quantity of diesel fuel and gasoline imported to Georgia
through Abkhazia—mostly for local consumption in the Samegrelo region,
sometimes to Kutaisi and other regions of western Georgia. Smuggling from
Azerbaijan and South Ossetia, however, is more significant. Of these,
Azerbaijan is the primary source, because there is no railroad or sea connection
from South Ossetia. Smuggling between Russia (North Ossetia) and South
Ossetia is limited in wintertime because traffic for heavy trucks is difficult due to
snowfalls and slippery roads in the mountains.
Changes in the taxation system of Georgia after 1998 aggravated the local
business environment, and the difference between world prices and fixed Rus-
sian fuel prices on the domestic market increased after 1999. The resulting eco-
nomic conditions boosted fuel smuggling through Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
In 1998, world prices were very low and smuggling not so profitable. The follow-
ing year prices started to climb, and with them smuggling from Russia.
Nowadays Russians can no longer compete with Azerbaijan fuel. Although
the Azeri fuel is poor in quality, it is cheap and close to the Georgian market. Rail
transport is cheaper and allows larger quantities than transportation from Russia.
In addition, psychologically, the business climate between Azeris and Georgians
93
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and Ministry of State Security of Georgia.
16 Source: ИА REGNUM, http://www.abhazia.com/news/.
is better—Georgian–Russian relations are extremely tense whereas there are
friendly relations between the two South Caucasian countries that share similar
geopolitical goals. Even if the railway through Abkhazia is opened, hostile
post-conflict relations and the high level of crime in the region will complicate
commerce.17
Cigarettes are smuggled mostly from Russia (“Donskoi Tabak”) and Turkey
(“Parliament” etc.). Earlier “Vice Roy” was the most commonly smuggled ciga-
rette through Abkhazia, but when a Georgian tobacco factory started to manufac-
ture “Vice Roy” in Tbilisi, its smuggling practically stopped. There are two fac-
tories in Gudauta and Sukhumi which produce low-quality “Marlboro” ciga-
rettes. Some are smuggled to Turkey, a small quantity to Russia, and the rest to
Georgia. The de facto authorities in Abkhazia have an excise license (issued in
Russia) for domestic trade, but it is not valid in any foreign country.
The exportation of non-ferrous and ferrous scrap metal through Abkhazia
peaked in 1999 (40,000 tons of non-ferrous metal, and 32 tons of ferrous metal),
after which the activity largely exhausted. One of the smuggling routes ran from
Zugdidi through the Gali district to ports in Abkhazia.
Coal from Tkvarcheli in Abkhazia is imported mostly to Turkey. Some for-
eign firms have even signed agreements for coal supply with the de facto govern-
ment of Abkhazia. There are plans to produce up to 100,000 tons of Abkhazian
coal per year. Today, three to four freight cars arrive daily from Tkvarcheli to
Abkhazian ports.
Some foreign companies have also signed agreements with the de facto gov-
ernment in Abkhazia for fishing rights. The boats which participate in illegal
fishing in Abkhazian waters are mostly Turkish. Both the secessionist Abkhaz
authorities and the Georgian Border Guards have made some arrests.18 The
Georgian border Guard started regular coastal patrolling in 1999, and has since
then apprehended 42 boats engaged in some type of smuggling.19
There is also seasonal trade in hazelnuts and citrus fruits from the Zugdidi and
Gali districts to Russia or Turkey. These products, together with smuggling in
cigarettes, scrap metal, timber, and fuel are the main activities connected with
criminal disagreements, assassinations, kidnappings, and the taking of hostages.
Who benefits from unresolved conflicts?
Despite the extremely violent environment related to smuggling through
Abkhazia, its negative impact on the Georgian economy is insignificant in com-
parison to the volume of smuggling through the Red Bridge (from Azerbaijan),
the port of Poti (Black Sea), the Autonomous Republic of Ajara (from Turkey
and the Black Sea), Kazbegi (from Russia) and Akhaltsikhe (from Turkey). Ac-
cording to expert assessments, of the total volume of smuggling to and from
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18 Сотрудники прокуратуры экологического надзора конфисковали 300 кг. камбалы и 130 кг. белуги.
http://www.abhazia.com/news/.
19 Information is based on materials submitted by the Department of the Border Guard of Georgia.
Georgia, smuggling through Abkhazia and South Ossetia constitute 15–20 %, of
which Abkhazia’s share is perhaps only 3–5 %.20
It is of much more importance that the smuggling networks in Abkhazia in-
crease the crime rate, create corrupt economic interests among powerful political
groups, and contribute to the existing political status quo. Groups in power bene-
fit from the situation both financially and politically. Smuggling and frozen con-
flicts are the two pillars which help political clans inside and outside Abkhazia to
control material and coercive resources, limit democracy, and maintain political
power for an indefinite time. There have been no elections for the head of the
Government-of-Abkhazia-in-Exile for over ten years. In the meantime, the se-
cessionist President of Abkhazia has held Soviet-type elections, receiving a fan-
tastic 98 percent of the votes in the absence of rival candidates. While the leaders
are hostile to each other, their grassroots level supporters and state organisations
successfully co-operate through smuggling networks. Sometimes the situation is
tensed by political orders from patrons, but the rest of the time people are occu-
pied with making money by co-operation. It is not surprising that many people in
Georgia wonder if the “Forest Brothers” are partisans or smugglers. There are
similar concerns about the secession-supporting Abkhazian paramilitary de-
tachments which frequently organise “cleansings” against Georgians in the Gali
district but then continue their co-operation with Georgian smugglers.21
The government of Georgia has also benefited from the existing status quo.
The constitution of Georgia does not regulate the administrative-territorial divi-
sions within Georgia until the conflict in Abkhazia is concluded and the final sta-
tus of Abkhazia determined. Instead of holding democratic elections for regional
governments, governors and local government administrators, the President of
Georgia appoints them, justifying these undemocratic measures by pleading to
concerns about aggression from the separatist regimes. Gerrymandering and the
interference of local and regional authorities in presidential, parliamentary and
local elections has become an integral part of the electoral process in Georgia.
The limitation of democratic freedoms, especially at the grassroots level,
leads to the formation of political clans which dispose of public property in their
own interests and keep their citizens in abject poverty. They use militant ideolo-
gies, and corrupt coercive and criminal structures to keep citizens terrorised (for
example, through a permanent irrational fear of war) or fill their minds with re-
vengeful thoughts. Ordinary ethnic Abkhazians and Georgians are manipulated
and victimised by these clans. Any democratic change is a serious threat to the
power of the ruling groups. Democratic change can initiate conflict resolution
and facilitate the transformation of smuggling activities into legal businesses.
The deep political crisis of November 2003, and the consequent changes in polit-
ical power give some hope that the situation in Georgia will eventually improve.
Georgian law enforcement bodies benefit from smuggling. Administrative
enforcement is not effective in the current disastrous economic situation. Ac-
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21 The last time such “cleansing” took place was in the second part of May with the participation of 500 gunmen from
the so-called “spetsnaz”. http://www.abkhazya.org/server/-docs/news/.
cording to statistics from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia (the Depart-
ment of Struggle Against Corruption and Economic Crimes), in 2000, there were
22 recorded cases of customs violation, in 2001: 23 cases, in 2002: 35 cases, and
in the first quarter of 2003: 17 cases. In comparison to the volume of contraband
trade, and the thousands of transport units which every day cross the borders of
Georgia, this is a drop in the ocean. In the Samegrelo region, which borders
Abkhazia, the corresponding figures are: 2000—0; 2001—0; 2002—2;
2003—12.22 The General Prosecutor’s Office very seldom conducts thorough in-
vestigations, and even if it does, only few cases are prosecuted.23 In effort to jus-
tify the situation, high-ranking officials from law enforcement bodies say that
since Abkhazia and South Ossetia de jure are Georgian territories, they cannot
find legal evidence of smuggling from abroad because Georgian smugglers usu-
ally buy their goods from Abkhazian or Ossetian smugglers on territories which
are Georgian, but outside Georgian control. Decree of the President of Georgia
No. 434 permits law enforcement organisations to monitor transportation of
goods inside Georgia, but in practice, rampant corruption foils any such efforts.
Given the current situation, combating the problem of smuggling by administra-
tive methods is almost futile. The monthly salary of law enforcement officials is
only $25–50, but by taking bribes up to $100 per truck, they can increase their
monthly income up to $1,000–5,000. In 2002, “Rustavi-2”, an independent
Georgian television programme investigated the connection between smuggling
and the corruption of the customs and law enforcement agencies. Video records
proved that administrative corruption is one of the main reasons for the failure to
control smuggling.
There is also a broad social base for the smuggling networks: they involve
many poor people and give them a chance to survive. Attempts by the “Extraor-
dinary Legion” (an agency of the Georgian Ministry of Finance) to confiscate
contraband cigarettes in Tbilisi from street vendors and kiosks caused massive
protests and clashes.24 In the present situation of continual political tension and
very little support for the government of Georgia, authorities are not willing to
use radical administrative methods and interfere in the operations of local clans
in conflict zones, where smuggling has become one of the main sources of in-
come. Despite its general destructive impact on attempts on conflict resolution,
smuggling may, however, have one positive outcome: unlike Abkhazia, where a
strong, hostile post-conflict atmosphere still prevails, the Ergneti contraband
market in South Ossetia has played a positive role in creating economic co-oper-
ation between Ossetians and Georgians despite their participation in smuggling.
This co-operation has resulted in hundreds of new jobs, and given parts of the lo-
cal population a chance to survive. “Ossetians are smarter than Abkhazians,”
said one expert from the American Chamber of Commerce in Georgia, “because
they understood to use the Roki tunnel to fulfil their economic goals, and now
both Georgians and Ossetians can freely go to Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, have din-
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24 “Extraordinary Legion” is an armed unit which was specially created for combating smuggling. It is subordinated to
the Ministry of Finance of Georgia.
ner in restaurants there, and more or less safely return to their homes. It is diffi-
cult even to imagine the same in any part of Abkhazia”.25 Any attempt to elimi-
nate the market through administrative measures may cause a new conflict, and
is pointless, because other markets will be created elsewhere.
Conclusions
The negative impact of smuggling through Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the
Georgian economy is insignificant in comparison to the volume of smuggling
through other parts of Georgia.
It is of much more importance that the smuggling networks in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia increase the crime rate, create corrupt economic interests among
powerful political groups, and contribute to the existing political status quo and
“frozen conflicts”.
The main reasons for smuggling through Abkhazia and South Ossetia are not
transparent borders or secessionism, but institutional weakness and corruption
in law enforcement bodies, and the absence of initiative among previous leaders
of the supreme executive branch of the Government of Georgia to change the sit-
uation in the country.
Sanctions against Abkhazia only contribute to the development of smuggling
and shadow businesses on its territory.
Recommendations
What to do in the current situation? In theory, there are several possible ways to
solve the problem of smuggling through Abkhazia and South Ossetia:
Sanctions against the secessionist regime in Abkhazia should be lifted regard-
less of the conditions the Georgian side has thus far insisted on. This would re-
duce the level of mistrust towards Georgians among ordinary Abkhazians, and
deprive Abkhaz secessionists of the possibility to use the sanctions for fuelling
anti-Georgian ethnic hostility.
Attempts to forcefully destroy contraband markets may cause a renewal of
armed conflicts or even social disorder in Georgia.
Ineffective Steps
Legal enforcement (1) against socially vulnerable people is dangerous in the cur-
rent tense political situation in Georgia.
Legal enforcement (2) against local secessionist clans in conflict zones, where
smuggling has become one of the main sources of income, is impossible due to
danger of renewal of conflicts.
97
25 Interview with experts from the American Chamber of Commerce in Georgia.
Effective Steps
Legal enforcement (3) against Georgian wholesale smugglers;
Legal enforcement (4) against corrupt law enforcement and government offi-
cials.
Most Effective Steps
Under the current conditions of tense relations with Russia and the “frozen con-
flicts” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, economic incentives would offer the most
appropriate and effective unilateral means for Georgia to minimise the level of
smuggling through Abkhazia and other territories. Smuggling can most effec-
tively be prevented by either economic measures or strong state and border con-
trol, but due to the uncontrolled borders in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the latter
is not at present a viable option for Georgia.
Economic steps could effectively minimise smuggling. It is necessary to ra-
tionalise the wage level of border officials, and to co-ordinate excise and other
tax policy with neighbouring countries. Borders are porous, and they can always
be used for smuggling if there are no economic incentives to promote the control
of smuggling.
According to Mr. Michael Machavariani, former Minister of Tax Revenues,
Georgia’s current tax rates are the highest when compared to all its four neigh-
bouring countries, i.e. Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey, with the excep-
tion of taxes on oil products where Armenia’s taxes are higher. This makes smug-
gling from neighbouring countries a profitable business.
Acting legislation, such as the Tax Code and Law on Consumer’s Goods, in
fact promotes smuggling. Georgian legislation has created an environment
where legal businesses cannot function and are squeezed out of the market.
Smuggled goods cost less than those that have been legally taxed and imported.
Legal importation makes no sense in such an inequitable competitive environ-
ment. Legal businessmen either switch to illegal operations or stay out of the
market.
In most areas of trade, Western democracies have a much more effective con-
trol of smuggling than countries such as Georgia. In countries like Georgia, au-
thorities know about the ongoing smuggling and often punish only those who fail
to co-operate with corrupt officials. Usually those punished are petty individual
smugglers.26
Additional measures that could also improve the situation would be to opti-
mise the socio-economic conditions of the customs employees and to modernise
customs infrastructure by, for example, implementing a programme for the com-
puterisation of customs offices.
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Reform of the Border Guard from military unit into Border Police
The old philosophy of border control sees it as a defence of the State border-
line—the Soviet type “Iron Curtain” defence. New philosophy regards it as an
instance that controls borders of the whole territory of Georgia, including re-
gions neighbouring to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Mobile Border Patrol in the
regions of Samegrelo and Shida Kartli would be a significant step towards more
effective control of smuggling through transparent borders in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia even in conditions of unresolved conflicts.
Main Problem
Before November 2003, authorities headed by Eduard Shevardnadze, the Presi-
dent of Georgia, demonstrated a lack of initiative and will to institute any of these
steps in an effective manner.
Example:
Pressure of the International Monetary Fund and anti-smuggling campaign in
Georgia in August 2003.
Fair elections of new Parliament and President of Georgia, and
political leaders in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Democratic change poses a serious threat to the power of the ruling groups both
in Georgia and in its secessionist zones. It can initiate conflict resolution and fa-
cilitate the transformation of smuggling activities into legal businesses.
There are expectations among the Georgian public that the newly elected
President of Georgia, Chairman of the Parliament, and State Minister will essen-
tially improve the situation in 2004.
Long term perspective
Political resolution of the conflicts, and comprehensive co-operation among all
interested parties. This would require the resolution of many highly complex
problems such as: the relations between Russia and Western countries concern-
ing the Caucasus region; relations between Georgia and Russia; relations be-
tween the Government of Georgia and the secessionist governments in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia; relations between the government of Abkhazia-in-exile and
the secessionist government of Abkhazia; and (most importantly) relations be-
tween ordinary ethnic Abkhazians, Ossetians, and Georgians through diplomacy
and civic initiatives.
Despite the fact that the current “frozen” situation greatly diminishes the pos-
sibility that problems of smuggling and crime can be solved through political
agreements and co-operation, they are in a key position if results are to be
achieved.
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Reassessment of the existing strategy on conflict resolution is necessary for
breaking the deadlock.
Existing strategy:
Conflicting sides and mediators try to define political status of secessionist terri-
tories, but Georgian, Abkhaz, and Ossetian politicians are hostages of the exist-
ing situation. They are not able to satisfy each other’s political claims connected
to the definition of the political status. For example, if the president of Georgia
agrees to recognise the independence of Abkhazia, he or she will immediately be
impeached. The same happens if the de facto president of Abkhazia agrees to re-
cognise Abkhazia as part of Georgia.
Result:
Both conflicts are in a deadlock with little prospect of resolution in the foresee-
able future.
Proposed strategy:
1. Postponing the definition of political status to the indefinite future (probably
to the future generation of politicians)—conflicting sides should announce a
moratorium which means that secessionist governments would not declare
independence while the Government of Georgia would not declare that
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are parts of Georgia, until a formal procedure of
unification with the European Union is topical. This will take several de-
cades;
2. Following the strategy of Europeanisation. Both Abkhaz and Georgian poli-
ticians have already declared Europeanisation as their objective, and this is
significant when a new strategy of conflict resolution is implemented. The
European Union could elaborate a special programme of standardisation for
further integration (as one of the means of conflict resolution) of those terri-
tories which have territorial disputes but wish to join the EU in future.
Europeanisation is understood here as a long term process of meeting EU
standards, which in the long run may lead to a formal procedure of unifica-
tion with the EU, provided that there are grounds to expect that future politi-
cians from all conflicting sides will be able to reach a compromise solution
to resolve the conflict.
Expected results:
1. Based on European norms, immediate initiation of the processes of stand-
ardising legislation, customs and tax policy in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
as well as in Georgia as a whole. Immediate elimination of any sanctions
against secessionist regime in Abkhazia, and initiation of a repatriation of
IDPs and refugees in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and other regions of Georgia.
Development of democracy and market economy within the context of poli-
cies aiming at eventual integration with the EU;
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2. Defined political status by the time of formal procedure of unification with
the European Union (either as one territory or two territories). New genera-
tions of Abkhaz, Ossetian, and Georgian politicians will define how they
want to join the EU—as separate territories or as one territory. If today Geor-
gian, Abkhaz, and Ossetian politicians are hostages of the situation, it is ex-
pected that by the formal unification with the EU (which definitely will take
several decades) new generations of politicians will act in a better political,
economic, and social environment—favourable to compromises and con-
sensus on the definition of the political status of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. It is expected that the incentive of joining the EU will play a positive
role in resolving this dispute.
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Criminal Networks and Trust.
On the importance of expectations of
loyal behaviour in criminal relations
Kl aus von Lampe and Per Ole Johansen,
Freie Universitä  t  B  erlin, Germany, and University of Oslo, Norway
It has become a truism to say that what holds organised crime together are bonds
of trust. At the same time there is no clear understanding of the meaning of trust
in the context of organised crime and how it affects the emergence and continued
existence of criminal structures. And there is only little if any empirical research
which specifically explores the presence or absence of trust in criminal relations.
The purpose of this paper is, first of all, to provide a tentative conceptuali-
sation of trust in the context of organised crime. Starting with a brief review on
the general sociological literature on trust we propose a typology of different
types of trust in criminal relations, and, drawing from our own research on two il-
legal markets, the alcohol black market in Norway (Johansen 1994; 1998; forth-
coming) and the cigarette black market in Germany (von Lampe 2002; 2003b),
we present some anecdotal evidence on the empirical importance of trust when
establishing and maintaining criminal relations. Finally, we consider constella-
tions of criminal co-operation where trust is violated or absent in the first place.
With our discussion we try to emphasise that in the analysis of organised
crime, different types of trust and different consequences of the violation of trust
need to be taken into consideration, not to mention the possibility that there are
criminal relations which are not based on trust at all.
Trust and Organised Crime
The issue of trust has been growing in popularity in the sociological and eco-
nomic literature over the past 25 years. Trust has variously been identified as a
prerequisite for economic development, as a necessary component of civil soci-
ety or, more generally, of the continued operation of any social order (Fukuyama
1995; Gambetta 1988; Huemer 1998; Laucken 2001; Luhmann 1979; Misztal
1996; Seligman 1997). In a similar vein, the notion of trust is used in the organ-
ised crime literature to explain the willingness and capability of “organised crim-
inals” to co-operate. Here, the need for trust appears to be even more pressing.
On the one hand, many of the institutional safeguards designed to compensate
for the consequences of deceit and betrayal, such as courts and insurance, are un-
available for illegal actors. On the other hand, with the threat of law enforcement
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intervention and criminal sanctions, the consequences of disloyal behaviour are
far greater than those to be expected in the legal sphere of society. Accordingly,
trust is treated as an essential feature of organised crime, and organised crime, in
turn, is placed in an inherent relationship with bonding ties of kinship, ethnicity,
or ritual kinship within mafia-like fraternal organisations (Black et al. 2001: 58;
Bovenkerk 1998: 122; von Lampe 1999: 220–1; 2001; Lupsha 1983: 65, 1986:
33–4; Paoli 2002: 84; Pearson and Hobbs 2001: 27–32; Reuter 1983: 116).
This conventional view has not remained unchallenged. Organised crime, it
has been argued, is better characterised by a lack of trust (van Duyne et al. 2001:
99, 127), as people who tend towards criminality are unlikely, in the words of
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990: 213), “to be reliable, trustworthy, or co-opera-
tive”. Even life in the Mafia, as Diego Gambetta (1996: 152) has stressed, is
fraught with uncertainty, distrust, suspicion, paranoid anxiety and misunder-
standing.
Conceptualisations of Trust
Trust has to do with how people cope with risk and uncertainty in interactions
with others (Fukuyama 1995; Gambetta 1988; Huemer 1998; Laucken 2001;
Misztal 1996; Seligman 1997). Trust implies reliance on another person’s integ-
rity in the absence of sufficient means to control this other person’s behaviour.
There are at least two dimensions along which conceptualisations of trust
vary. One dimension refers to the level of rationality or irrationality when a trust-
ing person decides to trust. The other dimension, ranging from micro to macro
level, refers to diverging views on the allocation of trust in society. In the spec-
trum from rationality to irrationality, trust takes up a space somewhere between
purely rational calculation of probabilities and irrational blind faith (Coleman
1990: 99; Giddens 1990: 33). The micro-macro dimension ranges from trust
placed in individuals to trust in abstract systems where individuals are recog-
nised only as agents who perform certain institutionally prescribed roles
(Misztal 1996: 72; Seligman 1997: 18).
Our conceptualisation of trust is based on the notion that the most appropriate
frame of reference for discussing trust in the context of organised crime is a net-
work approach. We view trust as a property of dyadic relations that form the ba-
sic elements of criminal networks. In turn, we regard criminal networks, defined
as webs of criminally exploitable social ties, as “the least common denominator
of organised crime” (McIllwain 1999: 304).
For reasons of simplicity we focus on dyadic relations between a trusting Per-
son P, the trustor, and a trusted other person O, the trustee (Fig. 1). We specifi-
cally focus on the perspective of the trusting person, leaving aside the question of
how the trusted person perceives and copes with the situation. Within this narrow
framework, we define trust as the expectation of P, under conditions of uncer-
tainty, that (1) O will not harm P, even though (2) O could harm P (see also Dunn
1988: 74; Gambetta 1988: 219).
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The quintessential situation in which trust is an issue is that of a cooperative
venture involving P and O. In this case trust means the expectation that O will
stick to implicit and explicit agreements and will protect the secrecy of the ven-
ture vis-à -vis other criminals, the public and of course the police.
But there are other constellations where the notion of trust may come into
play, even cases where O is a mere bystander who observes a criminal act com-
mitted by P. Here trust means P’s expectation that O will not interfere or alert oth-
ers, especially the police.
A Typology of Trust under Conditions of Illegality
In the analysis of a given criminal relation, the first question to be addressed
would be: Is there trust at all? If not, the alternatives are either lack of trust or out-
right mistrust.
If there is trust, the crucial question becomes: On what basis does P expect O
to be trustworthy? We believe that this question is heuristically of tremendous
value because it opens the door to a systematic exploration of the myriad factors
that may contribute to the emergence and continued existence of criminal net-
works.
In order to systematise the various potential constellations, we go back to the
two dimensions of rationality-irrationality and micro-macro referred to above.
We propose a typology of trust under conditions of illegality that rests on a dis-
tinction of different bases on which P expects that O will be trustworthy. In es-
sence we define four categories of trust along the micro-macro dimension (indi-
vidualised trust, trust based on reputation, generalised trust, trust in abstract sys-
tems) and within each category we emphasise variations in the rationality of the
decision to trust. (Tab. 1).
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P
(Trustor)
O
(Trustee)
O will not harm P even though O could
Uncertainty
Expectation
Figure 1. Basic Trust Relation.
Individualised Trust
The first category involves individualised trust. The expectation of agreeable be-
haviour relates specifically to the trustee as an individual. The motivation for
trusting a particular individual can be rational. It may lie in previous observa-
tions of the trustee’s behaviour and dispositions (Misztal 1996: 76), or in expec-
tations of how the trustee will react to sanctions (Coleman 1990: 115). Or the
motivation to trust may be irrational, resting on affections the trustor feels for the
trustee (Gambetta 1998: 232; Huemer 1998: 121; Misztal 1996: 21).
Individualised trust can primarily be expected to emerge among criminal ac-
tors from continuous interaction in delinquent peer groups or in a prison setting,
where affectionate bonds and a sense of predictability may develop.
It needs to be taken into account that trust—and especially individualised
trust—can be mediated. In this case, P and O are connected through a chain in-
volving one or more intermediaries who advise P on O’s trustworthiness or even
vouch for it (Coleman 1990: 180–182).
Trust Based on Reputation
The second category pertains to trust based on reputation. Here P places trust in
O as a particular person but relies on publicly formed and held opinions about
this person’s trustworthiness (Dasgupta 1988: 54). Relying on reputation can be
irrational considering the weak basis reputations may have. On the other hand, a
reputation of trustworthiness can be a valuable asset that creates a strong incen-
tive to actually be trustworthy. Thus, speculating on this mechanism can be quite
rational. 
Generalised Trust
The third category, generalised trust, comprises constellations in which trust is
linked to social groups rather than to a particular individual. The trustor P places
trust in the trustee O on the basis of the presumption that the trustee conforms to
some more general norms or patterns of behaviour, for example codes of mutual
support and non-cooperation with law enforcement that are internalised by
members of a deviant subculture or a mafia-like fraternal association.
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Level of Abstraction of Basis of Trust Level of Rationality of Decision to Trust
M
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ro
–
M
ac
ro
rational ↔ irrational
Trust in Abstract Systems
Generalised Trust
Trust Based on Reputation
Individualised Trust
Table 1. A Typology of Trust.
On a more mundane level, but perhaps with the most rational justification to it,
a trust producing a sense of predictability may arise in routine situations. Harold
Garfinkel (1963) has stressed the relevance of unspoken rules in daily life. This
may be valid for conditions of illegality as well.
Trust in Abstract Systems
The fourth category refers to trust that is placed in abstract systems that set and
maintain certain basic conditions. Of course, there are no direct counterparts in
the sphere of illegality to abstract systems in legal society like government, the
monetary system or the medical system (see Giddens 1990; Luhmann 1979;
1988). Still, where criminal groups manage to establish some level of control
over a territory or market, and to set and enforce certain rules, as for example the
Mafia in Palermo with regard to ordinary criminals (Gambetta 1993), then it can
be assumed that such a framework will influence the behaviour of criminal ac-
tors and thus contribute to a sense of predictability and the emergence of trust.
Trust Producing Social Settings
It should be noted that the four categories are not mutually exclusive. On the con-
trary, it can be expected that a given trust relation rests on different bases of trust,
and conversely, that there are social settings within which various trust building
factors take effect.
In the following section, we briefly discuss four of these settings (family, local
community, ethnic community and business) with reference to our empirical re-
search on the alcohol and cigarette black markets to further illustrate the catego-
ries we have defined in our typology and to provide some insight into the actual
relevance of different types of trust.
Family
According to conventional wisdom, there is a direct link between family and
trust. Anthony Giddens (1990: 101), for example, suggests that “kinspeople can
usually be relied upon to meet a range of obligations more or less regardless of
whether they feel personally sympathetic towards specific individuals in-
volved”. Trust in family members, it is argued, rests on familiarity and confor-
mity, i.e. on individualised trust growing out of continuous interaction, and on
generalised trust based on a sense of similarity and shared norms and values
(Misztal 1996: 39, 157, 171). However, the link between kinship ties and crimi-
nal relations may not be as straightforward. There is, first of all, the aspect of in-
ner family conflicts. Secondly, the question of “borrowed loyalty” arises: It is not
clear under what circumstances relations with no illegal connotation, such as
kinship ties, can become the basis of trust for criminal co-operation.
In fact, our findings do not indicate a dominant role of family structures in the
black markets we study. Among alcohol smugglers in Norway, the most com-
mon kinship-based patterns of co-operation are father and son relations, some-
times on equal terms. One interviewed Norwegian bootlegger explained: “Dad,
who used to be a workingman, did start on his own in the 50s with tobacco and
fruits, mostly black. Later on he went on with booze, and asked me to drive. He
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had no driver’s license. Here you see the coincidence of life.” In some instances,
bootleggers have been found to receive moral and logistical support from their
wives and families. Another Norwegian bootlegger recollected in an interview:
“My wife and I, we have always been together. I go nowhere or do nothing with-
out her. We did our first deals in the 50s—went to the loan shark with our wed-
ding rings to raise money for our first investment in cigarettes and booze... But
my son, by the way, is a doctor.” In other instances, family ties have turned out to
be a source of risk when abused wives and disgruntled relatives have volunteered
information to the authorities.
Local Community
Local communities and other homogeneous face-to-face groups, like family, can
be expected to produce trust through familiarity and conformity (Giddens 1990:
101; Luhmann 1988: 94).
In the case of the illegal alcohol market in Norway, close-knit rural communi-
ties appear to be a more significant trust factor than the immediate family. In
these communities, moonshining is widespread, and disloyal behaviour would
be directed not only against a business partner but against the entire community.
Similar mechanisms could be observed in the context of legal associations such
as athletic clubs. One informant reported that his soccer coach used to sell liquor
to his team on a regular basis. Another informant recalled: “We used to buy
booze from a guy who was a member of our athletic club. Nobody grassed on
him. That would be unthinkable”
Under such conditions, we hypothesise, family ties, to the extent they are
criminally relevant at all, provide no added value.
Ethnicity
Ethnicity, probably more than anything else, has been assumed to provide a basis
of trust for organised criminals (see Bovenkerk 1998). And indeed, the link be-
tween ethnicity and trust is fairly easy to establish where close-knit ethnic com-
munities exist, because here the same notion of trust created by familiarity and
conformity would seem to apply as in the case of family and local community.
Moreover, marginalisation and discrimination tend to increase internal cohesion
while self-chosen isolation may block alternatives.
Where intra-ethnic relations are not embedded in close-knit communities,
however, the link between ethnicity and trust is less clear. What would have to be
assumed is that a sense of similarity is generally present in the interaction be-
tween people of the same ethnic background, and that their behaviour will there-
fore be predicted with greater confidence (Hardin, quoted in Misztal 1996: 134).
In our research we have found a significant difference in the importance of
ethnicity between the bootleg liquor market in Norway and the cigarette black
market in Germany. In Norway, members of ethnic minorities play a marginal
role at best in the black market. In contrast, in the cigarette black market in Ger-
many, the procurement and wholesale levels tend to be occupied by Polish smug-
glers and dealers whereas the street sale is dominated by the Vietnamese. It ap-
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pears that illegal entrepreneurs can operate within their respective ethnic net-
works with ease and without fear of being reported to the authorities.
The most striking aspect of the dominating role of certain ethnic groups in the
cigarette black market is not, however, that they facilitate criminal co-operation,
but that there is an apparent ease with which the ethnic cleavages between these
groups are bridged, namely in the relation between Polish whole-sale suppliers
and Vietnamese dealers, and between Vietnamese dealers and German customers.
This is remarkable because in legal business, ethnic and language barriers are
generally believed to hamper the establishment and maintenance of business
contacts due to the great potential of misunderstanding and conflict when mem-
bers with different languages, cultural backgrounds and belief systems meet
(Good 1988: 45–46; Neubauer 1997).
In the illegal cigarette market in Germany (see Fig. 2) quite the opposite might
be true. From the available evidence it seems that Polish smugglers initially took
the risk of directly approaching potential Vietnamese customers without any
prior connection. The cigarettes were randomly solicited in front of housing pro-
jects known to be occupied by the Vietnamese. We can hypothesise that the
equivalent status of a foreigner, minimising the possibility of co-operation with
the authorities, provided sufficient grounds for co-operation.
The same may be true for the relation between German customers and Viet-
namese street vendors. But yet another trust building factor may be at work as
well: the routinisation of the street sale of contraband cigarettes. These ex-
changes are publicly repeated in the same fashion over and over again so that a
given customer will most likely not anticipate any deviation from this norm
when he or she approaches a vendor.
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Wholesale Level
(predominantly Polish)
Retail Level
(predominantly Vietnamese)
Consumers
(predominantly German)
Ethnic Cleavage
Ethnic Cleavage
Figure 2. The Ethnic Factor in the Cigarette Black Market in Germany.
Legal Business
While ethnicity cannot be ruled out as a trust building factor, at least in the case of
the cigarette market in Germany, there is one social setting that appears to have a
much greater significance for the emergence of criminally relevant trust: legal
business.
The issue of criminogenic business cultures and criminal relations growing
out of business relations has been raised in the literature on white-collar crime
(see e.g. Coleman 1987; 1989; Waring 1993), but it has received little attention
so far in the literature on criminal networks. Like the other settings, networks of
legal business relations and relations within a firm tend to be characterised by a
high level of cultural cohesion, patterns of repeated interaction, and transparency
through social and geographical proximity. In such an environment, trust can be
expected to be the result of a combination of factors like affectionate bonds, ob-
servations of personal conduct, reputation, and the reliance on shared norms and
values.
Our findings suggest that this kind of trust can facilitate criminal co-opera-
tion. Both bootlegging in Norway and the trafficking in untaxed cigarettes in
Germany are closely linked to legal business, namely the transportation sector.
In our research we have found criminal relations growing out of existing or previ-
ous employer/employee relations, relations between employees of the same
firm, and between independent business partners. One Norwegian alcohol
smuggler stated that when obtaining credit in the bootlegging business, he was
able to take advantage of the reputation he had gained as a legal entrepreneur
who pays his debts on time.
Violation of Trust
It is a matter of further research to explore how the different social arenas relate
to the emergence of trust relations and different levels of trust. What seems clear,
however, is that no basis of trust is strong enough to rule out the possibility of be-
trayal. That is why the analysis of trust would be incomplete without a look at the
consequences of a violation of trust. Our research suggests that the violation of
trust can have very different consequences.
No Consequences
In some instances, the violation of trust may not entail any consequences, for ex-
ample, because the trusting person remains unaware of the disloyalty. In one il-
lustrative case, the members of the network of one of the big-shots of Norway’s
bootleg business continued to cooperate despite poor results. They failed to real-
ise that the reason for their failures was that the big-shot himself occasionally in-
formed on accomplices to fend off criminal investigations directed against him.
In some instances no consequences will follow because the trusting person
has no motivation or resources for retribution. Several instances have been docu-
mented where participants of the bootleg business in Norway remained un-
touched although they had been known grasses for years.
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Responses
When the trusting person does react to disloyal behaviour, the response needs not
be drastic. Instead of using violence, the cooperation may be continued on a
lower level. Overall, neither the bootleg liquor market in Norway nor the illegal
cigarette market in Germany is marked by widespread violence.
Just as there are patterns of criminal co-operation that endure violations of
trust, we also find co-operative relations among criminals that either seem to lack
an initial basis of trust or appear to be characterised by outright mistrust.
At this point it must be stressed, however, that the presence or absence of trust
is a matter of the subjective perspective of the trusting person. Trust may exist
even though a rational objective observer would feel that there is no sufficient ba-
sis. One has to take into account that decisions under uncertainty, such as the de-
cision to trust, are prone to be influenced by biases and misleading intuitions
(Tversky and Kahnemann 1982). Therefore, trust-based co-operation may occur
on a very precarious basis and without much of a past history (Gambetta 1988:
232; Good 1988: 45).
This may explain, for example, the on-the spot recruitments on the wholesale
level of the cigarette black market in Germany. In several cases, persons have
been recruited in the course of chance meetings in bars to transport considerable
amounts of contraband cigarettes (von Lampe 2003b). It can be hypothesised
that these encounters have been sufficient for both sides to form an opinion about
the other’s trustworthiness.
Co-operation Without a Basis of Trust
These constellations notwithstanding, there seem to be instances where co-oper-
ation occurs without a basis of trust. Four types of cases in particular can be dis-
tinguished:
(1) Cases where trust is placed to explore the other’s trustworthiness, typically
beginning with an initial co-operative move on a low level of risk which is
gradually increased to develop individualised trust;
(2) Cases of adverse conditions where the trustor has no choice but to place trust
in another because not to trust would lead to greater harm (see Coleman
1990: 107–108; Gambetta 1988: 223–224; McCarthy et al. 1998: 174);
(3) Cases where the risks of co-operation are simply ignored, fatalistically ac-
cepted as a fact of life, or even welcomed to thrill gambler’s adventurous
mind (Adler 1985: 85).
(4) Cases where the risks of co-operation are minimised by functional alterna-
tives to trust in the form of precautionary measures such as anonymity and
segmentation.
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Conclusion
In conclusion we would like to argue that trust is an empirically and theoretically
significant variable but it provides no exhaustive explanation for the emergence
and continued existence of criminal networks. To fully understand the impor-
tance of trust it is necessary to acknowledge its many forms and micro- and
macro-social contexts within which it is rooted. Kinship and ethnicity are just
some, and not necessarily the most important trust variables that need to be taken
into consideration. It may well be that criminal co-operation is not founded on
trust at all: empirical evidence suggests that under certain circumstances, crimi-
nal relations can exist in the absence of trust and even despite mistrust.
Analysing organised crime with regard to the presence or absence of trust
promises new insights from a combination of psychological and sociological
perspectives.
Numerous questions remain to be answered through future research, includ-
ing:
• how trust developed in legal contexts can be used for criminal purposes,
• to what extent the strength of trust-relations varies with different types of
trust,
• to what extent the need for trust in criminal relations varies with the hostility
of the environment and the general levels of trust in society.
It needs to be stressed that the illegal markets we are studying exist in relatively
non-hostile environments and in societies that are characterised as “high-trust cul-
tures” (Fukuyama 1995). It can be hypothesised that the picture is different in ille-
gal markets in hostile environments and/or embedded in “low-trust societies”.
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Trafficking in Women and Children
in Europe
Martti Lehti and Kauko Aromaa,
National Research Institute of Legal Policy, and European Institute for
Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations, Finland
Concerning trafficking in women and children, Europe is divided into two parts:
the member countries of the European Union serve as a destination area, and
Eastern Central Europe, the Balkans and the CIS-countries as source and transit
areas. Illegal immigration as a whole has six main routes to and inside Europe: 1)
from Moscow through Lithuania, Poland and/or the Czech Republic to Germany
and Austria; 2) from Ukraine through Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic
and/or Poland to Austria and Germany; 3) from the Middle East and Turkey to
Greece and Italy; 4) from North Africa to Spain and Italy; 5) from Turkey
through the Balkans to Italy and Austria, and 6) from South and Central America
to Portugal and Spain. These routes also serve as the main routes of trafficking in
human beings (NCIS UK, 34).
A. Trafficking in women and children for sexual exploitation
1 Overview
In Europe, the trafficking in women and children is dominated by trafficking
connected with prostitution and other forms of sexual exploitation. A recent
study shows that more than 80 percent of the victims from south-eastern Europe
(one of the main source areas) end up as prostitutes, and about 10 percent as sup-
pliers of other erotic services. Approximately 10 to 30 percent of the victims are
under 18 years of age; mostly 15–18-year-old girls, but also younger children are
involved (Hajdinjak 2002, 51; Omelaniuk 2002).
Precise information on the volume and turnover of the crime is not available.
This is mainly due to the following:
1) The absence of comparable statistics on reported crimes, indictments and
court cases, as well as on the number of victims involved (on the whole, na-
tional statistics indicating the number of victims in reported crimes are avail-
able only in a few European countries);
2) The heterogeneous criminalisation of the crime of trafficking in women in
the national legislation of European countries;
3) The characteristics of trafficking (as organised transnational crime), which
result in a high dark figure and make trafficking hard to control and to pre-
vent;
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4) The poor legal status of the victims in the legislation of the European coun-
tries, which makes them unwilling to report the crimes or to co-operate with
the authorities during investigation and court proceedings;
5) The heterogeneous use of the concept of trafficking in women in both inter-
national and national contexts.1 This is partly due to the heterogeneous na-
tional legislation in Europe, and partly to the different ideological and moral
attitudes to prostitution. At its largest, trafficking in women is understood to
include all (international) female prostitution, and at most limited, only cer-
tain crimes against personal freedom criminalised in national legislation.
Hence the current extent of trafficking in women in Europe is subject to rough es-
timates, and in most cases it is unclear how these estimates have been reached.
Furthermore, due to some of the definitional grey areas involved, very accurate
estimates would be impossible to make even in theory.
As far as the whole continent is concerned, the Swedish NGO Kvinna till
kvinna estimates that every year approximately 500,000 women and children are
trafficked for sexual exploitation to the European Union member countries. Ac-
cording to the latest estimate of IOM, the volume of trafficking to the European
Union from and through the Balkans is 120,000 women and children a year, and
from the whole of Eastern Europe about 200,000 women and children. In addi-
tion to the trafficking directed at the European Union, trafficking in women and
children for sexual exploitation is common also to, in and between the countries
outside the EU, as well as from Europe to other continents (North America, the
Middle East, Japan and Southeast Asia). Estimates of the extent of this activity
are even more vague than those of trafficking to the EU, but the volume is proba-
bly smaller. According to the latest estimate by the US Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration (DEA), the annual volume of all forms of trafficking in women and
children all over the world is 500,000 victims, of whom 200,000 go through the
Balkans. According to the US State Department, the corresponding figure is
700,000. All the above mentioned estimates must be considered as indicative
only, for there are no exact data (and, for definitional problems, it is doubtful if
such data will ever exist) on the actual volume of trafficking in women either in Eu-
rope or on other continents (Hajdinjak 2002, 51; Laczko etc. 2002, 4; Organised
crime situation report 2001, 41; fpmail.friends-partners.org; www.janes.com;
www1.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs).
It is, however, evident that in Europe, the volume of trafficking has increased
rapidly over the last ten years. Two plausible explanations are to be found:
Firstly, the demand for prostitution and other sexual services has increased in
Western Europe. Secondly, the former Socialist countries in Eastern Europe with
their current economic and social problems form a source area from which traf-
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1 The term trafficking is used in this report as defined in the UN Palermo Protocol on Trafficking in 2000: “Trafficking
in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat
or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of position of
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control
over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.
ficking in humans to Western Europe can be organised far more easily and more
economically than from the old source areas (Southeast Asia, West Africa and
Latin America). Estimates of the yearly turn-over of the crime vary from 100
million Euros to several billion euros (Hajdinjak 2002, 51; Organised crime situ-
ation report 2001, 41; fpmail.friends-partners.org).
The majority of the victims of trafficking come from Albania, Lithuania,
Moldavia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine. Of the victims of coerced prostitution
assisted by IOM over the last few years, about half have been Moldavians,
one-fourth Romanians, and one-tenth Ukrainians. Trafficking in women to Eu-
rope from other continents is most common in the Mediterranean countries and
in Western Europe. The main source areas are Southeast Asia (Thailand), Latin
America (Columbia, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic) and North and West
Africa (Morocco, Nigeria and Sierra Leone). According to Europol, the extent of
this trade has remained about the same over the last decade. The increase in the
total volume of trafficking in women in Europe thus originates from Eastern Eu-
rope (Organised crime situation report 2001, 41; fpmail.friends-partners.org).
2 The characteristics of trafficking in women and children for
prostitution in Europe
On average, the victims of trafficking for prostitution in Europe are not only from
the economically most depressed, and socially and politically most unstable ar-
eas of the continent, but also belong to the most disadvantaged social and ethnic
groups of those areas. They are usually also very young: teenagers, or in their
early twenties. When seeking better opportunities in life, they fall easy prey to
criminals promising good jobs and high wages abroad. For the criminals and or-
ganised crime groups, trafficking offers an opportunity to make very high profits
with minimal risk and low capital requirements.
Trafficking operations are usually carried out in co-operation by several, rela-
tively small local criminal groups. This makes the activity both flexible and diffi-
cult to prevent, since the elimination of one group does not usually affect the ac-
tivity of the whole network: the missing link will only be replaced by another
(NCIS UK, 34–36).
The relations between the groups are normally pure business relations, and
each groups can act in several networks simultaneously. The women are trans-
ported either directly to the ultimate destination country, and engaged in prostitu-
tion after arrival, or they are moved in stages, in which case they are exploited at
each stage. The first method is common in trafficking from the Baltic countries and
Russia to Western Europe, and the co-operation between the recruiters, transport-
ers and exploiters is usually close. The latter method, on the other hand, is fre-
quently used in the trafficking through and from the Balkans; the co-operation net-
works are loose and change from operation to operation (NCIS UK, 34–36).
The victims are recruited in the source countries through newspaper and
Internet advertisements, by individual recruiters (often female), or by front agen-
cies offering legal or illegal employment opportunities in the EU member coun-
tries as, for example, maids, nannies, waitresses, models, striptease-dancers or
cleaning women. Some of the women are recruited knowingly into prostitution,
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but even in their case the conditions of their employment often differ from what
has been agreed. In the actual trafficking, the recent trend, at least in the Baltic
countries, has been towards personal recruiting instead of general advertising. In
some countries, women are also recruited by abduction; from Albania and
Kosovo, there are even reports on families selling their daughters to traffickers
(Hajdinjak 2002, 51; NCIS UK, 35; Sipaviciene 2002, 14).
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Destination Countries
Destination (11)
Destination, Transit                     (9)
Destination, Transit, Source        (7)
Other                                        (20)
Source Countries
Source (3)
Source, Transit                         (10)
Source, Transit, Destination        (7)
Other                                       (27)
Once recruited, the victims are controlled during the transport and in the desti-
nation countries by a variety of means, but violence (implied and actual) is com-
mon and ever-present. There are more and more reported cases of extreme forms
of coercion, assaults, rapes and even homicides. Especially the trafficking from
and through the Balkans is reported to be exceptionally violent by nature, and the
invasion of the Balkan groups on the West European prostitution market has had
a brutalising effect on the working methods also outside the Balkans. A common
trend of the last few years has been the increasing use of forced addiction of
women to hard drugs, which ties the victims to the traffickers in a very effective
manner. This method is especially popular among those traffickers who are also
involved in the drug trade, and in Finland, for example, where foreign prostitu-
tion is mainly mobile, prostitutes are regularly used as drug smugglers/couriers
and dealers. In most European countries, the groups trafficking women are usu-
ally also involved in other forms of trafficking and smuggling (Laczko etc. 2002,
15; Lehti & Aromaa 2002, 87–92; NCIS UK, 35, 38–39).
The traffickers also exploit the economic, social and cultural vulnerabilities
of the victims. Debt is one of the most common means of control. The women
usually agree to pay their travelling and recruiting expenses from the future earn-
ings. This debt is passed from one trafficker to the next until it ends up in the
hands of the exploiter in the destination country. Together with the inflated hous-
ing and living expenses charged from the victims, the debt soon becomes impos-
sible to handle. The earnings of the victims are then directed at the pockets of the
exploiters, and the women become totally dependent on their abusers because
they have no financial means to escape. It is also normal to confiscate the pass-
ports and other identity documents of the victims, and to threaten them with local
authorities, deportation and detention. The effectiveness of the threats is in-
creased by the fact that they are often at least partly real: in most European coun-
tries, it is almost impossible for the victims to avoid immediate deportation, and
that effectively prevents the women from approaching the authorities even in the
most aggravated cases of abuse (NCIS UK, 36).
B. Other forms of trafficking in women and children
As mentioned above, presently 80–90 percent of the trafficking in women and
children in and to Europe is serving organised prostitution and other forms of
sexual exploitation. As far as the other forms of trafficking in human beings is
concerned, the lack of information, and the confusion of concepts are even
greater than in the case of trafficking for sexual exploitation (Forced Labour
2002; Omelaniuk 2002).
Trafficking in women and children for forced or slave labour seems to be
fairly rare in the EU member countries, even if the recruiting of employees for,
for example, hotel and catering business and of domestic servants and nannies
from the Balkans and the Baltic countries sometimes meets the criteria. In sev-
eral European countries, the staff of a few African and Asian embassies have
caused problems by trafficking domestic servants from their home countries to
work for their employees in conditions resembling slave labour. Trafficking for
industrial work is found in Italy, for example, where 30,000 foreign children
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(mostly from China) are estimated to work in small-scale clothing and other in-
dustry in conditions similar to slave labour. In Greece, some 3,000 children,
mostly Albanians, are estimated to work in corresponding conditions as window
cleaners and in other similar occupations. On a larger scale, children are traf-
ficked and made to work for organised crime in begging rings, or as pickpockets
and thieves. This practice is exercised in the whole of Europe; the victims usually
come from Eastern Europe, and the proportion of Roma is considerable
(www.globalmarch.org).
The evidence of trafficking connected with the international trade in human
organs is almost non-existent in Europe. It is true that in Russia, for example,
there are rumours and allegations of kidnapping street and orphanage children
for this purpose. However, the only known case is from the year 2000, when a
Muscovite grandmother sold her grandchild for 90,000 USD to police officers,
acting as traffickers, to be used in organ trade. Since the events of this case were
triggered by a trap laid by undercover police, its value as evidence is questionable.
As far as is known, other cases with concrete evidence of this kind of trade have not
been reported from Europe in the last few years (www.globalmarch.org).
Apart from trafficking for prostitution, the most important forms of traffick-
ing in humans in Europe are at present the illegal trade of children for adoption,
and the trafficking in workers for the shadow labour market existing between the
legal market and slave labour.
The source areas of trafficking in children for illegal adoption to Western Eu-
rope are the Eastern European countries and the third world countries. In addi-
tion, children are trafficked from Eastern Europe to industrial countries outside
Europe, especially to North America. There are no estimates available on the ex-
tent of the trade (www.globalmarch.org).
Trafficking in workers for the shadow labour market serves mainly the re-
cruiting of seasonal labour force for agriculture. In addition, there is demand for
such labour force in the construction industry and other business sectors where
large numbers of unskilled workers are employed, the turnover of labour is high,
and the official control weak. The destination for grey labour in Europe are the
EU member countries, whereas the Balkans and the Eastern European countries
serve as source areas. Workforce is smuggled into the European Union also from
outside Europe, especially from North Africa as well as East and South Asia; one
of the primary individual source countries is China. If the smuggled employees
are minors, this kind of activity must always be regarded as trafficking. The
Palermo Protocol on Trafficking states quite explicitly that the recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploi-
tation is to be considered as trafficking in persons, regardless of whether coer-
cion and deception are involved. In the case of adults, it is somewhat more diffi-
cult to determine if the terms of recruitment, employment and working meet the
criteria of trafficking in humans. When compared with the legal labour market,
the terms and conditions employed on the shadow market are generally consider-
ably worse, and various malpractices are common. On the other hand, the work-
ers usually know this already when they are recruited and make the contract with
the traffickers more or less voluntarily; it seems that in many cases, the immi-
grants rather tolerate working conditions that resemble forced labour, than the
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impoverished freedom in their home countries. In spite of this, there can be no
justification for any forms of forced labour, and both the governments and civil
society groups should show more political will in order to tackle the problem.
The majority of the grey labour force smuggled into Europe are men; women are
mostly recruited to the hotel and catering sector, or work as domestic servants.
There are no estimates available on the volume of the trade (Forced Labour 2002,
5; Plant 2002).
C. Prevention, crime control, and witness protection legislation
The main reason behind the rapid increase in trafficking in women and children
in Europe after the collapse of the Iron Curtain at the beginning of the 1990s is
the deep difference in the standard of living between the Western European
countries and the former Socialist countries. It is not a coincidence that four of
the most important source countries for the trafficking (Albania, Moldavia, Ro-
mania and Ukraine) are also the poorest countries in the continent, one (Lithua-
nia) is the poorest country in the Baltic Sea area, and that in Russia (sixth most
important source country), there are large areas where the standard of living is
exceptionally low and the social problems enormous. Thus, it is improbable that
any fundamental positive changes in the situation can be achieved before the in-
ternal differences in the standards of living have been levelled down throughout
the continent. The point is illustrated by the recent development in Poland, Hun-
gary and the Czech Republic, where the positive social and economic develop-
ment has significantly and rapidly reduced trafficking.
The most effective means to improve the situation and to prevent trafficking is
to support and facilitate the social and economic development in the Eastern Eu-
ropean countries. In this respect, the enlargement of the European Union can be
expected to produce significant positive results. However, the most problematic
countries will be disregarded at least in the first phase of the enlargement, and es-
pecially Moldavia and Ukraine have been left to play second fiddle in EU-East-
ern European relations.
In the actual crime control policies concerning trafficking in women, the most
crucial questions are presently:
1) creating extensive and reliable systems for collecting comparative data on
the whole continent;
2) criminalising the trafficking in women in all European countries with
relatively uniform criteria and sanctions;
3) developing and increasing the co-operation in crime prevention both
internationally and between the European countries;
4) improving the status and rights of the victims in the legislation of the
European countries, and
5) creating efficient witness protection legislation and programmes applicable
to the victims of trafficking.
For the time being, there is no reliable, comparative information available on the
extent of trafficking in women in Europe, or on the numbers and the nationalities
of the victims; not even concerning the reported and prosecuted crimes. In order
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to improve the situation, the European countries should invest in gathering na-
tional statistics on reported trafficking crimes which would employ relatively
uniform criteria and comparable standards. In addition to the relevant authori-
ties, important sources of information are NGOs that assist and provide support
for prostitutes and the victims of trafficking. Means should also be created in or-
der to make an efficient and extensive collection of their information possible in
each country as well as all over the continent. Mere statistics would, however,
produce only indicative information at best. In order to obtain better knowledge
of the situation, and to create a basis for more efficient data collection systems, it
is of utmost importance to increase basic research concerning trafficking and or-
ganised prostitution in Europe and in each European country. Much valuable
knowledge has already been produced within the STOP and STOP II pro-
grammes, the IOM research projects, and some national research programmes.
The need for additional research is, however, urgent.
The legislation concerning trafficking in women is still fairly heterogeneous in
the European countries, but in recent years, harmonisation in regard to the criteria
of the crime, sanctions, and the status and rights of the victims has been achieved.
Activities of the Council of Europe (COE), the Organisation on Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Union have been crucial.
Several conventions of the Council of Europe are relevant to combating traf-
ficking in women (for example, the Conventions on Human Rights; on Laun-
dering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime; on the
Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes; and on Extradition). However, so
far all the special COE regulations concerning the trafficking in women are mere
recommendations. The most important of these is the R (2000) 11 (Recommen-
dation on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings for the purpose of Sexual
Exploitation) which proposes that:
1) trafficking should be made a special offence;
2) courts of law should have the right to seize assets belonging to convicted traf-
fickers, and
3) victims of trafficking should receive help and protection; governments
should set up agreements to facilitate the victims’return to their native coun-
tries if they so wish, and victims should be granted, if necessary, temporary
residence status on humanitarian grounds.
Other relevant COE recommendations include: R (91) 11, R (96) 8, R (97) 13, R
(80) 10, R (85) 11 and R (87) 21. Their objective, at least indirectly, is to harmo-
nise the legislation of the member countries, and to improve the legal status of the
victims of trafficking.
According to the 2002 data, in 28 of the 52 European countries and other de
facto independent jurisdictional areas, the trafficking in women is criminalised
as a separate crime, and in at least three others an amendment for this purpose is
being drafted. Not a single European country has at the moment specific legisla-
tive witness protection programmes designated specifically for the victims of
trafficking. Of the EU member countries, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Luxembourg and Sweden do not have any formal witness protection
programmes; in the remaining member countries, witness protection for victims
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of trafficking is provided on the basis of either general legislative witness protec-
tion provisions or non-legislative protection programmes, and the entry criteria
are by default so strict that they are not attainable by standard victims of traffick-
ing. Of the Central and Eastern European countries, at least the Czech Republic
and Hungary have general witness protection programmes applicable to the vic-
tims of trafficking (Holmes & Berta 2002).
As mentioned, there currently is no special European Convention on traffick-
ing. There is, however, a convention under discussion which aims at a binding
regulation concerning the legal status and protection of the victims of trafficking
in humans. The convention would focus specifically on minors, and include an
efficient monitoring system (CM (2002) 129; Trafficking in Women, 42).
The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe is a regional or-
ganisation, and another source of non-binding regulations on trafficking. The
OSCE and especially its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR) have become increasingly involved in the issue over the last ten years.
In 1999, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly adopted a Resolution on Traf-
ficking in Women and Children, in which the member countries were called
upon to make sure that they have the necessary legislation and enforcement
mechanisms to punish traffickers. Country reports requested from the member
countries presently form the most extensive source of information on the extent
of trafficking, and on the existing legislation concerning trafficking in the Euro-
pean countries (Trafficking in Women, 42–43).
The European Union legislation concerning trafficking in women and chil-
dren is variable and constantly developing. The three most important pieces of
special legislation with regard to combating trafficking in women and children
are the Council framework decision on combating trafficking in human beings
(2002/629/JAI), the proposed Council framework decision on combating the
sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and the proposed Council
directive on the short-term residence permit issued to victims of action to facili-
tate illegal immigration or trafficking in human beings who co-operate with the
competent authorities (COM (2002) 71). The framework decision on combating
trafficking in human beings obligates the member countries to ensure that traf-
ficking in humans for forced labour as well as for sexual exploitation are
criminalised, as are the instigation, aiding, abetting and attempt of such activity.
The decision also includes stipulations on the maximum penalty (six years of im-
prisonment) and on aggravating circumstances. The criminal liability of corpo-
rate actors is addressed, as well as issues of jurisdiction and co-operation be-
tween the member states. The proposed framework decision on combating the
sexual exploitation of children is intrinsically linked with trafficking in children
because at the moment, prostitution and other forms of sexual exploitation domi-
nate trafficking in children in Europe. The proposed decision defines a child as a
person under 18 years of age.
The proposed directive on short-term residence permits includes regulations
on the conditions and procedures for issuing short-term residence permits for
victims of trafficking in human beings. The objective is that the victims who in
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the course of a certain reflection period consent to assist the authorities in the in-
vestigation and prosecution of the crime, would on certain conditions have the
right to a temporary residence permit in the EU member countries. At request,
the permit could be renewed according to the needs of the investigation and the
court proceedings, but it could not be renewed after the proceedings have been
concluded. The conditions for the permit are strict, and the whole procedure is al-
ways dependent on the victim’s willingness to co-operate. Nonetheless, the di-
rective would improve the present situation in which the victims are as a rule de-
ported from most EU member countries (similarly to the other European coun-
tries) immediately and without exception. If the changes brought about by the di-
rective are able to make the victims more co-operative towards the investigation
and prosecution of the crimes, there are hopes that the clearance and conviction
rates will improve, which in turn would have a significant invigorating effect on
the prevention of trafficking. This is not, however, self-evident, for even if the
stipulations of the directive are implemented, the factual position of the victims
still remains rather insecure.
At present, the day-to-day protection and support of the victims of trafficking
in Europe depend mostly on the activity of various NGOs. The European Union
has supported and supports their work within the STOP, STOP II and Daphne
programmes. However, the main responsibility as well as the financing of the ac-
tivity are shouldered by voluntary citizens’organisations and volunteer workers.
At the moment, only the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Italy and the Czech
Republic have promulgated special witness protection legislation applicable to
the victims of trafficking. In some countries, such legislation is under prepara-
tion. All of the above mentioned laws are relatively new, and there is not yet
much experience on how they work in practice. They all include the possibility of
issuing temporary residence permits for victims of trafficking; in Belgium and
the Netherlands, the consent of the victim to co-operate in the investigation and
prosecution is required, in Italy all victims have similar rights whether they
co-operate or not. In Spain, the stipulations of the general witness protection law
apply also to the victims of trafficking. Presently, only Italy and Spain offer the
victims actual, active police protection that continues also after the court pro-
ceedings have ended (by establishing a new identity, for example), but even here
the right for this kind of protection is to a large extent only theoretical. It is ques-
tionable how effectively the victims’ willingness to co-operate with the authori-
ties (which is crucial to combating trafficking in humans) can be improved by
granting mere temporary residence permits; on the other hand, a great many Eu-
ropean countries do not presently have any kind of efficient witness protection
programmes, and the population in many countries is so small that it would be
virtually impossible to create such programmes without some kind of common
programme covering the whole of Europe (Pearson 2001, 10–13).
Since trafficking in humans is a transnational crime, it is necessary to have ef-
fective international police co-operation to combat and prevent it. In Europe, the
co-operation is both bilateral and international (Europol). In addition to the ev-
eryday co-operation, several large-scale special operations have been conducted
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in the last few years, usually with good results. For example, during the Sun-
flower operation in 2002, more than 80 suspects were arrested in an operation
carried out by the Europol and nine national police forces (news.bbc.co.uk).
The routes of trafficking in Europe are so manifold, and the organisation of
the crime so flexible that it is not possible to close all the routes and eliminate all
the trafficking networks. It is more practicable to concentrate the crime preven-
tion efforts and combating operations on the main source countries and the most
important junctions of the trafficking routes. When the Eastern Central Euro-
pean countries join the European Union, the possibilities to control the transit
trafficking carried out via them will improve significantly; but there is still a need
for a more efficient police and intelligence co-operation both inside the EU, and
in particular between the EU member countries and the non-members. It is also
crucial for the effective prevention of trafficking in women and children to con-
tinue and invigorate the combat against corruption in border controls, police
forces, and on all levels of government which is rampant not only in many source
countries but also in many of the main destination countries of trafficking in Eu-
rope, both inside and outside the European Union (NCIS UK, 34–36).
D. Conclusions
Exact information about the volume, characteristics and organisation of traffick-
ing in women and children in Europe is still so scarce, and most of the
programmes and legislative changes aimed at combating the crime so new that it
is hard to say how they work in every-day crime prevention, and what practises of
countering are the best and most effective. On the whole, it seems that the mea-
sures taken should be many and varied, comprised of legislative measures, police
operations as well as different awareness campaigns, support programmes and
media actions.
In several European countries, the implementation of even the basic legisla-
tive and other recommendations of the COE, OSCE, EU and UN concerning traf-
ficking in women and children is still deficient. Thus, the most urgent short-term
task in Europe should be the adoption and implementation of compatible and ap-
propriate legislation concerning the crimes of trafficking, as well as the develop-
ing and strengthening of effective protection and assistance mechanisms for vic-
tims of trafficking in all European countries. This should be combined with the
strengthening of socio-economic support programmes and awareness-raising
activities in both the source and the destination countries. The urgent need to col-
lect and exchange comparative information on trafficking throughout the conti-
nent, and to allocate sufficient funds to monitor trafficking, create databases and
carry out further research on this issue should also be underlined.
In the long run, the best and most effective way to prevent trafficking is to sup-
port and facilitate the general social and economic development in the Eastern
European and third world countries.
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Развитие межнациональной экономики
и углубление интеграционных процессов
как криминогенные факторы и пути их
минимизации
Natalia Lopashenko,
Saratov Center for the Study of Organized Crime and Corruption, Russia
Лопашенко Наталья Александровна,
д.ю.н., профессор, Директор Саратовского Центра по исследованию
проблем организованной преступности и коррупции,
профессор Саратовской государственной академии права,
член Российской криминологической ассоциации
1. Постановка проблемы.
Объединение экономик различных государств Европы, усиление
процессов интеграции на территории последней, как правило,
оценивается в мире, в целом, позитивно. Но эти процессы,
затрагивающие любое государство, объективно влияют и на все
присущие ему явления. С высокой степенью вероятности, поэтому,
можно прогнозировать существование точно таких же интеграционных
тенденций внутри преступности разных стран. В частности, этот
прогноз отчасти оправдался при анализе результатов проведенного нами
совместного российско-грузинского исследования по контрабанде и
приграничной торговле
1
Межнациональная экономика и разные виды
благоприятной интеграции выступают, таким образом, в качестве
факторов, порождающих транснациональную преступность и ее новые,
не известные ранее отдельным государствам, виды преступности, т.е., в
качестве криминогенных факторов. Очевидно, исключить полностью
подобное крайне негативное явление, - невозможно, следовательно,
задача состоит в том, чтобы минимизировать его. Обо всем сказанном, а
также о некоторых возможных путях уменьшения побочных следствий
позитивных процессов интеграции и пойдет речь ниже.
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1 Исследование проводилось совместно Саратовским Центром по исследованию проблем организованной
преступности и коррупции (Россия, TRACCC), созданным по договору между Саратовской
государственной академией права и Американским (Вашингтонским) университетом, с подобным же
Тбилисским Центром (Грузия) в апреле – сентябре 2003 г.
2. Развитие межнациональной экономики и углубление
интеграционных процессов – современные позитивные реалии.
А. Почему это реалии?
Собственно, этот вопрос особых аргументов не требует. Вот только
некоторые наиболее зримые свидетельства развития межнациональной
экономики и интеграции: 1) широкое присутствие иностранного
капитала в любом государстве мира, вне зависимости от того, относится
ли оно к развитым или развивающимся, в виде иностранных инвестиций
в промышленность; предприятий с иностранным капиталом, или
принадлежащих собственникам других государств; и т.д.; 2) введение
единой валюты для разных государств (евро, или рубль, который, по
прогнозам, станет единой валютой для государств СНГ, начиная с
Республики Беларусь)
2
; 3) создание международных организаций для
решения сообща различных проблем (экономических, экологических,
проблем безопасности, борьбы с преступностью, культурных,
медицинских, и др.); 4) установление полной прозрачности границ,
вплоть до полностью беспрепятственного и безвизового их пересечения
в отдельных регионах (например, в государствах Западной Европы);
5) стирание языковых барьеров (знание английского языка становится
международной нормой, равно, как знание русского – для большой
территории стран СНГ); 6) развитие телекоммуникационных связей,
Всемирной сети Интернет, дающей великолепную возможность
международного общения; и т.д.
Другое дело – что здесь первично: развитие ли экономики, или
углубление иных – неэкономических – процессов. Однако решение этой
проблемы не входит в мою задачу; впрочем, едва ли в принципе
возможен однозначный ответ на этот вопрос. Он - из разряда вечных.
Б. Почему это неизбежно?
Стремление различных государств к интеграции – процесс неизбежный
и закономерный. При этом для государств с разным уровнем
экономического и политического развития причины этого стремления, в
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2 Следует отметить, что процессы перехода на единую валюту успешно решают для себя как жители
приграничных районов различных государств, так и лица, совершающие в этих районах
межгосударственные преступления, например, контрабанду. В процессе упомянутого выше
российско-грузинского исследования нами было установлено, что названные лица используют валюту
США и России; валюта Грузии успехом не пользуется. Больше того, валюта является приоритетным
контрабандным товаром. Так, например, в марте 2003 г. на таможенном посту МАПП Адлер, при
осуществлении таможенного контроля,     у гр-ки России З., следовавшей из России в Грузию, изъято
незадекларированных письменно и сокрытых от таможенного контроля в белье $ 6323 на сумму 200422
рубля и 224.000 рублей. Возбуждено уголовное дело по признакам ч. 1 ст. 188 УК (контрабанда), которое
впоследствии было прекращено, «поскольку виновная пересекла белую линию по неосторожности». В
2002 г. там же, при осуществлении личного досмотра, у гр-ки Грузии М., следовавшей из России в Грузию,
изъято незадекларированных письменно и сокрытых от таможенного контроля $ 10800 на сумму 343707
рублей. Возбуждено уголовное дело по признакам ч. 1 ст. 188 УК. Всего же за период 2000 – 4 месяца 2003
г. на российско-грузинской границе (абхазский участок) было изъято 125,8 тысяч долларов США.
общем, совпадают, хотя порядок приоритетов, безусловно, отличается.
Так, для экономически сильного, развитого государства, по мере его
развития, все острее и острее встает вопрос о рынках сбыта, поскольку
возможности собственного государства исчерпаны. Точно также, и в
связи со сказанным, значительно ограничиваются объективно
возможности для развития и увеличения капиталов, как
государственных, так и частных. Поэтому выход на межгосударственный
уровень здесь становится жизненно необходимым.
Для развивающихся государств, напротив, от прихода в них
иностранного капитала в значительной, а иногда – и в определяющей –
степени зависит их выживание и сохранение себя как государства.
Развитие экономики, между тем, неизбежно приводит к эпохе
глобализации. И хотят они того, или нет, все государства оказываются
существующими в ней, а, следовательно, опять-таки, вне зависимости от
их желания, вынуждены жить по новым правилам, для того, чтобы жить.
Поэтому, со временем встает вопрос о межгосударственном управлении.
Он решается постепенно, медленными шагами, начиная, например, с
локальных межгосударственных организаций и межгосударственных,
международных соглашений в одной, отдельно взятой, области.
В. Почему это хорошо?
Процесс межгосударственной, в том числе, экономической, интеграции –
это, конечно, позитивный процесс. Очевидные преимущества
интеграции: 1) усиление экономического развития всех государств,
вовлеченных этот процесс; 2) соответственно, повышение уровня жизни
государств и населяющих его граждан; 3) появление возможности,
решать те проблемы, которые не под силу одному, или даже нескольким
государствам (например, освоение космического пространства, создание
новых прогрессивных технологий, или лекарств от ранее неизлечимых
болезней, преодоление последствий экологических бедствий, и т.д.); 4)
международная интеграция дает много шансов для того, чтобы избежать
по спорным позициям не только открытого противостояния, локальных
и масштабных конфликтов, но и войны, так называемой, «холодной».
Вырабатываются навыки межнационального и международного
компромисса; и т.д.
3. Оборотная сторона медали. Плата за сближение.
А. Подводные камни: маленькие и большие.
К сожалению, не все так безоблачно, как хотелось бы. Позитивное и
негативное составляют собой диалектическое единство, и присутствуют
в каждом явлении. Об этом, на примере свободы и несвободы, пишет
известный не только в России, но и во всем мире российский
криминолог В.В. Лунеев: «Свобода не может быть позитивно
избирательной. Будучи непреходящей ценностью человечества, она
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может одинаково служить не только добру. С не меньшим успехом она
может быть использована во зло, в нашем случае – для совершения
преступлений. И в этом узком понимании … вполне допустим вывод:
свобода более криминогенна, чем несвобода, если только не принимать
во внимание накопительный криминогенный процесс последней…»
3
.
Явление, тем более, такое сложное и объемное, как межнациональная
и межгосударственная интеграция, тоже не может быть выражено одной
краской, и не может нести одно только благо. При общей положительной
характеристике и, безусловно, прогрессивных, результатах, интеграция и
экономическое развитие влекут за собой массу побочных негативных
последствий, отличающихся различной степенью вредоносности и
совершенно разным характером.
Прежде всего, эти последствия носят экономическую окраску.
Злоупотребление одними государствами преимуществами своего
экономического развития, или даже просто, игнорирование
экономической слабости международного партнера, приводит к тому,
что сильные экономически государства становятся еще сильнее, а
слабые – еще слабее. Таким образом, вместо того, чтобы получить
обоюдную пользу от сотрудничества и интеграции, одни из участников
интеграционного (в этом случае, в кавычках) процесса подвергаются
разрушительному иностранному влиянию, фактически, порабощению.
Разумеется, это – крайняя ситуация, но она, к великому сожалению,
существует, и примеры подобного рода дает и демократическая
Америка, и стремящаяся к демократичности Россия.
От экономики – один шаг, или даже, меньше, до политики. Кроме
описанного выше порабощения, теперь уже политического,
развивающегося государства более сильным, появляются возможности,
путем международной интеграции, нескольким развитым государствам
диктовать свою волю всем остальным государствам мира, и в том числе,
навязывать определенный политический режим. Думаю, нет нужды
объяснять, что даже благие намерения (например, превратить какое-то
государство из оплота зла в демократическое) не могут оправдать
насилия над волей проживающих в государстве людей. И опять-таки, я
говорю здесь о России (политика в Чечне) и об Америке,
Великобритании и других сильных государствах (политика в отношении
Югославии, и в отношении Ирака).
Отсюда напрашивается единственный вывод: правила игры
(международной интеграции) – еще не сложились, и нет действенного
механизма (применение военной силы, конечно, не может быть отнесено
к нему), гарантировать их соблюдение участниками.
Разумеется, в рамках этой статьи все негативные последствия
развития международной экономики и интеграционных процессов не
могут быть названы, да это и не является моей целью, более того, анализ
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3 См.: Лунеев В.В. Рыночная экономика и экономическая преступность в России. – Экономическая
преступность / Под ред. В.В. Лунеева, В.И. Борисова. – М.: Юристъ, 2002. – С. 15.
большинства этих последствий и поиск выходов из них – прерогатива
специалистов – политиков, социологов, экономистов, юристов,
занимающихся позитивным правом, и т.д.
Есть, однако, в числе негативных последствий такие, которые могут и
должны быть оценены, в первую очередь, криминологами. Речь идет,
конечно же, о преступности. И здесь принципиальны два момента: 1)
межнациональная экономика и межгосударственная интеграция
обладают криминогенными свойствами: они продуцируют
преступность, порождают ее, причем, в том числе, такие ее виды,
которые ранее человечеству были неизвестны, или неизвестны в столь
крупном масштабе; 2) преступность как относительно массовое и
присущее всем государствам явление, также подвержена тем переменам,
которые происходят на межнациональном уровне; она неизбежно
стремится к интеграции.
Б. Криминогенные свойства межнациональной экономики и
интеграции: почему они существуют и в чем проявляются?
Прежде всего, следует напомнить, что криминогенными свойствами
обладает любая экономика, а рыночная – в особенности. В.В. Лунеев
справедливо отмечает, что рыночная экономика, как всякое сложное
явление, «социально противоречива, а следовательно, и криминогенна»
4
.
Ему вторит директор Санкт-Петербургского Центра по изучению
организованной преступности и коррупции Б.В. Волженкин: «Рыночная
экономика с ее беспощадной конкурентной борьбой подчас за
выживание, погоней за прибылью и сверхприбылью неизбежно
порождает преступность»
5
.
Зарождающаяся межнациональная экономика, или экономика в
условиях глобализации, тоже, разумеется, не безупречна в этом
отношении и не может быть безупречна. Нил Шовер и Эндрю
Хохстетлер (Университет Теннеси, Ноксвилл) пишут: «Рост мировой
экономической системы открывает новые возможности для совершения
преступлений. Простое мошенничество, основанное на завоевании
доверия жертвы, или коммерческое мошенничество могут пересекать
границы государств, благодаря широкому распространению новых
средств связи»
6
. И далее: «Торговые соглашения, заключаемые между
различными государствами, порождают новые производственные и
торговые предприятия, растущий свободный поток товаров и услуг,
также открывают новые криминальные возможности»
7
.
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4 См.: Лунеев В.В. Рыночная экономика и экономическая преступность в России. – Экономическая
преступность / Под ред. В.В. Лунеева, В.И. Борисова. – М.: Юристъ, 2002. – С. 14.
5 См.: Криминология / Под ред. д.ю.н. В.Н. Бурлакова, д.ю.н. Н.М. Кропачева. – СПб.: Питер, 2003. – С. 255.
Автор главы – Б.В. Волженкин.
6 См.: Криминология / Под ред. Дж. Ф. Шелли / Пер. с анг. – СПб: Питер, 2003. – С. 372. Авторы главы –Нил
Шовер и Эндрю Хохстетлер (Университет Теннеси, Ноксвилл).
7 Там же. – С. 373.
Следует иметь в виду и то, что межгосударственные интеграционные
процессы не просто порождают отдельные преступления, они
воспроизводят преступность как некую систему криминальных
массовых явлений. Точно об этом пишут питерские криминологи и
экономисты В.М. Егоршин и В.М. Колесников: «…Если экономически
современное рыночное хозяйство и доказало свою эффективность, то
криминологически оно остается крайне далеким от совершенства – ему
изначально присущи противоречия, предопределяющие наличие и
воспроизводство экономической преступности как масштабного
асоциального явления»
8
.
В основе криминогенных свойств межнациональных экономики
и интеграции лежат, например, следующие их признаки и
характеристики:
1) конфликт интересов, и, прежде всего, экономических, участников
этих процессов. Даже при наличии общих целей деятельности
сохраняется, на мой взгляд, всегда ряд противоречий, более или менее
выраженных: между разными участниками деятельности; между общей
целью и конкретным интересом отдельного участника; между
ожидаемыми результатами деятельности и прогнозируемыми, но
побочными результатами, и т.д. Существующий конфликт провоцирует
участников отношений на поиски путей его разрешения с получением,
разумеется, своекорыстной выгоды. Один из криминальных примеров
разрешения подобного конфликта приводят уже упоминавшиеся Нил
Шовер и Эндрю Хохстетлер: «…Сельскохозяйственные субсидии в
Европейском Союзе были призваны обеспечить качество и достаточное
количество продукции, а также стабильные доходы фермеров. Однако на
практике это привело к тому, что искажение данных о качестве,
происхождении и назначении товара стало прибыльным предприятием.
В рамках самой простой схемы виноделы используют субсидии,
выплачиваемые для изъятия избытков вина с рынка. Они закупают
дешевое вино за рубежом, обозначают его как свою продукцию и
получают субсидии как за то, так и за другое. Криминальные
возможности открываются и для поставщиков мяса, с которых взимается
меньший налог, если они экспортируют продукцию, а не продают ее на
внутреннем рынке. Одним росчерком пера на упаковочном листе мясо,
произведенное и проданное внутри страны, как бы пересекает границу и
приносит незаконную прибыль»
9
. Последние схемы сегодня прекрасно
знакомы и России, и другим государствам. В ходе проведения
российско-грузинского исследования нами было установлено, например,
что для периода до 2000 г. для российско-грузинской контрабанды было
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характерно использование способа «перегона воздуха». В соответствии с
ним, коррумпированные работники таможенных, пограничных и иных
органов, действуя в сговоре с преступниками, желающими уйти от
налогообложения, «помогали» им оформить документы, якобы, на вывоз
товаров из России, или, наоборот, на ввоз. Таким образом,
документально подтверждался лжеэкспорт или лжеимпорт товара,
позволяющий уходить от налогообложения государства. Однако, в связи,
во-первых, с ужесточением контроля за подобными операциями, и,
во-вторых, благодаря положительным тенденциям в налоговом
законодательстве России, описанный способ потерял в последние годы
свою былую актуальность. Однако, приведенные выше схемы,
действительно, относятся к числу простейших и далеко не исчерпывают
используемых для совершения преступлений, ставших возможными,
только благодаря развитию межнациональной экономики и углублению
межгосударственной интеграции;
2) правовая неурегулированность развивающейся межнациональной
экономики и иных интеграционных процессов. Несомненно, что
названные новые позитивные процессы требуют нормативного
регулирования по каким-то общим правилам, признанным всеми без
исключения участниками международных отношений. На сегодня их
нет;
3) разница в законодательном урегулировании экономических, налоговых,
таможенных и иных правовых позитивных отношений в разных
государствах, участниках интеграционных процессов. Одни и те же
отношения по-разному, иногда кардинально, регулируются в праве
государств, участников интеграционных и межнациональных
экономических процессов. Очевиднее всего указанное положение
демонстрирует налоговое законодательство: ставки налогов бывают
принципиально различными, а иногда налоговое законодательство
одного государства предусматривает ряд налоговых послаблений и
льгот, неизвестных другому государству. Само собой разумеется,
государство с мягкой налоговой системой более притягательно, нежели
то, в котором установлены строгие налоговые нормы. Кроме того,
вполне реальна не очень добросовестная игра крупных участников
межнациональных экономических отношений на разнице
законодательных норм. Верно отмечают Н. Шовер и Э. Хохстетлер:
«Владельцы и менеджеры корпорации могут пригрозить перевести свою
компанию в страну с более мягким нормативным климатом, тем самым
лишив страну, в которой компания расположена в настоящее время,
рабочих мест и налоговых поступлений. … Желание привлечь
промышленность в свою страну является мощной побудительной
причиной для развития физической и правовой инфраструктуры,
благоприятной для деятельности корпораций. Наиболее
привлекательными ресурсами являются дешевый труд и мягкие
административно-законодательные нормы»
10
. Указанная разница в
законодательном регулировании усиливается многократно еще и
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отмеченным С.П. Глинкиной нарастанием «противоречий между
глобальным характером производства и сохраняющимися
национальными формами его регулирования, в частности, налоговым
законодательством»
11
;
4) разница в криминализации и пенализации стран – участников
интеграционных процессов. Другими словами, уголовно-правовая
политика разных государств не совпадает, иногда – принципиально.
Разница обусловлена существующими различиями в экономических и
политических системах, историческими традициями, разницей в
менталитетах, и т.д. Соответственно, одно и то же деяние, чаще –
экономического характера, в одном государстве может считаться
преступным и влечь строгое наказание, в другом – признаваться
преступным, но наказываться гораздо менее строго, в третьем – быть
административным деликтом, в четвертом – вообще не наказываться, а
то и расцениваться как позитивное явление. В качестве примера можно
привести спекуляцию, которая до сих пор преступна по
законодательству Республики Беларусь, и считается нормой
экономического поведения в других государствах. Кардинально
по-разному также оценивается и совершение некоторых валютных
операций гражданами или частными организациями разных стран.
Разную оценку дают незаконному перемещению товаров и иных
ценностей через таможенную и государственную границу российский и
грузинский уголовные кодексы. В последнем, например, отсутствует
само понятие контрабанды (хотя незаконное перемещение товаров,
разумеется, наказуемо); в российском оно есть. Примеры подобного рода
можно продолжать до бесконечности. Коль скоро они существуют, есть и
примеры злонамеренного использования законодательных
межгосударственных коллизий. Поэтому совсем не случайны вопросы,
которыми задаются те же Нил Шовер и Эндрю Хохстетлер: «… Какие
законы и нормы следует применять при установлении стандартов
поведения… Может ли считаться преступлением нарушение
международных соглашений, если оно не нарушает уголовного закона
всех государств? Если экономическая деятельность проводится в
странах с несопоставимыми законами и нормами, в соответствии с
каким стандартом следует определять криминальное поведение? К
производителям или к импортерам должны относиться нормы
регулирующих органов? …»
12
.
Разумеется, выше перечислены только самые очевидные причины
криминогенных свойств развития международной экономики и
интеграционных процессов. На деле их гораздо больше, при этом
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конкретное отклоняющееся поведение определяют обычно сразу
несколько причин, вступающих между собой во взаимодействие. Еще на
Всемирной конференции по организованной транснациональной
преступности на уровне министров (Неаполь, Италия, 21-23 ноября 1994
г.), в справочном документе к п. 4 повестки дня, были приведены
факторы развития мировой экономики и политики, обусловившие
возникновение транснациональной преступности:
• увеличение взаимозависимости государств;
• формирование мирового рынка, для которого характерны тесные
экономические связи, взаимные инвестиции;
• формирование международных финансовых сетей, систем
международных расчетов, позволяющих быстро осуществлять
сложные финансовые операции, с задействованием банковских
учреждений нескольких государств;
• развитие мировых систем коммуникаций;
• развитие международной торговли, чему особо способствовало
введение системы свободной торговли в послевоенный период;
• широкое развитие технологии контейнерных перевозок;
• увеличение масштабов миграции, образование многонациональных
мегаполисов (это, например, характерно, для России и Грузии. В
Россию из Абхазии и Южной Осетии (Грузия) въехало большое
количество людей, и поток беженцев от бедности и тяжелых условий
жизни, к сожалению, не иссяк, хотя и стал меньше);
• «прозрачность границ» между государствами, входящими в
Европейский союз и Содружество Независимых Государств13. Мы
имели возможность убедиться в достаточной прозрачности границ
между Россией и Грузией, проводя собственное исследование по
контрабанде. Не смотря на то, что между государствами ныне введен
визовый режим, он, фактически, не действует для жителей
приграничных районов – Краснодарского края и Северной Осетии
(Россия) и Абхазии и Южной Осетии (Грузия). Больше того, этот
визовый режим не сильно применяется в России и для жителей из
других грузинских районов (мы видели в России свободно
перемещающиеся автомобили с тбилисскими номерами); свободно,
без всяких виз, побывали на территории Абхазии и мы, проживающие
далеко за пределами Краснодарского края.
Как видим, и сегодня указанные факторы активно действуют, вызывая к
жизни преступность различных видов.
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В. Межнациональная интеграция преступности.
Процесс объединения характеризует не только позитивные
межнациональные отношения; он, безусловно, затрагивает и
преступность. Последняя тоже организуется и интегрируется, и
происходит это часто по тем же самым причинам, по которым
осуществляются и позитивные процессы, выше они назывались.
Консолидация преступности дает новые возможности для получения
криминальных прибылей и сверхприбылей, и это, пожалуй, главное в
интеграционных процессах, характерных для преступности.
Преступность разных государств удивительно легко находит общий
язык, даже, не смотря на сложные политические отношения государств.
Это стало нам очевидным в процессе российско-грузинского
исследования по проблемам контрабанды. Прекрасно известно, что
Россия и Грузия переживают не лучшие времена в своих
взаимоотношениях, обоюдно нарушая межгосударственные
договоренности. Однако политическая напряженность совсем не мешает,
договариваться российской и грузинской преступности и даже
грузинской преступности из разных регионов. Сложные, проблемные
для Грузии ее регионы Южная Осетия и Абхазия, которые не
контролируются из Тбилиси, совсем не оторваны от остальной Грузии,
если посмотреть на интеграцию преступности. Так, прекрасно
договариваются между собой, по нашим данным, российские, южно
осетинские и грузинские преступные группировки. Контрабандный
российский груз беспрепятственно, через всю Южную Осетию, идет в
центральные районы Грузии, растворяясь там на всевозможных рынках.
Межнациональная интеграция преступности – самая опасная, на мой
взгляд, тенденция современной преступности. Прежде всего, она
касается наиболее опасной, вредоносной разновидности преступности, а
именно – преступности организованной, поскольку само понятие
интеграции предполагает наличие системы управления, системы
организации объединительного процесса. Ее в полной мере имеет только
организованная преступность.
Помимо сказанного, интеграция преступности приводит к
возникновению новых качественных ее характеристик, затрудняющих
борьбу с ней. Появляются, например, не существовавшие ранее
возможности, спрятать «грязные» деньги в том уголке земного шара, где
менее всего есть опасность их обнаружения. Сверхлегким, благодаря
новейшим технологиям, становится и мировое управление отдельными,
наиболее экономически эффективными, разновидностями преступности
– наркобизнесом, торговлей людьми, торговлей оружием, и др.
Преступность достигает высокой мобильности, позволяющей в
считанные часы использовать для совершения преступления
образовавшийся в любом конце Земли повод.
Парадоксально, но факт: преступность проще и быстрее организуется
в рамках интеграционных процессов, поскольку она – вне закона, и
процессу интеграции законодательные коллизии не мешают.
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4. Разновидности порождаемой межнациональной преступности.
Степени риска.
Говоря о криминогенных свойствах межгосударственной экономики и
интеграции, нельзя, в то же время, их преувеличивать. Прежде всего,
они порождают далеко не все разновидности преступности. Думаю,
понятно, что, например, так называемая, семейная преступность или
преступность неосторожная, хотя и могут испытывать на себе влияние
объединенной экономики и интеграции, в то же время продуцируются
иными причинами. В отношении других видов преступности
криминогенность межгосударственной экономики и интеграции
различна – от минимальной до сверхмаксимальной.
Следует, на мой взгляд, выделять шкалу рисков криминогенности
межгосударственной экономики и интеграции, которые олицетворяют
средние показатели степени риска обозначенных позитивных процессов.
Она может иметь не только, и даже, - не столько научное, сколько
практическое значение. Показатели криминогенности должны
приниматься во внимание при создании нормативной базы
межгосударственной экономики и интеграции; они же должны
учитываться при планировании и реализации мер противодействия
транснациональной преступности.
Шкала выглядит следующим образом:
1. Посягательства на личность – риск минимален.
При этом, по бытовой преступности против личности, включая половые
преступления, посягательства на честь и достоинство, на семью, на
конституционные права граждан, риск криминогенности практически
отсутствует, сведен к нулю. Однако, например, по таким видам типично
организованной преступности против личности, как заказные убийства,
или похищения людей, торговля людьми, он достаточно высок.
2. Экологические преступления – риск существует.
Поскольку природная среда – межнациональна и принадлежит всему
человечеству, постольку интеграционные процессы могут оказывать
негативное воздействие на нее, которое, в том числе, выражается и в
экологической преступности. Внутри экологической преступности
межнациональная интеграция приоритетно, с повышенной степенью
риска, провоцирует совершение таких преступлений, как
международное браконьерство, уничтожение природных богатств ради
преследования каких-либо целей (например, строительства каких-либо
объектов). Думаю, что межнациональная экологическая преступность
сейчас находится на минимальных показателях, но у нее, к сожалению,
большое будущее.
3. Политические преступления – новые возможности.
Собственно, выше об этом уже шла речь. Объединение преступного
капитала, рано или поздно, но всегда, приводит к стремлению получить
доступ к политике, к власти на территории какого-либо региона,
государства или нескольких государств. Возможно, поэтому участие
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международной организованной преступности в национальных
избирательных кампаниях, да и просто, применение силы для захвата
власти.
4. Коррупция – риск высок.
Коррупционные преступления тоже относятся, на мой взгляд, к числу
политических. Можно воздействовать на власть в своих интересах, не
применяя силы, используя различные виды подкупа. Именно поэтому
степень риска в отношении коррупции достаточна высока.
Интеграционные процессы, с одной стороны, дают новые возможности
для коррупции, поскольку появляется новый – межнациональный – вид
управленцев. С другой стороны, интегрированная преступность
обладает повышенными экономическими возможностями для оказания
воздействия на коррупционеров разных государств, так называемых,
национальных коррупционеров.
5. Экономические преступления, преступный бизнес
14
, терроризм –
высочайшая степень риска.
Об этом пишут В.М. Егоршин и В.М. Колесников: «Наблюдаемое в
современном мире умножение хозяйственных связей и усложнение
социально-экономических отношений, наряду с развитием новейших
информационных технологий, а также усилением позиций
организованной преступности, обусловливают потенциальную
возможность совершения в сфере хозяйствования все большего числа
правонарушений и опасность появления новых разновидностей
делинквентного (преступного) экономического поведения»
15
.
Однако, следует признать, что экономический хаос в соседствующих
государствах тоже влечет резкое усиление межгосударственной
экономической преступности. Примеры дает проведенное нами
российско-грузинское исследование. В конце 90-х годов большой
проблемой для России была контрабанда спирта из Грузии, который тек
к нам непрекращающимися потоками. На российско-грузинской границе
(осетинский участок) скапливались километровые очереди
большегрузных автомобилей, ввозящих спирт в Россию. Имели место
прорывы границ. В настоящее время все изменилось с точностью до
наоборот. Контрабанда этого товара занимает достаточно скромное
место среди прочих предметов контрабанды; и скорее, вскрываются
факты контрабанды спирта с территории России на территорию Грузии.
Этому есть простое объяснение: в Северной Осетии в настоящее время –
переизбыток производства спиртных напитков; этим бизнесом
официально занимаются не менее 20 фирм.
Повышенная экономическая криминогенность межнациональной
экономики и интеграции еще более усиливается криминогенными
свойствами самой экономической преступности (она, как известна,
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15 См.: Егоршин В.М., Колесников В.В. Преступность в сфере экономической деятельности. – СПб: Фонд
«Университет», 2000. – С. 189-190.
способна порождать саму себя), развитием высоких технологий и
телекоммуникационных связей (соответственно, риск в отношении
компьютерной преступности тоже велик), и очевидной неспособностью
национальных правоохранительных систем справиться с нею
(экономической преступностью). Н. Шовер и Э. Хохстетлер пишут по
этому поводу: «Полиция и следственные органы в регионах и в
развивающихся странах не имеют средств, экспертов и других ресурсов,
необходимых для расследования подобных дел. Даже богатые страны
вынуждены производить выборочное расследование преступлений.
…Вероятность привлечь к ответственности мошенников, орудующих в
Нигерии или в одной из стран – «изгоев», весьма мала. Еще меньше
шансов вернуть деньги, которые беспрепятственно утекли на счет
«беловоротничкового» преступника через один из многочисленных
банков развивающихся стран. Война против торговцев наркотиками
увеличила возможности прокуроров вести расследование дел и
прослеживать путь международных денежных переводов, однако
небольшие группы работников прокуратуры не в силах на равных
тягаться с международными финансовыми экспертамии созданными ими
сетями), которых нанимают инвесторы, банкиры, бухгалтеры и
коррумпированные чиновники в ходе своей деятельности в сфере
международного бизнеса»
16
.
5. Пути противодействия: существуют ли они?
Нарисованная выше картина довольно, если не сказать жестче,
пессимистична. Однако уже тот факт, что мы эту картину полностью
осознаем – является необходимым звеном или шагом для того, чтобы
двигаться дальше и искать пути по ее изменению.
Возможны ли и существуют ли они? Другими словами, возможно ли
влияние на криминогенные свойства межнациональной экономики и
интеграции, при этом, влияние позитивное (здесь, как в медицине,
главное – не навредить), и каковы его пределы?
1. Искоренение - борьба – противодействие – минимизация.
Прежде всего, определимся в терминах. Очевидно, совершенно
нереально вести речь об искоренении криминогенных свойств
межнациональной экономики и интеграции. Точно так же, как нельзя –
невозможно – говорить об искоренении самой преступности. Это сверх
желаемый, но совершенно недостижимый результат. Криминогенность
экономики – ее неотъемлемое свойство в связи с присущими ей
генетически внутренними глубокими противоречиями (частично о них
было сказано выше).
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16 См.: Криминология / Под ред. Дж. Ф. Шелли / Пер. с анг. – СПб: Питер, 2003. – С. 372. Авторы главы –
Нил Шовер и Эндрю Хохстетлер (Университет Теннеси, Ноксвилл).
Борьба и противодействие – это термины, которые используются в
отношении преступности. При этом, в последнее время стал больше
применяться термин «противодействие», его считают более
корректным
17
. Думаю, что противодействие преступности, порождаемой
позитивными интеграционными процессами, в том числе,
экономическими, должно обладать некоторой спецификой,
обуславливаемой спецификой причин преступности.
В отношении же последних (причин преступности), видимо, речь
должна идти о минимизации, т.е. об уменьшении выраженности,
сведении к возможному минимуму криминогенных свойств
межнациональной экономики и интеграции.
2. Национальные возможности минимизации – эффективность
со знаком минус.
Полагаю, что минимизация названных криминогенных свойств на
уровне национальном, или на уровне отдельного государства,
практически не возможна, поскольку: 1) условно говоря, нельзя
обезвредить яд, растворенный в одном сосуде, только с одной стороны, в
одной части напитка. Для того, чтобы пить его, не опасаясь за свое
здоровье, нужно предпринять меры по обеззараживанию всего
содержимого сосуда. Можно в этой же связи вспомнить известную
басню И. Крылова про слона и моську. Точно также, принятие
национальных мер к криминогенным свойствам межнационального
явления, т.е. явления совсем другого уровня, с другими отличительными
чертами и системными проявлениями, едва ли может быть эффективным
в деле их минимизации; 2) больше того, к сожалению, это может
привести к совершенно противоположным результатам, в связи с
неприятием осуществленных мер другими сторонами межнациональных
процессов (в России говорят: «то, что русскому хорошо, немцу –
смерть»).
3. Межнациональная интеграция в деле минимизации
криминогенности объединительных процессов: перспективы
отдаленные и ближайшие.
Соответственно, остается только один путь – путь межнациональной,
межгосударственной интеграции в деле минимизации криминогенных
свойств межнациональной экономики и иных разновидностей мировой
интеграции. Уменьшить, ослабить криминогенность позитивных
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17 Следует согласиться с С.С. Босхоловым, что парадигма «борьба с преступностью» имеет существенные
дефекты. – См.: Босхолов С.С. Основы уголовной политики. – М., 1999. – С. 38 – 41. Правильнее поэтому
говорить о политике противодействия преступности. Это понятие – понятие противодействия
преступности – включает в себя как пресечение подготавливаемых и совершаемых преступлений, так и
адекватные меры реагирования на совершенные преступления, а также и меры по предупреждению
преступности.
объединительных процессов можно, действуя в отношении всего этого
явления сразу, по договоренности и сообща со всеми его участниками.
Это, в свою очередь, можно сделать, через новую – межнациональную
или мировую - систему управления, о которой любят рассуждать
писатели -фантасты и создатели фантастических фильмов. Впрочем, все
мы знаем, что многие их находки и предсказания со временем
претворяются в действительность. Сразу хотела бы оговориться, что
речь не идет о современных международных организациях; они
являются лишь прообразом, и далеко не всегда, совершенным (вспомним
многочисленные нарушения норм, принятых ООН, ее же участниками)
будущей и уже реально необходимой сегодня мировой системы
управления. Именно ей должен быть передан отдельными государствами
целый ряд типично государственных функций, в том числе, по
управлению мировой экономикой, по сохранению природной среды для
всего человечества, по противодействию транснациональной
преступности, и некоторые другие.
Сегодня все сказанное выше кажется совершенно нереальным, в связи
с теми процессами, которые происходят в мире, наряду с интеграцией и
развитием международного сотрудничества (повсеместное обострение
национальных и межгосударственных конфликтов, распространение
международного терроризма, усиление позиций преступности, и т.д.).
Думаю, однако, что уже сейчас все цивилизованные государства должны
задуматься над тем, как может быть претворено в действительность
мировое управление. Путь к цели – далек, но «дорогу осилит идущий».
Что можно сделать уже сегодня?
Во-первых, известные межгосударственные законодательные коллизии
должны быть преодолены. Верно пишет С.П. Глинкина: «На повестку
дня встает вопрос о выработке единых международных норм
регулирования экономической деятельности…»
18
. И хотя далее она,
опять-таки, совершенно справедливо, отмечает, что это, «однако, будет
иметь принципиально разные последствия для различных групп стран и
будет сопряжено с нарастанием противоречий между ними, а также в
рамках отдельных групп»
19
, создание единых – и не только
экономических – регулирующих норм – необходимый этап и в процессе
минимизации криминогенных свойств объединительных процессов, и в
процессе создания системы мирового управления.
Во-вторых, необходимо усиление координации межведомственной
деятельности всех государств и правительств
20
. Проводя исследование
приграничной российско-грузинской контрабанды, мы убедились,
например, в том, что взаимодействия таможенных, пограничных или
правоохранительных служб России и Грузии практически не существует.
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19 См.: Россия в фокусе криминальной глобализации. – Владивосток, 2002. – С. 59. Автор главы – С.П. Глинкина.
20 Об этом же пишут Нил Шовер и Эндрю Хохстетлер (Университет Теннеси, Ноксвилл). См.: Криминология /
Под ред. Дж. Ф. Шелли / Пер. с анг. – СПб: Питер, 2003. – С. 372.
Более того, даже если случается обращение каких-либо органов одной
страны к подобным же из другой страны, оно выполняется очень
медленно, долго, что практически сводит на «нет» смысл такого
обращения.
В-третьих, для противодействия новым негативным
межнациональным явлениям нужно принимать те меры, о которых
говорит Ю.В. Голик: «Мы вплотную приближаемся к моменту создания
международно-правового акта прямого действия, не требующего
инкорпорации в национальное законодательство. …Речь сегодня идет о
создании системы наднациональной юстиции»
21
.
Роль международного права, часто находящегося сегодня на задворках
у национальных правовых систем, должна быть переосмыслена
22
.
6. Некоторые выводы.
1. Развитие межнациональной экономики и международной
интеграции – естественный, неизбежный и, в целом, позитивный
процесс на пути развития мировой системы цивилизации.
2. Вместе с тем, его характеризуют и некоторые негативные моменты,
одним из которых, едва ли, не самым серьезным, является наличие
криминогенных свойств, т.е. таких качеств, которые порождают
новые разновидности преступности или увеличивают вероятность
появления уже известных.
3. Криминогенность межнациональной экономики и интеграции –
неизбежна и присуща им имманентно в силу существующих внутри
позитивных процессов глубоких противоречий.
4. Криминогенные свойства межнациональной экономики и
интеграции различны в отношении разных видов преступности.
Степень криминогенности может быть выражена соответствующей
Шкалой рисков, имеющей следующие усредненные значения: 1.
Преступления против личности – риск минимален. 2. Экологические
преступления – риск существует. 3. Политические преступления –
новые возможности. 4. Коррупция – риск высок. 5. Экономические
преступления, преступный бизнес, терроризм – высочайшая степень
риска. В любом случае, речь идет, в основном, об организованной
преступности.
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22 Интересно, что даже современные криминологи, осознавая нарастание интеграционных процессов и
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сторону закона»?» См.: Криминология / Под ред. Дж. Ф. Шелли / Пер. с анг. – СПб: Питер, 2003. – С.
374-375.
5. Криминогенные свойства межнациональной экономики и
интеграции должны быть минимизированы. Минимизация, в свою
очередь, неэффективна на национальном уровне, и должна
осуществляться на межнациональном и межгосударственном
уровнях.
6. Одним из самых действенных путей минимизации криминогенности
межнациональной экономики и интеграции является создание новой
мировой системы управления, аккумулирующей переданные ей
отдельные государственные управленческие функции. Это, однако,
дело ближайшего будущего, к которому нужно готовиться уже
сейчас.
К числу возможных сегодня путей минимизации криминогенности
межнациональной экономики и интеграции следует отнести: 1)
преодоление межгосударственных законодательных коллизий; 2)
усиление координации межведомственной деятельности всех государств
и правительств; 3) переосмысление роли международного права путем
создания международно-правовых актов прямого действия и
межнациональной юстиции.
English summary
The Intensification of Inter-State Integration and the Rise of
Inter- State Economic Integration as Factors Enabling Criminalization,
and Methods of Minimizing this Criminalization
The development of the international economy and the integration of states is a
natural, unavoidable, and—as whole—a positive process in the development of
world civilization. The evident advantages of such integration include: 1) rise in
the economic development of the states involved; 2) as a result, a rise in the stan-
dard of living in these states and their populaces; 3) ability to find solution to the
problems that cannot be solved by individual states or smaller unions of states; 4)
opportunity to avoid not only open confrontation, local and large-scale conflicts,
but also the so-called “cold war.” With this integration come skills, international
and inter-state compromise, and other forms of conflict resolution.
However, there are certain negative characteristics of this integration, not the
least serious of which is that crime within these states is also tending toward inte-
gration. This point is exemplified by the following two key issues: 1) the interna-
tional economy and inter-state integration possess criminogenic qualities: they
provoke crime, and in fact give rise to it in forms that human kind has not wit-
nessed, or at least on such a scale; 2) crime undeniably favors integrative pro-
cesses, as it is a phenomenon that is particular to all states and is affected by those
changes which occur on an international level.
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Criminality of the international economy and inter-state integration is inevita-
ble due to the deep contradictions that are inherent to any positive process. The
fundamental qualities and characteristics inherent to the criminality of the inte-
grative processes include: 1) conflicts of interest—primarily economic—of the
states party to these processes; 2) lack of well-established legislation to govern
the development of international economy and other integrative processes; 3)
differences in laws and norms that regulate tax, fiscal, customs and other legal af-
fairs in the states party to the integration processes; 4) differences in
criminalization and penalization in the states party to the integration processes.
4. The criminogenic qualities vary depending on the type of crime. The degree
of criminality can be reflected in the following Risk Scale: 1. crimes against indi-
viduals—minimal risk; 2. environmental crimes—a certain degree of risk; 3.
crimes for political reasons—the risk lies with the rise in new political opportu-
nities; 4. corruption—high risk; 5. economic crimes, criminal business, terror-
ism—the highest degree of risk. Inasmuch as these are organized crimes, the de-
gree of criminalization should be considered when preparing legislation that will
regulate the international economy and integrative processes, as well as when
preparing and implementing programs aimed at combating organized crime.
The criminogenic characteristics of the international economy and integrative
processes must be curtailed. However, this can only be effective if done on the
inter-state and international levels; it will not be effective on the national level.
One of the most effective ways to decrease criminality in the international
economy and integration is the creation of a new world governance system that
will absorb certain governing functions from the states. The model used by inter-
national organizations nowadays can serve as a prototype for a future model of
the world governance system; it is as yet imperfect since there are many exam-
ples of member states violating UN norms. Such a system should absorb a num-
ber of state functions, including governing the world economy, protecting the en-
vironment, combating organized crime and others. This is a task for the near fu-
ture, for which preparation must be made now.
Ways of minimizing the criminality of the international economy and integra-
tion include: 1) overcoming the incompatibility of the states’ legal systems; 2)
improving coordination among various state agencies; 3) rethinking the role of
international law through creating both overarching international legal acts and
the system of international justice.
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The Main Weaknesses of the Management
System in the State Administration of
Georgia as Supporting Factors for
Corruption and Money Laundering
Shalva Machavariani,
Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, Georgia
As a country of transition economy, Georgia is characterised by a kind of disor-
der in the governance system, which acts as the main reason for the growth of
corruption.
In the Annual Report (2000) of Transparency International (Coalition against
corruption) (Transparency International 2000), Georgia took 84–86th place to-
gether with Albania and Kazakhstan among 99 countries in terms of corruption
level. 2 years later Georgia had moved to 127th place (Transparency Interna-
tional 2003, 5), indicating a tendency to corruption growth.
In 2000, 2001 and 2002 (The State Department of Statistics of Georgia 2000,
28–30; The State Department of Statistics of Georgia 2001, 102–105) local en-
trepreneurs named the following as the main obstacles to business development:
a) Corruption in public services, 62.7%, 52.6% and 63.6% of respondents
respectively;
b) Dependence of business on government, 50.6%, 59.5% and 61.4% of
respondents respectively (Figure 1).
Particularly, corrupt public servants and dominating private interests have re-
sulted in the growth of the shadow economy. According to the International
Monetary Fund, in the countries of transition economy, the share of the shadow
economy of the Gross Domestic Product varies between 21–30% on average. In
Georgia, the situation is worse: the State Department of Statistics of Georgia has
estimated that one third of total production is not accounted for, and according to
the International Monetary Fund, the proportion of the shadow economy is as
high as 64% of the GDP (Schneider and Enste 2002).
The large-scale shadow economy results in a low level of tax revenue. The
share of lost revenue is 13.7% of the GDP, and this figure is among the highest in
CIS countries (Georgian Policy and Legal Advice Centre 2002). Tax collection
is further impeded by corruption. Reduced tax income has a negative impact on
state economy, which in turn restrains infrastructural development and eco-
nomic growth. According to a well-known specialist, Daniel Kaufmann, low
level of economic development, poor governmental structures and corruption
are interrelated concepts (Kaufmann 2001).
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In Georgia, the main reasons for inefficient public services are:
Inertia and inflexibility
In spite of the ongoing changes, public agencies—in terms of their form and sub-
stance—have still retained certain qualities typical to “Soviet” structures, like
autocratic style of governance, which expresses itself as 900–1,300 presidential
decrees each year (Figure 2). It seems that officials of different sectors try to
avoid personal liability by preparing normative acts which transfer responsibil-
ity to the president. Inefficiency is further caused by low qualitative and quantita-
tive levels of decentralisation, failure to perform governing functions in a proper
manner, etc. It also seems that public agencies are not interested in solving prob-
lems of national importance, but rather in serving their particular and immediate
interests.
Disorganisation
Disorganisation is expressed in numerous non-implemented orders (Figures 3,
4, 5). In fact, their number increases (on average 3.5–6%) each year.
At the present stage of transition, the disintegration of public service struc-
tures is caused by:
1. Public agencies no longer suffer from excessive control from superior State
bodies, and the administrative apparatus is no longer dependent on political
power. On the other hand, a new, democratic system of governmental control
has not yet been built. As a result, the almost fully autonomous public agen-
cies have found themselves in a “control-free” environment. The existence
and manifestation of social control (ideological, political, religious,
work-related etc.) is very important in modern society, ideally providing an
effective tool for fighting economic crime and corruption. It is possible that
Georgia succeeds in this goal.
2. As a result of the ongoing process of denationalising public property, the for-
merly government-owned enterprises have been liberated from its control.
The old-fashioned public servants have been deprived of their habitual man-
aging tasks, and instead of implementing directives and instructions of the
state organs, they are now expected to devise means for creating and imple-
menting sectoral development policies and strategies. An overwhelming
majority of them lack the necessary know-how and skills.
3. Heavy administrative machine is maintained by overlapping functions at all
levels: the different governmental agencies, different subdivisions of those
agencies, different public servants working for those subdivisions. Such an
organisational model is characterised by limited responsibility for out-
comes, imbalance between official duties and responsibilities, structural
overloads, and excessive functions.
Lack of proper development programme
There is no public service development strategy, nor coherent implementation
programmes which would define the most optimal solutions to existing prob-
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lems, including methods for building an appropriate structure. There is obvious
disrespect for a key principle of management; the structure, as an implementing
mechanism, is being constructed and/or perfected without any consistent strat-
egy or objectivity, although proper attention to both external factors and poten-
tial changes are prerequisites for any good development programme. Thus it is
impossible to shape a long-term development strategy and build appropriate or-
ganisational structures to implement such strategies. Experiences of developed
countries should be taken into account and possible changes forecasted on the
basis of current circumstances. In reality, however, executive authorities react
“today” to events that took place “yesterday”. Such an approach only encourages
the survival of old-fashioned, non-problem-oriented and complacent structures.
Underdevelopment of legal framework regulating public service
Major problems are associated with regulations and standards, their inconsis-
tency with each other and with current developments. Without coherent legal
framework, the normal functioning of public agencies and public servants is im-
possible.
Poor motivation
Public servants need both effective financial and moral incentives. Unfortu-
nately, the average wages of public servants are below the minimum level of sub-
sistence (Figure 6), and there are no social guarantees provided. The latter should
be established without delay. If nothing is done, the normal functioning of public
service, and addressing the facts connected to economic crime is impossible.
Lack of modern management style, organisational culture and proper
code of conduct
A public servant is a representative of the State, whether inside or outside the
country. Public agencies can portray the image of national statehood. The higher
a public agency is in the governmental hierarchy, the more strict ethical require-
ments should be imposed on its staff. Each governmental agency should be re-
quired to formalise such requirements to a code of conduct. Such a code, consist-
ing of both universal and national values, as well as ethical norms acceptable to any
democratic society, would pave the way for harmonious relationships inside the
agency, and create a very positive image of that agency in the eyes of the public.
Poor staff management
This results primarily from the lack of modern approach to staff management.
Presently, there are no precise job descriptions, duties or responsibilities defined
for any offices of the hierarchical or horizontal public service sector. In other
words, it is not clear which professional skills and personal qualities the candi-
dates for public offices should have. Without such criteria, it is impossible to en-
sure objective selection and promotion processes.
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Lack of government’s uniform staff training and retraining policies
Staff training and retraining policies should be consistent with the job descrip-
tions, duties and responsibilities of each particular office. Only those with proper
professional skills and personal qualities should be recruited for public services.
Staff training and retraining programmes should be implemented in accordance
with curricula based on uniform national standards.
These requirements have been met by more or less all developing countries
that are willing to build modern governmental institutions. It should be remem-
bered that if proper solutions to the above-mentioned problems are not found, it
may increase corruption and undermine the prestige of the national government.
This emphasises the need for a fundamental reform of governmental structures.
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Figure 1. Primary obstructing factors for development of business
(source: survey for businessmen).
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6.  Ministry of State Property Management
7.  Ministry of Agriculture and Product
8.  Ministry of Urbanization and Construction
9.  Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Protection
10.  Ministry of Refugees and Placement
11.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
12.  Ministry of Education
13.  Ministry of Culture
14.  Ministry of Emergency Affairs
15.  Ministry of Defense
16.  Ministry of Justice
17.  Ministry of Internal Affairs
18.  Ministry of State Security
Figure 2. Implementation of instructions in Ministries (January 1, 2003).
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Figure 3. Dynamics of instructions for governmental structures during 1999–2002.*
Instructions issued during the first 6 months of the current year amount to 85.2%
of last year’s instructions. 2,299 were implemented, which is 1.5 times more than
a year before, but still the percentage of implemented instructions has sunk. In
28.6% of the cases, the designated execution time was extended.
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Figure 4. Implemented instructions in ministries, other agencies and governmen-
tal commissions (1.01.2003).*
* Source: research conducted with prof. Gela Grigolashvili
• 3,855 instructions were supervised by the State Chancellery. 20.4% of them
were related to economic issues, from which 9% to financial-credit policy,
functioning of economy and budgetary control.
• 11.5% of the instructions were related to culture, education and science,
7.5% to health and social welfare issues, 4.9% to defense, justice and cor-
ruption issues, etc.
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81.2%
Ministries
Governmental
comissions
Other agencies
Figure 5. Instruction performance rate of all accomplished tasks of ministries,
other agencies and governmental commissions (July 1, 2003).
Owing to the low volume of cases, the satisfactory performance of governmen-
tal commissions does not improve the poor overall situation. However, im-
provements in management and the determination of the leaders of institu-
tional level give hope of a successful reform of the governmental management
system.
Recommendations
1. To achieve radical improvement in the coordination of executive govern-
mental agencies, a coherent action plan—national social/economic develop-
ment strategy should be developed.
2. The structuring of executive governmental agencies should be implemented
in line with the national development strategy. This would, on the one hand,
orient the agencies to solving existing problems and, on the other hand, sta-
bilise operations and prevent functional overlaps and duplication.
3. When forming executive governmental structures, one should take into ac-
count EU requirements associated with the efficiency, transparency and
cost-effectiveness of governmental structures.
4. Institutional-level agencies of executive branch should focus on conceptual
issues, associated with policy implementation, action planning, prognosti-
cation, monitoring and the like. They should altogether relinquish economic
functions which should be delegated to lower-level structures (regulatory
agencies, legal entities under public law).
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5. Within the executive branch, a strict control of sub-institutional agencies
should be ensured. The need of such agencies should be determined by the
following principle: how effectively can they assist the superior agencies in
achieving their goals and objectives. Performance of public agencies and
public servants should be measured by clearly defined criteria (Efficiency,
Effectiveness, volume of work).
6. To ensure the introduction of modern governance approaches to executive
governmental agencies, as much power as possible should be delegated to
lower levels; in addition, job descriptions and job requirements should be
prepared in accordance with the new organisational techniques; all this re-
quires the introduction of a brand new role-based organisational discipline.
7. All executive governmental agencies should focus on the improvement of
staff management procedures and practices that meet modern requirements.
In particular:
– all decisions on the recruitment, testing and promotion of staff should be
based on job descriptions, job requirements and clearly defined proce-
dures;
– staff training and retraining needs should be assessed in accordance with
the requirements of specific jobs;
– some objective criteria for staff evaluation and promotion should be spec-
ified;
– a database of actual public servants and reserves should be compiled;
– radical steps should be taken to improve the quality of staff managers.
8. An effective incentive system for public servants should be developed. Ade-
quate financial reserves for this could be found. Specifically, the legal frame-
work for the effective use of non-budgetary incomes should be improved.
9. To overcome the existing shortcomings in financial and economic sectors,
the budgeting process should be based on target funding.
10. To ensure consistency of the reform of the executive branch, the functions
and responsibilities of the Public Service Bureau, which is a structural unit
of the State Chancellery, should be redefined.
11. To ensure the proper operation of the executive branch, its legal and regula-
tory framework should be improved for the purpose of consistency and har-
monisation of all legal acts with each other and with current developments.
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Representations of Organised Crime
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Abstract: This discourse analysis of newspaper publications over a one-year pe-
riod on organised crime provides an insight into the ways in which the media
constructs the said phenomenon. It reveals that organised crime is being pre-
sented as an extremely dangerous social phenomenon existing outside the com-
munity and state of Estonia. In the available publications, the existence of a large
Mafia-type criminal organisation in Estonia is taken for granted. However, the
idea of organised crime and criminals is strongly associated with the ethnic back-
ground of those involved in crime. The prevalent presentation of the phenome-
non of organised crime in mass media is characterised as an alien conspiracy.
Introduction
Since the late 1980s–early 1990s, the problem of organised crime has been
widely discussed. With the fall of communism the world faced a novel situation
where there were no more clearly defined enemies. Paddy Rawlinson points out
that “the end of the Cold War and the opening up of borders in the former Soviet
Empire spawned a new area of international concern, that of global/ organized/
transnational/ cross border/ crime. The variety of terms betrays a lack of consen-
sus (and, arguably, understanding) as to the nature of this new menace while the
response to it displays an interesting homogeneity. … Organized crime has re-
placed Soviet communism as the new enemy of democracy and free market”
(Rawlinson 2002: 295). Despite the ambiguity of the concept (or probably due to
it), the amount of financial, intellectual etc resources channelled to study and
combat this phenomenon was—and still is—enormous. Numerous commis-
sions, conferences, international journals, think tanks, special foundations and
institutions—all resources have been committed to this new “war”. In just a few
years, Russian organised crime has become as famous as Sicilian Mafia or La
Cosa Nostra.
As a rule, analytical papers try to solve the ambiguity of the given concept by
providing a suitable phrase expressing the essential nature of organised crime.
This has resulted in numerous new definitions and has compounded the confu-
sion. Letizia Paoli (2002), discussing the paradoxes of organised crime
emphasises that the concept of OC incorporates two notions: the provision of il-
legal goods and services on the one hand, and criminal organisations on the other.
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According to her, what is more important is that these notions are superimposed,
which produces an ambiguous, conflated concept.
In Estonia, a criminal alliance is defined as a collusion of “a stable group of
three or more persons with division of labour, associated for the purpose of com-
mitting offences of the first and second degree”. This legal definition enables the
law enforcement bodies to target at small-size and loosely organised illegal en-
terprises as well as members of big criminal organisations. Since the introduc-
tion of the definition in 1996, there has been only one case where a group of peo-
ple was prosecuted for establishing and belonging to a criminal alliance. In 2001
a group engaged in trafficking in stolen cars from Europe to Estonia was brought
to justice. Although there previously had been several attempts to charge groups
under the criminal alliance clause, this was the first time that sufficient evidence
was collected to actually do so. It is also worth mentioning that the said alliance
included both law enforcement officials and car thieves.
Although organised crime is defined as a criminal enterprise by Estonian law,
rather than a conspiracy of aliens, media discourse paints quite a different pic-
ture. The case discussed above generated several newspaper articles. While the
official presentation of the news was rather neutral, the comments demonstrated
disagreement with such an understanding of organised crime. An excerpt from a
Päevaleht article below serves as an illustration of the point:
ESTONIAN MAFIOSI
Since yesterday there have been three persons in Estonia who you can call
Mafiosi without the fear of being sued for libel. Who are they, the first Esto-
nian Mafiosi?
Let me introduce to you, Merike Soots: a young woman, a border guard who,
driven by banal greed, helped some rogues for 10,000 kroons to bring stolen
cars over the border. In all other respects, she is a respectable family person,
mother of two.
Hillar Grünbaum: For years, he was a medium-calibre actor in the world of
criminals. He contrived a simple scheme, based on clear and direct bribing of
a senior border guard.
Margo Liiva: an errand-boy of the former, who did not need to do any thinking
himself.
Do they really befit the image of organised crime? Ironically, the capture of
these small-time offenders is considered a manifest achievement of the police
and the court. Seemingly, to reach high, one has to start from the lowest rung
of the ladder….
(13 December 2001)
The author of the newspaper article evidently disagrees with the idea that either a
“respectable family person”, “mother of two”, a “medium-calibre actor” or an
“unthinking errand-boy” could be considered organised criminals. The question
follows: what kind of image of organised crime and criminals does the Estonian
mass media have?
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Discourse analysis
The most appropriate method of looking for meanings of organised crime in the
printed news is the discourse analysis. The term ‘discourse analysis’ is con-
nected to a variety of approaches, but all of them share one common feature: dis-
course analysis rejects the idea that language is a neutral means of reflecting the
reality. Instead, it holds that discourse has pivotal importance in constructing so-
cial life (Gill 2000). As said by Gill, “it is useful to think of discourse analysis as
having four main themes: a concern with discourse itself; a view of language as
constructive and constructed; an emphasis upon discourse as a form of action;
and a conviction in the rhetorical organisation of discourse (ibid. 174).” Dis-
course analysis is not interested in finding out “how things really are”. Instead, it
looks for answers to different questions. In case of the above-mentioned article,
the author is not interested in what organised crime and criminals really are, but
what they are not. The more important question, however, is how organised
crime is constructed in mass media, and what is meant by organised crime.
According to van Dijk (1989a), news represent a special kind of discourse.
Traditional content analysis of texts concentrates on economical, political, so-
cial or psychological aspects of text processing. This orientation allows the iden-
tification of factors involved in the processes of news production and reception,
as well as those influencing the news messages. In such an approach, attention is
paid to the message itself, in so far as it provides information about the different
contexts of its usage. The discourse analysis, in contrast, concentrates on the
core of the process of mass communication. All media texts, and news texts in
particular, are analysed as a special case of language use and a special kind of
text. It means that news should be analysed from the point of view of its organisa-
tion. This analysis, alongside with the linguistic analysis of morphology, syntax
and semantic structures of words and phrases, involves more complicated analy-
sis of relationship between sentences, general schematic structure of the whole
text, rhetoric, and style. And since discourse is not only a textual structure but a
more complicated communicative act (phenomenon), the analysis of news dis-
course should also include the social context of communication actors and the
process of news production.
In an approach like this, many factors and conditions of the production of
mass communication (such as the economic context or institutional procedure of
news production) could be brought into association with various structural char-
acteristics of texts. This holds true also with the process of how news are per-
ceived. How news are understood, memorised and reproduced should be studied
by taking into account the textual and contextual properties of the communica-
tion process.
The newspaper discourse, like other genres of discourse, should be analysed
at different levels. Such properties of texts as word order, clause structure, sen-
tence meanings, local coherence, global topics, lexical style, semantic moves,
disclaimers, metaphors, levels and completeness of descriptions and so on,
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should be taken into account. It is clear that all categories cannot be addressed in
one go. The most important question is what structures should be attended to
within the limited framework of one project. The choice of categories primarily
depends on the research question, and the problems and aims of the project. (van
Dijk 1998)
The problem and categories of analysis
As mentioned before, the choice of structures to be analysed depends on ques-
tions one wishes to answer. My goal is to understand the meaning of organised
crime as presented in Estonian newspapers. Another issue under scrutiny will be
political corruption. In recent statements of high-level Estonian law enforcement
officials it has often been suggested that in Estonia, organised crime has attained
a new level of development: the metastases of organised crime have now reached
politics and legal business. Analysis of how these processes are understood and
presented by the mass media contributes greatly to the understanding of the im-
age of organised crime in general.
Obviously, within the framework of one project, only a few structures can be
analysed. In this paper I will focus on such categories of analysis which deal with
meaning, and are general enough to characterise the discourse as a whole. These
include the analysis of topics, lexicalisation, and the analysis of rhetorical de-
vices (metaphors, hyperboles, euphemisms, irony etc.)
Topics. Topic is defined as the general proposition that constitutes the global
meaning of a text. Topics represent what the writer (member of a dominant
group) regards as the most important theme of the text. The main topics deter-
mine, in broad outlines, how people understand and remember the text. Topics
influence the agenda, i.e. what people think and talk about. (van Dijk et al. 1997).
The research of the structure of discourse (van Dijk 1989b) has shown that the
lead and heading of a newspaper article often contain/summarise the most im-
portant information in the text. Previous research based on analysis of topics has
demonstrated that topics express and reproduce major stereotypes (van Dijk et
al. 1997).
Lexicalisation. One thing that can be quite easily examined is the
lexicalisation of the underlying conceptual meanings. The words chosen to de-
scribe organised crime, its members and actions immediately reveal properties
of discourse. Whether the group of criminals is described as “gang”, “network”,
“criminal enterprise”, “Mafia”, or just “tumour” refers bluntly to the understand-
ing and models of organised crime in discourse.
Rhetorical devices. As van Dijk (1998) suggests, rhetorical structures “regu-
late effective comprehension and especially opinion formation and change”.
Rhetorical devices such as metaphor, irony, etc are designed to call attention,
help memorising author’s point of view, and in this way, change people’s minds.
Similarly to the choice of words used to describe the organised crime phenome-
non, rhetorical devices contribute heavily to the construction of meaning. Since
metaphors and other rhetorical features do not appear in every sentence, this kind
of analysis is appropriate when analysing large fragments of discourse.
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Sample
Using the search engine of the on-line version of the daily Pä  evaleht, I selected
all newspaper texts where the keywords “organised crime” (organiseeritud
kuritegevus), “underworld” (allilm, allmaailm), “Mafia”, “criminal alliance”
(kuritegelik ühendus), “gang” (jõ  uk), “grouping” (grupeering) appeared. After
sieving the material obtained, 195 newspaper articles were selected for analysis.
Not all of them had organised crime as their main topic, but all of them gave some
consideration to the theme. The articles where the organised crime-related words
just appeared in a list (for example, “After re-gaining independence Estonia has
faced several problems like unemployment, inequality, organised crime etc”)
were excluded from the sample, as were articles that discussed organised crime
abroad. Although being aware of the fact that any discussion on organised crime
could contribute to the construction of the phenomenon, we decided to exclude
the said texts for two reasons: Firstly, our aim was to deconstruct the meaning of
organised crime in Estonia and, secondly, we wanted to reduce the amount of
material to be analysed by assessing and weighing it from the viewpoint of qual-
ity. Eventually, 104 articles were approved for analysis.
Articles on organised crime appeared regularly. Some of the events like ap-
prehension of law-breakers or gang trials were reported in one or two articles,
while others triggered a series of writings. Most often such series of articles ad-
dressed the issues of corruption. The cases which aroused keen interest among
the public are especially rewarding to the researcher, and worth studying in
greater detail. The material available being rich, we decided to limit the question
and concentrate on examining how organised criminals were constructed in the
selected articles.
Three series of articles were selected for the analysis at hand. Firstly, the se-
ries on links between the Tallinn City Administration and the St. Petersburg or-
ganised crime; secondly, the articles dealing with the murder of the businessman
Vitali Haitov. Although different, both series have similar features: persons in-
volved are prominent businessmen, allegedly tainted by their affiliation to organ-
ised crime; some politicians are referred to in both cases. The ethnic background
of the actors is, however, different. The third series of articles was set off by a pa-
per on organised crime by the leading expert in Estonia, Director of the Board for
Security Police (in Estonian KAPO).
“The notorious Lao sets a trap to his buddy Mõis”: articles concerning
the links between organised crime and the Tallinn City Administration
The first of the selected series (13 articles in total) started with an article titled
“FBI: Lao is a middleman of St. Petersburg’s underworld” (EPL 21 April 2001).
In contrast to the series of writings on Vitali Haitov’s death, to be discussed later,
the first article in this series was an outcome of investigative journalism, rather
than information casting light on the event. The events described took place in
March 2001, and the article was published in the end of April 2001. The said arti-
cle, an event in itself, will be studied in greater detail; in order to understand what
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a story recounts, its discourse structure needs to be analysed (Bell 1998; van Dijk
1985).
FBI: Lao is a middleman of St. Petersburg’s underworld. The Reformist Party
finds that Mayor of Tallinn, Jüri Mõis, should resign if the data provided by
the FBI, alleging that Mõis’ bosom friend Meelis Lao is the stooge of St. Pe-
tersburg organised crime in Estonia, should turn out to be true. ( 21 April 2001)
The lead and heading of a newspaper article are used to express the main theme
or topic of the text (van Dijk 1985). As suggested by van Dijk, if there are several
topics, the one that is most important or most recent is expressed in the heading
while others are presented in the lead. (van Dijk 1985, 242). The message of the
topic in the above piece of writing is that the FBI has information on Lao’s con-
nections with the St. Petersburg organised crime. The lead adds political dimen-
sion to this information. The reader learns that Lao is a good friend of Mõis,
Mayor of Tallinn. The lead also refers to the subsequent action (also called the
follow-up), i.e. what should be or will be done in the future as a consequence of
the given event. This idea is further emphasised in the comment (direct quota-
tion) of the Head of the Tallinn City Council, supporting the resignation of the
Mayor, provided the FBI information should be found true. The main idea be-
hind the resignation is actually the innuendo that the Mayor of Tallinn has con-
nections to organised crime or, in other words, to political corruption. However,
this innuendo is not expressed explicitly. Instead, by excluding the topic of Mõis’
resignation/corruption from the headline, the main attention is turned to the
question of Lao’s possibly criminal background.
The thematic structure of the article helps to reconstruct what the story says.
Thematic structure is a set of formally or subjectively organised topics. Each sec-
tion of the newspaper text is organised around these topics. The reader learns that
during his visit to the USA in March 2001, the Estonian Minister of the Interior
received information about money laundering and economic activities of the St.
Petersburg organised crime in Estonia. According to that information, the con-
nections between the Tallinn City Administration and organised crime had made
those murky activities possible. The person who allegedly had helped to estab-
lish contacts between the City Administration and the organised crime was
Meelis Lao, buddy of the Mayor of Tallinn. The Minister did not inform the Gov-
ernment about the issue.
The text of the article does not always follow the linear structure of the topics.
Instead, journalists assign different relevance value to each of the topics. This
relevance is reflected in the order in which the topics appear in the text (van Dijk
1989b, 246): the later a topic appears in the text, the lower relevance value it has.
In this particular text, topics appear as follows:
a) Organised crime is involved in large-scale real estate operations
in downtown Tallinn
b) FBI’s warning should be taken seriously
c) No government official wanted to comment on the issue
d) Minister claims he did nothing wrong when (not) processing /
forwarding the FBI information
e) Minister claims no particular names were discussed.
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f) There is no official FBI report on the issue
g) Meelis Lao claims the information is a slander (libel)
h) Pro Patria party (the one the Mayor of Tallinn belongs to) believes
what the Minister says.
The first two topics, (a) and (b) are newspaper commentaries or additions to the
main event. The general information about the economic activities of organised
crime is supplemented by providing more precise description of the organised
crime activities in the real estate sector (a). The next comment regarding the seri-
ousness of the FBI information (b) actually further stresses the topic presented in
the lead. Lower in the hierarchy are topics concerning the official reaction to this
information. Topics (c)–(f) elaborate on the Minister’s vacuous reaction. In no
uncertain terms, the Minister is being accused of “shielding” Mõis. The Minis-
ter’s explanation of the usual procedure of recording and forwarding the content
of formal talks is presented (d), by which he claims that he did nothing wrong.
Additionally, he claims no particular names were discussed (e) during his meet-
ing with the FBI officials. This paragraph explicitly expresses the idea that the in-
formation presented in the newspaper article is not true. Further on, in the last
paragraph (h), an official representative of the Pro Patria party claims they “trust
what the Minister says”. This is quite intriguing, because what is actually be-
lieved is the implicit message.
It is worth noting that the idea of Mõis’resignation, or in other words, of Mõis’
connection to organised crime, does not appear anywhere in the text except for
one sentence in the end of the article, where it is mentioned that Mõis was not
available for a comment.
Significant for this article is the use of sources. The story has an author
by-line. The heading attributes the information to the FBI, but there is no indica-
tion that information was directly received from the FBI. All in all, the following
sources of information or comments can be identified in the text:
• FBI
• Director of FBI
• Head of the Tallinn City Council
• Anonymous governmental source
• Police source
• Minister of the Interior
• Public relations officer from the Ministry of the Interior
• Meelis Lao (the alleged OC figure)
• Head of Tallinn Chapter of the Pro Patria party.
Each claim made in this article is attributed to some source. Such precise and
even obsessive indication of sources makes sure that each claim presented in the
article has a strong factual basis (asserts that the information is genuine). All
sources mentioned (probably with the exception of Meelis Lao) are incumbent
officials, holding high positions. As already mentioned, the core story is attrib-
uted to the Director of the FBI. The newspaper writes that the Director “drew the
Minister’s attention”, “mentioned”, “warned” about the issue. The selection of
163
verbs is characteristic to informal advice, rather than to official statement. Direct
quotation is not used, which implies that the journalist did not get the informa-
tion “straight from the horse’s mouth” (the FBI), but via other channels, which is
further indicated by the phrase “according to Päevaleht’s data”.
Perhaps the excessive reference to supporting claims seeks to make up for the
weakness of not having direct FBI reports. The seriousness of the primary state-
ment is underscored by providing background information on the authority of
the FBI Director, who is “number four figure in the USA” and “if he draws atten-
tion” to an issue, “the matter is volatile”. Moreover, the expertise of the USA
source is emphasised not only by the journalist herself, but by additional refer-
ence to an anonymous “police source”.
The Minister of the Interior is given a much stronger voice when compared to
the suggestive character of the FBI claims. First, he is quoted directly. Second,
while commenting on the issue, he “assures” the journalist (and through direct
quotation also the reader) of the correctness of his actions during and after the
visit to the USA. The minister also “stresses” that concrete names—implication
to “Lao”—were not specified.
As a follow-up to this article we have an opinion of a high-ranking politician
(representative of the Reformist party), that the Mayor of Tallinn, Mõis, should
resign. Follow-ups usually concern the future, and state the consequences of an
event, or an opinion of “what should be done”. As Bell notes, a follow-up is a
prime source of subsequent updating of stories, that themselves are called ‘fol-
low-ups’ by journalists (Bell 1998: 69). As I will show later, several subsequent
publications were concerned with Mõ  is’ resignation.
On the same day, the newspaper published a comment by another expert, Koit
Pikaro, the former Commissioner of Police. This comment was not included in
the article “FBI: …” but was presented as a separate piece. It is worth pointing
out that the Estonian mass media hails Koit Pikaro as a legendary figure in the
law enforcement landscape. Formerly the Vice-Director of the Central Criminal
Police, he is considered a lone fighter against organised crime. Such a status is
highly valued among the public, and explains why Pikaro, and not some incum-
bent police official, was asked to comment on the event. Pikaro confirmed the
FBI information and stressed that this was not the first time that suspicions re-
garding the connections between Meelis Lao and the leader of St. Petersburg’s
organised crime had been aroused. The latter’s nickname is Mogila (‘grave’ in
Russian). By calling the organised crime figure by his nickname, and thereby
adding savour to the whole story, Pikaro demonstrated sophisticated knowledge
of the subject. Pikaro, however, refused to comment on the question whether or
not Mõis could be linked to organised crime.
In sum, the article makes claims of a political corruption case and stresses the
credibility and importance of such a statement by referring to high-ranking au-
thorities. However, the accusation is made in a clear-cut fashion. This “not beat-
ing about the bush” makes it possible to shift the focus from links between the
Mayor of Tallinn and organised crime to the question of whether the information
about criminal links of Meelis Lao is valid or not. The follow-up articles pursue
both possible tracks. Articles discuss the issue of resignation, but at the same
time weigh the (in)validity of the information about Meelis Lao’s criminal back-
ground.
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The headings of articles, which to some extent trace the “resignation” path,
are listed below:
TALLINN CITY ADMINISTRATION DID NOT DISCUSS THE ACCUSA-
TIONS AGAINST MÕIS. (23 April 2001)
PRO PATRIA DECIDES MÕIS SHOULD CONTINUE AS MAYOR OF THE
CITY. (23 April 2001)
PRO PATRIA WILL NOT DISMISS MÕIS BY DEFAULT. (23 April 2001)
COALITION PARTNER INITIATES MÕIS’ RESIGNATION  (3 May 2001)
Especially interesting are the articles that shift attention from Mõ  is to Lao, the al-
leged puppet of organised crime:
MEELIS LAO – MAFIOSO OR BUSINESSMAN? (26 April 2001)
Despite the high credibility of the sources of the original allegation (FBI, govern-
ment source, police source, and legendary former police commissioner), re-
ferred to in the first article, the subsequent articles downgrade this information
by explicitly expressing disbelief. Mõ  is is the first one to voice doubts.
JÜRI MÕIS DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT LAO HAS LINKS WITH MAFIA (23
April 2001)
In addition, the authority of the FBI is overruled by two even higher authorities
(as if one would not have been enough), i.e. by two Estonian Ministers who
downplay the importance of the FBI report:
TWO MINISTERS DO NOT CONSIDER THE REPORT ON LAO AS IMPOR-
TANT. Minister of Justice Märt Rask and Minister of Social Affairs Eiki
Nestor do not regard the report concerning the Tallinn City Administration’s
alleged connection with organised crime as important. (24 April 2001)
In the whole series of articles, the juxtapositioning of “us” and “them” is con-
spicuously outstanding. “Us” are represented by concrete figures: ministers, pol-
iticians, and Mayor Mõis. Mõis’personal qualities, both those of a politician and
a successful businessman, are repeatedly highlighted. In addition to these “to-
kens of success”, by which Estonians assess the man’s achievements, his inner
positive virtues such as the capacity for friendship (“a buddy of Mõis”) are pre-
sented. Mõis is referred to as a victim of the developments, unbeknown to him:
The notorious Lao sets a trap for his buddy Mõis. (24 April 2001)
“They” are vaguely represented, described in general terms of “organised
crime”, “underworld”, “Mafia”. Only one trait is disclosed—“they” are from St.
Petersburg, they are the “Russian organised crime”. The only exception is the
nickname “Mogila” (‘grave’) of an organised criminal. This macabre nom de
plume aside, the reader learns nothing about the said underworld figure.
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Between these clearly marked borders, between “us” and “them”, is the per-
son whose true identity remains a mystery, Meelis Lao. The question about his
stature is stated point-blank: “Meelis Lao—Mafioso or businessman?” Im-
plicitly, however, Lao is presented as one of “us”. He is characterised as “notori-
ous” rather than criminal. Newspaper reports abound in reference to his high so-
cial position: the prominent businessman Hannes Tamjärv and the Mayor of
Tallinn Jüri Mõ  is are his friends, his legitimate annual earnings are about one
million Estonian kroons (well above the average), he receives fixed income from
shares he holds in businesses, he is unable to remember how many cars he has
had over the past ten years. The phrases “sinewy, light-haired sportsman” with
“strong chin” allude to his sporty appearance, in stark contrast to the standard
definition of Russian “mug-headed” (derivative of “mugger”) racketeers. As
Meelis Lao is identified as one of “us”, he is also cleared of suspicions regarding
his criminal behaviour. The tacit inference is that his friendship with Mõis is not
a problem, really, and that there is no evidence of political corruption.
Before moving to the next group of articles, I would like to point out that here,
“political corruption” is used to refer to alleged relationship between the city ad-
ministration and organised crime. The word “corruption ” is not mentioned in any
of the 13 articles, which as such is interesting.
“It’s like soap opera”: Murder of Vitali Haitov
The second group of articles slightly differs from the first one, evolving around
high-ranking officials’ statements on organised crime. The articles analysed in
this section are concerned with the murder of a media businessman, Vitali Haitov
on 10 March, 2001. The tentative analysis revealed that a subset of articles re-
lated to Haitov’s death did not contain the original news about the murder. There-
fore, additional selection was made from 2001 Eesti Päevaleht publications. This
time “Haitov” was used as the keyword. The search resulted in 11 additional arti-
cles. The newspaper published 23 articles in total to cover the event.
This gangster-movie-like event would be extremely attractive to any journal-
ist. In 2000, one year before the assassination of Vitali Haitov, his son Marian
Haitov was killed. The crime went unsolved. From the very beginning, the two
deaths were associated; it was claimed that even the motives coincided:
VITALI HAITOV MURDERED YESTERDAY. Yesterday afternoon an of-
fender not yet apprehended shot VitaIi Haitov in front of his home, killing him.
The victim, whose son Marian was murdered in spring last year was a pub-
lisher, head of the Vesti media group […]. (12 March 2001)
EDITORIAL: BLOOD OF BUSINESSMAN HAITOV. It is too early to make
conclusive statements concerning the motives for the murder of an eminent
Russian businessman Vitali Haitov. However, the reason for his murder could
be that he was too close to dispel the murky shadows obscuring the mystery of
the murder of his son, Marian, in April last year. (12 March 2001)
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ACCORDING TO POLICE DATA, THE UNDERLYING REASON FOR
KILLING BOTH MARIAN AND VITALI HAITOV FOLLOWS THE SAME
RATIONALE. (13 March 2001)
The murder was immediately put into the context of organised crime. Although
the headlines did not explicitly reveal any linkage between these murders and or-
ganised crime, in the following texts the association was made. This was done in
two ways. When describing the background of the two victims, the press claimed
that they had had connections with organised crime. The following quotation
serves as an example:
“However, until the end of last year Haitov, who held the position of director
of the underworld-related Russian Cultural Centre, was involved in
never-ending conflict with media business” (Editorial: Blood of businessman
Haitov, 12 March 2001)
The majority of publications devoted to that event described the crime scene,
played back Marian Haitov’s murder in 2000, deliberated on suspects etc. Two
articles, however, looked at the organised crime (Mafia) phenomenon in general.
One of them, published 5 days after the murder, mentioned Haitovs’name in the
lead, unequivocally relating them to Mafia.
WHAT IS MAFIA? We talk about the Haitovs and the other dénommé busi-
nessmen of Jewish descent, sporting Russian names, and call them Mafia.
This is just rubbish. Do we have an inkling of what Mafia is? (15 March 2001)
The prevailing theme of the article is nicely presented in the title, and repeated in
the last sentence of the lead: it sets out to define Mafia. The missing “correct” un-
derstanding of Mafia is contrasted with the entrenched idea of what “we” mean
by Mafia: “the dénommé businessmen of Jewish descent, sporting Russian
names”, father and son Haitov serving as an example. In the lead of the other arti-
cle, one notices that once again the two murders are mentioned in the context of
general discussion about Mafia. No arguments, no proofs are presented. Haitovs’
affiliation to Mafia is regarded as an obvious fact.
WHY DO WE LIKE MAFIOSI? It is a catastrophe when in one family father
and son die within one year, a 9-year boy deprived of father and grandfather,
in a series of related dramatic events. For the Haitov family it’s a tragedy. For
someone else, it is a standard solution to a problem. For media, the unsolved
murder cases are just means to boost circulation and gain profit. For the pub-
lic it provides interesting reading material. It’s like a soap opera. (15 March
2001)
The topic re-appeared in the newspaper again in August, when two suspects were
arrested and charged with murder.
POLICE CAUGHT SUSPECTS OF VITALI HAITOV’S MURDER. (3 August
2001)
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LITHUANIAN NEWSPAPER: SUSPECTS OF VITALI HAITOV’S MURDER
ARE PERMANENT RESIDENTS OF LITHUANIA (7 August 2001)
HAITOV’S MURDERER WAS CHARGED WITH CRIME (9 August 2001)
Eventually, the motive for both homicides was claimed to be the stock of the Rus-
sian language newspaper Estonija:
ESTONIJA’S SHARES PROVIDE MOTIVE FOR HAITOVS’ DEATHS (24
August 2001)
Estonija’s stock was acquired by Gennadi Ever, a local politician, and member of
a political party associated with the Russian-speaking population. Due to Ever’s
personality, the murder was again linked with organised crime. Being the one
who benefited from Haitovs’murders, Ever was implicitly accused by the news-
paper long before he was officially charged. In two articles focusing on Ever’s
background, his ethnic roots were especially stressed. In both cases, Ever’s na-
tionality was revealed already in the headline.
GENNADI EVER ALIAS GENNADI GRIGORJAN - UNOFFICIAL BIO-
GRAPHY (24 August 2001)
TRANSITION FROM SHISH KEBAB BAR TO SEAT OF MEMBER IN THE
CITY COUNCIL (20 September 2001)
The first headline tells the reader the “authentic” name of Gennadi Ever. One
learns that Ever comes from Armenia. The second title reveals how Ever started
his career. The shish kebab bars in Estonia are often operated and visited by
Georgians, Armenians, or Azerbaijanis. As a rule, the places are small, far from
resplendent, and tend to have a shady reputation. The reference to a person work-
ing in a shish kebab bar is likely to produce an association of a fishy stranger.
Later Gennadi Ever was arrested as a suspect in Haitov’s death, but was even-
tually released. Ever’s arrest was used as a proof of what the newspaper had ear-
lier called “Pihl’s exceptional statement about the involvement of organised
crime in politics” (“Underworld fastens its grip”, 24 May 2001).
IS THE CONNECTION OF UNDERWORLD WITH POLITICS NOW
PROVED? (20 September 2001)
Thus Haitovs’ deaths and the subsequent events are linked to another series of
publications, the analysis of which is necessary if we wish to understand how the
meaning of “organised crime” is created.
“Carcinoma is growing deeper”: statement of Director of Security
Police on organised crime
The series started with the publication of a full-length analytical paper by the Di-
rector of the Estonian Security Police, Jüri Pihl, titled “Security Risks Jeopardise
Economy and Businesses”. The article is uncommonly long (over 3,000 words)
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for newspaper format. The style and structure of the article are also unusual. The
paper was prepared to be delivered at the Conference on Security of Enterprise,
held in Pärnu, Estonia 3–4 May 2001. The newspaper, however, provided a spe-
cific angle to its publication:
JÜRI PIHL’S REPORT ON INVOLVEMENT OF CRIME IN POLITICS. (24
May 2003)
Pihl’s paper mainly deals with organised crime in Estonia as a security risk. It
discusses many aspects of organised crime like drug trafficking, smuggling of al-
cohol, tobacco and oil products. It also discusses corruption, the investments of
organised crime in legal economy and white-collar crime, political corruption,
and money laundering. Due to its format, the paper itself will not be discussed
here. However, the title of the publication was chosen by the newspaper with a
specific purpose in mind, and therefore deserves closer attention. Involvement of
organised crime in politics was the only theme (accounting for only 12% of the
space of the report) the daily picked from several possible alternatives. Fol-
low-ups on Pihl’s paper mostly discussed the seriousness of the given problem
and the correctness of Pihl’s claims. They, too, were solely concerned with the
involvement of organised crime in politics. Later that year, however, on 13 Sep-
tember 2001, in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the USA, an-
other part of Pihl’s report was published: his evaluation of the risk of terrorism
threat in Estonia.
Here is the heading and lead of the Päevaleht editorial published on the same
day as the first report:
UNDERWORLD PENETRATES DEEPER. The development of the criminal
world and the society have progressed neck and neck. This cancer spreads
deeper and wider, the proof to it being Jüri Pihl’s sensational statement in to-
day’s Eesti Päevaleht, boiling down to the plain assertion that the criminal
world has penetrated into politics of Estonia. (24 May 2001)
Since the article is an editorial, the first in a chain of publications, it will be ana-
lysed in greater detail. Its topics are presented as follows (arranged in chronolog-
ical order)
1. Organised crime emerged in 1980s; at that time, its main business was racket
2. Estonia re-gained independence, legislation and economy were put in place
3. Organised crime accommodated itself to the new economy due to loopholes
and lacunae in legislation
4. Organised crime attained its financial objectives, developing a smoothly op-
erating system
5. Some prominent businessmen became cover-ups (puppets whose function
was only nominal, to cover someone else’s activities—“tankist” in Estonian)
for organised crime
6. The need for corruption emerged for OC to function
7. Criminal world took one step further: penetration into politics
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8. Penetration into politics was effected through politicians, active in financing
9. The emergence of criminals on political scene jeopardised constitutional order
10. The linkage of organised crime and politics undermined Estonia’s credibil-
ity abroad
11. Possibility of sudden changes and the consequent uncertainty reduced the
flow of foreign investments
12. Instability started to endanger the joining of Estonia to Western economical
and security structures
Organised crime as presented here by using the expression “criminal world” sug-
gests the size and complexity of the phenomenon. Again, “otherness” is accentu-
ated: “our” society is contrasted with the criminal world. The editorial is built as
an overview of the history of organised crime in Estonia. Basically, it says that
organised crime has succeeded in getting the upper hand in all sectors of social
life, and has now come close to the top—the level of politics. Especially interest-
ing are topics 9–12, focusing on threats organised crime poses to Estonia. Of the
four suggested consequences, three deal with Estonia’s reputation abroad, rather
than with domestic issues. A similar tendency was noted by Lagerspetz (1996,
122–124) when analysing the Estonian prostitution debate in 1993–1994: exten-
sive references to international policies and practices were made, the West Euro-
pean ones being the standard against which Estonian practices were validated.
The follow-ups to Pihl’s report and the editorial, presenting the said report,
were mostly worried about the volatility of the situation. The following headline,
for example, stresses the same idea of the force and power of organised crime:
JÜRI PIHL WARNS: UNDERWORLD FORCIBLY THRUSTS INTO POLI-
TICS (24 May 2001)
The danger exuding from organised crime is added preponderance by the use of
war rhetoric and cancer metaphors. However, the main emphasis is laid on the
source of the information. The importance of the “organised crime in politics”
message is stressed by the authority of the Director of Security Police. A selec-
tive extract from a conference paper is called a “sensational statement” in order
to emphasise the extraordinariness of the information. The news carry the mes-
sage that Pihl’s position authorises him to warn this country about the impending
threat. Pihl’s competence is stressed in the following story, in particular:
MYTHS AND MAFIA STORIES. Tony Soprano and Vito Corleone are the em-
bodiments of the Evil on Earth. But they are artificial, fiction, the common
fantasy of media and writers - film directors. Jüri Pihl is real. The dangers
spelled by him are not fictitious. He is the Chief of Intelligence in a real coun-
try. When a high official like him makes a statement, society should take it se-
riously.
In today’s Eesti Päevaleht Pihl states that criminal underworld has pene-
trated into Estonian politics.
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If it had been said by somebody (e.g. the proverbial Auntie M.) calling the
Vikerraadio phone talk show, it would have sounded like grumbling of a stupid
woman. But since it (a well-known fact by itself) is announced by the head of se-
curity police, we should pay close attention and think what he means by it.
The head of Security Police is not the press guru Daddy Jannsen from the 19th
C, whose ambition was to tell educating stories to the common people. …(24
May 2001)
The importance of Pihl’s statement is emphasised three times. Comparison be-
tween fictional characters and the chief of security police gives particular promi-
nence to realism. Contrasting the annoyingly stupid talk of Auntie M. and the
facts provided by a high ranking police expert accentuate the truthfulness of the
story. The third contrast to the tales of Daddy Jannsen underlines that the said in-
formation should be taken seriously. Thus the article conveys the message that
the involvement of organised crime in politics is a real, true and serious threat, by
no means vicarious or virtual.
Similarly to the series of articles described above, one will not find the word
“corruption” here. Originally, Pihl never used that term in respect of politics in
Estonia. In his paper, “corruption” is applied to cases where organised criminals
establish contact with clerks (officials). He distinguishes two types of corrup-
tion: On the one hand, there is “direct corruption” meaning arrangements be-
tween the clerks (officials) and the criminals or their close relatives in order to
give some companies unfair advantage over others. On the other hand, “collu-
sion with officials” facilitates tax evasion (tax fraud) or smuggling.
However, when politicians are engaged in similar practices with similar
goals of unjust enrichment, it seems not to be corruption any more, but rather
“involvement of organised crime in politics”, or that is at least how the news-
paper presents the issue:
UNDERWORLD HAS CHANGED SWEAT SUITS TO BUSINESS SHIRT. (21
May 2001)
UNDERWORLD IN POLITICS (20 September 2001)
In sum, the series of publications on Jüri Pihl’s report assert that organised crime
in Estonia has reached a new level of development. That level, involvement in
politics, is considered to be extremely dangerous, especially in the context of Es-
tonia’s integration into Europe. By not using the term “corruption”, emphasis
and responsibility are shifted towards organised crime, while the Estonian politi-
cal scene remains an innocent victim, unawarely caught in the turmoil. There are
striking similarities in the way the alleged criminal connections of the Mayor of
Tallinn, and the general issue of politicians and organised crime are presented.
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Conclusion: Organised crime and criminals in media
In all three series of publications there are common features that help to recon-
struct the meaning of organised crime and criminals in Estonian media. Firstly,
organised crime is presented as a dangerous phenomenon that exists and devel-
ops on its own, parallel to the development of the Estonian society. The phenom-
enon is presented as existing outside the society and state, somewhere in the
“twilight zone”. This is done by using war metaphors (words like involvement,
penetration, underworld etc) on the one hand, and metaphors of fatal sickness on
the other (cancer developing metastases). Such presentation of organised crime
highlights its dangerousness. The seriousness of the danger is then accentuated
by using high ranking officials as sources of reference. To put it in a nutshell: or-
ganised crime is an extremely dangerous phenomenon that threatens Estonian
society from the outside.
Secondly, the concept of organised crime is extremely vague. It is presented in
general terms. The existence of organised crime, or rather of some large criminal
organisation, is taken for granted. For example, when talking about “underworld
in politics”, “director of underworld-related Russian Cultural Centre”, “Mafia”
or a “representative of organised crime”, one tacitly presumes that all those activ-
ities are well-orchestrated. However, no organisation, nor its activities are de-
scribed. The accusations levelled against a given person are not conclusive, but
confined to castigating him for being “affiliated” to the said organisation.
Thirdly, the notion of organised crime and criminals is strongly connected to
the ethnic background of the latter. Even when the context of ethnic background
is not explicitly voiced, as for example in the paper by the Director of the Board
of Security Police, implications of such context are slid in by the newspaper. Dis-
cussions on Ever’s personality with reference to Pihl’s statement about organised
crime, or the prevailing self-explanatory “knowledge” that Mafia consists of
“Russian speaking businessmen of Jewish origin” are just a few examples. Peo-
ple with a familiar ethnic and cultural background are considered “one of us” and
perceived as businessmen (e.g. Meelis Lao), while others are more likely to be
organised criminals (e.g. Haitov, Ever).
In legal discourse, organised crime is defined as criminal activities, but the
mass media defines it as a big and vague organisation or a network based on kin-
ship ties. These ties are based on common ethno-cultural background. In litera-
ture this kind of model of organised crime is called an alien conspiracy model,
which in Paddy Rawlinson’s (2002) opinion reduces the complex situation to
simplistic dichotomies which identify the problem as “outside” and “other”.
Such a model and construction of Russians as dangerous strangers may harm the
process of integration of the Estonian society. According to Rawlinson (ibid),
such a model is also supported by large international bodies. US and EU officials
target Russian organised crime as a high-level threat to Estonia. Owing to such
prioritisation, the limited resources of the Estonian criminal justice system are
invested in tightening the Estonian-Russian border, while other problematic ar-
eas, such as trade in steroids and amphetamines run by Finnish dealers and local
Estonians, have been left without proper attention.
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The Last Resort in Action: Initiatives to stop
the diffusion of white-collar crime and
corruption in transitional countries
Anna Markovska1 and Dmitriy Nochvay2
Abstract
This paper considers the feasibility of reducing the diffusion of white-collar
crime and corruption in emerging markets by strengthening the international fi-
nancial regulation regime. The authors analyse recent changes in legislation pro-
vided by the international and national regulatory systems, such as FATF and
OECD, and evaluate the dialogue and co-operation between developed and
emerging markets in handling this problem. As a case study the authors outline
the Ukrainian experience with policing white-collar crime, including the help it
has received from the international community, and assess the results of this col-
laboration.
Introduction
Over the last ten years a lot of studies have been published discussing the prob-
lems experienced by transitional countries (Fleming, Chu, Bakker 1996; Shelley
2000). A number of studies have concentrated on corruption and its impact on
the development of the emerging markets (for the discussion of the so-called re-
lationship banking see Siegelbaum, 1997; highly politicised process of loan is-
suing discussed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
& World Bank, 2001; for the case study of corruption in Ukraine see
Markovskaya, Pridemore, Nakajima, 2003). All transitional countries aim to
achieve sustained economic development and to establish transparent financial
institutions to allocate resources and provide productivity enhancing invest-
ments. While almost all transitional countries have underdeveloped financial
markets (Claessens, Djankov, Klingebiel 2000; Coffee 2001), it seems that the
countries experiencing problems with political and judicial reforms tend to have
a very low level of major financial indicators (De Melo, Denizer, Gelb, Tenev
1997).
Following the recent events and continuous threat of international terrorism,
the global financial community has become increasingly worried about the ef-
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fectiveness of financial supervision and financial policing. The USA legislation
regulating the financial sphere has experienced dramatic changes. The Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot Act) of 2001 imposed strict rules
on US and foreign banks and financial institutions (Alexander 2002). A number
of countries and international organisations, such as FATF and OECD have in-
troduced new regulations to address the issues of international financial control
and corruption of foreign state officials. Different projects have been organised
in attempt to help transitional countries. For example, in February 2003, the Eu-
ropean Commission and Council of Europe Against Money Laundering in
Ukraine (MOLI-UA) launched a project aiming to support the efforts of Ukraine
in establishing a fully functioning system against money laundering.
Understanding the difficulties experienced by transitional countries in fight-
ing corruption, how feasible is it to expect that countries such as Ukraine can
comply with the new rules? How easy is it to transfer the laws and regulations
adopted by one country to another, and not to be delusioned by the results? These
questions present a serious problem to the outside world. This is partly caused by
the political sensitivity of the issue.
In this paper the present authors attempt to provide a basis for discussing the
impact of the requirements of the international financial regulations on the devel-
opment of the financial system in transitional economies such as Ukraine.
The paper starts with a brief introduction to the banking system in Ukraine,
then discusses the recent changes in the international financial regulation, and
the attempts of the Ukrainian authorities to comply with the changes.
A brief overview of the banking system in Ukraine
During the Soviet time, savings were allocated through government’s budget and
a largely passive banking system. In 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the establishment of the independent state, Ukraine decided to use the bank-
ing industry as a tool to allocate resources to help advances in the economy. The
banking system in Ukraine consists of the Central Bank—the National Bank of
Ukraine, with its functions of monetary policy and banking supervision, and of
commercial banks. The adaptation of the new approach towards banking al-
lowed Ukraine to increase the number of banks from only a few in 1989 to more
than 70 in 1991, and 230 in 1995 (National Bank of Ukraine 2003)3. However,
rising quantity was not followed by improved quality. The creation of the ‘new
banking’mechanism manifested itself in an extremely liberal policy adopted by
the Central Bank of Ukraine.
Many new private banks were established by enterprises and functioned as
pocket banks (Kurkchiyan 2000; Siegelbaum 1997; World Bank 1999). Ukrai-
nian banks failed to play the role of a major mediator enhancing long-term in-
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3 To understand such a sharp rise in the number of banks one has to bear in mind not only the pure economic factors, but
also the cultural ones. For the rich living in a transitional society, it is ‘cool’ to own a bank. Secondly, it is an undeniable
fact that “the best way to rob a bank is to own one” (Calavita, Pontell, Tillman 1997, 58).
vestments. A study conducted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development in 1997 suggests that only 5% of the active enterprises succeeded
in obtaining loans from the financial sector (Siegelbaum, 1997).
From 1995 to 1998 the legislation allowed the opening of anonymous ac-
counts in foreign currency without identifying the beneficial owner. In 1995, the
official view4 was that the legal framework for these accounts was sufficient
enough to provide for anti-money laundering measures. A few years later, the
use of anonymous accounts was banned in Ukraine as a result of the influence of
the international community and ratification of the international treaties by
Ukraine. It is easy to see that the 1990s were marked by the absence of financial
regulation in the country. However, there was an attempt to regulate the financial
sphere. The problem was that banking regulations were constantly changing,
sometimes confusing the users and creating loopholes for the abuse of the system
(purposefully in order to obtain financial gain, or by mistake due to lack of
knowledge).
Transitional literature identifies the following systemic factors which led to
the criminalisation of the banking industry: poor regulation and supervision,
poor accounting and excessive taxation, an inadequate legal infrastructure for
lending, and pervasive corrupt practices coupled with weak banking skills and
mismanagement on a significant scale (Fleming, Chu, Bakker 1996).
The international financial community (in particular, organisations such as
FATF, OECD, the Council of Europe), and recently, the initiatives undertaken by
the United States, have all contributed to the so-called ‘westernisation’ of the
Ukrainian standards of the financial regulation. As a study of the law on corrup-
tion (Markovskaya, Pridemore, Nakajima 2003) suggests, the biggest problem
to address is the enforcement of the ‘Western style’ financial regime.
The following sections deal with the developments in the international finan-
cial regulations and identify the changes these developments brought to the regu-
lation of Ukrainian banking.
The Patriot Act: international response to terrorism and
its implications for international financial regulation
USA Patriot Act 2001
The attack on the USA on 11 September dramatically changed the international
approach to dealing with terrorism and its financial aspects. The US Government
has adopted extraterritorial financial controls on foreign banking and financial
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4 Presidential Decree issued in August 1995 allowed the use of anonymous accounts in foreign currency. The idea be-
hind the degree was that it would help liberalising the foreign currency market and improve the investment situation, so
that grey money would leave ‘grey economy’ and be legalised. With the Ratification of the Council of Europe conven-
tion in 1990, Ukraine had to adapt measures to prevent the use of anonymous accounts, and that is why in July 1998 the
President issued a decree “On some issues of the banking secrecy”, prohibiting the opening and use of anonymous ac-
counts. However, the National Bank of Ukraine adopted the instruction (Instruction No. 469, 9 October 1998) on the
rules and functioning of the so-called coded accounts, where the owner of the account could restrict the number of peo-
ple aware of the existence of the account, although the rules did allow the identification of the owner to the official au-
thority in case of criminal investigation. In March 1991 National Bank of Ukraine revoked the Instruction No. 469.
institutions that facilitate transactions with, or assist designated terrorist groups.
In October 2001, the US Congress enacted legislation entitled ‘the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism’ (the Patriot Act 2001). Title III of the Patriot Act deals
with the International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Fi-
nancing Act of 2001. It concerns US and foreign banks and financial institutions.
Among the other provisions, Title III provides authority to take targeted action
against countries, institutions, transactions, or types of accounts that the Secre-
tary of the Treasury finds to be of prime money-laundering concern. It contains
high standards of due diligence for inter-bank correspondent accounts and pay-
able-through accounts opened at US financial institutions by foreign offshore
banks and banks in jurisdictions that have failed to comply with international
anti-money-laundering standards (Alexander, 2002).
Provisions of US Executive Order 13224 on 24 September 2001 together with
the USA Patriot Act impose extra-territorial jurisdiction on foreign banks, com-
panies and individuals who conduct, facilitate or assist transactions involving
US-designated terrorist organisations and provides a framework to establish a
set of new reporting requirements and due diligence standards for US and for-
eign financial institutions designed to combat international money laundering
and to stop terrorist financing (Alexander 2002).
Title III of the Patriot Act is called the International Money Laundering
Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001. It contains the major pro-
visions addressing not only US banks and financial institutions, but foreign fi-
nancial institutions as well. Section 312 of the Patriot Act requires financial insti-
tutions to establish due diligence programmes for correspondent accounts of for-
eign financial institutions and private banking accounts of “non-US persons”.
With regard to correspondent accounts for foreign banks, the proposed regula-
tion requires that a due diligence programme must: first, assess whether the for-
eign institution presents a significant risk of money laundering; second, consider
information from US government agencies and multinational organisations with
respect to supervision and regulation of the foreign institution; third, review
guidance from the Treasury and federal regulators regarding risk associated with
particular foreign institutions; and fourth, review public information to decide
whether the foreign institution has been the subject of any criminal or regulatory
action relating to money laundering (Alexander 2002). Special attention is given
to certain foreign institutions that operate under licenses issued by countries re-
garded as non-co-operative with international anti-money laundering principles
(i.e. FATF).
With regard to due diligence programmes for private accounts of non-US per-
sons, the proposed regulation requires that such programs must: establish the
identity of all nominal holders and beneficial holders of the accounts, including
information on their lines of business or source of wealth; identify the source of
funds deposited into the account, identify whether any holder may be a ‘senior
political figure’(if it is established that account holder is a senior political official
further due diligence is required), and report any known or suspected violation of
law conducted through or involving the account (Alexander 2002).
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The due diligence regulation is believed to be the ‘further-reaching’ regula-
tion issued under the Title III (Gimbert 2002). If suspicious financial transac-
tions are discovered, the institutions must report to federal law enforcement
agencies and the Treasury. The reports are then entered into a confidential data-
base. The FBI uses this database to create a list of suspicious persons and bodies,
which is available to all financial institutions.
Section 313 (a) of the Patriot Act prohibits some financial institutions from
establishing, maintaining, administering or managing correspondent accounts
with foreign banks that have no physical presence in any jurisdiction (known as
‘shell banks’). Section 315 entitled ‘Inclusion of foreign corruption offences as
money laundering crimes’ recognises bribery and other foreign corruption of-
fences as unlawful manifestations of money laundering.
The definition of financial institutions is expended to include foreign banks or
other financial institutions operating outside the USA (Alexander 2002). The
regulations issued by the Department of Treasury determine the financial institu-
tions subject to anti-money-laundering laws. New regulations also apply to con-
centration accounts to prevent the financial institution’s customers from anony-
mously directing funds into or through these accounts.
Section 326 of the Patriot Act sets up the following rules: “all financial institu-
tions must have a Customer Identification Program detailing its Identity Verifi-
cation Program; all new accounts need to be screened against the OFAC and
other published lists of suspected terrorists and terrorist organisation; any docu-
ments used to identify the new account holder, such as, driver license, passport,
social security card, etc, need to be verified against a third party database to de-
termine that the identity is valid to extent reasonable and practicable; a database
of all accounts needs to be maintained that includes the account name, date of ac-
count opening, identifying information presented, and the items used to verify
the identity. This information needs to be time and date stamped and maintained
for 5 years following the closure of the accounts” (Penley 2002). A new obliga-
tion to identify the ‘foreign beneficial owners’of certain accounts at US financial
institutions may in some jurisdictions lead to conflicts with the privacy protec-
tion provisions.
Section 311 of the Patriot Act gives the Secretary of the Treasury the authority
to designate a foreign jurisdiction, a foreign financial institution, or a type of ac-
count or transaction as a primary money laundering concern. Once designated,
the secretary can require U. S. financial institutions to take appropriate counter-
measures. In December of 2002, Treasury made the first designations under Sec-
tion 311, identifying both Nauru and Ukraine as primary money laundering con-
cerns. However, as a result of the important steps undertaken by Ukraine to ad-
dress deficiencies in anti-money laundering legislation, the Treasury Depart-
ment announced on 15 April that it had rescinded the designation of Ukraine as a
primary money laundering concern pursuant to Section 311 of the USA Patriot
Act.
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The international response
The USA initiatives to strengthen anti-money laundering control has been re-
garded as highly controversial, but long-awaited in terms of establishing
world-wide understanding of the danger of the abuse of financial institutions.
The Patriot Act 2000 received a wide international response. Below are just a few
examples of the consequent initiatives, undertaken by two international organi-
sations, United Nations and FATF, and one country, the UK.
The United Nations adopted resolution 1373 which identifies some extra
measures that need to be taken into account to prevent future terrorist acts. In Ar-
ticle 2 (c) it is stated that countries are required to prevent and suppress the fi-
nancing of terrorist acts and to refrain from providing any type of support, active
or passive, for terrorists and to deny safe haven to those who finance, plan or par-
ticipate in terrorist acts.
FATF issued “Special Recommendations” on terrorist financing to establish
the basic framework for detecting, preventing and suppressing the financing of
terrorism and terrorist acts. Special recommendation II asks each country to
criminalise the financing of terrorism and associated money laundering. Alexan-
der (2002, 320) writes that “The ‘Special Recommendations’supplement and re-
inforce the measures already adopted by the UN and create a more comprehen-
sive international regime for interdicting the financing and commercial support
of terrorists and terrorist activities.”
The UK Government adopted a number of measures to combat the financing
of terrorism. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Amendments to the Terrorism
Act 2000 adopted in November 2001 create new offences, including offences of
international terrorism, stipulating that it is illegal for a person to solicit, or to re-
ceive, money or property on behalf of terrorists if the person knows or has reason-
able cause to suspect that such money may be used for the purpose of terrorism.
It is difficult to predict the implications of these new rules for the developing
nations. What is clear is that financially advanced countries such as USA and UK
take the issue of the abuse of financial system very seriously, and that they are
willing to impose a set of strict regulations allowing the financial system to iden-
tify the terrorist finances at a very early stage. It is also important to remember
that corruption of foreign state officials is now considered an offence by the US
legislators. In countries where corruption is endemic these changes can cause a
lot of difficulties.
Financial stability in emerging financial markets:
Ukraine at the international agenda
FATF black list: the image of Ukraine
On 7 September 2001, FATF added Ukraine to the list of non-co-operative juris-
dictions. Non-cooperative jurisdictions are those, which have not made adequate
progress in addressing the serious deficiencies in anti-money laundering legisla-
tion identified by the FATF. In September 2001, Ukraine was deemed to meet the
following FATF criteria: 4, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 23, 24, and 25. These criteria de-
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scribed are: (4) existence of anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously ficti-
tious names; (8) secrecy provisions which can be invoked against, but not lifted
by competent administrative authorities in the context of inquires concerning
money-laundering; (10) absence of an efficient mandatory system for reporting
suspicious transactions to a competent authority, provided that such a system
aims to detect and prosecute money laundering; (11) lack of monitoring and
criminal or administrative sanctions in respect to the obligation to report suspi-
cious or unusual transactions; (14) regulatory or other systems which allow fi-
nancial institutions to carry out financial business where the beneficial owner(s)
of transaction is unknown, or is represented by an intermediary who refuses to
divulge that information, without informing the competent authorities; (15) laws
or regulations prohibiting international exchange of information between ad-
ministrative anti-money laundering authorities or not granting clear gateways or
subjecting exchange of information to unduly restrictive conditions; (16) pro-
hibiting relevant administrative authorities to conduct investigations or inquiries
on behalf of, or for account of their foreign counterparts; (23) failure to provide
the administrative and judicial authorities with the necessary financial, human or
technical resources to exercise their functions or to conduct their investigations;
(24) inadequate or corrupt professional staff in either governmental, judicial or
supervisory authorities or among those responsible for anti-money laundering
compliance in the financial services industry; (25) lack of centralised unit (i.e., a
financial intelligence unit) or of an equivalent mechanism for the collection,
analysis and dissemination of suspicious transactions information to competent
authorities (FATF 2000).
FATF criterion 11, lack of monitoring and criminal or administrative sanc-
tions in respect to the obligation to report suspicious or unusual transactions,
needs to be explained in greater detail. According to Article 64 of the Law on
Banks and Banking Activities, banks are required to identify persons involved in
substantial or suspicious transactions. Pursuant to the law, the threshold for a
substantial transaction is 50,000 euros, and in cash transactions 10,000 euros.
Suspicious transactions are defined to have the following characteristics: (1) car-
ried out in an unusual or unjustifiably complicated conditions; (2) are not eco-
nomically justified or are against the legislation of Ukraine. Some Ukrainian re-
searchers (Neelov, 2001) argued that observing the law would mean that a major
part of transactions of legal and physical persons undertaken in Ukraine would
have to be reported.
Arguments did not help. Ukraine was given till the completion of the third
round of the FATF’s evaluation to work on the serious deficiencies identified.
Otherwise if would have to face FATF’s counter measures.
The deficiencies relate to problems on various areas: financial regulations, in-
ternational co-operation, and recourses available to finance public and private
sector. The last-mentioned obviously derives from the poor state of the economy
and state budget deficit. It has to do with the general lack of resources, while the
other problems tend to be characterised by the lack of political will in the coun-
try. For example, the draft law on Anti-Money Laundering legislation was dis-
cussed in the Parliament for almost a year after FATF had identified the problem
and warned Ukraine about possible sanctions.
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Law of Ukraine on Prevention and Counteraction of Legalisation
(“Laundering”) of the Proceeds from Crime
On 7 December 2002, Ukraine enacted the “Law of Ukraine on Prevention and
Counteraction of Legalisation of the Proceeds from Crime”. According to the
FATF, this legislation did not, however, address the main deficiencies detected in
2001 during FATF’s anti-money laundering review in Ukraine. In mid-Decem-
ber 2002, Members of the FATF decided to impose counter measures on
Ukraine. Then on 14 February 2003, the FATF informed: “FATF members have
decided to withdraw the application of additional counter-measures with respect
to Ukraine as the result of a recent enactment by Ukraine of comprehensive
anti-money laundering legislation that addresses the main deficiencies identified
by FATF in 2001 and reaffirmed in December 2002. Ukraine will remain on the
list on NCCTS until it has implemented effectively its new anti-money launder-
ing legislation” (FATF 2003, downloaded from http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/
FATF withdraws counter measures with respect to Ukraine, 14 February, 2003).
As it was already mentioned, Ukrainian Parliament discussed the draft law for
more than a year. The law was finally approved by the Parliament and signed by
the President only a couple of weeks before the FATF’s deadline in December
2002. This law consists of 16 articles, described under 6 sections. Section I: The
General Provisions consists of three articles: Article 1 provides definitions, Arti-
cle 2 gives an account of activities related to money laundering, and Article 3 de-
scribes the scope of the law. According to Article 1, the primary definitions are:
profit, illegal activity which leads to money laundering, money laundering, types
of financial activity, compulsory financial monitoring, and local (internal) finan-
cial monitoring. Profit is defined as any economic advantage criminally acquired
and then legalised; profit shall mean money or securities, movable and immov-
able property, property rights, any other items covered by property rights. Illegal
activity which is followed by money laundering shall mean activity which ac-
cording to the Criminal Code will lead to three or more years imprisonment or
activity which is considered to be criminal according to the criminal code of an-
other country (and the same activity is prohibited under the Criminal Code of
Ukraine), and as a result of which the profit is illegally obtained. Financial trans-
action shall mean any transaction aimed at making or assisting in transaction by
means of: bank account transaction; foreign currency exchange; assisting in is-
suing, buying or selling of securities; giving or receiving a credit; insurance (re-
insurance); giving or receiving financial guarantees; managing the securities
portfolio; issuing a state or other money lottery; assisting in issuing, buying or
selling of securities, payments, postal cash transaction or other means of pay-
ment; opening an account. Section II describes the system of financial monitor-
ing in Ukraine. Article 4 of the Section II identifies two levels of financial moni-
toring in the country: primary and state. The primary financial monitoring units
are: commercial banks, insurance and other financial institutions, agencies
authorised to receive, pay and transfer money; commodity or stock or other ex-
changes; professional players at the securities market; investment trusts; com-
missions shops, gaming houses and organisations which hold lotteries of any
kind; post offices, telegraph offices and legal entities that provide, in conformity
with the law, services of receiving, paying, conveying, transferring money or
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management of investment funds or non-state pension funds. The state financial
monitoring units are represented by governmental agencies and the National
Bank of Ukraine, and authorised under the law to regulate and monitor financial
operations. Article 5 describes tasks and duties of the primary financial monitor-
ing agencies. These duties include identification of the initiator of a financial
transaction, detection and registration of any doubtful transactions, reporting fi-
nancial transaction under financial monitoring to a special unit (reporting shall
occur not later than three days from the day of transaction registration); assisting
the special financial monitoring units in the financial transaction analysis; at re-
quest of the financial monitoring agencies provide additional information re-
garding a particular financial transaction, even if this information constitutes
banking and commercial secret (information shall be provided no later than three
days after the request is received); keep the financial monitoring in secret from
the client. The primary financial monitoring units shall keep the file of identifica-
tion of the initiator of a financial transaction under financial monitoring for five
years. Article 6 states the details of the information used to identify physical and
legal persons, including residents and non-residents of Ukraine. According to
Article 6, identification is not necessary if the transaction is initiated by someone
who has already been identified before. Article 7 gives a right to the financial in-
stitutions to refuse financial transaction. Article 10 identifies the duties of the
state financial monitoring agencies, such as the National Bank of Ukraine and
the authorised bodies, to control that the primary financial monitoring institu-
tions act in compliance with the obligations prescribed by the law, and to inform
a special unit of the violations discovered by financial operators.
Section III describes the financial operations subjected to compulsory and in-
ternal financial monitoring. Article 11 states that a financial operation is subject
to control if its value equals to or is more than Hrv 300,0005, or if its value in for-
eign currency equals or is more than Hrv 300,000, or in case of a cash transac-
tion, if its value equals or is more than Hrv 100,000, or if its value in foreign cur-
rency equals or is more than Hrv 100,000, and if the financial transaction has one
of the following characteristics: payment is due to be made to an anonymous ac-
count abroad or is due to be received from an anonymous account abroad, and if
the payment is due to be made to a financial institution situated in a country listed
by the Cabinet of Ministers as off-shore zone; buying or selling travel cheques or
other means of payment; financial transactions conducted with countries which
do not co-operate with international organisations tackling money-laundering;
transfer of money abroad with the purpose that the receiver receives the money in
cash; opening account to a third person; foreign transfers conducted despite the
absence of a foreign trade agreement between the parties involved; cash pay-
ments for securities purchased; lottery or casino payments; foreign currency ex-
change.
According to Article 12, financial operations shall be monitored if they are
unnecessarily complex, or the information obtained cannot be checked (for ex-
ample, changes made by one of the parties in regard to money re-allocation, etc.);
182
5 £1=Hrv 8.45 as on 15 December 2002, The National Bank of Ukraine exchange rates.
if the financial operation does not correspond with the business activity of the cli-
ent described in related documentation; if there is a reason to suspect that the cli-
ent has conducted financial operations to avoid financial monitoring. Section IV
states the tasks, functions and duties of the authorised authority.
Section V of this law is of particular importance to this research because it
aims to regulate international co-operation in regard to the anti-money launder-
ing measures. Article 15 identifies the grounds for and forms of international
co-operation for prevention and counteraction of legalisation (laundering) of the
proceeds from crime and terrorism financing. The article states that international
co-operation for the prevention and counteraction of legalisation (laundering) of
the proceeds from crime and terrorism financing shall be based on the Conven-
tion on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from
Crime (1990) and other international treaties of Ukraine, this Law and other
Ukrainian laws and regulations. Refusal and postponement of co-operation shall
be handled on the grounds and in the manner prescribed by the Convention on
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime
(1990).
Article 16 describes the agencies involved in international co-operation. Ac-
cording to Article 16, the central agencies to carry out international co-operation
for the prevention and counteraction of legalisation (laundering) of the proceeds
from crime shall be the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine with regard to judicial de-
cisions, and the Office of Prosecutor General of Ukraine with regard to investi-
gating criminal cases. The information or evidence provided by the said agencies
within the framework of international co-operation for the prevention and coun-
teraction of legalisation (laundering) of the proceeds from crime shall not be
used by authorities of a foreign state for the purposes of investigation or judicial
proceedings not mentioned in the judicial request, without a prior consent of the
Ministry of Justice of Ukraine or the Office of Prosecutor General of Ukraine.
The authorised agency shall co-operate with appropriate authorities of foreign
states for the purpose of exchanging information on legalisation (laundering) of
the profits, shall co-operate with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and
other international organisations aiming to prevent and counteract the legalisa-
tion (laundering) of the profits. Section VI states the consequences of breaching
this law.
The adoption of the above-described legislation is considered to be a very im-
portant step towards international co-operation in fighting money laundering.
Discussion
The above-described law can be regarded as a victory of the international com-
munity, and FATF in particular. Without pressure from the international commu-
nity, the adoption of this law in Ukraine would not have been possible. However,
there are still deficiencies to be addressed to ‘clear’ the country’s name.
Despite the achievements made in the area of international financial regula-
tion, some researchers argue that international pressure is not always good (Por-
ter 2001; Ward 2002). Common tendencies can be observed by considering in-
ternational organisations dealing with financial regulation. These organisations
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tend to represent a number of developed countries that get together and establish
new regulatory arrangements which are then imposed on emerging markets.
Concerns have also been voiced about the democratic principles involved in an
international attempt to regulate the globalised financial services. There is a ten-
dency to exclude developing countries from the international collaboration. Por-
ter (2002) argues that the Basle Committee’s bank regulations do not match the
needs of the microfinance industry in developing countries. Ward (2002, 4)
criticises the New Basel Accord, stressing the differences between countries and
arguing that if “the New Accord is implemented without major adjustments it is
likely to fail in developing countries”. Ward (2002, 4) provides reasons for this:
“greater macroeconomic volatility, greater volatility of external flows and
greater vulnerability to external stocks, weak institutions, and lack of skills in de-
veloping markets.”
It is important to address the special character, and social and cultural tradi-
tions of each individual country when attempting to impose regulations or laws
borrowed from another country. Discussing this aspect of the international finan-
cial regulation, Rider (2002) argues that while it is understandable that leaders
and politicians wish to develop ways to fight organised crime worldwide, it is by
no means sensible to transport the laws and legal procedures of one jurisdiction
to the legal system of another (at least not without adaptation). “The need to es-
tablish a convincing and workable balance is all the more important in the con-
text of small, developing and transitional economies. These highly vulnerable
states may well find themselves effectively deprived of the advantages and ser-
vices of those more developed and stable countries that are able to espouse the
sort of measures found in legislation such as the Patriot Act” (Rider 2002).
It is important to understand the complexity of international standards and
regulations. Developing countries often face an interesting dilemma: If they do
not implement the international standards, they will perhaps be punished. If they
do implement them, they may face the risk of wasting resources, and sometimes
extend the roots of corruption (Rider 2002; Porter 2002). Following the interna-
tional pressure, Ukraine will shortly introduce the new structure for financial su-
pervision that stresses the role of financial supervisors. Ward (2002) warns that
supervision is a difficult issue in advanced financial markets, because it, among
other things, involves personal relationships. The National Bank of Ukraine as
the main supervisory body of the country has to try to create a transparent frame-
work for supervision that guarantees equal treatment to all financial institutions.
That is why the Financial Service Intelligence Unit, the foundation of which was
suggested by the President of Ukraine in January 2002, has to be an independent
body. Otherwise, there is a great danger that another corrupt unit will be created
inside the already corrupt structure. If, as suggested, the Financial Service Intel-
ligence unit will be established as an internal structure managed by the Ministry
of Finance, it will be subjected to direct political influence and political supervi-
sion. In this case, the equality of treatment of the financial institutions in the
country will remain problematic. The Financial Intelligence Unit should thus not
be a punitive organisation, but a preventative one capable of providing examples
of best practices.
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Concerns about imposing the standards provided by a group of countries with
advanced economies have been voiced before the attack on America and subse-
quent changes in legislation (Porter 2001). It seems as if the critical discussion of
the role of the authoritative supranational decision-making has been postponed
to more peaceful times. It is also difficult to provide an answer to the following
questions: will the strengthening of the international financial regulation lead to
better/faster response from the Ukrainian officials? If not, what measures should
be provided to insure the enforcement?
Despite the criticism towards the approach adopted by the USA authorities,
one thing is obvious: for a country where corruption is endemic, and where the fi-
nancial institutions have not been supervised on the basis of transparent and
equal rules, current changes in the international environment can provide an op-
portunity for reforms.
Conclusion
The last two decades of the 20th century witnessed enormous technological ad-
vances. This influenced not only the way the financial market works, but also the
way high profile criminals conduct their business. Adamoli (2001, 187–188) no-
ticed “…just as legal businesses are expanding internationally in response to the
globalisation of market, so are the crime enterprises seeking to develop both their
structures and crime trade internationally in order to gain access to new markets,
taking advantage of the discrepancies between the national legal system”.
If allowed to participate in a modern international financial market system,
emerging financial markets find themselves in an advantaged position: more ex-
perienced financial markets can provide financial and technological assistance.
However, at the same time emerging markets can easily be abused by corrupt of-
ficials, criminals, etc. That is why the primary goal of a democratic government
is to develop the framework for transparency of the financial institutions. Experi-
ence suggests that while some governments are not willing to accept the need for
reforms, others are too eager to reconstruct the financial sector of the country.
That is why it is important to establish international mechanisms to control fi-
nancial institutions in emerging economies. A great number of international or-
ganisations have already been created to carry out functions of supervision by is-
suing recommendations and warnings to non-co-operative jurisdictions. An in-
ternational agreement has been reached as to the policies each country needs to
adopt to provide for laws to confiscate the proceeds from serious crime, or at
least those associated with the illicit trade in drugs, the investigation and inter-
diction of the proceeds from such offences, the criminalisation of money laun-
dering, the reporting of suspicious transactions, the imposition of reporting and
due diligence requirements on those most likely to confront money laundering,
and facilitation of international mutual assistance. However, what still needs to
be considered are the most suitable ways of imposing the new rules on the devel-
oping and emerging markets, that is, to make sure that these markets will not suf-
fer from artificial rules and standards. It needs to be remembered that interna-
tional co-operation in such issues as financial regulations is very complex: if
problems are ignored, there is a chance that a financial monster is created inside
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the emerging financial system. On the other hand, if there is too much pressure, it
is possible that the system is denied an opportunity to develop. However, re-
search also suggest that legal framework without an appropriate enforcement
mechanism can create delusions of reality. In Ukraine, the pressure of interna-
tional financial community is necessary to get rid of corrupt state officials and to
set a framework for good practices. Ukrainian experience suggests that reforms
should start from the financial sector, and be as de-politicised as possible.
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To Counter Effectively Organized Crime
Involvement in Irregular Migration, People
Smuggling and Human Trafficking from
the East. Europe’s Challenges Today.
Robert Oberloher1,
United Nations Interregional Crime and
Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)
Migration is nothing new. On the contrary: we have witnessed constant migra-
tion throughout human history. It is definitely not a crime per se. In recent years,
however, migration has been understood more and more as a global challenge.
The alarming manifestation of irregular (illegal) migration, as well as some spe-
cific interrelated phenomena—most of all people smuggling and trafficking in
human beings—have without any doubt become a crucial security issue. In par-
ticular trafficking in minors and young women for the purpose of sexual exploi-
tation has become an issue of major concern, due to its brutality and rapid expan-
sion during the past decade. These phenomena are increasing and becoming
more transnational in scope and organisation.
Particular concern is caused by the growing link between irregular migration,
people smuggling and human trafficking on the one hand, and Organised Crime
(OC) on the other. We understand that these phenomena are “not a question of a
few isolated cases of border crossing and smuggling—it is a serious organized
crime problem threatening the majority, if not all, developed countries around
the world.”2 The specific danger to the State and society derives from the OC
nexus with the legal world—including the State apparatus and the econ-
omy—through corruption and infiltration.
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1 Dr. Robert F. Oberloher (PhD) is currently responsible at United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research In-
stitute (UNICRI) for Projects focusing on the issue of trafficking in human beings in Eastern and South Eastern Eu-
rope. Disclaimer: the opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the view of UNICRI or the United
Nations. Dr. Oberloher is handing in this paper in his private quality as a researcher and in the framework of the 3rd An-
nual Conference of the European Society of Criminology, 27–30 August 2003, Helsinki.
2 International Criminal Police Review, No.489–490/2001, p. 3.
The OC-Nexus – a dangerous cobweb3
Especially the people smuggling and organised human trafficking from the Bal-
kan and the Baltic areas to Central and Western Europe challenge security in a
complex and comprehensive way. These regions play an important role not only
in terms of the origin of the involved humans but also regarding the major routes
and active crime syndicates. Germany, Austria and Switzerland are definitely
among the favourite destination countries.
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According to national statistics4, citizens from Asia, Russia, the Balkans
(namely Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Moldova and Romania) and the Baltic countries
have in the past few years been continuously present on the list of the 10 national-
ities that dominate illegal migration, people smuggling and human trafficking
into Germany, Austria and Switzerland. According to IOM (2001), the Ukrai-
nian Ministry of Interior has estimated that in Ukraine alone, some 400,000
women have been subjected to trafficking during the past decade While the value
of such roughly estimated numbers remains, of course, always somehow limited,
the figures may give an idea of the dimensions behind these phenomena. OC is
attracted by the businesses’potential for huge profits on the one hand, and the in-
ternationally still relatively low risk5 of detection, prosecution and arrest on the
other. The OC-link produces a more sophisticated, aggressive and lucrative ex-
ploitation network for both the illegal migration and the sex business.
OC manages these criminal businesses regardless of any ruthless violations of
the fundamental rights of the victims. Eastern and South-eastern European
OC-syndicates are reported to be increasingly involved in smuggling of persons
and trafficking in human beings, especially for sexual exploitation. Trafficking
in young women and girls from Eastern Europe has—as found by intelligence
and investigative sources, such as the German Bundeskriminalamt6—grown to
be the biggest source of females to be exploited in the European sex industry. Ac-
cording to Interpol findings, OC groups are involved in the entire spectrum of ac-
tivities associated to it. Local crime gangs operating in various Eastern and
South-eastern European countries manage the recruitment of the victims, techni-
cal issues (from false passports and visas to transport facilities and logistics) and
the transnational trafficking connections with their international counterparts.
The various gangs own a lot of brothels, dancing clubs and hotels, and play a ma-
jor role in prostitution rings and business. The business continues to in-
crease—in terms of victims involved as well as in turnover and profits. A recent
Europol 18-case study (in the framework of the “Falcone” programme) showed
the importance of major routes emerged and developed for human trafficking
from the East. Official national crime statistics from Germany and Austria7 con-
firm these findings. Apart from the important “Balkans routes”, irregular immi-
grants (a significant number of whom are women for sexual exploitation) that are
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4 Cf. Bundeskriminalamt (Germany): Lagebild Menschenhandel 2000, 1999; Bundesgrenzschutz (Germany):
Unerlaubte Einreise und Schleusungskriminalität, 2001, 2000, 1999, 1998; Bundesministerium für Inneres,
Generaldirektion für die Öffentliche Sicherheit (Austria): Organisierte Schlepperkriminalität, 2001, 2000, 1999,
1998, 1997; Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement, Interdepartementale Arbeitsgruppe Menschenhandel
(Switzerland): Menschenhandel in der Schweiz, 2001. Cf. also U.S. and Ukrainian Research results, Hughes, Donna
M. / Denisova, Tatyana A.: The Transnational Political Criminal Nexus of Trafficking in Women from Ukraine, in:
Trends in Organized Crime, Vol. 6, No. 3&4, 2001, p. 53.
5 Cf. also Interpol, International Criminal Police Review, No.489–490/2001, p. 2; IOM: “New IOM figures on the
globale scale of trafficking”, Trafficking in Migrants Quarterly Bulletin, No.23, April 2001; OSCE Economic Forum
on “Trafficking in human beings, drugs, small arms and light weapons: national and international economic impact”,
Prague, 20–23 May 2003.
6 See Annual Reports on human trafficking into Germany.
7 German Bundeskriminalamt, the German Bundesgrenzschutz, the Bavarian Police Department and the Austrian Inte-
rior Ministry.
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stopped at the Austrian or German borders come over the “Eastern routes”
(among which “North Eastern Routes”).8
In Europe, smuggling and trafficking in people and in other “commodities”
(such as drugs, weapons) are mostly organised and run by the same criminal net-
works. They basically follow the same routes and show significant similarities in
some “typical” OC-methods. The German BND (secret service) warns that
crime in general and transnational organised crime in particular spread along the
migration flows. According to the findings of the different security agencies, a
very important role in this context is played by the larger ethnic communities
which are concentrated on preferred locations, and more and more present in cer-
tain European metropolises.9 OC directly and indirectly profits from migrant
flows. On the one hand, ethnic communities are used by transnational crime syn-
dicates as local bases for their criminal activities, and for infiltration. On the
other hand, as national law enforcement agencies in different countries have ob-
served, there is a growing trend of migrants turning to professional organisations
and networks for illegal border-crossing and entering the EU—which makes the
business big and lucrative for the organised criminals.10 In addition to that, ille-
gal migrant flows form huge and uncontrolled black markets for illegal goods,
commodities and services, and meet the demand for informal or black labour.11
Smuggling activities as well as transportation, distribution and logistics are
heavily interlinked and often provided or organised by the same criminal actors
and networks. Some crime syndicates (but also a number of looser networks) op-
erate as drug and human traffickers, or as people and arms smugglers at the same
time. Linkages are highly developed when it comes to money laundering activi-
ties, but also to customs or border police bribery. As a consequence, logistics, or-
ganisations and the routes that supply Europe with illegal drugs and illegal mi-
grants are basically the same.12 For example, the Albanian OC-groups, as has
been found by the Italian “Antimafia” agency, use similar routes and logistics
when trafficking drugs, smuggling migrants or trafficking human beings.13 Also
the German authorities have identified significant parallels in the routes of illegal
migrants, smuggled people, trafficked humans, refugees and asylum seekers on
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Schlepperkriminalität. Jahresbericht 1998, p. 21; Hughes / National Institute of Justice (NIJ): The “Natasha” Trade, p.
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11 Cf. Oberloher: Schleusungskriminalität, Munich 2004; Lange: Kriminalität, p. 7; Hughes / NIJ: “Natasha”, S.10;
Violante, Luciano: Preface, 12.7.1999, in: Jamieson: The Antimafia, New York 2000, S.ix–xi.
12 Cf. Öffentliche Sicherheit, No.7–8/01, p. 21; Storbeck: Kriminalität, in: Kaiser / Schwarz: Weltpolitik, pp.173–185;
Martinetti: Il Padrino di Mosca, Milano 1995, pp.102–105; Deen, Thalif: Rights, in: Global Information Network,
Interpress Service, 13.12.2000; http:www.br-online.de/politik-wirtschaft/terror/taliban.shtml (as per: 29.10.2001,
showing also the links to terrorism activities through financial and material supply); BKA (Germany): Situation Report
on Organized Crime in the Federal Republic of Germany 1999 (May 2000), pp.16f. and CIA, www.cia.gov/ (as per:
10.8.2000): Annual Report 1999: International Organized Crime.
13 Cf. O’Neill / CSI: Trafficking (2000), p. 61.
the one hand, and other “commodities” such as drugs on the other.14 This may to
a certain extent result from the fact that a part of the illegally brought-in mi-
grants—as cases in past years have proven—find themselves in a hostile
exploitive relationship in which they are even forced to commit crimes, for ex-
ample to smuggle or deal drugs for the local destination market, in order to pay
off their “debts” to the organised traffickers/smugglers.15 Drug crimes are often
related to nightlife crime, prostitution and illegal migration. An explanation for
this may be the fact that OC-groups involved in specific illegal or criminal busi-
nesses have not only established links of cooperation and commerce, but a lot of
them are active in several fields.16 Parallels seem even more obvious when local
geographic, economic and social opportunities for the criminals are also taken
into account. These parallels and linkages need to be taken into consideration
when strategies to “combat” the individual OC-phenomena are developed.
Europe’s borders within the EU are today open, the exchange of goods has
risen enormously over the past decade between West and East, North and South,
and the volume of migration flows towards Europe has reached unprecedented
levels. All this poses, without any doubt, an increasing challenge to internal se-
curity politics in Europe. Experts warn about underestimating the dangers the il-
legal migration flows and other crime phenomena pose to the State and society.17
The high social and economic costs for society, dangers to internal security de-
riving from the spreading of informal, illegal and criminal practices, corruption,
as well as the rise in criminal assets (and therefore power) and the growing
shadow economy with its various black markets are not to be ignored, either. In
addition to the more “traditional” fields such as drugs and arms smuggling, OC
has created well-established and more and more sophisticated means for smug-
gling and trafficking people. The turnover of these is estimated to be as high as
that of the illegal drug market, ranking them among the most lucrative OC activi-
ties.18 The real size of these criminal businesses, the dimension of illegal migrant
flows, and the annual number of people smuggled or trafficked can—if at
all—only be roughly estimated (based on the cases annually detected—mostly
by chance—by customs or the police).
Even then, one can safely assume that these phenomena have reached a level
which can be regarded as significant. The existence of a huge black market is cru-
cial to most border-crossing crimes; sufficient demand is a necessary prerequi-
site for any lucrative business, legal or illegal. Once again these markets and
businesses are linked through the actors and structures involved, through the ille-
gal flows of dirty capital, and, in some cases, through forms of barter-trade:
some criminal groups collaborate at times by exchanging “goods” to serve their
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14 Cf. Bundesamt für die Anerkennung Ausländischer Flüchtlinge (Germany): Reisewege von Asylbewerbern, in:
www.bafl.de/ (update: 16.6.2003); Salzburger Nachrichten, www.salzburg.com/sn/, 17.6.2003; BMI (Germany),
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15 Cf. www.diepresse.at/, 7.12.2001; Rupprecht: Freiheit, p. 90; Wocon: Implications, pp. 1–15, 27–30; ODCCP: Drug
Nexus, pp. 26–29, 47–49, 93f., 104–108.
16 Cf. Lebed: Observations (1999), in: La Strada, www.brama.com/lastrada/.
17 Cf. BKA (Austria): Organisierte Schlepperkriminalität. Jahresbericht 2001, p. 57.
18 However, when it comes to trafficking in human beings, we face a crime against humanity and as such also an impor-
tant human rights issue.
clientele—drugs for young women, weapons for drugs, etc.19 Strategic re-invest-
ments of illegal profits are another relevant element in the OC-picture: buying
key-businesses such as import-export companies, transport enterprises and
travel agencies (for covering smuggling of illegal migrants, drugs, etc.), hotels,
bars and pubs (for storing drugs, for illegally accommodating and hiding people,
for dealing drugs and for offering illegal prostitution), as well as foreign ex-
change businesses for money-laundering. Police raids into certain city quarters
of various cities in Europe have shown these connections.20 As important are the
parallels between the various smuggling and trafficking fields related to corrup-
tion. The spreading of corruption in general can be seen as a fertile breeding
ground for the development and growth of OC. Corruption—together with infil-
tration—intertwines criminal world and legal businesses (e.g. banks, transport-
ing) as well as the State apparatus (police, customs, administration, politicians).
There have been some cases in Europe where even the police have been involved
in local drug business and illegal prostitution.21
Primary routes for smuggling drugs and people to Europe follow important
migration and trade routes. Significant “plaques tournantes” for drug trafficking
and illegal migration are i.a. Russia (Moscow), Turkey (Istanbul) and the Bal-
kans. Besides Greece, Italy (especially its Southern territory) plays a key role as
a “Gateway to the EU”, with “motoscafi” and ferries bringing illegal migrants,
drugs, weapons and other “commodities” ashore, arriving via Tunisia / North /
Western Africa, or Albania / the Balkans. Other important routes run through the
Balkans or from Eastern Europe via Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Po-
land into Germany and Austria—countries which are attractive for their eco-
nomic potential and developed markets, and which to date have been most ex-
posed to the famous East-to-West smuggling routes.22
All this, explained by necessity in a few lines, demonstrates the complexity of
the existing OC-network structures, and gives an idea why the linkages between
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www.usinfo.state.gov/: ARIAT (2000); AIC, www.aic.gov.au/: Trafficking, 7.7.1999; OSZE, www.osce.org/: Traf-
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21 Cf.Ö   ffentliche Sicherheit, No.3–4/01, p. 26.
22 Cf. Le Monde, 20.2.2001, p. 9; The Times, 31.8.2000, p. 14; Corriere della Sera, www.corriere.it/, 26.4.2002.
the different OC-fields are indeed so relevant. If we really intend to combat phe-
nomena such as irregular migration and drug trafficking, it is necessary to under-
stand that we will have to focus on the prevention of the phenomena—and thus
on their root causes Effective countering of Organised Crime involvement in ir-
regular migration, people smuggling and human trafficking therefore requires,
as a prerequisite, focusing on the parallels, linkages and interrelations among
and between these fields and other crime phenomena, as well as between crimi-
nal actors, structures and networks operating at different levels of the criminal
world, and in the grey area between criminality and legality.23
There seems to be a global consensus of the need for action. With the supple-
mentary protocols to the Palermo 2000 Convention against Transnational Orga-
nized Crime—the protocol against smuggling of migrants and the one against
trafficking in persons—the international community has reached some impor-
tant common minimum standards in addressing these challenges in the future.
However, there is still much to do. Many actions have been initiated, while coor-
dination and cooperation are still insufficient. There are many national and inter-
national, governmental and non-governmental organisations, agencies, groups
and individuals actively engaged in countering the aforementioned businesses
with numerous initiatives, and an even larger number of those who claim to do
so. However, the current initiatives planned or launched by the different govern-
mental and non-governmental actors at national and international levels seem to
great extent underestimate the role of the OC-links24, and comprehensive initia-
tives focusing on this aspect are thus needed. Despite the many initiatives, the
fight against organised illegal migration, people smuggling and human traffick-
ing is wanting in many aspects. Besides the failure to use clear definitions of
these phenomena (which partly derives from the non-standardised criteria for
collecting information),25 there are other problems resulting from an inadequate
system to exchange information between actors involved in the anti-trafficking
field, as well as from a lack of a multi-level26 vision of joining knowledge, forces
and strategies to confront the challenges. It is no longer sufficient to tackle such
issues only at local or at national level, nor is it very effective to concentrate
solely on the international level and by so doing dismiss the indispensable na-
tional and sub-national input. Thirdly, there is not sufficient knowledge of the
role of OC, and of its logistic and structural aspects. Gathering information is, of
course, unlikely to be simple because, apart from the smugglers and traffickers
themselves, the people who know the most about the subject are the police, and
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25 While the important connections and relations have to be studied and taken into consideration when elaborating coun-
ter-strategies, it is also crucial to make the necessary distinctions.
26 Oberloher, Robert F.: Moderne Sklaverei im OK-Netz. Effiziente OK-Konfrontation mittels koordiniert-kooperativer
Mehrebenenpolitik, Vienna 2003.
they may refuse to share some important data and knowledge with others (some-
times still even among themselves, due to restrictions, especially in sensitive
subjects such as these). As a result of the lack of data available, effective strate-
gies and measures to counter OC-involvement in these fields still need to be de-
veloped, and the existing analyses and assessments of the problem are far from
being comprehensive.
We will have to bear in mind that human trafficking and people smuggling are
only a small part of organised crime. Criminals will probably always smuggle
and traffic any type of “goods” and “commodities” that proof to be lucrative. De-
spite the fact that everything should be done to decrease the humanitarian misery
connected with these crime fields, we should understand that if we really want to
“combat” OC, we have to focus more on the criminal networks, and less on their
victims. We also need a better definition of ‘organised crime’ and means to dis-
tinguish it from criminals who are organised, as well as from groups operating at
an unsophisticated level. If we want the police to be effective, specific training is
needed to enable them to better confront these issues with special skills. Further-
more, appropriate legislation has to be in place and, most important of all, there
has to be undivided political will supporting the efforts.
Initiatives that try to address such complex and important challenges will re-
quire a lot of time, a multi-level strategy and cooperation among an interdisci-
plinary spectrum of key actors. This may sound too much of a vision. However,
improvements require visions and despite all these difficulties, efforts to im-
prove insight into these phenomena and their crucial links and methods, as well
as the elaboration of more effective, advanced and comprehensive strate-
gies—based on sound knowledge—should remain our priority.
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Impact of Transnational Organized Crime
on Law Enforcement
Marvene O’Rourke,
National Institute of Justice, USA
Global Attention on Transnational Crime
Six years before delegates gathered in Palermo in December 2000 to sign the
United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, representatives
to the UN focused their attention on transnational organized crime. Completion
of the convention was a bold statement by the world community. It announced
that this form of crime is growing in scale, scope and degree of sophistication and
it showed a new commitment by nations to prevent and combat this problem.
One look at the list of countries which have ratified the convention makes it
clear that transnational organized crime affects all corners of the world.1 Yet,
transnational organized crime remains difficult, if not impossible, to measure in
quantitative terms. There are no statistics which measure incidents of most trans-
national crimes.
For example, in the area of human trafficking—there are many estimates of
how many people are trafficked.2 Other estimates attempt to calculate the cost of
human trafficking in currency, certainly not in terms of human suffering. But
these are only estimates. And those who compile the estimates will often con-
fess, in the strictest of confidence, that the estimates are only guesses. Recently,
as Federal cases on trafficking are being prosecuted in the U.S. under the Victims
of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, we have begun to see some
national statistics for human trafficking in the U.S. But certainly they are not a
complete picture of a single transnational crime problem in one country.
In the United States, the debate may be more basic than developing or main-
taining reliable statistics on transnational crime. While transnational crime is an
international issue, it takes place at the local level in the villages, towns and cities
where law enforcement officers must, first, identify what they are seeing as
transnational crime before they can respond. Transnational crime is often diffi-
cult to identify, particularly at the local level. It is more difficult to learn if trans-
national crime has any impact on these local law enforcement agencies. And, we
have discovered in the U.S., it is most difficult to measure what that impact might
be.
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Impact in the U.S.
While the UN was deliberating and negotiating the convention on transnational
crime, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), began to look at these crimes in the
United States to determine whether and how they impact law enforcement there.
Such measurements in the U.S. are complicated by the complex criminal justice
system. Rather than one National police force, the United States has more than
17,000 Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies across the country. Not
only does this complicate collecting and analyzing quantitative data, but it also
creates definitions that vary from one jurisdiction to another.
During informal conversations with law enforcement officers, we discovered
a lack of awareness about transnational crime. When asked about the types of
transnational crimes they encountered in their jurisdiction, officers would ask if
we meant drug trafficking. They seemed to have little, if any, awareness of the
other types of transnational crime which have been defined for decades in inter-
national criminal justice circles.3
Initially, NIJ took advantage of several captive audiences and conducted a
convenience sample of New Jersey prosecutors and law enforcement officers in
Orange County, California, to determine how much and what type of transna-
tional crime they encountered.
This convenience survey gave us very mixed signals. For example, the respon-
dent might have indicated there was NO transnational crime in their jurisdiction,
but that 50 foreign nationals had been arrested. Certainly, not all 50 were involved
in international crimes, but it is safe to assume that some might have been.
Nationwide Survey
Because the convenience survey produced no clear results, NIJ contracted with
Abt Associates, Inc., a well-respected research firm to conduct a nationwide ex-
ploratory survey to determine if and to what extent transnational crime impacts
law enforcement agencies at the state and local levels.
Method
One objective of the survey was to achieve a high response rate, since poor re-
sponse rates can undermine the validity of survey results with even the best in-
strumentation and sampling. Several alternative methods of data collection were
considered and rejected. A telephone survey was selected as the primary mode of
data collection to be augmented with use of mail, email and phone communica-
tion to contact, schedule and follow-up to the phone survey. This method of data
collection was most likely to capture busy, mobile, upper level law enforcement
managers and it was feasible to collect the data within a six month time frame.
Developing a nationally representative sample involved several steps. A liter-
ature review was conducted to identify key transnational crime problems most
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likely to be of highest current and future concern to local law enforcement. Prior
surveys of law enforcement agencies were examined for guidance on the most
effective data collection procedures. As substantive issues arose, discussions
were held with law enforcement personnel in police departments of large and
small cities to gain clarification. A key set of transnational crime and relevant
law enforcement issues, a prototype questionnaire and an outline of data collec-
tion procedures were tested on a small focus group with one Chief of Police, one
Deputy Chief and one Head of Operations from representative departments. This
provided critical feedback and helped refine the questionnaire and data gathering
procedures. Following the focus group, a pretest of the procedure and data col-
lection instrument was conducted with nine police departments from geographi-
cally diverse states. The revised instrument performed very well.
The questionnaire provided a working definition of transnational crime and
contained instructions asking respondents to provide information only about
crimes with international connections. Survey instructions were followed by a
list of the more common types of transnational crime which the survey was in-
tended to address:
• Illicit trafficking—including trade in humans (for forced labor or sexual ex-
ploitation), drugs, weapons (biological weapons, firearms, munitions, or
components of weapons), stolen art or artifacts, endangered animals or ani-
mal parts and products, or stolen intellectual property (e.g., pirated CDs,
counterfeit clothing, or trademarked materials).
• Illegal immigration
• Computer crimes—reaching across international boundaries, such as money
laundering, identity and information theft, unauthorized access, sabotage, vi-
ruses (“hacking”), internet commerce in child pornography, or theft and illicit
transmission of intellectual property (music, books, patented materials).
• Crimes related to homeland security—such as foreign organizations attempt-
ing to disrupt or destroy domestic infrastructure, threatening or killing Ameri-
can citizens and residents.
• Other transnational crime of local concern which respondents wished to ad-
dress.
Sample
The sampling plan integrated three different sub samples to include state, county
and municipal levels of law enforcement. This approach was chosen to obtain a
descriptive, exploratory study to account for transnational crime not bound by
geographical patterns or uneven geographical distribution among urban, subur-
ban and small community areas and to obtain a high response rate. To maximize
the information, the following sample plan of 250 law enforcement agencies was
designed to incorporate three components:
• 175 local police agencies with 50 or more sworn officers
• 50 state police departments
• 25 main police departments of core cities of the 25 largest U.S. metropolitan
areas
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The centerpiece of this design was a random sample of 175 law enforcement
agencies drawn from data in the Bureau of Justice Statistics Census of State and
Local Law Enforcement Agencies. Given that relatively few truly large cities are
likely to be captured in a random sample of agencies with 50 or more sworn of-
fices, a set of 25 core cities was purposively drawn. Finally, all 50 state police
agencies were included to ensure a wide geographic coverage and because state
police often act as a conduit between the local and federal levels. Neither the pur-
posive selection nor the total coverage of states will support generalizations.
Data Collection
Data was collected during a 10-week period through telephone interviews which
took between 30 and 60 minutes. The survey interviews addressed the following
issues:
• Perceptions of transnational crime at the local level;
• Level of transnational crime activity in their jurisdiction;
• Local resources devoted to preventing and responding to transnational crime;
• Extent of cooperation among local, state, federal, and foreign law enforcement;
and
• Perceptions of resource needs.
The approach to data collection, emphasizing persistent follow-up procedures
using multiple media, proved to be well suited for the extraordinary conditions
under which the survey occurred. Survey interviews began on March 18, 2003,
one day after and one day before events which impacted the workload and priori-
ties of local and state law enforcement. The day before data collection began, the
Department of Homeland Security Terror Threat Level was raised to orange, in-
dicating a “high risk of terrorist attack” when President Bush declared Saddam
Hussein must leave Iraq within 48 hours. The day after data collection began the
U.S. military campaign against Iraq began. Local agencies’ attempts to address
homeland security during a time of war stressed state and local resources making
data collection difficult during the first weeks.
200
Figure A. Sample
Contacted Responded Response Rate
25 Largest Cities 25 12 48 %
State Police 50 20 40 %
Random Sample 175 152 87 %
Total 250 184 74 %
However, by May 30, when data collection ended, the total response rate was 74
percent. While the response from law enforcement among the 25 largest cities and
state police agencies hovered below 50 percent, the response rate from local law
enforcement was 87 percent. Geographically the survey covered agencies in 43 of
the 50 states and included boarder areas, major ports of entry and interior states.
Survey Results
Perceptions at the Local Level
The survey indicated that law enforcement agencies believe crimes related to
homeland defense and other transnational crimes are a serious or critical problem
in their jurisdiction. Roughly half of respondents from the large city and random
sample of departments expressed this perception (Fig. B). The remaining respon-
dents considered transnational crime as “not a problem” or “a minor problem”.
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Figure C: Law Enforcement Concern About Transnational Crime
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According to police surveyed, roughly half of the respondents across each sub
sample said citizens within their jurisdictions view these crimes as “serious” or
“a critical problem”.
Level of Activity
The crime itself was the deciding factor as to whether law enforcement perceives
transnational crime to be increasing, decreasing or remaining the same within
their jurisdiction. The trends vary across sub-samples depending on crime types.
For example, police believe drug trafficking, illegal immigration, money laun-
dering, computer crime and, to some degree, homeland security appear to be in-
creasing. About one-fifth to one-third of respondents believe that human traf-
ficking is increasing in their jurisdiction, while respondents in large city police
departments tend to believe this form of trafficking has increased.
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Figure D: Perceived Citizen Concern About Transnational Crime
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Figure E: Percent of Jurisdictions with Investigations
For Transnational Crimes
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The data which was collected regarding the number of arrests, investigations,
foreign organized crime and the country of origin for foreign nationals involved
proved to be weak. The major obstacles to collecting useful data are structural
and procedural. Some of the crimes addressed in this survey are not recorded by
local law enforcement agencies, but are instead referred to federal agencies. Ar-
rests and other data on these incidents are not always recorded locally. In other
cases, criminal codes and data recording systems do not adequately distinguish
transnational crimes from local variations of the same activity. For example, po-
lice in many locales record cases of human trafficking for sexual exploitation as
prostitution, either because they have not established sufficiently that the illegal
activity is part of a larger trafficking enterprise or because they are trained only to
record the violation of local criminal codes and to leave the possible interna-
tional connection to federal agencies. In some locations, prostitution by traf-
ficked persons is referred to federal agencies such as the INS and the FBI and
would not appear in local crime records at all. Even when the arrest data on trans-
national crime exists, it is not always easily accessible to staff or aggregated in a
way helpful this survey. Finally, many agencies do not compile aggregate statis-
tics on investigations, especially those categorized by crime type.
As a result of these limitations, the arrest and investigation data was collapsed
into dichotomous variables, where agencies do or do not report instances of ac-
tivity in each crime type. Respondents would say with confidence that there was
a presence or absence of arrests or investigations into a particular type of crime,
but could only guess about numbers or provide a wide range.
There were arrests and investigations for each of the major types of transna-
tional crime across almost all crime types and sub samples. While it was not a
surprise to see indications of widespread international drug trafficking, nearly all
state and local agencies were conducting investigations into transnational com-
puter crime. Other categories such as weapons trafficking, money laundering
and even art, animal and intellectual property theft show a higher percentage of
203
Figure F: Percent of Jurisdictions with Arrests For Transnational Crimes
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arrests than might have been anticipated. However, this reported activity, raises
the question of how much more of these crimes go undetected. Do local and state
police really know what they’re seeing?
For example, a cigarette smuggling case in North Carolina (which ultimately
linked the profits to the support of terrorists) began with a local sheriff’s deputy
observing people coming from long distances to buy truckloads of cigarettes at a
discount warehouse.4 In Canada, the RCMP received a complaint from a fraud
victim, and while investigating this complaint, common elements surfaced link-
ing it to on-going investigations in both Canada and the U.S. An ensuing joint in-
ternational investigation ultimately led to a significant indictment for a “Nige-
rian Letter Scam” conspiracy.5 In northeastern Italy, Russian businesses became
active in the purchase of clothing and consumer goods for the Russian market.
Suspicious law enforcement officials investigated bank and commercial records,
revealing a criminal network of primarily Russian and Italian businesses, result-
ing in arrests of more than 30 people in five countries.6 Are these cases simply
“lucky breaks”, or can practical investigative screening procedures be developed
to look for potential transnational connections?
While the survey could not measure the amount of crime undetected, there
was an attempt to determine country of origin of those foreign nationals who
were arrested or investigated for transnational crimes. Unfortunately, the data
collected regarding country of origin was very vague and in many cases the inter-
viewees refused to respond saying that once the international nature of a crime
became apparent the cases were referred to federal authorities and their own in-
vestigations would cease.
Similarly, when asked whether people arrested or investigated for transna-
tional crime were associated with a known criminal organization or terrorist
group, most respondents did not know, refused to answer or qualified their an-
swers with expressions of doubt. The following is a list of those organizations
identified:
Drug cartels from (country) Al Qaeda
Gangs Russian Mafia
Mafia Israeli Mafia
Crime organization from (country) Latin Kings
Bloods KKK
Obviously the data do not support analysis that would provide a coherent profile
of foreign countries or organizations linked to crime addressed by state and local
law enforcement. However, enough anecdotes were gathered to suggest that
transnational crime can originate virtually anywhere and reach nearly any part of
the U.S. For example, one Western jurisdiction noted an ongoing problem with
204
4 David E. Kaplan and Monica M. Ekman, “How a Hezbollah Cell Made Millions in Sleepy Charlotte, N.C.”, U.S. News
& World Report, (March 10, 2003).
5 “RCMP, FBI and U.S. Secret Service Crumple ‘Nigerian Letter Scam’”, Canada NewsWire, (July 10, 2001).
6 Bruce Zagaris, “Arrests in Europe Indicate Progress in Russian Transnational Crime Investigations”, Transnational
Organized Crime, vol. 18 (August 2002).
poaching to provide bear gall bladders to illicit markets in Asia. In one small, in-
land Southern city, police identified suspected Russian Mafia operatives en-
gaged in local trafficking in stolen auto parts, with some of the illicit revenue sent
abroad.
Local Resources
The survey also addressed the nature and extent of resources devoted to transna-
tional crime within the jurisdictions participating. All large cities and state police
surveyed have some dedicated personnel for transnational crime. Most state po-
lice agencies have at least one full time equivalent position focused on transna-
tional crime and 55 percent have six or more. Only the departments with less than
50 sworn personnel do not have a significant number of positions dedicated to
transnational crime.
Cooperation
The vast majority of large cities (83 percent) and state police (95 percent) depart-
ments have special in-house units, squads or task forces devoted to transnational
crime. About half of the random sample of the departments have special units.
These units have a wide variety of names and focuses depending on the local
needs and prevalent crime which include:
Domestic Security Task Force Russian Organized Crime Unit
Counter Terrorism Team Port Security
Terrorism Unit Drug Task Force
Terrorist Intelligence Unit Computer Investigations
Anti-Terrorism Unit Special Investigations
Homeland Security Task Force Special Operations
Homeland Threat Assessment Special Tactics and Response
Special Assistant for Homeland Weapons of Mass Destruction
Security Preparedness
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Figure G: FTEs Devoted to Transnational Crime
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The survey indicated a significant amount of collaboration with federal law en-
forcement agencies takes place in the area of drug trafficking. Surprisingly, ille-
gal immigration and computer crime also involve collaboration with federal law
enforcement agencies. Then, in descending order we see local cases in weapons
trafficking, homeland security, money laundering and human trafficking local
being referred to federal agencies. Interestingly enough, the proportion of agen-
cies referring cases to the federal and regional levels closely follows the propor-
tion reporting investigations for most types of international crime type. This sug-
gests that local agencies usually refer their international cases to at least one
agency outside of the state.
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Figure H: Agencies with In-House Special Units, Squads, Task Forces
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Figure I: Percent Referring Cases to Federal Agencies or
Regional Task Forces
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In addition to the upward flow of investigation related information from the
local and state level to the regional and national level, The only crime type in
which the prevalence of downward alerts exceeded the prevalence of upward in-
formation flow was crime related to homeland security. Most state and local
agencies indicated they had shared information about drug trafficking (84 per-
cent) and computer crime (64 percent) with other local and state agencies in the
previous year while sharing information on other transnational crime types were
below 50 percent. Cooperation with foreign organizations is rare, ranging from
two percent (trafficking in weapons, art, animal products, intellectual property)
to nine percent (drug trafficking) of the state and local agencies sampled.
The level and quality of communication were attributed mainly to the person-
alities and working relationships between the individuals involved. In some
cases, poor communication could be traced to past people and events and had be-
come institutionalized.
Resources Needed
All respondents felt, to varying degrees, that they could use additional resources
to prevent or respond to transnational crime. Respondents were ask to indicate
the “percentage increase” necessary in each of the following categories to im-
prove their response to transnational crime (1) personnel, (2) training, (3) equip-
ment, and levels of cooperation with (4) federal, (5) state, (6) local, and (7) for-
eign law enforcement. Across most of the resource, respondents from large city
agencies expressed the need for the greatest proportional increases, while state
law enforcement indicated the need for the smallest increases. By a substantial
margin, responding agencies cited the greatest need for personnel, training, and
equipment to effectively address transnational crime, and indicated a need for
relatively modest increases in additional inter-agency cooperation.
In Summary of the U.S. Survey
There are a number of general conclusions that can be drawn as a result of the
data collected through this survey.
• Transnational crime is present and considered to be a substantial problem by
local law enforcement in most U.S. communities.
• In most communities, one or two types of transnational crime stand out, cause
concern and trigger investigations for local law enforcement.
• Most respondents felt computer crime is increasing and keeping up with tech-
nology is an increasingly important issue.
• There is a significant level of communication and cooperation among law en-
forcement at various levels—Federal, state and local—driven by the local
crime issues and by relationships.
• Some large cities have started their own antiterrorism units in response to fed-
eral inaction.
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• Most respondents felt their agency was at least adequately prepared to deal
with transnational crime but 92 percent said they needed additional training
and equipment.
While the results of this nationwide survey reported here present only summary
tabulations and simple comparisons of responses to the survey, the data collected
will support additional analysis. Nonetheless, these results do indicate a signifi-
cant amount of transnational crime at the state and local level within the United
States.
The next step is to bring law enforcement—local, state, federal—together
with researchers to identify gaps and determine the next steps. These experts will
analyze what we’ve learned, what we still need, where the critical gaps are and,
more important, how to fill them to improve the response by local and state law
enforcement to transnational crime.
What Are Other Nations Doing to Define and
Measure Transnational Organized Crime
As NIJ conducted this survey, we learned there are other efforts in progress to ad-
dress, and in some cases, measure or assess, transnational organized crime.
For example, the International Association of Chiefs of Police conducted a
similar study and another component of the U.S. Department of Justice surveyed
Federal, state and local law enforcement regarding the effectiveness of their re-
gional terrorism task forces.
Other organizations have established programs, both formal and informal, to
improve cooperation or facilitate operational investigations across national
boundaries. These include:
• INTERPOL which has several operational level initiatives such as the Fusion
Task Force to assist member countries in terrorism related investigations fo-
cusing on drug, human and weapons trafficking and financial crimes and the
bridge project human smuggling and trafficking and the organized crime con-
nection.
• The Financial Action Task Force on money laundering is a 31-country group
to detect and prevent financing of terrorism.
• The 6-member Shanghai Cooperation Organization has a goal to strengthen
regional security and stability against terrorism.
• OECD with its 30 members has a program to protect consumers from
cross-border fraud through information sharing.
• EUROPOL hopes to improve cooperation in combating terrorism, drug traf-
ficking and other international organized crime. Specific agreements have
been made to that end with Estonia, Norway, Poland, Iceland, Hungary, the
Czech Republic, USA, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Interpol.
• International Money Laundering Information Network provides model laws
against financial crime and tracks anti-money laundering legislation.
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In addition there are a number of regional efforts underway and the United Na-
tions Office on Drugs and Crime has a variety of programs. All are important and
each is a step toward combating transnational crime.
How Are We Going to Respond?
Although this survey confirms the hypothesis that transnational crime does im-
pact local and state law enforcement in the U.S., accurate records are not avail-
able and it is very probable that much transnational crime may go unnoticed,
un-identified and unreported.
Is it possible that the situation in the United States is NOT unique?
Let us assume for a moment that law enforcement in other countries may also
have difficulty in identifying transnational crime in our villages, towns and small
cities. Let us assume that other countries share our difficulty in measuring trans-
national crime’s impact and that no one really knows how much transnational
crime there is or how it impacts our countries.
Should these assumptions be accurate the question is: What are we going to
do about it? With the coming into force of the United Nations Transnational
Crime Convention, questions about the nature and extent of transnational crime
will inevitably follow. They may take the form of “how much”, “what is the im-
pact”, or “is it increasing or decreasing?” But the questions will be asked.
Whether the U.S. and other countries are prepared to answer is difficult to pre-
dict.
But now is the time to begin thinking about how to answer these questions and
to initiate research that will provide valid and meaningful responses.
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An Occupational Perspective on some
Efforts to Fight Organized, Transnational
Crime in the European Union1
Lotta Pettersson,
Department of Criminology, Stockholm University, Sweden
According to statistics from the Swedish customs, seizures of alcohol and to-
bacco have increased since the middle of the 1990s. It has been claimed that this
increase is actual, possibly resulting from structural changes, for instance re-
duced control at the borders due to Sweden’s membership in the European Un-
ion. For individuals who engage in the road haulage industry, the changes mani-
fest themselves in terms of reduced time spent at border controls. However, when
large-scale alcohol and tobacco smuggling is revealed, a lorry is often involved
as a means of transport. Smuggling of these sorts of goods is, for different rea-
sons, at times associated with so-called organised criminality. The smuggling
phenomenon in itself is nothing new. The liveliness of the related (political) dis-
cussion, on the other hand, may well be. The paper is based on interviews with
individuals convicted of smuggling, made within a collaboration-project be-
tween Norway and Sweden, aiming to explore economic crimes from an ac-
tor-perspective within the industry. The interviewees, therefore, had a work-re-
lated role in the road haulage industry.
Background
In year 2000, a research project was initiated with the purpose of analysing eco-
nomic crime within the transnational road haulage industry. The project was
qualitative, and during a two-year period we conducted in-depth interviews with
individuals who worked in the trucking industry.2 The economic crimes we fo-
cused our interest on varied in terms of type and seriousness; some were more
typical for a specific industry, some related to a specific corporation.3
Besides the interviews with people who worked in the industry, we inter-
viewed ten persons who, through their work, were somehow connected to the in-
dustry (policemen, custom officers, accountants, trade union representatives,
etc). I also participated in some fieldwork, for instance in places associated with
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veloped article is under progress.
2 The project was conducted together with Vanja Lundgren Sorli, at University of Oslo, Norway at the time. We also par-
ticipated in some of the interviews together.
3 See BRÅ-rapport 2002:6 for a presentation on the various types of economic crimes.
the industry, like the harbour where drivers rest, truck stops and so on. Finally, I
joined two drivers at work for short periods.
In this paper, I focus on a particular and limited group of this population. It
consists of individuals who have been sentenced to prison for smuggling alcohol
and tobacco.4
This paper
In the present article, I explore a particular group of interviewees who have been
sentenced to prison for smuggling alcohol and tobacco. I will outline some re-
flections on the issue of organised crime from two perspectives. First, the
“crime-policy” context and the efforts made to combat the crime-problem with
which it is associated. I concentrate on the parallel development in Sweden and
the European Union in terms of universal and transnational solutions to the trans-
national crime-problem.
Thereafter, the “criminal actor” perspective will be presented, where the oc-
cupational context and a viewpoint of the convicted individuals in relation to
smuggling are explored. The analysis will focus on the informants’ background
and situation. In other words, the smuggling will be connected to a broader occu-
pational context and the conditions surrounding the transnational, international
trucking industry.
Before that I will present how the connections between the road haulage in-
dustry, smuggling and organised crime can be understood.
The road haulage industry, smuggling and organised crime
There are links between the trucking industry and smuggling of alcohol and cig-
arettes. The latter is often, in official reports, associated with so-called organised
crime.5 Therefore, one might claim that the political issues of organised crime af-
fect individuals within the haulage industry since smuggling of alcohol and to-
bacco is often mentioned in the Swedish discourse as an example of the activities
conducted by organised crime. The haulage business, in turn, has for different
reasons a central position in smuggling these kinds of goods. Most often, when
the customs or police detect smuggling, the driver is caught and convicted of the
crime, since lorries often are used as means of smuggling. This is not to say that
the actors within the industry are particularly criminal or that the industry is
problematic as such. It is rather a matter of structural conditions. For instance:
1) The industry is characterised by international and transnational activities.
2) In contrast to other vehicles, long-distance lorries have a large capacity to
carry goods.
3) The borders are open within the European Union—the control at the borders
is reduced.
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4 The informants in focus are a small group. For ethical reasons, the information concerning these individuals will be
presented in general terms.
5 RKP KUT rapport 2001:13
The criminal policy perspective
The first perspective is considered to be official and criminal-political. Two main
issues will be shortly discussed: the development of measures against organised
crime and the problems of clarifying what kind of phenomenon organised crime
actually is.
Political discussion on the international, cross-border criminality has been
vivid since the 1990s.6 It is claimed that since 1995, the seizures of alcohol and
cigarettes have increased remarkably7, and that the increased levels are actual.8
This kind of criminality can be regarded as an obstacle and threat to the princi-
ples of the Union. It can also be considered as a problem for the state. For in-
stance, it has been estimated that a lorry loaded with smuggled cigarettes equals
to 15 million Swedish kronas in lost taxes.9
Even though it is stated in official documents that organised crime still has a
low impact on Swedish society, Sweden is involved in an adjustment process to-
wards more universal and common solutions to combat the problem of organised
crime. In other words, a new international and cross-border criminality is to be
fought with international and cross-border measures.10 From the Swedish point
of view this means, for instance, changes in the organisational structures of the
justice administration, the law and operative work as well.11
Measures—against what and whom?
There seems to be an agreement within the European Union and Sweden that
new measures are needed, but the question remains—against what and whom?
In effort to work towards a common policy for the union, most countries have
adopted a common criterion-list to determine whether a criminal action should
be considered organised crime or not. This list consists of 11 criteria of which
four are obligatory (1, 3, 5, and 11). In addition to these four, two additional crite-
ria need to be met for an act to be defined as organised crime.12
1. Collaboration of two or more people
2. Each with own appointed tasks
3. For a prolonged or indefinite period of time
4. Using some form of discipline and control
5. Suspected of the commission of serious criminal offences
6. Operating on an international level
7. Using violence or other means suitable for intimidation
8. Using commercial or businesslike structures
9. Engaged in money laundering
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10 Ds 1997:51
11 Westfelt, 2001
12 RKP KUT rapport 2001:13
10. Exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration, judicial au-
thorities or economy
11. Determined by the pursuit of profit and/or power.
Similar to the concept of economic crime, the concept of organised crime is
somewhat vague, and the variety of criminal activities that are described as ex-
amples of organised crime indicate a lack of precision. The definition covers, for
instance, a broad range of criminal acts and settings: smuggling of alcohol and
cigarettes, trafficking, murder, theft and so forth. Despite these problems, the list
is probably an important tool for political activities. For example, it provides a
guideline to decide what kind of crimes, and who and what groups should be con-
trolled and handled as organised crime.13
I have now outlined in a very broad and brief manner what can be considered
as tendencies in the crime policy agenda in the European Union. The first per-
spective is seen as the crime-policy context in which this particular group of in-
formants worked before the sentence, but also during their time in prison. I have
focused on the political aspect of organised crime and emphasised that interna-
tional, cross-border crime problems should be handled by international co-opera-
tion on several levels. A step toward this is the usage of the criterion-list. The list
has an operative and essential function. It is likely to serve as a framework for both
knowledge and political decisions.14 Despite the vagueness of what to “act
against”, there is a clear ambition to act united and with common strategies against
organised crime. Whether or not this in practice proves to be an adequate measure
and action against smuggling and organised crime, remains an open question.
The crime-actors’ perspective
I will now focus on the empirical material from two perspectives. The first deals
with the haulage industry and describes some of the difficulties from a structural
level. Thereafter, I will describe motives to smuggle.
None of the interviewees had entered the industry or established a business with
the intention to commit crimes or to smuggle. The crimes had not been committed
during the ordinary occupational duties, but rather alongside with the legal busi-
ness. It should be noted that even though the informants were in prison, convicted
of smuggling, this did not necessarily mean that they were guilty of the crime.
Some informants claimed they were either innocent or unfairly sentenced.
Small-scale companies, with one or a few vehicles, dominate the road haulage
industry.15 Several informants described it as an occupation that has stayed in the
family for generations. Most of the informants had small-scale companies, and
described financial difficulties they had faced. A majority stated that Sweden’s
entrance in the European Union has had positive effects, but they also described
the competition between many countries as tough. They believed that the situa-
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tion derived, among other things, from the different cost and price levels: Swe-
den is more expensive in many respects than other countries, and, therefore, its
competitive position is weak also in the haulage business. All informants dis-
cussed their strained financial situation. Even small expenses could lead to major
difficulties. They also described a sense of lack of self-determination and not be-
ing able to control or handle their everyday working life.
These are some of the factors that the informants mentioned as affecting their
everyday work, things with which they had to cope somehow. A strained finan-
cial situation was a common problem among the informants, especially those
with small companies. In conclusion, all informants had experienced some sort
of strain in relation to their occupation.
The smuggling procedure in itself is no different from ordinary and legal
transport. Alcohol and cigarettes are legal goods in society and transported on a
legal basis. In other words, there is a “normality dimension” to alcohol and to-
bacco in contrast to narcotics. All informants distanced themselves from smug-
gling narcotics. None of the informants said they were “out in the cold” or stig-
matised among their colleagues because of the smuggling. They could, if they
wanted, get back into the industry after prison.
When asking an informant about the motives to smuggle, I was told that “it
wasn’t for the excitement”. The informants’ descriptions reflect a financial di-
mension of smuggling. Some of them had, after a longer period of financial
strain, committed a crime to remain in business. Some of them had smuggled be-
cause “hard work wasn’t enough”. A few of them had already experienced bank-
ruptcy. Most informants expressed a sincere will to remain in the industry.
It seems that smuggling was regarded as a strategy to solve financial prob-
lems. Another aspect of financial motives was to smuggle in order to get money
for a new vehicle, a vacation or something else that could be considered “extra”.
Respondents said that ordinary work had not provided those possibilities. The
interviews indicate that in most cases, the motive was a financial one. I believe
that for most, smuggling presented a strategy to cope with financial strain, rather
than to satisfy “greed”.
Conclusion
So far, I have concluded that there is a connection between the haulage industry,
smuggling and organised crime, resulting from structural dispositions in the in-
dustry.
Crime political issues, and more specifically the problem of organised crime,
can be analysed from different points of departure. I have chosen to relate tenden-
cies in the political discourse to crime-actors’perspective. In other words, two per-
spectives on the meaning of organised crime are connected to each other. First, the
political perspective, reflecting the development towards common definitions and
measures within the union. Second, the actor perspective including descriptions of
structural difficulties in the industry and motives to commit crime.
From a crime-political perspective, smuggling, as a form of organised crime,
poses some form of obstacle and threat (threat to freedoms within the European Un-
ion, resulting tax losses to the Swedish state, etc.). On the other hand, from an actor’s
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perspective, the empirical material indicates that smuggling means something else.
According to the interviews, the motives appear more complex. For instance, it is not
possible to view the crimes as simple attempts to gain economic profit.
If we take the informants’descriptions seriously, new crime-political options
emerge. A majority of the individuals have experienced different forms of strain
in their everyday work, some of which have partly resulted from the situation on
the European market. Hence, there are alternative and distinctive political means
available, such as creating better structural conditions for people who wish to
work in the road haulage industry.
Final remarks
In my future work, I will scrutinise the issues of formal control, law enforcement
and regulation of the industry; including a number of institutions that play a sig-
nificant role. One purpose is to examine what meaning the informants attribute to
the different aspects of control, and what impact it has on their professional life.
This is also linked to the informants’ construction of meaning when it comes to
economic crimes. The informants’ experiences and descriptions are interpreted
in relation to the occupational, structural and historical context of the road haul-
age industry.
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Organized Crime in Ukraine:
Contemporary Situation and
Methods of Counteraction
Olena Shostko,
National Law Academy, Ukraine
Organised crime, rooted in the Soviet past, is a very serious problem for all
post-communist countries, including Ukraine. The main trait of all post-Soviet
organised crime is the combination of corrupt civil servants and their association
with shadow economy and criminal structures. L. Shelley believes that post-So-
viet organised crime represents a new form of non-state based authoritarianism
(Shelley 1997).
Organised crime is a very complex phenomenon that reflects only the outward
appearances of a more general process. It is directly connected with integral po-
litical, economic and social relations within our society.
In this paper, I first make several observations about the notion of organised
crime. It is necessary to stress that organised crime is a criminological definition,
and is formulated, as a rule, on the basis of legislation. There is no consensus over
this term among Ukrainian scholars, nor among the international scholarly com-
munity.
There are two major approaches to classify organised crime. The first ap-
proach is to classify groups by the nature of the offences they commit. The legis-
lation of the USA and some other countries stipulate categories of crimes, which
identify criminals as being engaged in organised crime. For example, the RICO
Act applies to any enterprise involving racketeering. Racketeering is defined as
an act that demonstrates a pattern of criminal offences (West’s Encyclopedia of
American Law, 393).
The second approach is to sort groups by the nature of their organisation. The
latter approach is dominant in Ukrainian criminology. Article 1 of the Law of
Ukraine “On the Legal Foundations of the Fight Against Organized Crime”
(1993) defines organised crime as an “aggregate of crimes, committed through
the creation and operation of organised criminal groups”, but provides no defini-
tion of “organised criminal group”. Sections 3 and 4, Article 28 of the new Crim-
inal Code of Ukraine (CC of Ukraine, 2001), passed on April 5, 2001 and thus
one of the most recently adopted criminal codes on the post-Soviet territory, fills
the gap by defining the terms “organised group” and “criminal organisation”. I
would next like to examine these definitions.
A crime is considered to be committed by an organised group (OG), if it is pre-
pared or committed by three or more individuals that have previously established
a stable association with the goal of committing this or any other crime with a
single plan, which is known to all members of the group and involves role distri-
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bution among the group members in order to implement the plan.(Section 3, Ar-
ticle 28 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, 2001).
A crime is considered to be committed by a criminal organisation (CO) if it is
committed by a stable hierarchic association of three or more individuals, whose
members or structural components have in advance organised joint activities
with the goal of committing serious or very serious crimes, or who have gov-
erned or coordinated the criminal activities of other individuals, or who have
supported this or other criminal organisations (Section 4, Article 28 of the Crimi-
nal Code of Ukraine).
Serious crime is a crime punishable by imprisonment of no more than 10
years (Section 4, Article 12). Very serious crime is a crime punishable by impris-
onment of more than 10 years or life (Section 5, Article 12).
It is necessary to underscore that the Criminal Code definitions include many
subjective characteristics and lack precise criteria. The traits of a stable associa-
tion or stable hierarchic association are determined by the investigative agencies
and the court, and are sometimes very difficult to prove. This interpretive nature
of the Criminal Code has resulted in more than one interpretation in terms of ju-
dicial practice, and in limited ability to fight organised crime as a whole. In prac-
tice, only individual members of criminal organisations can thus be prosecuted.
I would like to point out that Article 255 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine
takes into account the successful experiences of foreign countries. It criminalises
activities that aim at creating criminal organisations. However, in 2002, for ex-
ample, there were only 17 registered cases of creating criminal organisations in
Ukraine. In the Kharkiv region, one of the largest in Ukraine, only one case was
investigated under Article 255 in the said year. The causes of this situation will be
discussed later.
We may compare approaches of the Ukrainian legislators with those of the
law enforcement agencies of the European Union (EU). The latter classify any
crime or criminal group as organised crime if at least six of the following charac-
teristics are present, three of which must be those numbered 1, 5 and 11 (Global
Report on Crime and Justice 1999, 61).
1. Collaboration of more than two people;
2. Each with appointed tasks;
3. For a prolonged or indefinite period of time;
4. Using some form of discipline or control;
5. Suspected of the commission of serious criminal offences;
6. Operating on an international level;
7. Using violence or other means suitable for intimidation;
8. Using commercial or businesslike structure;
9. Engaged in money laundering;
10. Exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration, judicial au-
thorities or economy;
11. Determined by the pursuit of profit and/or power.
We may conclude that the Ukrainian Criminal Code differs in that it does not re-
quire “organised group” or “criminal organisation” to be involved in activities
that are organised for the explicit purpose of achieving gains in wealth or power.
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The first and fifth characteristics, however, are present in the corresponding Arti-
cle of the Ukrainian Criminal Code.
Many scholars think that the terms “criminal business” and “criminal enter-
prise” better reflect the essence of organised groups’ activities. Thus a criminal
organisation is to some extent a criminal enterprise. Additionally, the legislation
of many foreign countries and international laws identify the purpose of “acquir-
ing proceeds and excess profit illegally” as the major criterion that distinguishes
organised crime from ordinary criminal activity.
The simplest definition of organised crime would be as follows: it is an aggre-
gate of crimes, committed by organised groups or members of criminal organisa-
tions on a certain territory for a definitive period of time.
I will now briefly analyse the contemporary situation of organised crime in
Ukraine. Official statistics from the Ministry of Interior of Ukraine depict the
scale and scope of organised crime, including the number of known organised
criminal groups (OG), their members and crimes committed (Department of In-
formation Technology, Ministry of Interior, 2003, 5-1–5-13).
Official statistics show that over the last five years, the number of exposed or-
ganised groups has declined from 1,157 to 721. This trend is consistent with the
decrease in recorded cases of organised crime.
Table 2 contains more precise data on the structure of organised crime.
From the 2002 statistics, we see that 78% of the crimes committed by OGs
and COs are of a general criminal nature. Of these 21% are economy-related.
Only 3% of the groups are considered to have international criminal connec-
tions. Most prosecuted organised groups (75%) existed for one year, 18% com-
mitted crimes for two years and only 7% operated for more than two years (De-
partment of Information Technology, Ministry of Interior, 2003). It is also note-
worthy that in the Kharkiv region, for example, law enforcement agencies dis-
covered only three drug-related organised groups in 2002, each with three mem-
bers. Yet some experts estimate that there are as many as 20,000 drug addicts in
the said area (Pitya, 2002).
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Years Exposed organised groups Registered crimes committed by
organised groups
1998 1 157 9 273
1999 1 166 9 307
2000 960 7 744
2001 770 6 703
2002 721 6 463
Table 1. Organised crime in Ukraine.
The data need to be interpreted with caution. 1. The decrease in the number of
OGs and COs detected results from the following circumstances: a) before 2001,
the Criminal Code of Ukraine did not clearly define these terms, and b) as a re-
sult, law enforcement personnel interpreted these terms broadly: their interpreta-
tion was based on subjective evaluation and approaches. Law enforcement agen-
cies lacked precise guidelines for distinguishing organised criminal groups from
traditional groups of criminals. For a long time activities carried out by two ac-
complices were considered to belong to organised crime, although hierarchy and
role distribution are possible only when at least three persons are working to-
gether. (This number has been identified in many countries, such as Italy and Ro-
mania, and in international documents). It is very positive that the new Criminal
Code of Ukraine reflects this definition and not the previous one. Earlier, crimes
that had nothing to do with organised crime were often regarded to be committed
by organised groups. Therefore, the decreased number of detected groups may
be regarded as a positive tendency. 2. Ministry of Interior statistics do not contain
any information concerning the number of disbanded organised criminal groups.
3. Crimes committed by the most dangerous organised criminal groups are still
latent (Shostko 2002, 66). These criminal organisations have corrupt links with
government officials, control shadow economy, and possess enormous amounts
of criminal funds invested in legitimate, semi-legitimate and criminal business.
Members of criminal associations use latest technology to prepare crimes and
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Structure of crime committed by organized
group and criminal organization, 2002
drug abuse
8.5
bribery
1.3
unlawful weapon
turnover
3.6
robbery
11.0
murder
1.5
bandititry
1.0
plunder
3.1
Extortion
1.8
embezzlement
7.7
money laundering
1.1
other
25.2
crime in
finance sphere
3.3
theft,
31.0
Table 2. More precise data on the structure of organised crime.
cover their tracks. Such illicit activity is very hard to investigate, so only clearly
visible crimes are investigated. 4. The primary criteria with which the efficiency
of law enforcement can be determined are the number and percentage of crimes
investigated. Therefore, law enforcement personnel who need to show results
target mostly at poorly organised crimes.
Very often the activities of criminal organisations are carried out through ordi-
nary commercial agreements, financial transactions, privatisation and legitimate
business dealings. As a rule they are related to tax evasion. These activities are
not included in official statistics.
Unfortunately, considering this analysis, we might conclude that
the law enforcement mechanism does not work effectively
An additional problem is posed by the connection of organised crime with
money laundering. Ukraine criminalised this kind of activity and began develop-
ing a legislative foundation for combating money laundering in 2001. Legalisa-
tion (laundering) of monetary assets or other assets acquired through criminal
means is understood as using such assets for business and other economic activ-
ity, or as founding organised groups in Ukraine or abroad to legalise (launder)
such assets (Article 209 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine)
The law On Fighting Money Laundering was passed in the end of 2002. The
State Finance Monitoring Department was established at the Ministry of Finance
of Ukraine in 2002. Money laundering comprises 0.8% of all crimes committed
by OGs and COs.
The massive concealment of foreign currency proceeds in foreign banks and
tax evasion worsens the economic situation in Ukraine. Although the CC of
Ukraine criminalises evading taxes on currency proceeds, and illegally opening
and using currency accounts abroad, in 2002 only 21 crimes committed by or-
ganised groups in the international economic sphere were investigated.
We may conclude that the most serious and sophisticated crimes and crimi-
nals go unpunished. This results from incontrollable corruption among those
who are defending law and order, and from the fact that organised criminal
groups often include employees of the militia, customs, tax and procuracy agen-
cies. As a rule such crimes do not reach the trial stage.
Obstacles to counteraction
As a country in transition, Ukraine is suffering from a lack of solidarity on social
and political issues and cultural values. Having democratically attained inde-
pendence, the people of Ukraine are now experiencing its downsides, resulting
in poverty, corruption and despair. Firstly, they are caused by the essentially to-
talitarian power structure in Ukraine that serves the interests of clans (influential
financial and administrative groups such as those in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk,
Kharkiv and other major cities). Law enforcement agencies often serve as tools
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for such groups and act under the latter’s instructions. In Ukraine there are two
types of shadow groups: financial-political groups (FPG) and administrative-fi-
nancial groups (AFG).
FPGs are informal shadow alliances that are comprised of representatives of
government agencies, business and the criminal world. AFGs have arisen from
the ruins of the Soviet administrative system and obtained access to financial re-
sources by belonging to governmental control agencies. Belonging to AFGs
gives civil servants stable and reliable income, as well as protection from audit
and law enforcement agencies.
In Ukraine, the moral degradation of society has reached an apex. A survey
conducted in 2003 by the Razumkov Centre shows that 21.5% of respondents
under 18 and 13.7% of 40–59-year-olds ignore laws. 56% of interviewed citi-
zens will always do their best to evade taxes (L. Shangina 2003).
The Soviet regime deprived citizens of their liberty and initiative. Unfortu-
nately, the middle class, the foundation of a democratic society, has not become a
major force in independent Ukraine. Selective justice and corruption are the
main obstacles to overcoming organised crime. One peculiarity of Ukrainian
corruption is that citizens have to bribe to realise their legitimate rights.
The acts of corruption are often veiled by nature. Thus it is necessary to draw
attention to the following fact: At present we are observing massive building and
reconstruction of court buildings, the prosecutor’s office, the militia and tax
agencies. In the early and mid-1990s, the lack of adequate funds and the resulting
material and technical incapacity impeded law enforcement agencies’ battle
against crime. Now the situation has changed. Administrative buildings have
been repaired, although in rural districts, the situation is not as optimistic as in
large cities. How can we explain such a sharp change? Law enforcement bodies
have found a method of financing their activities: they have begun to use “spon-
sors”, mainly from business life. L. Kapelushny, an observer of the Ukrainian
newspaper “Svoboda” (Freedom), argues that this type of official “white” brib-
ery guarantees security for those who have “sponsored” law enforcement offi-
cers, and signals to others that “give money and you win”. But it is the state that
bears responsibility for this situation, because the level of its financial support to
law enforcement agencies is so low (Kapelushny 2002).
There is a special fund in Ukraine that is separate from the budget. All dona-
tions are directed to this fund. It is very interesting that the most successful dona-
tion-collecting agencies are the Ministry of Interior with 310 million hryvnas
(approximately $57 million) in 2001, the Security Service of Ukraine with 122
million hryvnas ($22.5 million), the State Committee on Border Guard Ser-
vice—94 million hryvnas ($17.4 million), the Ministry of Defense—95 million
hryvnas ($17.5 million), and the State Tax Administration—72 million hryvnas
($13.3 million) (Dim’yanchuk 2002).
The question, which arises, is whether organised crime is a force that opposes
the establishment in Ukraine. Or, perhaps the establishment itself is mainly re-
sponsible for criminalising its own ways of working and for the fact that it has
lost control over some processes (e.g. shadow economy).
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Methods of counteraction
Constant and persistent efforts in several areas are needed to solve this problem.
The absence of civil society in Ukraine is one reason behind the inadequacy of
measures to counteract organised crime. Anti-organised crime efforts should fo-
cus on reforming public policies and institutions with explicit high-level leader-
ship and commitment.
Additionally, Ukraine still lacks appropriate measures to encourage fair busi-
ness. As a consequence, criminal organisations are monopolising certain sec-
tors. Some estimates state that 60% of Ukrainian economy is shadow economy.
We may conclude that the state is in crisis. According to Freedom House,
Ukraine has reached a development stage of “transit/hybrid regime” with its in-
herent autocracy and democracy. Government officials are still above social con-
trol. State functions are flagrantly excessive. Total licensing, various quota and
permission systems have not yet been extirpated. As a rule decisions depend on
individual officials whose actions can provide a fertile field for corruption. The
economic difficulties of Ukraine attract foreign criminals, especially Russian, to
legalise their profits in the most important sectors of the economy.
It is necessary to emphasise that fighting organised crime is impracticable un-
less provisions of the Criminal Code and other acts are applied adequately, and
unless proactive activities, crime prevention in particular, are carried out.
It is also worth noting that Ukrainian criminology distinguishes two types of
preventive practices: general (social) and special (criminological).
The first type—general (social prevention)—is a combination of political, ed-
ucational, social and economic measures aimed at perfecting public relations.
Major social measures include the reform of the political and economic system,
the determination of a development strategy, and the formation of civil society
able to gather “political will” to fight organised crime.
To achieve this objective it is of paramount importance to support independ-
ent press, to conduct journalist investigations, and to facilitate the widespread
use of the Internet as a means of publication and communication. At present in-
vestigative journalism is impeded by offenders who use violence against jour-
nalists or bribe them.
Political censorship does exist in Ukraine. It has become the everyday reality
of journalism. This is the view of 86% of the journalists surveyed by the Socio-
logical Service of the Razumkov Centre in 2002. The 727 respondents represent
various printed and electronic, state-run and private mass media agencies from
all administrative regions of Ukraine. The survey demonstrates that it is very
dangerous to write about criminal clans, local authorities, the President and his
administration. Most of the interviewees have learned this first-hand
(Yakimenko and Zhadan 2002).
In order to foster the transparency and openness of public officials, it is neces-
sary to develop and adopt complex laws “On Civil Control of Public Activity”
and “On Organized Political Opposition in Ukraine”. It is also very important to
develop a special law on parliamentary control over the activities of the President
of Ukraine, Prime Minister, Cabinet of Ministers, departments, agencies, de-
222
fence and Prosecutor’s Office. Constant and persistent efforts in several areas are
needed to solve this problem.
First it is necessary to create an environment that is conducive to honest busi-
ness, speed up the creation of a modern legislation on competition, price forma-
tion and contract making, and carry out a tax reform. Anti-organised crime ef-
forts should focus on reforming public policies and institutions, with explicit
high-level leadership and commitment.
The first step must be to develop and enact methods of general and social pre-
vention which would encourage public officials to fulfil their duties honestly,
such as moral and material stimulation, a system of privileges, and quicker ca-
reer advancement in the case of honest fulfilment of one’s duties. On the other
hand, it is important to inform citizens about the legal ways of solving problems
under Ukrainian legislation, including initiating court proceedings in order to
protect violated rights. It is necessary to remove from peoples’minds the behav-
ioural stereotypes which connect problem-solving with money. This should be
executed through special school programmes. It would be difficult for public of-
ficials to commit misuse or abuse of office or power if people were willing to dis-
close all facts of such misuse or abuse.
Ukraine needs an independent judicial branch. Despite the general difficulties
of the third power, statistics show that the citizens of Ukraine are placing an in-
creasing amount of trust in the court system. During 1991–2000, the number of
complaints against wrongful acts committed by public administrative agencies
and officials increased from 1,043 to 29,952. When in 1991 courts decided 222
cases for the plaintiffs, in 2000 the corresponding figure was 18,260 (Bulletin of
Supreme Court of Ukraine 2002, 44).
Special (criminological) prevention must be aimed at neutralising and de-
creasing the influence of criminogenic factors that produce crime, particularly
organised crime.
On the grounds of Part 2, Article 5 of the Law of Ukraine On the Legal Foun-
dations of the Fight Against Organized Crime, the following public agencies
have been purposefully established:
a) Coordination Committee for Combating Corruption and Organised Crime
of the President of Ukraine;
b) Special subdivisions for combating organised crime in the Ministry of Inte-
rior;
c) Special subdivisions for corruption and combating organised crime of Se-
cret Service of Ukraine.
According to Section 1 Art. 8 of this law, the Attorney General’s Office coordi-
nates the fight against organised crime at the national level, and its counterparts
at the regional level. But new circumstances require entirely different ap-
proaches for the organisation and functioning of law enforcement agencies that
were created during soviet time.
We need to study international experience concerning the responsibility of le-
gal entities in corruption and organised crime cases. We need to improve
Ukraine’s ability to combat organised crime by initiating a judicial reform which
would have to include legal, administrative and organisational changes. For the
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system and processes to be more efficient, they must also be made more transpar-
ent and accountable. Therefore, the creation of a transparency mechanism to en-
hance social control of law enforcement agencies is vitally important.
Current activities to combat organised crime in Ukraine are hampered by defi-
ciencies in the criminal procedure laws, especially those concerning the collec-
tion and assessment of evidence. The increasing proficiency and technical ca-
pacity of the criminals dictates the necessity for legal regulation and implemen-
tation of new types of forensic technologies. International community considers
the use of testimony by members of organised groups who have agreed to collab-
orate with law enforcement agencies as a key method of fighting organised
crime. Although Section 2, Article 14, the Law of Ukraine On the Legal Founda-
tions of the Fight Against Organized Crime provides such a possibility, this pro-
vision does not work in practice as long as there is no real mechanism to exoner-
ate such individuals. At present, Part 2, Article 225 of the Criminal Code of
Ukraine provides for the release of criminal groups’members from punishment,
but it does not contain a similar provision for the members of organised groups.
An appropriate mechanism to enforce the above-cited provision does not exist,
as the Criminal Procedure Code still requires respective amendments.
Under the current Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, adopted 40 years ago,
it is impossible to solve the investigative problems, as well as to guarantee an ad-
equate procedure for counting the acts of organised crime. A new Criminal Pro-
cedure Code has not yet been passed.
It is necessary to specify more clearly the rights and duties of the various law
enforcement and control agencies to avoid any unnecessary overlapping of their
functions. We need to enforce complex laws necessary to prosecute large and so-
phisticated crime networks.
Conclusion
A number of systemic improvements should be brought about. However, I view
this as impossible under the present government. Thus it is of primary impor-
tance for Ukraine, as a country in transition, to reach a new stage of political de-
velopment, in particular to involve in public activity fresh politicians who are not
burdened with the nomenclature past and who are able, first of all, to defend
Ukrainian interests. Until this takes place one should not expect radical changes
in law-enforcement activity against organised crime.
R. Kelly rightly states that criminal syndicates are successful “… in societies
where political institutions are not particularly sensitive to or responsive to the
needs of the public” (Kelly, 40). About 80% of Ukrainian citizens agree that they
are not able to influence governmental decisions and actions.
If new forms of social and legal control over organised crime are created, most
likely after the next presidential elections, Ukraine will be able to achieve and
maintain a decrease in organised crime.
I believe that research and recommendations that take into account the experi-
ence of other countries can become an intellectual force facilitating qualitative
changes in public relations.
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International Trafficking in Human Organs
G.V. Travaini, S. Garibaldo, V. Arcari, R. Molteni,
Institute of Legal Medicine, University of Milan, Italy
Introduction
The development of medical knowledge has given birth to new techniques which
are the driving force of modern civilization.
Success in organ transplantation was one of the most powerful medical ad-
vances of the twentieth century. Continuous progress is clearly occurring, and
future possibilities may exceed all expectations. In Italy, the development of
medical technology has led to routine transplantation. Unfortunately, a concomi-
tant reality casts a shadow over this scientific feat: there is a dramatic shortage of
organs, and the situation worsens by the day.
This gap between demand and supply has opened a window of opportunity for
criminal exploitation.
In the following, the authors will try to clarify the borderline between legend,
myth and reality characterising this kind of crime. The focus is on kidney com-
mercialisation since the medical skills needed for its transplantation are more el-
ementary if compared with surgical procedures for other organ transplants.
The authors analyse organ commercialisation from a criminological and med-
ico-legal point of view, and focus their attention on the possible difficulties
which may emerge when combating the crime.
Current developments
The most consistent source of information about organ trafficking are the ru-
mours spread worldwide with multimedia coverage; unfortunately, few of them
are based on official reports or scientific analyses.
Of the official material, American literature is the most analysed since organ
traffic has been thoroughly studied in the United States.
After a deep examination of the procedural protocol pursued and approved by
the international transplantation societies, and considering the medical problems
related to single organ traffic, it is plausible that the only possible way to sur-
mount these obstacles is to create “medical tourism” for transplant surgery.
This “tourism” is realised through international trade routes between the
would-be organ recipients, and the future vendors who to a large extent occupy
the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum.
To best understand how this crime is constructed, the authors will now exam-
ine the situation in India, China and Iran.
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India
India has been called a “warehouse for kidneys” or “the great organ bazaar”. It
has become one of the largest centres for kidney transplants in the world, offer-
ing low costs and almost immediate availability.
On 15 January 1995, customs officers in Delhi uncovered a kidney racket
where the residents of a rehabilitation colony for leprosy patients in Villivakkam
near Chennai (before known as Madras), capital city of Tamil Nadu in the south
of India, freely donated kidneys for money offered by agents. Then, on January
29, 1995, the police busted a massive racket in Banglore, in which kidneys of
nearly a thousand unsuspecting victims had been removed in the leading city
hospital by prominent doctors. The “donors” had been lured with offers of jobs,
and their kidneys removed under a pretext1.
The official reports highlighted that the potential receivers, kidney patients
from Occidental Asia, Malaysia and Singapore, were prepared to travel to India.2
After the exposure of kidney scandals in its major cities, Indian Congress
passed Act 42, The Transplantation of Human Organs’Act, in order to block the
trade in human organs. This law prohibits all commercial trading and allows or-
gans to be removed only for therapeutic purposes. Furthermore, it bans all organ
transplants, except those donated by relatives specified as spouse, son, daughter,
father, mother, brother or sister. The Act, however, is far from watertight. Its big-
gest problem is the clause which states that an unrelated donor, for reasons of af-
fection or attachment towards the recipient may donate his or her kidney pro-
vided that the donation is approved by the Authorisation Committee. Since the
Act came into force, this clause has provided a cover for hundreds of illegal
cash-for-kidney deals. End-stage renal disease patients in Karnataka and Tamil
Nadu have claimed blatantly false emotional and altruistic attachment to pro-
spective donors, and made misrepresentations to the Committee in order to se-
cure approval for what are in fact outright commercial transactions in kidneys.
The Voluntary Health Organisation of India estimates that each year more
than 2,000 people sell their organs for money (compared with 500 in 1985 and
only 50 in 1983).
The kidney market in not subject to inflation: the receiver spends approxi-
mately $9,900–$23,000 of which a small percentage goes to the donor, and the
remainder is shared between the doctors and the broker.
The possible long-term consequences of this illicit activity are dramatic: in
Bombay, a number of HIV-patients tried to sell kidneys in order to earn a living.
Doctor Kandela says that for every donor identified as HIV-positive, five slip
through the net, putting many lives at risk3.
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China
In 1997, a task force composed of transplant surgeons, organ procurement spe-
cialists, human rights activists, and social scientists, met at the Rockfeller Con-
ference Centre in Bellagio, Italy. This group met to define ethical standards for
the international practice of organ donation, especially in light of abuses that un-
dermine the bodily integrity of socially disadvantaged members of society.
The report produced by the Bellagio working group underlines how the use of or-
gans from executed prisoners is systematic, accepted and institutionalised in China.
The June 1977 Protocol One Additional to the Geneva Convention of 1949
bans the use of organs from prisoners. The rationale is that prisoners are thought
to be incapable to give their consent.
The precise number of prisoners executed in China is not known. Some 2,000
cases are reported in the country’s newspapers, but organisations such as Am-
nesty International believe that there may be as many as 8,000 to 10,000 execu-
tions each year.
Some anthropologists believe that physicians in Japan, Hong Kong, Singa-
pore and Taiwan serve as “travel agents”, directing their patients to hospitals in
Wuhan, Beijing and Shanghai. Foreigners do not have to wait for an organ to be
available; executions can be timed to meet the market needs, and the supply is
more than adequate4.
Descriptions of the event are dramatic: immediately before the execution, the
physician sedates the prisoner. Then a breathing tube is inserted into his lungs
and a catheter into a vein. The prisoner is then executed by a shot in the head; the
physician immediately moves to stem the blood flow, attaches a respirator to the
breathing tube, and injects drugs into the catheter to increase blood pressure and
cardiac output. With the organs thus maintained, the body is transported to hospi-
tal where the receiver is waiting, and the surgery performed. The physicians have
become immediate participants in the executions; instead of protecting life, they
are manipulating the consequences of death.
Iran
At the beginning of the transplant programme in Kermanshah in 1989, the price
per kidney was $340 (2.5 million Rials), ranking the so-called Kermanshian kid-
ney as one of the cheapest in the world by any standard. But in ten years time the
price has risen to $1,219 (10 million Rials)5.
The current availability of cheap kidneys for sale is the greatest obstacle to es-
tablishing a cadaveric transplant programme in Iran6.
In Iran, the Charity Association for Support of Kidney Patients (CASKP) per-
forms all preparatory steps for arranging transplants. CASKP representatives
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have admitted that CASKP is involved in more than 90% of kidney transplanta-
tions in Iran: CASKP is like a real estate agency where sellers and buyers meet7.
The potential donor contacts CASKP and is put on the donor list. In Kermanshah,
the donor provides CASKP a promissory note of $244. If the potential donor refuses
donation after the preoperative evaluations and laboratory tests, which are done at
recipient’s expense, the donor pays this sum. The system prevents potential donors
from refusing donation after entering the preoperative phase.
There are two contracts regarding payment. One is the official contract stating
that the donor receives the equivalent of $1,219 from the governmental budget.
Payment is made immediately postoperatively.
The other contract is concluded between the donor and the recipient. Often,
the recipient offers the donor extra money and, if unemployed, a job.
The emergence of this type of contracts has resulted in non-existent recipient
waiting lists, open black market, extinction of living-related renal donor trans-
plantation, and in the appearance of professional brokers.
Certain control should be imposed on any living-unrelated renal donor trans-
plant programme for it to be even remotely acceptable. There should be no mid-
dlemen. Medical criteria should be given priority, and independent medical and
psychiatric evaluations on both the donors and recipients conducted. There
should be an independent team of surgeons and physicians caring for donors,
long-term medical insurances for donors, external financial auditing, and ban on
transplantation across countries. But there is no sign of any of this. Abject pov-
erty, unemployment, and the lack of social security force people to sell kidneys,
the only reserve they have.
According to a study of 310 Kermanshahian “donors” conducted by the Uni-
versity of Kermanshah, 38% of them had lost their job due to absence from work
because of postoperative pain and disability. Vendors had also been rejected by
their families because they were regarded as unable to earn money by other, more
respectful means. 60% expected to be dialysis-dependent and eventually die of
kidney failure since they were unable to pay and attend all required follow-ups8.
The commerce on web
Over the last years traditional commerce has been coupled with a new kind of
trading. Internet has opened a door to a truly global market area where anyone
can trade anything from home, even organs.
The keywords “kidney for sale” presently produce 56,000 search engine hits.
They take to discussion groups, suspicious money movements, and contrasting
laws on organ donation. Few years ago, a kidney was sold at eBay, the most im-
portant online marketplace, registering the highest price ever offered for a good
on sale9.
229
7 cfr 6
8 Zargooshi J.: Qualità of life of Iranian Kidney “Donors”. The Journal of Urology 166:1790–1799, 2001
9 http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9909/03/ebay.kidney/
The authors browsed Google hits, and tried to investigate which of the “kid-
ney for sale” offers were genuine and which part of the many urban legends re-
lated to this issue. Of the thousands of web pages opened, most could be classi-
fied as belonging to the latter group. On the other hand, we found numerous an-
nouncements on virtual notice boards where web navigators from all corners of
the world may leave messages to which others reply by e-mail.
These messages, sent from different countries, containing similar texts,
seemed to have been written by desperate people for whom selling a kidney
served as the only thinkable financial reserve. The notices underlined some med-
ical information which was thought to be useful to the buyer.
After a thorough analysis of the messages, it was realised that the majority of
e-mail addresses given were not easy to trace since they had been obtained from
services that guarantee e-mail anonymity. For this reason, the investigation was
brought to an end. Any further research would have crossed the line of illegality;
contacting a kidney broker without being traced by the police requires particular
authorisation and specialised technical skills.
The findings of the investigation do not necessarily correspond with reality.
There are no concrete data verifying the existence of this crime; at this mo-
ment we are not able to say if e-commerce on organs is a mere swindle.
However, if this crime really exists, it is obvious that the number of victims
will increase unless a balance between demand and supply can somehow be
achieved.
Final considerations
Considering the difficulties in maintaining an organ in perfect condition for an
implant, and the risk of being caught by customs of states where it is forbidden to
sell organs, it seems plausible to suggest that these kinds of transplants are car-
ried out in countries where laws are not so strict.
The primary commodity on this market is the kidney, and the reason for this
must be the relatively easy surgical approach.
In a follow-up to the Bellagio Task Force, Professors Scheper-Hughes and
Cohen, with support from the Soros Foundation, created an “Organs Watch”, a
small, independent, ultimately self-supporting, human rights-oriented docu-
mentation centre that aims to track down global rumours on organ commerce.
Anthropologist Scheper-Hughes talks about medical tourism:
“Medical centres propagate their medical services as tourist operators prop-
agate their locations with beautiful golf camps and luxury hotels with excel-
lent restaurants and convenient prices. These medical tour operators offer
all-inclusive packets. For example, in Tel Aviv, with the collaboration of one of
the most famous Israelian surgeon, an agency offers an all-inclusive trip for
$120,000–$200,000. For this price, the Israel Medical Tour Operator offers
private airplane, taxes for the custom officials, room in a private clinic, fee for
the donor and transplant operation.”
Organs Watch’s experts believe that the would-be organ recipients follow routes
from those countries where organ commerce is a crime to those where these kind
of transplants are legal.
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In February 2001, a group of American researches obtained interesting results
from Chennai, the capital city of Tamil Nadu (India). They interviewed 300 indi-
viduals who had sold a kidney there, and the results were unequivocal: Almost
all participants had sold the kidney to pay debts. The amount promised for selling
a kidney averaged $1,410, while the amount actually received $1,070. The ma-
jority of the donors reported a worsening of their economic status. 60% of the
money received had been spent on debts, 22% for food and clothing, and only
11% was retained as cash equivalents. About 83% of the donors reported deterio-
ration in their health status after nephrectomy10.
Although we cannot yet be sure of the quantification of this crime, there are
few doubts as to the existence of a parallel and illegal organ procurement. This
obliges us to consider which methods should be put in use to achieve a contain-
ment of organ traffic.
Important implications regard developing countries where potential donors
need to be protected against exploitation. Protection might involve education
concerning the likely outcomes of selling a kidney. But there are many possible
means of intervention through which a collective consciousness of the immoral-
ity and dangerousness of organ trafficking can be obtained.
On the other hand, there are experts who think that the legalisation of organ
commerce and creation of market models for the procurement of transplantable
organs would be the solution11.
The main arguments supporting organ commerce, found in literature, are ei-
ther libertarian or utilitarian. Libertarians claim that since selling oneself freely
to another does not involve a violation of the right of self-determination, such
transactions should fall within the protected privacy of free individuals on the ba-
sis of the principle of autonomy12. Utilitarians, on the other hand, say that as long
as the current altruistic system of organ procurement is not making enough or-
gans available, the benefits for the recipients by an overall increase in the supply
of transplantable organs and the benefits for voluntary vendors would outweigh
objections. It is claimed that insisting on the ethical superiority of an altruistic
system of organ procurement will impose heavy costs on those patients who
could benefit from the pragmatic and immediate solutions offered by a modern
market system13.
The proposals to introduce commerce in organ transplantation have been
unanimously rejected by national and international medical organisations and
parliaments. The World Health Organisation has published reviews of interna-
tional and national legislation, codes and other measures to combat commercial-
ism in the use of human organs and tissues for therapeutic purposes.
Nevertheless, some arguments against paid transactions with organs reveal
their weakness if scrutinised. Selling an organ is not necessarily equivalent to a
commodification of the donor’s body, depersonalised view of human beings, and
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an offence against their dignity, because the question of self-degradation de-
pends on whether the person who sells an organ evaluates his/her action as
self-degradation or not14.
There is, however, one argument against commercialism in organ transplanta-
tion that is beyond criticism: market models would inevitably mean the exploita-
tion of the poorer in favour of the richer parts of society. Disparities in wealth and
chances should mean that we have duties and responsibilities towards the less
privileged, not that we have the right to exploit them.
The more general question of a financial quid pro quo for the donor of an or-
gan constitutes one of the most controversial problems in the current ethical dis-
cussion of living organ donation. As the continuing analytic and documentary
work of Daar15 has shown, there are crucial differences between rampant com-
mercialism on the one hand, and concepts of rewarded gifting on the other. The
concept of compensation does not just include compensation for the living do-
nor’s loss of earnings, but also an adequate additional insurance scheme against
the risks he takes. From an ethical point of view, this seems to be something the
health system owes to living donors, and in this respect a lot still has to be done.
Additional financial incentives must not be permitted. In fact, it seems possible
that even direct financial incentives could be restricted in ways that would still
permit altruism. The boundary between compensation and incentives could be
drawn on the grounds of a legal term “Schmerzensgeld”16, which is defined as
pain money or smart-money, a compensation for personal suffering, and which
originates from the context of actions for illegal damages. The idea would be to
pay an official, unified compensation for the pain and troubles an organ donor
has to endure. Such a reward would still be closer to removing disincentives than
to providing financial incentives, and it would preserve the socio-cultural mean-
ing of the act of donation. This idea seems acceptable for developed countries
which have enough cultural and legal resources to provide sufficient control over
such a system, and to prevent it from getting on the “slippery slope” towards
commercialism which could undermine public trust in the transplant system.
In conclusion, we are aware of the fact that our work on this complex topic is
by no means exhaustive. We have tried to get a general idea of the actual situa-
tion. There are only few certainties: the quest for organs is continuously increas-
ing, and the legal routes to satisfy the demand are not sufficient. The concrete
risk is that illegality will prevail in organ procurement, and that organs will be-
come smuggled goods.
There is a need for further studies that are free from banal sensationalism, and
which monitor the development of the phenomenon and analyse the motivations
which undermine legal measures against this crime.
Our study represents the first humble step on this winding road.
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The Penal Legislation Concerning
Illegal Drugs in the Czech Republic:
The Right Time for Change Now?
Petr Zeman,
Institute of Criminology and Social Prevention, Czech Republic
Introduction
After the fall of the Communist regime, there arose a need to change the legal or-
der of the Czech Republic. The principles of democratic law were included in the
new rules, from the Constitution to many laws, their amendments, and sub-laws
(ministerial orders, municipal ordinances, governmental decrees). Penal law
was not excluded from this development. However, freedom has been accompa-
nied by negative phenomena, too. One of them, the interest in illegal drugs and
their use, started to increase in the early 1990s, and this trend still continues. As a
positive impact of this situation, the drugs and their use are no longer a taboo.
Nevertheless, drugs have spread through the whole society—drug careers start-
ing at the age of 12 or 13 and the flourishing drug market have become an integral
part of Czech reality. Before 1990, the Czech Republic shared the same experi-
ence in the field of drug abuse as the other European Communist countries: there
was no real drug market, “classic” drugs like heroin or cocaine were absent and
substituted by popular home-made drugs (pervitin, braun), there was an en-
closed drug subculture, and so on. The fall of the iron curtain led to the establish-
ment of a similar organised and structured drug scene as in Western Europe. This
development was strengthened by specific aspects like the country’s strategic
position in the centre of Europe, the initial high border permeability, and the de-
veloped legal chemical industry whose procurable raw materials experienced
producers were able to use for drugs production.
The most recent evaluation of the Czech drug scene in the Principal Hygienic
Station’s Epidemical Report indicates that drug use is increasing. In 2002, the in-
cidence of registered drug users (First Treatment Demand, FTD) was 4,719 per-
sons (45.9/100,000 inhabitants), and prevalence 9,237 persons (89.9/100,000 in-
habitants). The incidence of registered so-called problem drug users (PDU) was
3,472 persons (73.6 % of all FTD’s), and prevalence 7,441 persons. As PDU is
considered a person, who injects drugs and/or has been using heroin or other opi-
ates for a long time and/or has been using cocaine for a long time and/or has been
using amphetamines (except ecstasy) for a long time. The estimated prevalence
of all PDU’s was 34,300 persons (28,800 injecting users). More than half of the
registered clients used ATS (especially pervitin, the No. 1 drug in Czech) as the
primary drug. Opiates (esp. heroin) and cannabis (esp. marihuana) followed with
a share of about 20 %. The male/female ratio was approximately 2.1/1. Most
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FDT’s were 15–19-year-olds, while the 20–24-year-olds formed the largest
group among all users.
This central drug user monitoring system has been running since 1995. The
figures have been on a steady rise, partially thanks to an increasing number of
treatment centres included in the system. It can be stated that excepting a very
small decline in the late 1990s, the incidence of ATS users has been increasing as
well as that of the opiates users. These two tendencies show a mirror effect: in-
crease in the number of ATS users has been attended by a lower number of opi-
ates users, and vice versa. The average age of registered ATS or opiates users has
been increasing (23 years), while with cannabis users it has remained perma-
nently low (18–19 years). The increasing number of injecting drug users is con-
sidered especially worrisome.
According to the latest National Anti-Drug Headquarters’ Annual Report1,
the availability of drugs is increasing on the Czech drug market, and drugs ex-
pand to smaller cities and villages. There are reports of great differences in drug
quality depending on the distribution network level, and of the continuing trend
of active substance quality and quantity lowering in the final drug. The Police
have registered more cases of synthetic drugs consumption by young people on
the dance scene and experimentation with volatile substances. The consumption
of ecstasy has increased as well, partially due to its reduced price. There were
also more recorded cases of hydroponic cannabis cultivation.
Drug-related crimes, including when connected to crimes against property,
are a significant problem. Registered cases of medical products thefts and for-
eign drug-runners have increased. Multinational and foreign criminal groups are
operating and trafficking drugs into the Czech Republic. Currently the Police are
detecting more intensive activity among Asian criminal groups (in the frame-
work of common goods smuggling) and deeper involvement of gypsies, women
and children, in distributing drugs on the streets. At the level of organised crime,
the Police have registered activity of Kosovo-Albanian groups (heroin), Arabian
groups from North Africa (cannabis), Russian-speaking, Vietnamese and Chi-
nese groups. The detection and investigation of crimes committed by these
groups is more difficult because of cultural and language problems. Related ille-
gal activities, such as money laundering through the purchase of cars, gold or for-
eign currency and their transfer abroad, have also been recorded. Pervitin, the
traditional Czech drug, is manufactured by Czech citizens of ephedrine obtained
illegally either from its official Czech producer, from medicines or from abroad,
and also exported to neighbouring countries, especially to Germany. The acts
committed by drug traffickers have become more and more violent, and their
means more and more conspiratory. They try hard to make and maintain contacts
with justice and administrative authorities, and to put pressure on crime wit-
nesses.
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International and National Framework
The Czech Republic is a contracting party to the International Drugs Conven-
tions (1961, 1971, 1988) and tries to keep its obligations, although their interpre-
tation does cause ambiguous opinions among experts. This is the international
aspect, the international source of Czech penal anti-drugs legislation. The legis-
lation also has to follow general principles of law honoured in the Czech Repub-
lic, resting mainly on the principle of “ultima ratio” (principle of subsidiarity of
penal repression). Some of them are explicitly expressed in the Constitution or in
the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms that set constitutional limits
for state intervention into the rights of individuals.
These aspects are reflected in the “National Drug Policy Strategy for the years
2001–2004” adopted by the Czech government, that is based on the comprehen-
sive and well-balanced approach combining primary prevention, harm reduc-
tion, treatment and repression. The Strategy was drawn up by the Governmental
Council for Drug Policy Co-ordination, and it follows the “Drug Policy Concep-
tion and Programme for the years 1998–2000”. With this Strategy, the Govern-
ment accepted the fundamental codes, principles and aims defined for the period
2000–2004 in the EU Action Plan on combating drugs, and expressed its will to
their fulfilment. The Strategy is the key document defining the basic starting
points and directions for solving the problems of drug use. It is the base for creat-
ing and implementing a drug policy for individual departments and local, dis-
trict, and regional public administration bodies. Its functions are:
• to mark basic principles and goals, and to set priorities of Czech drug policy
• to delimit responsibility and competencies of relevant departments and indi-
vidual units of public administration, and to bind them to fulfil the given tasks
for achievement of defined goals
• to define institutions and organisations working in the area of drug policy,
thus enabling them to find their place and role in fulfilling the drug policy
• to mobilise civic society and to strive for incorporation of responsible institu-
tions on all levels, local government bodies, local communities, governmen-
tal as well as non-governmental organisations, volunteers, and self-help or-
ganisations,
• for the needs of international co-operation, to inform on the form, goals and
priorities of the drug policy of the Czech government. Drug policy is one of
the monitored areas in EU candidate countries.
The handling of narcotic and psychotropic substances is governed by Addictive
Substances Act No. 167/1998 Coll. as amended. It defines, among others, what
substances are deemed narcotic or psychotropic substances, preparations con-
taining such substances, and precursors. Each breach of this law is an illegal
act—either crime or misdemeanour. The elements of relevant misdemeanours
are included in Misdemeanours Act No. 200/1990 Coll. as amended.
The current penal legislation concerning illegal drugs in the Czech Republic
is contained in the current Penal Code No. 140/1961 Coll. as amended. This law,
adopted in 1961, has from the beginning contained specific essential elements of
drug offences. However, we can say that the framework for this penal anti-drugs
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legislation was set out by the Opium Act adopted in 1938 (not valid anymore),
since at least the main features are the same. These features are as follows:
• self-injury is not punishable, i.e. drug consumption as such is not penalised,
and
• all illegal drugs are regarded the same, i.e. offence qualification does not de-
pend on the type of drug in question.
These two principles are still implied in the Czech Penal Code. However, over
the years new aspects have emerged, especially due to the changes after 1989.
Main emphasis has been laid on fighting the most serious forms of drug criminal-
ity (especially organised crime related), instead of petty offences committed by
drug users or experimenters where alternative measures and principles of harm
reduction should be in key role.
Drug Crimes in the Czech Penal Law
Specific drug crimes included in Penal Code are “Illegal Production and Posses-
sion of Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances and Poisons” (provisions of Arti-
cles 187, 187a, 188) and “Propagation of Drug Use” (Article 188a). As men-
tioned above, the basic principles were set when the current Penal Code was
adopted, but naturally they too have undergone some development, as has the
whole Penal Code. The main features of this development concerning drug-re-
lated crimes through amendments to Penal Code are as follows:
• essential elements of crimes have been supplemented and adapted to corre-
spond more with the real situation and international obligations (i.e. the en-
largement of forms of illegal behaviour, the prohibition of illegal disposal of
precursors and preparations containing narcotic or psychotropic substance,
the extension of relevant aggravating circumstances)
• the severity of punishments has been increased, especially in cases of organ-
ised production and trade in drugs
• room for alternative solutions in individual cases has been created (i.e. diver-
sion in criminal procedure, community sanctions and measures).
As far as drug offences are concerned, the significant change in Penal Code was
made by amendment No. 112/1998 Coll. This Act introduced a new provision to
Penal Code—Article 187a—containing the framework for crimes involving
possession of drugs for one’s own use (punishability of possession for one’s own
use had been included in the original version of Penal Code, but cancelled in
1990). To commit this offence, the perpetrator has to have in his/her possession a
quantity of drugs that is “greater than small”. The concrete specification of this
quantity was left to judiciary. The Supreme State Prosecutor’s Office issued a
chart of “greater than small amounts” for most frequently used drugs as an acces-
sory guide for police bodies and prosecutors.2 Although the final court decision
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has to follow individual criteria of each case and each person, this chart is in prac-
tice accepted even by courts. The possession of a small quantity of substance is
considered a misdemeanour, and punished by a fine of up to 15,000 CZK.
First attempts to recriminalise possession for one’s own use were made in the
early 1990s. They were primarily motivated by the desire to fulfil international
obligations and to facilitate police work in the process of evidence collection.
The adopted amendment is a combination of the original proposal presented by
the Communist deputy and of the following governmental version. However, it
can be stated that the amendment was accepted by all parliamentary parties,
Christian Democrats being the strongest supporters. Although President Vaclav
Havel vetoed the law, the Parliament held its ground, and finally the amendment
was adopted. From the outset this provision has had many opponents. In 1999, a
proposal for its cancellation was made, unsuccessfully.3
The Penal Code contains many provisions related to and used in the prosecu-
tion of drug offenders. These include, for instance, provisions on protective
treatment, provisions on insanity, provisions on community sanctions and so on.
The non-thwarting of crimes described in Articles 187 and 188 is considered a
crime punishable by imprisonment up to three years. Special provision exists for
cases of repeated offence of possessing drugs for one’s own use. The court has
the right not to consider such a perpetrator a recidivist if he/she is a regular drug
user. In some provisions the narcotic and psychotropic substances are put to-
gether with alcohol as “the addictive substances”. This is the case with such
crimes as “Threat under Influence of Addictive Substance”, “Drunkenness” or
“Evasion of Military Service”, and with the provisions on insanity. Alternative
aspects of criminal procedure are included mainly in the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure No. 141/1961 Coll. as amended. Depending on the seriousness of the act,
the prosecutor or the judge can for instance use the provisions on the conditional
cessation of criminal prosecution, the out-of-court settlement or the discharge
from punishment.
Recent Development
The Czech Republic is in the process of creating completely new criminal codi-
ces. They should be the culmination of the so-called Reform of Justice. It is gen-
erally acknowledged that the current codices are not in conformity with the
changing social reality, and that they ensure the rights and freedoms of the indi-
vidual only to a limited extent. First Commission for the re-codification was offi-
cially appointed by the Minister of Justice in 1995. In 1997, the Minister of Jus-
tice appointed a new commission of almost forty members. Its task is to complete
the re-codification work within a reasonable period of time, preferably by the
time the Czech Republic is accepted as a member of the EU. There are several
clear reasons why the legal system of the Czech Republic must be brought into
conformity with the system of the other member countries and the acquis
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communautaire before it joins the Union, and becomes firmly established in
both its concepts and practical application.
As mentioned above, the 1998 amendment to Penal Code elicited serious dis-
cussion on the consequences of criminalising drug possession for personal use in
connection with the treatment of drug users, the police work, the impact on pri-
mary, secondary and tertiary prevention, and the possibly increasing level of “le-
gal nihilism” in society. As a result, the former Governmental National Drug
Commission (now Governmental Council for Drug Policy Co-ordination) car-
ried out a three-year research “Impact Analysis Project (PAD)” on the new drugs
legislation in the Czech Republic, focusing on the introduction of the punish-
ment for possessing drugs for personal use. The project consisted in five main
sub-studies and more than twenty particular sub-parts, and used the testing of
five main hypotheses as a basic tool for evaluating amendment’s impact. The hy-
potheses were elicited from or directly cited from documents and parliamentary
speeches of the presenters of the amendment. The conclusions were briefly as
follows:
• the intervention represented by the introduction of the punishment for pos-
sessing drugs for personal use had hardly had any impact on drug-related
problems in the Czech Republic
• the expectations that the presenters of the intervention offered or promised to
fulfil had not been met; on the other hand, it was not unambiguously proven
that the legislative change had brought about or impaired negative develop-
ment of some indicators
• during the first two years of the application of the amendment, penalizing pos-
session of illegal narcotic and psychotropic substances for personal use had
been enforced in a very selective manner, randomly and occasionally—not
under the principles of officialdom and legality (however, it remains a fact that
this was the only reason why the incurred social costs were not significantly
higher)
• from the perspective of social costs, enforcement of the penalisation of the
possession of illicit drugs for personal use had been disadvantageous.
As a response to PAD conclusions, Government passed a resolution in Novem-
ber 2001. This governmental resolution charged the relevant ministries, on the
basis of the PAD findings, with preparing the legislative division of drugs into 2
or 3 categories pursuant to their medical and social dangerousness, and review-
ing drug offences and related punishments for the purpose of re-codification.
The medical division was prepared by an experts group of the Ministry of Public
Health in March 2003. It proposed a three-category division from the least dan-
gerous to the most dangerous as follows: 1) cannabis (products containing
THC), 2) “right” ecstasy, psychedelic/hallucinogenic drugs, 3) ATS, heroin and
other opiates, cocaine, “false” ecstasy. This marked an interesting development
and the experts, as well as the public, wondered whether the legislative approach
to drug offences would change.
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In July 2003, the re-codification Commission completed its work, and the bill
for the new Penal Code was circulated for comments. As for drug offences, the
bill proposed new names for drug-related crimes, but maintained the current ap-
proach, i. e. there was no division between illegal substances. The relevant provi-
sions were based on current text with some modifications in wording regarding
aggravating circumstances and imposable sanctions. The bill charged the Gov-
ernment with drawing up the decree which would define, among others, the
quantity of narcotic or psychotropic substance “greater than small”. The bill’s
reasoned statement said that “the originally proposed division between ‘soft’and
‘hard’ narcotic and psychotropic substances was not implemented due to its es-
sential difficulty or rather impossibility”...
During the circulation for comments, some experts, institutions and politi-
cians submitted their comments to the part related to drug offences. They stated
that the current legislative approach which ignores distinctions between the dif-
ferent illegal substances seems groundless, and that on the grounds of medical
knowledge, experts opinions and foreign experience, the outlook on illegal drug
handling should be adjusted. The re-codification process would provide a unique
opportunity to make fundamental changes and to persuade the public to accept
them. The bill includes many amendments, for instance, the formal concept of a
crime (instead of the current material concept), binary categorisation of indict-
able offences into crimes and transgressions, and the criminal liability of legal
entities. The aforementioned division of drugs for the purposes of penal law
could, and should, also be included. The dangerousness of the uniform view on
illegal drugs is emphasized in connection with the above-mentioned introduc-
tion of the formal concept of a crime: At present, sufficient social dangerousness
is one of crime’s characteristics in the Czech Republic. When evaluating the
committed act, the police, the prosecutor or the judge can take into consideration
the nature of the different drugs. Interestingly enough, when Amendment No.
112/1998 Coll. was adopted, this was presented as a safeguard against unjust
criminalisation of young first-time offenders. The bill would revoke this oppor-
tunity for consideration. There is a danger that the prosecution of drug-related
offences will become entirely formal. This approach would be prejudicial to
first-time users, experimenters and drug addicts, and omit the requirement of in-
dividualisation when prosecuting drug crimes.
The re-codification Commission took the comments into consideration and
passed a new version of the bill to the Government Legislative Council in Octo-
ber 2003. This new text seems to be a compromise between the original version
and some of the comments. It introduces a different regime of prosecution for il-
legal cannabis possession for one’s own use, stipulating that a higher amount of
such drug is needed for the possession to be qualified as a criminal offence.
While the illegal possession of a “greater than small” amount of other drugs
would henceforth be a criminal offence, the condition for prosecuting cannabis
possession for one’s own would be the possession “in larger extent”. Moreover,
the revised version acknowledges a new crime of illegal cultivation of cannabis
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for one’s own use in larger quantity (or the illegal cultivation of mushrooms or
other plants containing narcotic or psychotropic substance for one’s own use in
quantity “larger than small”). These offences should henceforth be punished
more leniently than the production of other drugs (even for one’s own use, and re-
gardless of the quantity of substance produced). The definitions of “larger than
small quantity”, “larger quantity” and “larger extent” are left to the governmen-
tal decree. The new bill’s reasoned statement says: “... we implemented the divi-
sion of narcotic and psychotropic substances into ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ for practical
reasons ... the purpose is to maintain the criminalisation of the possession of
psychotropic plants (especially the most frequently cultivated cannabis) and cul-
tivation for one’s own use, but at the same time exclude non-problem consumers
of such plants from drug market, where significantly more dangerous drugs like
heroin, metamphetamine and cocaine are available...” Thus, between July and
October, the bill’s authors’ position on the possibility to distinguish drugs ac-
cording to their medical and social dangerousness made a U-turn.
Although there is still a longish way to the adoption of the new Penal Code’s
final version, and we can expect strong opposition to this development in Parlia-
ment, it is obvious that the Czech Government and the re-codification Commis-
sion have made a significant attempt to introduce the current findings of medical,
sociological and epidemiological research into the penal law. The proposal itself
is not a revolutionary step towards the liberalisation of drug policy (as some sup-
pose), but towards reality. It can be debated what kind of usage with what type of
substance should be punishable, and how severe the punishment should be, but
the different nature and impacts of the various narcotic or psychotropic sub-
stances should not be ignored. It is worth pointing out that the bill maintains quite
severe punishments (in the framework of the Czech sanction system) for of-
fences comprising drugs production, export, import or supply, especially with
regard to organised trafficking in drugs or to supply to children and the youth.
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Appendix 1.
Current Wording of Essential Elements of Drug Related Crimes
Article 187:
1/ A person who illegally produces, imports, exports, smuggles, offers, medi-
ates, sells or otherwise procures for a second party or possesses for a second
party a narcotic or psychotropic substance, a preparation containing a narcotic or
psychotropic substance, a precursor or a poison, will be punished by imprison-
ment for one to five years.
2/ A perpetrator will be punished by imprisonment for two to ten years, if
a) he/she commits the act as a member of an organised group, or on a larger ex-
tent, or
b) he/she commits the act towards a person below the age of eighteen.
3/ A perpetrator will be punished by imprisonment for eight to twelve years, if
a) he/she gains a substantial profit from the act,
b) he/she commits the act towards a person below the age of fifteen, or
c) he/she causes through the act serious harm to someone’s health.
4/ A perpetrator will be punished by imprisonment for ten to fifteen years, if
a) he/she causes through the act serious harm to the health of several persons or
death,
b) he/she gains great profit on a large extent from the act, or
b) he/she commits the act in association with an organised group operating in
several states.
Article 187a:
1/ A person who, without authorisation, possesses a narcotic or psychotropic
substance or poison in a quantity greater than small will be punished by impris-
onment of up to two years, or a fine.
2/ The perpetrator will be punished by imprisonment for one to five years if
he/she commits the act on a larger extent.
Article 188:
1/ A person who produces, procures for him/herself or others, or possesses an ob-
ject intended for the illegal production of a narcotic or psychotropic substance,
or of a preparation containing a narcotic or psychotropic substance, or of a poi-
son will be punished by imprisonment for one to five years, or a prohibition of ac-
tivity, or a fine, or a forfeiture of item.
2/ A perpetrator will be punished by imprisonment for two to ten years, if
a) he/she commits the act on a larger extent,
b) he/she commits the act against a person below the age of eighteen, or
c) he/she gains significant profit from the act.
241
Article 188a:
1/ A person who entices anyone to abuse addictive substances other than alcohol,
or who supports him/her in the abuse, or who otherwise incites or propagates the
abuse of such substances, will be punished by imprisonment of up to three years,
or a prohibition of activity, or a fine.
2/ A perpetrator will be punished by imprisonment for one to five years, if
a) he/she commits the act towards a person below the age of eighteen, or
b) he/she commits the act over the press, the radio, the television, or the com-
puter system open to the public, or by other similarly effective manner.
Appendix 2.
Statistical Data
These statistical data show the development of drug-related crimes registered by
the police, number of perpetrators and sanctions imposed. Data on the number of
registered and solved crimes were obtained from the statistics of the Police of the
Czech Republic, and the data on the number of prosecuted, charged and con-
victed persons, as well as on the sentences imposed, from the statistics of the
Czech Ministry of Justice.
These data show some development trends. Above all, it is clear that the pro-
portion of punishments not connected with the deprivation of freedom has in-
creased, especially community service. Community service was incorporated in
the Penal Code as of 1 January 1996. The changes in the number of those sen-
tenced to community service clearly show the initial misgivings and mistrust on
the part of the courts, resulting from the initially inadequate wording of the legis-
lation and from the absence of implementing regulations.
Illegal Production and Possession of Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances and Poisons—
Article 187 of Penal Code:
Table 1. Crimes
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year Crimes
registered
Crimes
solved
Solved
%
Persons
prosecuted
Persons
charged
Persons
convicted
1996 1 436 1 431 99.7 706 608 283
1997 2 303 2 290 99.4 920 789 357
1998 4 056 4 034 99.5 1 185 1 029 702
1999 6 100 6 064 98.9 1 300 1 102 765
2000 3 292 2 892 87.8 1 547 1 276 819
2001 3 198 2 968 92.8 1 640 1 418 905
2002 3 359 3 150 93.8 1 603 1 444 1 007
Table 2. Sentences
Table 3. Sentences of Imprisonment
Illegal Production and Possession of Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances and Poisons—
Article 187a of Penal Code
Table 4. Crimes
Table 5. Sentences
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year Total Imprisonment Suspended Fine Community
Service
Other Discharge
1996 283 116 149 7 -* 5 6
1997 357 145 192 9 6 2 3
1998 702 279 358 17 15 1 32
1999 765 279 432 4 23 0 27
2000 819 315 441 1 34 2 26
2001 905 365 474 3 41 5 17
2002 1007 347 540 3 77 6 34
* Community Service was not recorded separately in 1996, if imposed, it is included in “Other” category
year Total Up to 1 year from 1 to 5 years from 5 to 15 years
1996 116 39 61 16
1997 145 56 75 14
1998 279 75 180 24
1999 279 63 192 24
2000 315 46 238 31
2001 365 65 257 43
2002 347 58 257 32
year Crimes
registered
Crimes
solved
Solved
%
Persons
prosecuted
Persons
charged
Persons
convicted
1999 228 226 99.1 130 115 18
2000 212 207 97.6 187 158 63
2001 241 231 95.9 261 215 86
2002 285 257 90.2 244 206 103
year Total Imprisonment Suspended Fine Community
Service
Other Discharge
1999 18 11 3 1 2 1 0
2000 63 17 30 2 6 4 4
2001 86 16 45 2 18 0 5
2002 103 18 60 3 17 2 3
Table 6. Imprisonment
Illegal Production and Possession of Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances and Poisons—
Article 188 of Penal Code
Table 7. Crimes
Table 8. Sentences
Table 9. Imprisonment
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year Total up to 1 year from 1 to 5 years from 5 to 15 years
1999 11 10 1 0
2000 17 13 4 0
2001 16 12 4 0
2002 18 10 8 0
year Crimes
registered
Crimes
solved
Solved
%
Persons
prosecuted
Persons
charged
Persons
convicted
1996 156 155 99.4 181 165 27
1997 101 101 100 159 140 32
1998 101 101 100 184 159 55
1999 90 89 98.9 141 119 38
2000 122 122 100 228 190 29
2001 157 156 99.4 222 195 62
2002 216 206 95.4 247 223 58
year Total Imprisonment Suspended Fine Community
Service
Other Discharge
1996 27 7 16 2 -* 0 2
1997 32 6 23 1 0 0 2
1998 55 8 41 1 3 0 2
1999 38 7 26 1 2 1 1
2000 29 3 22 0 4 0 0
2001 62 13 40 4 4 0 1
2002 58 10 34 1 12 0 1
* Community Service was not recorded separately in 1996, if imposed, it is included in “Other” category
year Total up to 1 year from 1 to 5 years from 5 to 15 years
1996 7 6 1 0
1997 6 4 2 0
1998 8 1 7 0
1999 7 3 4 0
2000 3 2 1 0
2001 13 4 8 0
2002 10 2 8 0
Propagation of Drug Use—Article 188a of Penal Code
Table 10. Crimes
Table 11. Sentences
Table 12. Imprisonment
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year Total Imprisonment Suspended Fine Community
Service
Other Discharge
1996 24 5 17 0 -* 2 0
1997 30 4 20 1 0 0 5
1998 45 1 35 1 1 0 7
1999 70 6 46 0 6 0 12
2000 61 7 43 2 5 0 4
2001 41 10 23 1 5 0 2
2002 48 4 31 0 7 0 6
* Community Service was not recorded separately in 1996, if imposed, it is included in “Other” category
year Total up to 1 year from 1 to 5 years from 5 to 15 years
1996 5 3 2 0
1997 4 3 1 0
1998 1 1 0 0
1999 6 4 2 0
2000 7 4 3 0
2001 10 6 4 0
2002 4 4 0 0
year Crimes
registered
Crimes
solved
Solved
%
Persons
prosecuted
Persons
charged
Persons
convicted
1996 446 444 99.6 212 183 24
1997 449 441 98.2 256 223 30
1998 1 077 1075 99.8 407 342 45
1999 1 302 1298 99.7 513 429 70
2000 832 829 99.6 491 419 61
2001 613 607 99.0 396 332 41
2002 470 446 94.9 410 374 48
Appendix 3.
Approximate Amounts According to Article 187a of
the Penal Code of the Czech Republic
(Appendix 1 of the Supreme State Prosecutor’s General Instruction No. 6/2000)
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Drug Type Weight (grams) of pure substance
“quantity greater than small”
(Art. 187a)
“larger extent”
(Art. 187a Par. 1, 2)
Heroin HCl 0.15 (approx. 5 doses/30mg) 1.5 (approx. 50 doses/30mg)
Morphine HCl 0.3 (approx. 10doses/30mg) 4.5 (approx. 150 doses/30 mg)
Methadone 0.3 (approx. 10 doses/30 mg) 4.5 (approx. 150 doses/30 mg)
Cocaine HCl 0.25 (approx. 5 doses/50 mg) 5 (approx. 100 doses/50 mg)
Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) 0.3 (approx. 10 doses/30 mg) 7.5 (approx. 250 doses/30 mg)
LSD 0.0005 (approx. 10 doses/50µg) 0.006 (approx. 120 doses/50 µg)
MDMA - base and homologues 1 (approx. 10 doses/100 mg) 24 (approx. 240 doses/100 mg)
Amphetamine - base 0.5 (approx. 10 doses/50 mg) 10 (approx. 200 doses/50 mg)
Metamphetamine - base 0.5 (approx. 10 doses/50 mg) 10 (approx. 200 doses/50 mg)
Psilocybin 0.05 (approx. 5 doses/10 mg) 3 (approx. 300 doses/10 mg)
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